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THE
DOMESTIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITION
OF
GREAT BRITAIN;

PRECEDED BY
A BRIEF SKETCH OF HER FOREIGN POLICY;

AND OF THE
STATISTICS AND POLITICS
OF
FRANCE, RUSSIA, AUSTRIA, AND
PRUSSIA.

George BY
G. BROWNING.

Of states, of empire, princely crowns, and altars,
Our written record treats:—and never falters
To give to TRUTH her triumph. * * * * *

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PREFACE.

FEW subjects present a higher interest than inquiry into the political and domestic condition of our own country. The practical operation of our foreign and internal policy affects in so large a degree the happiness of the community, that whatever tends to awaken that spirit of useful inquiry, which leads to improvement in the management of the national resources, is in the highest sense useful and interesting.

As preliminary to the general subject of the following pages, we have appropriated a short chapter to the review of the foreign policy of the British government, in which our relative position to the leading continental states is briefly developed. The political, domestic, and financial condition of Great Britain is so essentially influenced by that of other European nations, that we have deemed it necessary, *in limine*, to give a brief outline of the resources and politics of the four continental powers which, in connexion with Great Britain, preside over the destinies of Europe. It is impossible to predict from what quarter may originate the impulse which may give a different course to the current of affairs; and every work which purposes freely to investigate the condition of any leading European nation, ought, in some degree, to comprehend the

state of Europe. The question of war or peace is, in modern times, so interwoven with the internal and financial condition of nations, that in judging of the probable future policy of European governments, we must necessarily look to their power, revenue, and resources. How far the plan which, from such considerations, we have adopted, has detracted from that unity of design which ought to form a distinguishing feature in every historical and political work, remains for the reader to determine; but, if harmony of purpose is wanting in the succeeding pages, the deep interest which is felt by the public in the politics of Europe, and the frequent reference to continental affairs which of necessity occurs in the elucidation of the more material subjects here treated of, will, in some degree, justify the plan adopted. The facts advanced have been carefully collected from the most authentic sources, and whatever has been considered to bear upon the general system of European policy, has been briefly sketched. Many of the particulars contained in this portion of the work, have been deduced from personal observation, during a residence on the continent.

At the commencement of the second part of our work, we have investigated, at some length, the operation of our numerical advancement; and our conclusions, based on a careful review of facts, are, we trust, calculated not only to dispel the lugubrious anticipation of those who view with alarm the expansion of our population, but to inspire confidence in the *prospective* effects of its increase. In the latter part of the work, the buoyancy of the state revenues is clearly shewn to spring from the increase of people.

Few subjects have excited a greater share of public interest than the condition of the working classes, and the practical operation of poor laws: these form the theses of the succeeding chapter.

The necessity for remedial measures in this part of our domestic policy is fully demonstrated, and the probable effect of the means adopted by parliament to eradicate the abuses which have crept into the administration of our eleemosynary laws discussed.—The state of British agriculture, and the question as to the policy of the present restrictions to a free trade in corn, form the succeeding topics of disquisition; our suggestions on these important subjects, are founded on a careful research into the operation of past enactments. The removal of present impediments to a free trade in grain, are not advocated without duly appreciating the claims of vested interests; and the *policy* of a return to a more liberal course of commercial legislation, is only recommended on the principle of reconciling a variety of private interests with public advantage.

The intricate topics of money, coin, and exchange next succeed. Few subjects demand a greater share of attention on the part of our rulers, than the state of the currency. The questions which arise in the discussion, are full of vital importance. The national losses by the late defective plans of pecuniary legislation, cannot fail to impress the reader with the necessity of new ramparts of security; nor can he fail to see the danger to which the best interests of the state are exposed, under the operation of the present system. The expediency and novelty of those reforms, which we have, perhaps with too much confidence, suggested, are submitted to his judgment. Our chief aim in this part of the work has been clearness and perspicuity, and we have studiously avoided those mysteries of language in which the subject is too frequently enveloped.

In the investigation of our financial condition, we have entered on a rigid scrutiny of the British plan of taxation. The sweeping reforms we have

suggested under this head, may appear to our readers far too bold, too extensive, and too dangerous for adoption; yet the encouragement afforded by recent financial changes, is well calculated to inspire ministers with confidence in the prospective result of enlarged operations, and to induce an extended application of those principles on which their financial policy has of late years been so wisely based—witness the success of the measures of 1832, when a remission of duties to the amount of 1,600,000*l.* was concurrent with an actual increase of revenue exceeding 200,000*l.* To the advantages which would result from the remission of such duties as those now charged on foreign timber, or on such articles of domestic manufacture as glass, paper, &c., none can be insensible; and if our estimates of the disposable means of abolishing that portion of taxes which impedes the progress of the nation in wealth and power, are deemed too sanguine, and our anticipation of the progressive advance of the national means of contribution too favourable, we trust that they will not be attributed to deficient industry in the investigation of the springs of British power, but to that confidence in the buoyancy of the state resources which must, in the course of their researches, grow in the minds of all who attentively examine into the domestic and financial condition of Great Britain.

In discussing these subjects, we have ventured on questions of great difficulty and vital importance; in the review of which, any attachment to party politics would be unsuitable. Happily, in this age and country, a rigid scrutiny into the *public* actions of *public* men is permitted; and we have thus felt free to commend and animadvert on measures in proportion as they appear well or ill adapted to our condition, without regard to the political principles of men in office, or of their opponents.

Convinced that in works wherein the leading design is utility, clearness and simplicity are especially desirable, perspicuity, rather than elegance of style has been our aim. We are far from being insensible to the imperfections which our work presents to the ingenious and intelligent critic; but, conscious that our pages bear the stamp of good intention, laborious investigation, and diligent research, we confidently claim the indulgence of the attentive reader.

Several changes have occurred since the beginning of the present session of parliament, when our manuscript was sent to press; during the progress of the printing, we have yet found opportunity to notice some of the most important measures of the legislature; with these exceptions, which will be remarked on perusal of the work, the manuscript must be considered to be made up to April 1834. In our observations connected with the science of political economy, we have taken for our guide the doctrines laid down by Boileau,* a writer of great discernment and solid judgment. To Mr. Mc Culloch a special acknowledgment is due, for the use we have made of his able and profound work;† nor can we close our preface without expressing our thanks for the assistance we have received from the gentlemen of the House of Commons' Library, and from those of the British Museum. We have also derived great assistance from the writings of other authors, to which we have referred in various parts of the future pages.

* Introduction to the science of Political Economy.

† Dictionary of Commerce and Navigation.

In page 14, the annuity payable on the Russian-Dutch Loan is stated to be 250,000*l*. The original loan was 50,000,000 florins at five per cent.; but by the treaty of the 19th of May, 1815, Great Britain agreed to pay the interest on 25,000,000 florins at five per cent., and redeem the capital at one per cent., or at three per cent. per annum, if required.—The amount remaining due on the 1st of January, 1831, was 21,250,000 florins. Supposing the Sinking Fund to be regularly applied at one per cent. until the liquidation of the debt, the sum to be applied to principal and interest is 66,406,250 florins; which, at the exchange of twelve florins one stiver, is equal to £ 5,510,892
To which if we add the sum already applied 1,782,181

The total sum paid, and to be paid, by Great Britain to
Russia is, in sterling money £ 7,293,073

ERRATA.

- Page 136, lines 13, 24, and 34, *for* Rundjah-Seing, *read* Runjeet-Sing.
— 141, note, *for* families, *read* females.
— 164, the first note refers to the succeeding paragraph.
— 216, — 13, *for* 273,249,000 *read* 259,980,000.
— 301, — 6, *for* was, *read* were; line 15, *for* Fontlenoi, *read* Fontenoi.
— 406, — 16, *for* $\frac{16}{15}$, *read* $\frac{15}{16}$; line 21, *for* 3100, *read* 31,000.

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PART I.

FOREIGN POLITICS OF GREAT BRITAIN,

AND

STATISTICS AND POLITICS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, AUSTRIA
AND PRUSSIA.

CHAPTER I.

REVIEW OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Introductory Remarks.—The love of power has, in every age, been the distinguishing characteristic of mankind. Honours, principalities, and empire, have ever been the subjects of strife and everlasting contention. Jealousy between nations, rivalry in imaginary interests, and thirst for dominion, the innate incentives to wars, which have caused the human race to pollute the genial sources of their happiness, and urged them to fight for their misery. It is this continual grasping for power, this envenomed malevolence disseminated throughout the several national branches of the human family, this interminable jealousy between nations, which is the parent of the severest woes; which propagates opinions at variance with the laws of heaven and of earth, militates against the happiness of states, and erects, as it were, political deities, delighting in cruelty and blood. National prosperity, enlarged commerce, social happiness, in a word, every substantial enjoyment is the offspring of peace. War is the mortiferous engine which destroys these essentials, raising on their ruins

civil discord, national poverty, and devastating famine. A war of defence is the only justifiable appeal to arms. It is then a necessary and lawful means of preserving internal peace, curbing ambition and injustice, and inflicting upon treason against the social harmony of states, its merited penal retribution. But of all duties of a government, the knowledge of the ways of peace is the most useful, paramount, and indispensable.

Britain is justly styled ;—

“ A fortress built by Nature for herself,
Against infection and the hand of war ;
A precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands.”

Thus protected against the encroachments of foreign nations, she finds, in an especial degree, her interest in a pacific line of policy. Since the era of the fanatic attempt of Philip II. of Spain, to subjugate our country, and abolish our religion, no unprovoked attack against Britain has been meditated by foreign powers. It would have been happy had the wise foreign policy of Burleigh, who, with forces and revenue little surpassing those of the new kingdom of Greece, baffled every attempt of the then colossal power of Spain against our independence, formed the prototype for succeeding statesmen. To enter on no war but on behalf of the national security, but vigorously to repel attack or menace against our institutions, were the principles which guided the councils of the maiden queen ; and it is the departure alone from such principles, which has involved us in that international embarrassment and turmoil, which have grown up with the officiousness of our foreign diplomacy.

So deeply rooted in the English councils was the political system of Burleigh, that it continued

to influence them during the whole period of the reigns of the high prerogative Stuarts, down to the revolution of 1688-9; the proportion of years of peace, to those of war, being greater at no prior or subsequent period.

Change in our foreign policy at the Revolution of 1688.—It was the revolution which, along with foreign councils and fears of French aggression, first imported the dreary, absurd doctrine, that Britain must combat to preserve the balance of power on continental Europe. It was the war frenzy of William III., and his military followers, that, politically speaking, filled up the narrow but deep straits which geographically separate us from the European continent, and placed us in the van of every hostile coalition against France; characterizing us, in the unchristian language of anti-philosophical statesmen, as the “*natural enemies*” of that nation. It was this that has sacrificed on the altar of the devouring deity of war, millions of the human race, dissipated countless millions of treasure, and made Europe groan with the pangs of contest.

Causes of this change.—This change of policy, and the active part we have since taken in the wars of the continent, arose, in the first instance, from the growing preponderance of France, and the thirst for dominion which characterized Louis XIV. This monarch may be styled the hero of good as well as of bad actions. The steady and liberal supporter of science and erudition, he was the powerful patron of those who formed that galaxy of literary talent which shone so brilliantly through his long and augustan reign. Yet he was ambitious, tyrannical, bigoted, and insincere. His revocation of the Edict of Nantes, followed by the virulent persecution and massacre of his subjects,

rendered his name odious to the protestants of Europe ; while his unjust attack on Holland, and the devastation of the Palatinate, from motives purely ambitious, awoke neighbouring nations to a sense of fear for the maintenance of their political independence.

The Wars of the Revolution, (1689.)—It was during the French invasion of Holland in 1672, that William of Nassau, by force of public feeling, and in spite of the faction of De Witte, became Stadtholder. This prince, who, at that period, figured as the modern Leonidas in defence of his country, had, from early youth, imbibed a deeply rooted jealousy of French power, and a feeling of personal animosity towards the French monarch. On his accession to the British throne, his first object was to retaliate on his powerful aggressor, for the injuries and the indignities offered to his country in the late war ; and under the specious, but (to Britain) false doctrine of the necessity of preserving the “ balance of power,” engaged us in a continental confederacy against France.

The encouragement afforded by Louis to the dethroned British monarch in his attempt on Ireland, implied a desire on the part of the French king to establish, in our country, a dominion at variance with the will of the people ; which, coupled with the pretended infraction of the treaties of Westphalia, Osnabruck, Munster, and the Pyrenees, was the ostensible subject of complaint advanced by the members of the league of Augsburg, against France. The first of these points, and indeed the only one which called for defence and retaliation on our part, was national ; hence it summoned the British nation to inflict a wholesome chastisement on the French monarch, and to impress him with a proper respect for British power. The other subjects of complaint were

purely Continental ; and in no degree connected with the security of the British empire. By the victory of La Hogue, 1692, which, by destroying the finest fleet that the French nation has at any time sent to sea, secured us the dominion of the ocean, the objects of the war, as regarded Great Britain, were attained ; but as regarded her allies, a long and expensive contest was yet to be vigorously prosecuted.

The treasure we expended in this war, amounted to about 36,000,000*l.*, a sum far surpassing the ordinary revenues of the state ; and the sacrifice of human life on the plains of Flanders, was scarcely exceeded during any war period of our history.

The decline of commerce and the increase of pauperism, marked the effects of eight long years of contest ; and as a memento of our sacrifices, we adopted the ingenious Italian scheme of borrowing on the security of our future resources, and thus laid the foundation of that debt, which has since pressed so heavily on the productive powers of the people. The national recompense, accorded at the peace of Ryswick, was the acknowledgment, or pretended acknowledgment, by Louis XIV. that William III. was our king ; a title already secured to him by an Act of the British senate, and disputed by no leading power in Europe, except France :—an admission of but little importance to the people of England ; and which, with the habitual inconstancy of Louis, was revoked on the demise of the *ci-devant* British monarch, by the title of royalty accorded to his son, the Pretender.*

* Voltaire relates that the recognition by Louis, of the son of James II. as king, under the title of James III., was directly in opposition to the advice of his council ; and that he was overpersuaded entirely by the solicitation of Marie de Modène (queen dowager of England), and Madame de Maintenon. He thus describes the scene :—“ Le Marquis de Torci, appuya par des principes de politique, ce que le Duc de Beauvilliers avait dit

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702).—The political expediency of England's figuring as a principal in continental disputes once admitted, every succeeding change in the established political equilibrium, became an open subject for British interference. The disputed succession to the Spanish crown was viewed as a matter of deep concern by our government; and the memorable words of Louis XIV. "Il n'y a plus de Pyrenees," when the crown of Spain devolved to his grandson le Duc d'Anjou, again roused the jealousy of the British court, and engaged us as principals in the Anti-Gallican confederacy of 1702. The history of this war, and the military trophies won at Ramilies, Oudenarde, Malplaquet, and Blenheim, are amply recorded. It terminated with the abandonment of the original object of contention, leaving to England the melancholy retrospect of an expenditure of 63 millions of money, a vast increase of public debt, and a prodigal sacrifice of her bravest sons: while of all her conquests she only retained Gibraltar, Minorca, and some desert wilds on the shores of Acadia.

comme citoyen. Il representa, qu'il ne convenait par d'irriter la nation Anglaise par une démarche précipitée: Louis, se rendit à *l'avis unanime* de son conseil; et il fut resolu de ne point reconnaitre le fils de Jacques II. pour roi.

Le jour même, Marie de Modène, veuve de Jaques, vient parler à Louis XIV. dans l'appartement de Madame de Maintenon,— Elle le conjure en larmes de ne point faire à son fils, à Elle, à la Memoire d'un roi qu'il a protégé, l'outrage de refuser un simple titre, seule reste de tant de grandeurs. Ou a toujours rendu à son fils les honneurs d'un Prince de Galles; on le doit, donc traiter en roi, après la mort de son père. Ces representations et ces larmes furent appuyées par Madame de Maintenon. Le roi revint à son premier sentiment. Enfin, Jacques III. fut reconnu, le même jour qu'il avait été arrêté dans le conseil, qu'on ne le reconnaitrait point." The Duke of Berwick, natural son of James II., says in his Memoirs, that Louis promised James II. to acknowledge his son as king of England. Lord Bolingbroke remarks in his Letters, that Louis was induced to acknowledge James III. "by the importunities of women."—See also *Macpherson's History of England*.

The Spanish War of 1739;—the War of the Austrian Succession, 1741.—These wars arose out of a complication of circumstances. The enervated and imbecile government of Spain, exercising but a feeble influence over the remote portions of its unwieldy empire, had, by the treaty of Utrecht, accorded to the British the privilege of sending, annually, a trading ship of 500 tons; and by a subsequent convention, of 800 tons, to the Spanish Main. This privilege, viewed with great jealousy by the French and Spanish interests, opened a wide field for the illicit introduction of British merchandise into the Spanish Americas. An extensive system of smuggling was carried on from the British West Indies; which naturally led to the confiscation of the property, and, in some instances, to cruelty towards British subjects. This offered fair ground for remonstrance to the Spanish government; and the Tory party, with their high propensities for war, were strenuous in urging the pacific Walpole to energetic measures. If the rights of British subjects demanded indemnities for undue confiscation of property, it was the undoubted duty of the government to support them; and if pacific negotiation proved inadequate, nothing was easier, from our great superiority of naval force, than to have made reprisals on Spanish property. Such a plan was, however, unsatisfactory to the Tory war-faction in the British senate, who expected to share in the emoluments and power, which a state of war could not fail to produce. To excite popular sympathy, Jenkins, a master of a vessel who had been unjustly seized off the coast of the Spanish Main, was brought into the House of Commons, and affirmed “that the Spaniards had split his nose and cut off his ears.” “Gentlemen,” said he, “when they had thus mutilated me, they threatened to put me

to death,—I expected it,—I looked to God for pardon, and to my country for revenge.” This was sufficient to stir up public indignation against the Spaniards. The Tories gained their point; and Walpole, yielding to popular clamour, consented, against his better judgment, to plunge the nation into a war to which he had so repeatedly avowed himself opposed. Walpole, by his corrupt plan of bribing the members of both Houses with money, places, and pensions, obtained, through the funding system, the means of enlarging the operations of the war. Unfortunately, Hanover was connected by the “golden link of sovereignty” with the British nation, and the hostility of France, growing out of our contest with Spain, rendered our court uneasy with respect to that appanage.

On the death of Charles VI., emperor of Germany, the question whether the queen of Hungary should wear the Austrian, and her husband, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Imperial crown; or whether Charles Albert, the elector of Bavaria, should succeed to the imperial dignity, embroiled Europe in a general conflagration, and crimsoned the plains of Germany with the blood of hundreds of thousands of the human race ignorant of the cause for which they were contending. In a war, so purely continental, natural reasoning would decide against the intervention of England: but that eagerness for interference in the affairs of the continent, which, during the latter 150 years, has characterised the British people, led them to enter heartily into the contest, and to declare themselves the champions of Maria Theresa.—A large military force, commanded by the king in person, aided by the counsel of Lord Stair, was dispatched to Germany. The Russians, Poles, Saxons, and Sardinians, were paid by Britain to play their horrid part in the tragic drama; the duchies on the Rhine

and the Moselle were subsidized to figure in the conflict;* and in 1747, England joined 40,000 troops to the allied forces, and voted 500,000 guineas as a subsidy to the Austrian empress.

These alliances cost the British nation a large portion of the 54,000,000*l.* dissipated during this inglorious war; which added nothing to British power or influence in Europe, and which was undertaken to enforce an indemnity of a few thousand pounds.

The Seven Years' War.—The next appeal to arms, in 1756, called the Seven Years' War, arose from some quibble about the limits of our possessions in New Brunswick; which, either from carelessness or mismanagement, had not been clearly defined in the treaty of Utrecht.† The primary cause of this war was, however, soon coupled with other matters, which led us to take part in the hostilities waging on the continent. “Hanover must be protected,” was the language of the court. Treaties were formed, subsidies provided, and troops sent thither for that object; and, notwithstanding the denunciations of many distinguished statesmen against the system pursued in our continental connexions, the injustice and erroneous policy of sacrificing British blood and treasure in wars in which the people of England had no solid interest, the private inclination of the king prevailed; and the government, under the immediate influence of the court, became as fervent in the support of the king of Prussia against

* The subsidies were, 200,000 guineas to the king of Sardinia; 150,000 to the king of Poland, as Elector of Saxony; to the Electors of Cleves, Mayence, and Cologne, about 22,000 each; and a large sum to Russia.

† By the Treaty of Utrecht, France ceded to Great Britain Acadia (New Brunswick), with all its ancient limits; but these limits were not specified.

Austria and her allies, as it had been in the former wars in support of Austria against the king of Prussia and his allies. The question to be decided was, whether Silesia, an imperfectly cultivated province, should be governed by the king of Prussia or the empress of Austria. In the late war, we contended for continuing Austria in the possession of it; in this war, we contended for continuing it in the possession of Prussia. Such was the vacillating policy of the government, and such the real point at issue: but, to give a colouring to the part taken by the British court, the necessity of protecting the protestant religion against the catholic league was plausibly held forth. The king of Prussia was also portrayed as the great champion and defender of the protestants of Europe, although he was about as much a protestant as his protégé Voltaire; and no hero of persecution, not excepting Louis XIV. or Charles IX., ever sacrificed so many as his Prussian majesty, especially in his invasion of Saxony.—The war was conducted at an unparalleled expense: besides maintaining a large military force in Germany, the king of Prussia received 700,000*l.* per annum from the British treasury. The annual rate of expenditure was about 16,000,000*l.* per annum, being 112,000,000*l.* for the whole period of the war. The submission to such sacrifices, in a cause foreign to British interests, was ridiculed even by the Great Frederick himself.*

The American War, 1775, and the French War of 1778.—The American war was one of unmixed oppression and injustice, kindled by the narrow

* The Count Garotti says:—"The people of England talked of nothing but the king of Prussia's victories; his birth-day was usually celebrated throughout the whole island; and the public rejoicings for his triumph at Rosbach, were as great as though by that victory he had saved England from invasion."

policy of one of the most incapable administrations that ever disgraced the British senate. The war it provoked with European powers was but a consequence of the breach with America. This war, arising from an attempt on the part of the English ministry to act in direct violation of the leading principles of the British constitution, by imposing taxes without representation, first gave rise to the maritime confederacy of Europe against us; exposed our shores to the attacks of hostile nations; cost 136,000,000*l.* of money; inflicted rankling wounds of humbled pride; curtailed our dominion, dilapidated our resources, and added upwards of 100,000,000*l.* sterling to our national debt.

The War of the French Revolution, 1793, and the War of 1803.—The war of the French revolution, of which the contest of 1803 was but a consequence, was entered into to check the spread of opinions inimical to the *right divine* and high prerogative of kings, and to allay the growing call for reform in the administration of church and state affairs; a call which alarmed the “Heaven-born Minister,” and drew forth the utterance of those sublime passages, as to the sanctity of “thrones and altars,” which so eminently characterised his oratorical displays. The war, as regards this country, was both unjust and unnecessary; and the cause of its renewal after the peace of Amiens, no language can satisfactorily explain. The war with America, in 1812, grew out of our mighty efforts against France, towards the close of the unparalleled contest; during which, our expenditure exceeded 1,600,000,000*l.*, and our sacrifice of human life 500,000 of the *élite* of the nation. As an alloy to the vain distinction of military triumph, it burthened the nation with the expenses of the contest, while our allies reaped the spoils of victory.

A Table of the wars since the revolution of 1688; shewing our opponents and allies in each contest: annual average, and total cost of the wars; and the progress of our taxes and national debt.

Names of the Wars.	Our Opponents.	Our Allies.	Wars commenced.	Number of Years of War.	Wars ended.	Ended by the Peace of	Millions Sterling raised by Taxes.	Millions raised by Loans.	Total Expenditure in Millions.	Average Annual Expenditure in Millions.	Total National Debt.
The War of the Revolution	The French	The Dutch, Austrians, Spaniards, Germans, and People of Savoy	1689	9	1697	Ryswick	16	20	36	4	20
The War of the Spanish Succession	French and Spaniards	Dutch, Austrians, People of Savoy, and Portuguese	1702	11	1713	Utrecht	30	32½	62½	5½	52
The Spanish War of 1739, and the War of the Austrian Succession, 1741	Spaniards, French, Prussians, and Bavarians	Austrians and Sardinians, after 1747 Russians and Dutch	1739	9	1748	{ Aix-la-Chapelle }	25	29	54	6	78
The Seven Years' War	French, Spaniards, Austrians, Russians, and Swedes	Prussians	1756	7	1763	Paris	52	60	112	16	146
American War, and French War of 1778	Americans, French, Spaniards, and Dutch	None	1775	8	1783	Versailles	32	104	136	17	238
War of the French Revolution	French, Spaniards, after 1796 the Dutch	Austrians, Prussians, Russians,* Portuguese, till 1796 Spaniards*	1793	9	1802	Amiens	263½	200½	464	51½	528
War of 1803	French and Dutch, till 1808 Spaniards, after 1812 Americans	Austrians, Prussians, Russians, Portuguese, from 1808 Spaniards*	1803	12	1815	Paris	780	388	1159	96½	845

* The Russians were our allies till 1795: they detached themselves from the coalition in that year, rejoined in 1799, separated in 1800, and were in the list of our opponents in 1801. In the war of 1803, they joined the coalition in 1805, separated in 1807, and immediately opposed us, and were again our allies in 1812.

Conduct of the Allies towards France at the peace of Paris, 1815.—Throughout the whole period of the war of 1793, and until the fatal expedition against Russia in the latter part of the war of 1803, the inferiority of the military power of the continental nations, as opposed to France, was fully proved. In the campaigns of 1793-4, she frustrated their combined efforts against her. In subsequent periods of the war she beat them in detail; and it was not until, by an abuse of her power in 1812, when her means of defence were almost annihilated by the deadly blasts of a Russian winter, that her subjugation was effected by the gigantic efforts of combined Europe. The military triumph of the allies at the termination of the war was complete; and the conduct of the confederate powers, evinced a deeply-rooted jealousy against France. Hence the treaty of Vienna was based upon principles of extreme caution against the outbursting of the military enthusiasm of the French, or the renewal of aggression against the political system which the allies sought to establish.

The smaller states, on the north-eastern frontier of France, were annexed to Prussia; the Belgian provinces, with Philipville and Marienberg, to the newly-created kingdom of the Netherlands; while France was limited to nearly the same extent of territory as previous to the war of 1793. She was, besides, enchained within a long line of fortresses on the Belgian and Prussian frontiers; her territory was garrisoned with foreign troops; her resources burthened with a heavy debt for the expenses of the campaign of 1815, and to maintain the army of occupation; and lastly, the services of the Northern Colossus were retained by a fee of 5,000,000*l.* sterling (paid by Britain), in case of a

renewed contest; or rather by an annuity of 250,000*l.*, payable so long as the political system then established should be preserved.*

Remarks on the political system sought to be established by the treaty of Vienna.—It has proved, however, even with all the caution observed at the Congress of Vienna, a more difficult task to preserve a political system at variance with the inclinations of the people, than the congregated holy allies imagined. The incorporations then designed, were subjections of the weaker, by the more powerful states, or rather junctions, with degrees of inferiority, than unions in spirit and principle. Of such a character were the incorporations of Belgium with Holland; Poland with Russia; Norway with Sweden; the Grand Duchy of the Rhine and part of Saxony with Prussia; the Lombardo-Venetian states with Austria; the Genoese territory with the states of the king of Sardinia: in fact, the treaty apportioned to each monarchy its unfortunate Ireland.

These legislative junctions were made, as it were, in spite of natural principles. They were futile efforts to reconcile opposite natures, and blend, politically, people essentially distinct in habits, language, and national character; efforts which the very nature of the human disposition must render vain and useless; and which will prove inefficacious in proportion to the spread of liberal opinions.

An attempt to rule people in the spirit of military subjection, or even in opposition to deeply rooted prejudices, must always, in the sequel, prove unsuccessful; for, the thoughts and affec-

* De Pradt estimates the expenses of the army of occupation borne by France, at 750 millions of francs—thirty millions sterling.

tions of the people being obstructed in their due course, a rancorous eagerness and tormenting irritation is fomented against the arm that governs; their passions being thus excited, they become incapable of moderation or control, and, like prepared fuel, readily burst into flame with the least spark. And has not the truth of this position been abundantly proved?—Not to cite such illustrations of the fact as the revolt of the Genoëse against the Austrian government in 1746, or the French revolution of 1788, there are other striking and very modern instances, in which it is fully exemplified. Has not the very treaty of Vienna, that boasted Utopian fabric of diplomatic wisdom, been shaken to its very foundation? and is it not in rapid progress towards a complete *renversement*? Italy has shewn a rancorous eagerness to free herself from the Austrian yoke, and her buoyant spirit is only submerged by the force of superior pressure. Belgium has given an indelible proof of the false principles upon which that treaty was concocted, and obliged its proud authors to admit that the execution of its provisions “is impossible.” While Poland, unhappy Poland! deeply crimsoned with the blood of her bravest sons, and bewailing the hard fate of thousands of her helpless children, torn by merciless Bashkirs from the arms of their shrieking mothers, curses the head that planned, and the hand that signed the instruments for the annihilation of her national independence.* “How long shall it be

* The *Times* paper of August 29, 1832, contains the following extract from the *Brunswick German National Journal*:—

“Up to the 5th of May, four convoys, each of 150 children, had been clandestinely sent out of Warsaw *alone*. On the 17th May, the fifth convoy, consisting of more than twenty wagons, full of Polish children, from the age of six to seven, were sent away, not in secret, but quite openly. The scene was heart-rending. For some days, writes an *eye-witness*, “the weather had been very bad and cold; and on that day (17th May)

that nations will inflict what they would not endure?"

It is of little importance to inquire, whether the incorporation of a minor with a more powerful state, is not beneficial as a mutual protection against attack from without, and discord within; whether submission to be governed in peace by a powerful master, even against innate prejudice, is not preferable to an independent but inefficient power of protection, springing from individual resources. The bulk, the numerical majority of a nation, by whom revolutions are effected, seldom reason upon collective circumstances; they are mainly governed by abstract prejudice, and that prejudice usually directs action.

The force of this feeling has already been seen in Italy, Germany, Poland, and Belgium. It has already demolished the rampart of the treaty, and its assaults will not cease until every vestige of it is destroyed.

Protocol issued by the Allies at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1819.)—The protocol issued by the assembled ministers at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, is particularly interesting, from the blind confidence which its authors appear to have

there was a heavy rain. Nobody was seen in the streets. All at once, about one in the afternoon, there was heard an extraordinary rumbling of wagons, trampling of horses, and *cries of women, mingled with sobbing*. It was the caravans with the *stolen children*, rolling from Alexander's barracks to the bridge. Every body who had any provisions, clothing, or money in the house, gave it to the innocent creatures, for ever lost to their mothers and their country. The mothers, running after their children, rush among the wagons to stop them; other women join in their grief; a *general lamentation is heard*, with loud curses from the gendarmes, but without effect." The circumstances here detailed are extremely *minute*. The day, the hour of the day, and even the state of the weather are mentioned, and the whole bears evident marks of truth.—AUTHOR.

reposed in the political order established at the treaty of Vienna, and from the loathsome hypocrisy with which it teems. We shall translate an extract from this famed protocol, with reference to the above remark.*

“The intimate union established between the allied monarchs, as well by their principles as for the interests of their people, offers the most sacred pledge for the future tranquillity of Europe. The object of this union is alike simple, grand, and salutary; it tends not to any new political combination, or to any change sanctioned by existing treaties: calm and constant in its action, its sole object is the maintenance of peace, and the guarantee of the measures by which it has been founded and *consolidated*. The sovereigns, in forming this august union, have regarded, as its fundamental basis, their invariable resolution (*de ne jamais s'écarter entre eux*) to never swerve, either between themselves or in their relations with other states, from the strict observance of the rights of nations, which in their application to a state of permanent peace can alone effectually guarantee the independence of each government, and the stability of the general association.” It further proceeds, “They (the sovereigns) formally acknowledge, that their duty towards God and towards the people they govern, prescribes that they shall, to the utmost of their power, give to the world an example of *justice, concord, and moderation*. Happy in having the power henceforth to (*consacrer*) devote all their efforts to cultivate the arts of peace, to increase the prosperity of their states, and to awaken those sentiments of religion and morality which the unhappiness of the times has but too much weakened.” These are silken

* The translation is our own, and hence may technically but not essentially, differ from the *official* translation.

words, and if intended to convey the true sentiments of those who subscribed to them, extremely consoling to the people of Europe ; but it appears, as a celebrated diplomatist affirms, that “ words were only made to conceal thoughts ;” for in looking to the subsequent acts of this “ august union,” we find them directly opposed to the declarations contained in this very protocol. For instance, when the Austrian emperor sent 80,000 troops into Naples, to stifle the first germ of constitutional liberty in that fine country, did *he* respect the rights of nations ? When Louis, to aid the faithless monarch who lately filled the Spanish throne in acts of merciless tyranny and oppression, sent his legions into Spain, did *he* respect the rights of nations ? When Nicholas marched his Tartar hordes to exterminate the heroic Poles, did *he* respect the rights of nations ; or by his good deeds give to the world an example of peace, concord, and moderation ? Did Frederick of Prussia, “ faithful to his principles,” as he says in the protocol, “ and happy in having the power to awaken sentiments of religion and morality,” give to the world an example of justice, when, having engaged his subjects to make unparalleled sacrifices in the last struggle against France, by promising them constitutional liberty, he basely refused the recompence after the work was accomplished, and success crowned their efforts ? Was it an act of justice in William of Nassau, towards his Belgian subjects, to abolish the trial by jury ?—If these, and many more state crimes, of which the detail would but excite indignation, are evidences of the justice and moderation of crowned heads, revolutions against established thrones need cause little surprise.

The line of Foreign Policy followed by the Liverpool and subsequent Administrations.—With the ex-

ception of Canning's administration, it has been the maxim of every Tory government to revert to the Treaty of Vienna as a master-piece of diplomatic wisdom ; to trust to the securities it sought to provide against French aggression, as a sure pledge for the continuance of peace. In every attempt on the part of the people of Europe to free themselves from the trammels of political injustice, the British government has remained a tacit observer ; its conduct in the Austrian invasion of Naples, and in the French invasion of Spain, was remarkable for its unusual tameness and lack of sympathy with the liberals of those countries ; and the mere assurances of the immaculate courts of France and Austria, that they entertained no views of aggrandizement, but that their sole object was the restoration of *order*, (by which is meant, the rooting out of every germ of liberal government,) sufficed to obtain concurrence in these measures.

The memorable words of Napoleon, "Ce n'est pas la coalition qui m'a détroné, mais les idées libérales," were a warning to despotic monarchs against the dangerous spread of liberal opinions ; and they could not but view with jealousy and distrust, the dissemination of principles, which tended to weaken the foundations of absolute governments.

"Although," to use the words of Canning, "as Englishmen we are called on to give assistance to those who are labouring to establish for themselves the constitutional liberty we ourselves enjoy,"* we can scarcely censure the strict neutrality observed in the Spanish and Neapolitan affairs ; for, strongly as the British people repudiate a tame concurrence in the *unholy* machinations of the *Holy* Alliance, we had a duty to perform to ourselves, which forbade the dissipation of already dilapidated re-

* Speech on the Military Expedition to Portugal, 1826.

sources, and the sacrifice of human life in a perilous and deadly contest: and to have defied the interference of the great powers with feeblar states, without following up that defiance by hostilities, would have been to degrade our character as a nation, and depreciate the force of our influence with foreign courts.

Canning's system of Foreign Policy.—Canning, with that foresight which is the peculiar attribute of great minds, clearly saw that the Treaty of Vienna could not be maintained; that its very foundations were wrong in principle; and that nations distinct in every character, politically blended, would no more incorporate than oil would mix with water.—“The war of opinion,” he prophesied, “will open in a different quarter from that in which we expected it to commence: the first gun will be fired in a quarrel about interference with the feeblar states, because the more powerful free states cannot remain passive in such an event: the desire of the new coalition will be, “to cut-up freedom in detail!”—With such views, he felt the danger to which the British nation was exposed by her connexion with the holy allies, and determined to sever the political tie. His prompt measures in the case of Portugal, afforded a warning to absolutists as to the cause which Britain would espouse, in the event of being obliged to interfere in the affairs of the continent. Canning's words, on moving the address to his Majesty on this occasion, strongly mark the views he entertained with regard to the interference of the powerful with the weaker states to repress every effort which could improve the condition of society.—“While England has an arm to lift in her defence, external force shall not be used to control the opinions of the Portuguese. Let us defend Portugal, whoever be her assailants, because it is a work of duty;

and let us end where duty ends. We go to Portugal, not to rule, not to dictate, not to prescribe laws; but to plant there the standard of England, and there foreign domination shall not come."

This was the principle laid down by Canning; and this is the principle since acted on in relation to Portugal. On a more recent occasion, which was one of extraordinary difficulty and peril, the government was determined to maintain a strict neutrality so long as foreign governments desisted from interfering in the political differences of the Portuguese; but was equally determined to oppose any hostile movements by the continental governments, and to protect Portugal from foreign dominion.

The Duke of Wellington's Administration.—The duke of Wellington's administration was predominantly Tory. The feeble admixture of liberalism which characterised it in its early days, in the persons of Huskisson, Grant, &c., was, as is well known, expelled through differences of opinion as to the necessity of reform, when the question of East Retford was agitated. The duke's plan of government was decidedly pacific; he adhered strictly to the line of policy laid down by the late lord Londonderry, at the peace of 1815. But he differed, or appears to have differed, from Canning as to the force and growing effect of liberal ideas; and fully joined with foreign powers in their accustomed and antiquated jealousy of France. The conservative policy of the duke, supported by his able colleague, so gifted in the science of European diplomacy, worked smoothly as long as the cause of freedom and liberal policy, founded on the enlarging sphere of human intelligence, was subservient to the military despotism of the confederate powers, who sought to perpetuate the old monarchical principles of the monkish ages; but when the first gun fired in the cause of liberalism

called the Parisians to arms, and announced to Europe that the war of public opinion had begun, the insecurity of the duke's conservative policy became apparent. His characteristic promptitude and discernment were never more strongly illustrated than on this occasion. He was immediately impressed with the necessity of a change in his system of foreign policy, and he did not hesitate to acknowledge the new order of things by the reception of the political representative of Louis Philippe. The European absolutists immediately felt that they could expect no coalition headed by this country against French liberalism; and, aware of the inadequacy of their own resources to contend against a people, of whom the great majority were ready to sacrifice their existence in defence of their free institutions, they adopted, however reluctantly, the only alternative, and acknowledged the right of the French to fashion their own institutions, and dispose of the crown of France according to their feelings and opinions.

Happy would it have been for the people of England, had the duke's views of the necessity of a change extended to the internal policy of Great Britain: he would then have added to his already well-earned laurels the honour of reforming our electoral law. But here his usual tact and discernment failed him—we do not mean as to the principle of reform, this is not the place to discuss that subject; but as to his estimate of the force of public opinion, reanimated by the passing events in France and Belgium. To refuse the just demand of a great majority of a nation, is but to add to its ardour and violence; and a government best consults its own safety and the national peace by ceding, with wisdom and good grace, that which is demanded with firmness and unanimity. The duke, though he admitted this principle in the discussion on the Catholic Relief Bill, seemed to

deny its force in the demand for reform ; and it is here, that whatever might be his private opinions as to the principle of the measure, we think he erred ; and, indeed, the sequel proves that he did. But to return from this digression ; on the duke's resignation, a change of measures was imperiously demanded by the nation ; and the accession of lord Grey, a confirmed and consistent liberal, to office, promised a full compliance with the public requisition.

Change of measures concurrent with the accession of Lord Grey to office, and his system of Foreign Policy.—The first act of lord Grey, after he became premier, was to respond to the *vox populi* by which he had been called to office, and by which liberal measures were to be supported. His prompt announcement that “ peace, retrenchment, and reform,” would be the fundamental objects of his government, was well received by the public as “ a pledge of better times.” The duke of Wellington and lord Grey were perfectly agreed as to the good policy of directing the influence of the British government to the maintenance of peace ; but they differed essentially as to the means necessary to accomplish so desirable an end. Jealousy of French power, and a system of degrading intimidation towards France, by an unseemly deference to the dictates of the absolute courts, formed no part of lord Grey's system of foreign policy. He sought no coalition “ to cut up freedom in detail ;” but, on the contrary, desired to consolidate a political intimacy with constitutional France, as a sure preventive against such designs. His accession to office took place at a period of great difficulty. Europe was rapidly arming, and the elements of destruction gathering in the north and east seemed destined to burst over the free states of the west. France and Belgium were tempest-tost with the

violence of revolution ; and the “ signs of the times ” seemed to indicate an approaching dissolution of the peace of Europe. The attitude assumed by the British government baffled the calculations of the absolute courts ; and the strong inclination manifested by Great Britain to defend the constitutionalists of Europe, powerfully contributed to protect France from the attacks of a continental confederacy, or, rather, to save Europe from the miseries of a general war. During lord Grey’s administration, we have experienced no such “ untoward event ” as that of destroying the Turkish marine, and thus aiding the Russian czar in his Machiavelian designs ; no such deceptive affair as that which outwitted “ the ablest diplomatist in Europe ; ” deluged Portugal with her noblest blood, and loosened the satanic imp of royalty to progress in his liberticidal machinations, and trample under foot the infant constitution which Canning had fostered ; no such barbarity as that of expelling persecuted foreign patriots from the British shores, and firing into the ships of a friendly nation to aid and defend the usurpation of a tyrant. If lord Grey’s foreign policy has not been all that could be wished ; if it has been deficient in firmness, in permitting Prussia to aid Russia in her tragic and merciless crusade against unhappy Poland, and thus to favour the subjugation of a country whose independence we are bound by sacred treaty to protect ; if it has been wanting in that well-directed energy by which the influence of reformed England can alone be maintained over the despotic courts of Europe ; if it has unwarily permitted the Russian autocrat to cajole the Turkish sultan into treaties which impair British interests in the dominions of the Porte, it has at least been frank and conciliatory, and conducted, to excess, in the spirit of peace. Perhaps the points most open to censure in the Grey administration, are the tedious trifling evinced

in the Dutch business, and the humble deference paid to Russia in renewing engagements cancelled, according to the letter of the bond, by the separation of Belgium from Holland. The latter measure, however, though unpopular, and seemingly derogatory to the British nation, is yet clearly defensible. The clause was designed to interest Russia in preventing the incorporation of Belgium with France. The sages assembled at Vienna never contemplated that Belgium would so speedily raise herself into an independent state; and when that event took place, we were bound by every principle of national honour to deal with the question upon the broad principle of doing that which conscience dictated to be just—to act according to the true *spirit*, and not the mere *wording* of the obligation: for as Addison, in his *Cato*, makes Juba say—

“ Honour’s a sacred tie, the law of kings,
And noble minds’ distinguishing perfection,
That aids and strengthens Virtue when it meets her,
And imitates her actions where she is not.
It ought not to be sported with.”

Dutch Negotiations.—The original object of the interference of England in the affairs of Holland, was, first, to secure the Belgic provinces against French incorporation; and secondly, to arrange terms of separation which could not be agreed upon between themselves. The history of these protracted, rigmarole, protocolling negotiations, is too long and tedious to be given here. The question seems to have become more and more clogged with difficulties at every step. This arises, in some measure, from the number and importance of the points at issue, and from the various and conflicting interests which require to be consulted at every stage of the proceedings. The settlement of the articles, on which the separation should be based, was the first difficulty; and here, the dogged obstinacy of

Holland, the unsteadiness of Belgium, and the artful and shuffling policy of the three great powers, in turns, tended to delay and embarrass the arrangement. The plenipotentiaries agree, and declare it to be their "*irrevocable*" resolution, to execute terms of separation contained in the twenty-four articles, which they pronounce "*definitive*;" and further declare, "that either party refusing to accede to them, shall be deemed *contumacious*." These terms the Belgians accept, and the Dutch refuse. Then Russia, Austria, and Prussia, refuse to ratify what they had before agreed to; defer, demur, and shuffle, until, by entreaties, they are induced to ratify, with "*reservations*." Then they refuse to execute what they have ratified, and allow his Dutch majesty to mock all their wise resolves. At length, the French and British governments, justly indignant at this vacillating fickleness, determine to resort to "coercive measures;" and plainly tell the Dutch king, "that since he contumaciously defies every effort towards a pacific arrangement of affairs, they are determined to perform their engagements to Belgium, by force of arms." In pursuance of the convention concluded between the British and French governments, an embargo is laid on Dutch property in British and French ports; the Scheldt is blockaded by the combined squadrons of the two powers, and 80,000 French troops advance to dispossess the Dutch of the citadel of Antwerp.*

* To have assented to the demands of Holland respecting the navigation of the Scheldt, would have virtually shut out Belgium from any share in a direct foreign trade. Antwerp is the very core of Belgium, the organ of circulation through which she maintains her feeble commerce with transmarine nations. From the mouth of the Scheldt to Dunkirk, her entire littoral, there is no naturally formed port, no embouchure of any considerable stream. Ostend, situated between the Scheldt and Dunkirk, is an inconsiderable port, that can only admit brigs which draw less than twelve feet of water, during about two or three hours of flood-

These measures put the question of hostile interference by the three despotic powers to a severe test. The challenge to Prussia, in particular, was full and fair; her doubtful policy throughout the Belgic negotiations, her contiguity to the scene of action, and the intimate family connexion between the houses of Brandenburg and Nassau, had excited suspicion that she would oppose the march of a French army into Belgium. Hence the *fortiter in re* which had succeeded to the *suaviter in modo*, was well calculated to elicit a distinct avowal of the views of the cabinet of Berlin. However, Prussia remained a passive spectator of the scene; and officially declared, she would not oppose the hostile movement, so long as its operation was confined to the avowed objects and principles of the convention:—viz. “the expulsion of the Dutch from Antwerp and its dependencies, and the adjustment of the terms of the political separation of Holland and Belgium.”

These coercive measures were little in favour with a numerous and influential portion of the parliamentary opposition. “Holland is our ancient ally,” said the Tories, “and must not be dealt with harshly.” If it be true, that Holland was our “*ancient ally*,” she may nevertheless be our “*modern opponent*,” but we deny the veracity of the prior proposition. In the 16th century, we assisted her with 800,000*l.* to free herself from the shackles of Spanish domination, and powerfully aided her to cement her political inde-

tide; hence the navigation of the Scheldt, subject only to such fair charges as may be necessary to repair its banks, &c., was a *sine qua non* with the Belgians in their negotiations with the Dutch government. Thus, the Conference and the British ministers, although disposed to give Holland all that circumstances admitted of, could not yield this point to the demands of the Dutch king.

pendence;* and how did she recompense our good offices? By driving us from the islands of Landoire and Puto (1619), and by the horrible massacre of our defenceless countrymen on the island of Amboyna, 1623. This was her gracious return for our sacrifices on her behalf. We will not minute the horrors of that scene; it was a crime so foul, that the very idea,

“ Fires the indignant soul, and revolting reason shocks.”

Since she appeared as our ally in the last two campaigns of the war of Austrian Succession, Holland has never figured otherwise than as an avaricious neutral, or opponent of Great Britain. In the war of 1756, she affected neutrality, but readily granted to the French army under d'Estrées, a passage through Maestricht, to overrun the defenceless Duchies of Cleves, Vessel, and Hesse, to attack the British forces at Minden, and hence to invest Hanover. Prompted by her accustomed mercantile avarice, she employed her neutral flag to furnish our enemies with warlike stores and trans-marine produce; and on our just remonstrance against these open breaches of neutrality, she insulted us with menaces, and threatened to join the formidable coalition against us.† In the American contest, when Britain, cumbered with an incapable administration, distracted by internal dissensions, and attacked by a dangerous European confederacy, was in a more defenceless condition than at any period of her modern history, Holland was foremost in planning the maritime confederacy against her. In the war of the French revolution, she deserted our cause immediately it

* Camden's History of Elizabeth.—Parliamentary History, vol. iv.

† Smollett, vol. ii.

assumed a declining aspect. In the war of 1803, she made no resistance to the reception of Louis, the brother of Napoleon Buonaparte, as her king, to consolidate the power of our formidable foe : nay, she did not hesitate to surrender every vestige of her national independence, and become a mere province of France. Where, then, is her title to British gratitude ? An ancient ally indeed ! We know not to what era this word “ *ancient* ” may extend ; but it is evident that for the last eighty years or thereabouts, she has uniformly figured as our opponent.

It is true, that in the last hour of the late struggle against France, Holland threw her weight into the scale against Napoleon ; but this step arose from his incapacity to protect her territories with his legions against the merited vengeance of Great Britain, and hence entitles her to no commendation : and even at that time (1814) not a single Dutch regiment joined the allied forces ; she left us the undivided honour of delivering her territories from foreign subjection. But when, in 1814, Holland lay prostrate at the mercy of England, did the latter seek to punish her perfidious conduct during the war, by the imposition of penalties ? On the contrary, with a zeal for Dutch interests, which blinded the better judgment of our rulers, England treated her as a constant, faithful, and “ *ancient ally* ; ” raised her from a mean province of France to an independent powerful kingdom ; extended her territory far beyond the utmost limits it had attained, even in the brightest days of her republic ; gave her the extensive and rich island of Java, which cost so much British blood and treasure in its capture ; allowed her to share in the trade with Surinam, Guiana, Demarara, and our possessions on that coast ; ransomed her colonies from Sweden ; raised, by British funds, fortresses on her southern

and eastern frontier; and engaged the leading continental powers to protect her against the degradation of again becoming a French province.*

We here dismiss the subject of the Dutch negotiations; and shall conclude our present chapter with a few observations on the probable course of the prospective foreign policy of the British cabinet.

Probable future course of Policy.—The British government, influenced at this more than at any former period by public opinion, must, in an especial degree, conform its policy to the disposition and prejudices of the people. We repeat, the *vox populi* must more than ever influence the decisions of the government. This feeling is decidedly in favour of a pacific course of policy, supported by a firm tone of remonstrance against any hostile movement of the despotic powers against the political independence and liberties of the free continental states.

The intimate political and commercial intercourse which has so long subsisted between Great Britain and the Peninsula, seems to demand some notice of our probable future policy towards that

* An account was presented to parliament, session 1832, of the sums of money contributed by Great Britain for the erection of fortifications in the Netherlands, and towards the defence and incorporation of the Belgic provinces with Holland, of which the following is a copy:—

Compensation to Sweden for rights in the colonies ceded by that country		£1,000,000
For the erection and repairs of fortifications in the Netherlands . . .	1,999,999	} 2,223,688
Paid out of the military chest of the British army in France and the Netherlands, in 1814 and 1816 .	223,669	
On account of Russ.-Dutch loan. .	1,465,876	
„ Sinking fund for ditto .	337,929	} 1,803,805
Total		
		<hr/> £5,027,493

interesting portion of Europe. In Portugal, the influence and interests of Britain have long predominated, almost to the exclusion of any other power ;—she cannot, therefore, but lament to see her constant ally torn by the relentless animosities of two rival factions, neither of which it is to be feared has a due regard for the solid interest and prosperity of that unhappy country. The raging contest is, however, purely domestic ; and to be brought to a successful and permanent issue, must be left to the uncontrolled efforts of the Portuguese themselves. The British people are naturally inclined to favour that party, which *professes* a desire to extend the principles of freedom and good government to a country with which they are connected by so many ties : but they ought to pause before they lend their support to the very questionable mode in which these blessings are now sought to be introduced into Portugal. At all events, it is to be hoped, that the principles upon which the British government are professedly conducted, will effectively negative any proposal to embroil us in the ambitious cause of either of the Theban brothers now contending for power : such a proceeding indeed would be worse than useless ; for perhaps of all people on earth, the Portuguese have the most unconquerable repugnance to submit to any authority established by means of foreign interference.

Recent events in Spain are calculated to excite far deeper interest. Scarcely recovered from the effects of the injuries and ravages inflicted upon her during her struggle for independence, against Gallic oppression ; and beginning to apply herself, under a regular government, to the improvement and cultivation of her resources, this fine country has been suddenly plunged into a desolating internal warfare, with all its attendant horrors and calamities. The fundamental, and indeed what may be termed

the constitutional law of succession in Spain,* excludes females from the throne, so long as males, though indirectly descended, are in existence. But

* The primitive or ancient Spanish law of succession is neither clear nor precise, several of the codes differing materially from each other. "On the death of the king," says canon 75 of the fourth council of Toledo, "the *proceres*, or leading men of the kingdom, with the clergy of our Lord, shall, by common accord, elect a successor:" and this enactment is adopted by Law 9, title 1, of the *Fuero Jusgo*. Sismundus caused his own laws, and those of the previous sovereigns, to be compiled into a *Liber Judicium*, A. D. 633; which being translated into Castilian, was denominated the *Fuero Jusgo*. It was further ordained, that, on the election being made, it was to be confirmed by a general meeting of the kingdom, in which the sovereign was to be formally accepted and confirmed. Thus, under the Gothic law, the monarchy was elective, and the franchise vested in the clergy and nobles, to whose choice the multitude gave assent by *acclamation*. At length, hereditary right was introduced, and finally established as a permanent rule. From the time of Sismundus to the year 1279, the law of succession continued in this undefined state; when Alonzo X., called the Wise, introduced the statute of *Partidas*, removing all doubts as to the right of succession, and establishing the *jus coronæ* on a clear and fixed basis. Alonzo's enactment entails the crown upon males and females lineally descended; and no *perfect law*, excluding females, had to this time been made. Thus Donna Sancha succeeded to the throne, A. D. 1030; and subsequently, the sceptre was held by Donna Uraca, Donna Berenguela, Isabel the Catholic, who, by her marriage with Ferdinand, united the crowns of Aragon, Castile, and Sicily, and added the New World to her dominions. Isabel was succeeded by her daughter, Donna Juana. Thus continued the law until the reign of Philip V., who, in spite of the treaty of partition, and the sanguinary efforts of the grand alliance of 1701, succeeded to the throne in right of his grandmother, Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip IV. and wife of Louis XIV., and in virtue of the testament of Charles II., concocted under the influence of French intrigue. After a lamentable sacrifice of blood and treasure, the right of the Bourbon prince to the Spanish crown was confirmed by the treaty of Utrecht, 1713, according to the stipulations of which, Philip V. renounced, for himself and his heirs, all title to the throne of France. Philip, at heart a Spaniard, resolved, by further precautions, to guard against the contingency of the crown's devolving through the female line, to a foreign prince, by excluding females from regal claims, while male heirs could be found, even in a transversal line. The Cortes,

the late king, Ferdinand VII., being without hopes of male issue, and influenced by the intrigues and persuasions of his youthful queen, took upon himself, by his sole but absolute authority, to alter, in

composed of the deputies of the cities, the clergy, and nobles, were already assembled in Madrid according to the constitutional forms, when Philip proposed to them a new law of succession, conformably to the above, and directed special letters to be sent to each privileged city and town, enjoining them to send up to their delegates full and sufficient powers to confer and deliberate upon the subject. The Cortes possess no power of making laws; but when assembled, as they always are, for special purposes, formally petition the king to issue his pragmatic sanction to the law, which, when ratified by the Cortes, becomes a statute. These forms were all minutely observed; and the *auto acordado* (statute) was promulgated on the 10th May, 1713. No further attempt to alter the law was made until 1789, when Charles IV. assembled the Cortes, ostensibly to swear allegiance to Ferdinand and the Beloved, as prince of Asturias; and, by the advice of Floridablanca, surreptitiously obtained from the Cortes a *petition* to alter in favour of females, Philip V.'s law of succession. Ferdinand and Don Carlos were at that time sickly boys, and Charles was desirous that, in the event of their decease, his favourite daughter, afterwards queen of Portugal, should inherit the Spanish crown. The Cortes were strictly sworn to secrecy, and the king was left at liberty to issue his pragmatic sanction. This, however, on reflection, he declined doing. The deputies and council again bound themselves never to divulge what had been transacted. The project was thus *hushed*—the papers *sealed*—and nothing was heard of the proceedings until 1809, when Joseph Buonaparte ordered the sealed packet to be opened. Ferdinand by his three first wives had no issue; but with his *fourth* wife, the youthful Donna Maria Christina de Bourbon, he had two children, both females. The beauteous queen, who exercised a great ascendancy over her feeble husband, persuaded him to recur to the petition which the Cortes had presented to Charles IV. in 1789, and to publish, after a lapse of *forty-one years*, his pragmatic sanction, declaring the law of succession changed; which was done on the 6th of April, 1830. The Cortes and nobles were subsequently assembled, not to debate on the validity of the pragmatic sanction—because Ferdinand and his queen well knew they would scout the cheat—but to swear allegiance to Donna Isabel, the infant queen. Some obeyed, while others refused: among the latter is *Don Carlos*. Thus stands the question. Lord Grey says, “the proceedings are agreeable to the ancient Spanish constitution,” while other authorities denounce

favour of his infant daughter, this long established law; thereby annulling the rights of his brother Don Carlos, who stood next in succession, and who had long been looked upon as the heir-apparent to the crown.

While Ferdinand lived, the Spaniards, with their characteristic apathy, took little heed of this important and unwarrantable innovation; but immediately he ceased to breathe, a large and powerful body of the people expressed strong indignation at this flagrant violation of justice, and at the irregular and unconstitutional manner in which the laws had been wrested from their due course. They openly declared their determination to uphold the rights of Don Carlos, to resist the authority of the queen regent's government, and to unfurl the crimsoned standard of civil contest. Thus has an intestine war been lighted up throughout the kingdom, the duration and result of which it is impossible to foretel.

But distressing and revolting as it is to witness the scenes of slaughter and outrage now going on in Spain, still sound policy dictates the observance of a strict neutrality on our part. Let Britain stand aloof from a contest in which no real or substantial good can be effected by interference. If British intervention cannot be dispensed with, let our efforts be directed to moderate the vindictive feelings of both parties, without shewing favour to either, while upholding the integrity of Spain against all foreign aggression or coercion. The only probability of our being called upon to adopt strong measures in defence of Spain, would be in case of an irruption on the part of France; but such an event, even should it happen, need cause

them as the result of intrigue and fraud, and hence opposed to every sound principle of political justice.—See an interesting pamphlet on the Spanish question, entitled "*Spain; or, Who is the lawful successor to the throne?*" By William Walton."

us little apprehension. Experience has clearly shewn, that the permanent occupation of Spain by France, is, morally and physically, impossible. Every motive for national enmity is discovered in France and the Spanish peninsula: proximity of frontiers; non-intercourse of commerce, in consequence of similarity of productions; the frivolity of one people, and the serious character of the other; and with the exception of a few years in the early part of the last century, the unceasing enmity which has subsisted between these nations, from the days of Charlemagne to the date of the late invasion of Spain, by the conqueror of the Trocadero, mark the impossibility of establishing any intimate political relations between the cabinets of the Escorial and the Tuileries. Indeed, united Europe is interested in forbidding the occupation of the peninsula by Gallic troops, and would decidedly oppose any such ill advised project, should it unhappily be meditated by the French ministry. The knowledge of these facts, together with a strong demonstration and firm policy on our part, may at all times be sufficient to repress the military ardour of the French, and hence avert the necessity of hostilities in that quarter.

If we look to the political aspect of the other parts of Europe, we find it so changed by the rapid growth and wide spread of liberal ideas, that the old conservative system can no longer be maintained; and while the art of printing is preserved, liberalism, which already threatens the stability of governments founded on military despotism, must continue to acquire additional strength and influence.

If the "war of opinion" is approaching, the most skilful generalship in the British cabinet is required to avert its ravages from our country. The proper course for us to pursue, is to maintain a strict neutrality; to offend none, despot or liberal; to be sparing of national resources, reserving them

to repel any attacks on our independence, any foreign interference with our institutions, or any attempt against our colonial appendages; to consolidate rather than exercise our powers, but especially to keep a watchful eye on the ambitious projects of Russia against our Eastern empire. But if, as Canning foretold, we cannot remain passive spectators of the interference of the powerful with the weaker states, it will be our duty and our interest whenever the time arrives, which we contemplate at a distance, to aid the march of constitutional freedom, rather than assist the encroachments of feudal despotism.

If our safety is to be consulted by foreign alliances, they must be made with liberal governments and free states. In France, the benefits and advantages of such a union are deeply felt; she courts, more than at any former period, amicable relations with the people and government of Britain. Ever since the peace of 1815, but especially since the revolution of 1830, the social intercourse of the French and English nations has been rapidly improving. Those of our countrymen who, of late days, have mingled in French society, cannot have failed to remark the growing inclination of the French people in favour of a close alliance between Great Britain and France. The language of the French to their statesmen, may be aptly assimilated to the well known injunction of Louis XIV. to his grandson, the Duc d'Anjou, on his accession to the Spanish crown.—“Vivez dans une grande union avec l'Angleterre,* rien n'étant si bon pour les deux puissances, à laquelle rien ne pourra résister.” This is precisely the language of the intelligent portion and great majority of the French nation, (we exclude factious cliques

* The original expression is *La France*. (Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*)

and parties,) and we fully believe it has its due weight with the government. The French know the jealous feeling of the triple alliance towards “la France nouvelle;” and they are fully persuaded that their security is best concerted by an intimate association with constitutional governments. They feel that they hold their colonies, and carry on marine commerce, only by the sufferance of Great Britain; and, what is, perhaps, a more powerful motive among the middle classes for the continuance of the connexion with England, they dread the loss of internal commerce, to which war would expose France, by the immediate retirement of the English residents.*

It would be lamentable, that the question as to the continuance of the occupation of Algiers, should disturb the present pacific harmony between the French and English governments. In the negotiations between the cabinets of Paris and London, either before or after the sailing of the expedition against Algiers, there appears to have been no written document which promised, in case of success, the subsequent abandonment of the territory.

* It may appear trifling to some readers to urge this latter motive when discussing the subject of foreign policy; but those who have resided in France, and remarked the general terms in which the French speak of the English as liberal customers, particularly at Tours, Orleans, Marseilles, Boulogne, St. Omer, &c.; those who consider the large amount of British gold (about four millions sterling) spent among the small traders; reflect on the large amount of British capital invested in France, and on the vast influence that circumstances, apparently trifling, occasionally have on affairs of state, will attach more importance to this motive than, on the first view, it seems entitled to. In forming a right judgment in this instance, the contrast of the present with past periods of peace should be materially considered. “L’Angleterre est la plus belle colonie de la France,” is a remark frequently heard in French society. It is somewhat at variance with the humour of an Englishman to hear his country spoken of as a French colony, but, of course, it merely means this—“that France gains more by her connexion with England than by her finest colony.” In this sense it is perfectly true.

Polignac appears to have played a surreptitious part in his oral correspondence with lord Stuart de Rothsay ; and, *à la française*, to have shaped his words the better to conceal his thoughts. Thus, when pressed by the British minister at Paris, as to the evacuation of Algiers, he disclaimed, *verbally*, any views of aggrandisement on the part of the French government, and vaguely assured his lordship, that the expedition was undertaken with the single view of *avenging the honour of France*.*

- Polignac denies ever having directly promised to evacuate Algiers, but he admits having notified to the British minister the assent of the French government to submit the whole affair to the decision of a conference. Hence the present French government contends, "that it is under no engagement with any power relative to the evacuation of Algiers, and avows that it has no intention of restoring it."† All those who know any thing of the present temper of the French people on this subject, are fully aware, that Louis Philippe has no more power to evacuate Algiers than the king of England has to abandon the Island of Jamaica, or the East Indies. The agitation of such a question can produce no other effect than that of creating a renewed jealousy between the French and British people; and thus perverting the most important interests of the two nations, and of all Europe.

In France, while her free institutions are preserved, England has a sure ally. With her 800,000

* *Courrier Francais*, 24 May, 1833.

† "The government has placed itself under *no engagement whatever* with any power relative to the abandonment of Algiers, *but it is perfectly free* to act in that respect as it thinks proper; but I will add, that up to the present moment, government has not entertained the *remotest* idea of evacuating Algiers. On the contrary, all its measures tend to fortify the security of its occupation, and to encourage, by every means in its power, the colonization of the country."—Duc de Dalmatie's reply to Le Marechal Clausel.—Sittings 18th June, 1833.

soldiers ready to march on the first summons of the government (see p. 59), and 3,000,000 of *garde nationale*; her navy, next in importance to our own; her financial credit supported by British capitalists—she is an overmatch for the Scythian giant, even if supported by his *quondam* ally, Frederick of Prussia; and, allied with England, “Elle donnerait la loi au monde.” Our position, without a French alliance, is secure; with it, invincible. No European confederacy could long maintain a contest with France and England united. Should wars arise, they could be but of short duration, and attended with comparatively little sacrifice. But the course of Great Britain is pacific. The last peace left us in possession of territories quite equal to our means of governing, of high military honour, and of vast political influence. We can gain but little, and may lose much, by a renewed contest; hence nothing appears better suited to consolidate our power, and add to our prosperity, than *moderation*. *Cetera invidiam* urgent.

From this sketch of our foreign policy, we proceed to review consecutively, the Statistics and Politics of France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

CHAPTER II.

REVIEW OF THE STATISTICS AND POLITICS OF
FRANCE.

SECTION I.—FRENCH STATISTICS.

Territorial Extent.—From an early date, until the close of the late war, France had been progressively, and, during the reign of Napoleon, rapidly growing in territory, population, and political importance. Under Philippe de Valois, she incorporated Brittany, Dauphine Burgundy, and Provence. Under Louis XIII., she acquired Roussillon and Bearn. Under Louis XIV., she obtained a considerable portion of the Spanish Netherlands, and Alsace. During the administration of Le Cardinal de Fleury (1736) the Duchy of Lorraine was added to her dominions. During the war of the Austrian succession, Corsica submitted to her sceptre; and Napoleon, by the incorporation of Holland, Belgium, the Rhenish and other German provinces, swelled the area and population of the French empire to an extent unequalled by any other European state.* By the peace of Paris in 1815, she lost all the conquests she had made during the Republic and the reign

* Besides the states incorporated with France at the era of the confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Istria, Dalmatia, and the Venetian and Neapolitan dominions *were under her protection.*

of Napoleon ; half her annual revenue, and about one-third of her subjects. At the present day, her geographical figure is nearly the same as before the outburst of the war in 1793, and measures about 206,000 British square miles.

Population.—The first official account of the population of France, is the “Rapport des Intendants” (governors of provinces),* made to the government towards the close of the 17th century, which states the

Number of inhabitants at	20,093,000
In 1754, Le Marquis de Mirabeau estimated the population at	} 18,000,000
1772, L'Abbé d'Exilly ditto	
1785, Neckar ditto, ditto	22,140,000
1791, The Committee of the National Assembly, ditto, ditto	} 24,676,000
1810, (The zenith of Napoleon's power,) De Pradt estimated the population of the French empire at	
1815, It was reduced, by the relinquishment of territory, following the treaty of Paris, to	} 42,000,000
1822, The official returns, exclusive of the Isle of Corsica,† make it	
1827, Ditto, ditto	} 29,500,000
1832, Ditto, ditto	
1827, Ditto, ditto	} 30,458,000
1832, Ditto, ditto	
1827, Ditto, ditto	} 31,858,394
1832, Ditto, ditto	
1827, Ditto, ditto	} 32,500,934
1832, Ditto, ditto	

It appears, by comparing the returns of 1827 and 1832, that the quinquennial increase of population was, for the period ending 1827, 1,400,000, or about $4\frac{6}{10}$ per cent. ; and for the period ending 1832—702,500, or about $2\frac{2}{10}$ per cent. ; thus shewing a diminishing ratio of increase.

In some of the departments the decrease, by the census of 1832, was actual. For instance, in the departments of Calvados, Cantel, Isle et Vilain,

* Since the first revolution, *l'Intendant* is purely a military officer, a sort of commissary.

† The Island of Corsica measures about 3260 British square miles, and numbers about 185,000 inhabitants.

Maine et Loire, La Manche, Mayenne, and La Seine, the population, in 1827, was 3,753,815

And in 1832 3,637,197

Shewing an actual quinquennial
decrease of 116,618

This diminution of numbers may proceed from the troubled state of these departments since the revolution of July 1830; the timid portion of the inhabitants migrating to other parts of France less exposed to popular tumult.

The following Table, compiled from the most recent official documents, shews that the decennial increase of population in France is greatly inferior to the prevailing ratio in the principal nations of Europe.

Countries.	Decennial ratio of increase of population, making 100,000 the integer.	Will double their population in the following terms of years.
Prussia,	27,027	26
Great Britain, . .	16,667	42
Netherlands, . .	12,872	56
The Two Sicilies, .	11,111	63
Russia,	10,527	66
Austrian dominions,	10,114	69
France,	6,527	105

Causes of the slow progress of Population in France, investigated. — The comparatively slow increase of population in France, is attributable to various causes: the principal of which are, the vast sacrifices of human life, occasioned by the wars and civil commotions; the attendant impediments to marriage; the annihilation of her commerce, and the destruction of her property, consequent on the contests.

Of all the European nations who took part in the late war, France suffered, by far, the most

severely in her sacrifices of human life. Le Baron Dupin computes the number of slain at 2,000,000 *of the elite of her male population*, viz.: 1,500,000 in her foreign wars, and 500,000 *in civil commotions*.* But this sacrifice, however immense, is not abstractly the leading cause of her slow progress in numbers. The disproportion it occasioned between the numbers of her male and female population, operated still more forcibly.

It is necessary also to reflect, in looking to the influence of the late wars on French population, that by the law of conscription, every youth attaining the age of twenty years is subject to military service; and that during the greater part of the wars, at least four-fifths of the French male population, between the ages of twenty and thirty years, were either engaged in the army or navy, or in other departments of the state equally inimicable to marriage.

The martial or military laws of France are extremely unfavourable to matrimonial alliances. No French soldier can contract marriage without the express permission of the colonel of his regiment; and as this officer has a discretionary power on the subject, assent is by no means general. We have been at some pains to obtain authentic information as to the relative proportion of married to unmarried men in the French army. There is no official document published on the subject; but from an estimate furnished to us by a French military officer, calculated on the average of several regiments, we are enabled to state it at as one to twenty-five. We give this estimate as we receive it, as an approximation to accuracy.

The demoralizing encouragement given by the government to illegitimate population, has proba-

* This includes all who perished on the scaffold for political offences.

bly had some influence in counteracting the effect of this paucity of marriages on the growth of numbers. The plan, first brought into operation by St. Vincent de Paul, A.D. 1670, of establishing hospitals for the reception and maintenance of *les enfans trouvés*, received a great extension subsequent to the revolution of 1789, and especially during the reign of Napoleon, when recruits for the army were so vigilantly sought for. Before the first revolution, the proportion of illegitimate children was computed at one in forty-seven on the total number of births. According to the census of 1822, the proportion had increased to one in eleven, and at present it is estimated at one in fourteen.*

Dupin's Tables of the comparative productive power of Great Britain and France in 1826.—The curious and interesting tables of Le Baron Dupin, estimating the progress and totality of “*les forces productives et commerciaux de la France*,” enable us to notice the comparative progress of Great Britain and France, in productive power and national income.

He has calculated the producing powers on one uniform scale. For instance, the power of a French or English horse, he computes as equal; and hence the different machines of so many horse power, possess, according to his calculation, a like relative force; therefore, whatever error may exist in his valuation of *real power*, that error being relative, will not affect the validity of his estimates.

* Dupin says, “that the plan of supporting illegitimate children at the expense of the state, has tended so much to limit marriage, that, *in Paris*, a moiety of the births are illegitimate.” By a late law, illegitimate children are admitted to the rights of legitimacy, if the father and mother, although unmarried, live together a prescribed time.

Table of the comparative *inanimate* productive power of Great Britain and France in 1826.

Machines.	Great Britain.	France.
	Equal to the power of the following number of men.	
Steam engines, . . .	6,400,000	480,000
Navigation,	12,000,000	3,000,000
Hydraulic mills and other machines,* }	1,200,000	1,500,000
Windmills,	240,000	253,000
Total inanimate pro- ductive power, . }	19,840,000	5,233,000

Table of the comparative *animate* and *inanimate* power of Great Britain and France, employed in manufactures and commerce (force industrielles et commerciales): animate power, besides human, includes that of horses, mules, horned cattle, &c.†

Description of power.	Great Britain. France.		Superiority of productive power employed in trade and manufactures.
	Equal to the power of the following number of men.		
Animate force,† .	7,275,497	6,303,019	972,478
Inanimate, . . .	19,840,000	5,233,333	14,606,667
Add for Ireland, animate and inanimate power,	1,002,667	—————	1,002,667
	28,118,164	11,536,352	16,581,812‡

* France, in 1826, counted about 76,000 mills of all sorts; of which about 10,000 were windmills, and 66,000 water mills, &c.

† Dupin calculates the power of a man between the

Ages of . . .	17 and 54, as	1
From . . .	54 to 60, as	$0\frac{1}{2}$
Youths from . . .	12 to 17, as	$0\frac{1}{2}$
Women		$0\frac{1}{2}$

A horse, 7

A bullock as 4; but as the greater portion of horned cattle are not employed in productive labour, he takes the general average at .	} $2\frac{1}{2}$

‡ We have seen some calculations of the actual relative power or strength of able-bodied men, natives of different states of

The superiority of Great Britain in inanimate force is especially remarkable: this proceeds, principally, from our physical advantages of coal and iron.

Comparison of the total productive powers of Great Britain and France, employed in agriculture, commerce, and manufactures.

	Great Britain and Ireland.	France.
Power employed in agriculture—animate and inanimate, }	32,088,147	37,278,537
Power employed in commerce and manufactures, }	28,108,164	11,536,352
Total productive powers .	60,206,311	48,814,889

The following Table exhibits a comparison of the productive powers of Great Britain and France, in 1780 and 1826, and the annual ratio of the increase: and shews how rapidly we have outgrown our ancient rival in power and resources.

	Great Britain and Ireland.	France.
Total productive powers } in 1826, }	60,206,311	48,814,889
Ditto, 1780, }	31,281,032	38,792,666
Total increase in forty- } six years, }	28,925,279	10,022,223
Annual ratio of increase,	628,810	217,874

Europe and Asia, in which the force of an Englishman, relative to that of a Frenchman, is stated as sixty-one to fifty-eight: hence the strength of a horse is computed, by Dupin, as equal to the force of seven men. The power of the English horse, compared with the French horse, would be as 427 to 406, and the value of inanimate power superior in the same degree. Watt's calculation of a horse power is, that it is equal to raise 33,000lbs. one foot high per minute, and a man's power one-sixth that of a horse. Dupin does not furnish us with the ratio upon which the power of a horse is calculated in France. —Some idea may be formed of the inferiority of the force of a

In France, the accuracy of Dupin's calculations, so far as regards his estimates of the productive powers of that country, is generally admitted : but his means of forming a correct estimate of the productive powers of Great Britain, in 1780, or even in 1826, could not be such as to warrant an implicit reliance on his statements ; they must be received, like most other calculations of the same character, as approximations to accuracy—open to the investigation of those who possess the means, and can bestow the time and labour necessary to elucidate such intricacies.

Dupin, in tracing the causes which have so much impeded the progress of France, and thrown her into the rear of European nations in the march of advancement,—making due allowance for the

Frenchman compared with an Englishman, by this fact, “ that out of 1,033,422 men, summoned before the council of revision in 1826, there were 380,213 rejected, being under the height of four feet eleven inches, about five feet three and a half English. This inferiority of stature is doubtless, in a great measure, attributable to the vast sacrifices of human life during the wars. The tallest men are those usually drafted for the army, and, as in modern warfare, the cannon and the musket have superseded the battle-axe and the buckler, the largest and strongest men who formerly possessed an advantage, and who, hence, were more likely to escape destruction, are now the most exposed to fall in action. The Scots were late in adopting the use of fire-arms : so recently as the battle of Preston-pans and Culloden they neglected the use of cannon, and trusted to their system of close combat. The consequence was that the weak fell, while the strong escaped, and hence the race of men is larger in Scotland than in England. Similar causes, doubtless, operated to preserve a large and strong race of men among the ancients. In such contests as those of Zama and Cannæ, where the battle was, as it were, divided into a number of single-handed combats, the loss fell on the weak and low in stature. It is a common remark with those who travel from the eastward, that in proportion as they advance towards western Europe, the race of men becomes smaller. The Turks are decidedly larger men than the Germans, and the Germans larger than the French. The loss of human life in war has not been so great among the English as among their continental neighbours, and hence we preserve our superiority in stature over the French,

devastating and ruinous effects of a long war,—forcibly and very justly denounces the wretched system of restricting the means of useful education to the poorer classes, and thus perpetuating that dark ignorance which is so fatally repugnant to national improvement. Of the five leading European powers, France (with the exception of Russia) is by far the most backward in affording the means of education to the humbler classes. Austria, which is usually regarded as a state of imperfect civilisation, figures as the first among the five powers in dispensing the means of primary instruction to the poor. The public schools established in the Austrian dominions are frequented by 1 in 13 of the total population: in the kingdom of Bohemia alone, by 1 in 11: in Holland, the proportion is 1 to 12: in Great Britain, 1 to 16:* in Prussia, 1 to 18: in France, 1 to 30: in Portugal, 1 to 80: and in Russia, scarcely emerging from Slavonic barbar-

* In England there has never been any national provision for the gratuitous education of the poor. The numerous free academical establishments are all supported by the munificence of individuals. According to returns made to Parliament in 1818, there were, in *England*, 4167 endowed schools, with a revenue of 300,525*l.* per annum; 14,282 unendowed schools, and 5162 Sunday schools. By means of these schools, 644,282 children, chiefly of the working classes, received the *rudiments* of education, being about one in sixteen of the total population: 322,518 children were taught gratuitously, and 321,764 paid for their education. Since 1818, there have been no official returns on the subject; but from the answers to the circular letters to Mr. (now Lord) Brougham, in 1828, it was estimated that there could not be less than 1,500,000 of the children of the humbler classes, who were receiving the advantages of elementary education, being about one in nine of the total population. The number of children between the ages of five and twelve cannot much exceed 2,000,000; and, as a large portion of the remaining 500,000 are educated in the upper schools, there is fair reason to believe that few of the English youth are deprived of the means of primary instruction. In the Sunday schools there are at least 1,250,000 children, in the United Kingdom; many of these belong also to other free schools.

ism, 1 in 954. These returns refer to 1826, since which a vast extension of education has been provided for, especially in Great Britain and Prussia.

When Buonaparte returned from Elba, he ordered a school to be founded on the plan of Lancaster. On the second return of Louis XVIII. the number of schools and pupils continued to augment; and at the end of the year 1815, twenty-eight schools on the Lancasterian plan were established in Paris alone, chiefly under the direction of Protestants. The clergy viewed with jealousy the progress made by the Lancasterian schools; and Le Grand Aumonier was deputed to express the *wish* of his Majesty and of all good Catholics, that *their* religion should form the basis of public instruction. The protestant directors of the schools were therefore dismissed, and their places supplied by Catholics. The Protestants were, however, permitted to open schools, and pupils were allowed to be instructed by teachers of their own persuasion. Yet under this new regulation, the Lancasterian schools (*enseignement mutuel*) continued to increase; and in 1818, there were sixty-seven in Paris alone: while *les écoles chrétiennes*, founded in the age of Louis XIV. by a religious fraternity called *les Frères des écoles chrétiennes*, received a much larger increase; it being calculated that there were in 1819 about 1000 schools for primary instruction, teaching about 80,000 pupils. When Charles X. came to the throne, new restrictions were imposed upon the Lancasterian schools, and every means used to place all free schools for primary instruction under the immediate management of the Roman catholic clergy. No individual could hold a school, however elementary the instruction, without an express license from *le curé* (rector) of the parish; and the consequence was, that *les écoles pour l'instruction populaire*, con-

ducted by laymen, rapidly declined, while les écoles chrétiennes, conducted under the especial superintendence of *les Frères Ignorantins*, received some extension.* Dupin says, that in 1821, France possessed 996 écoles pour l'instruction populaire, and that in 1826, this number had decreased to 254, or about 73 per cent.

Some idea may be formed of the prevalence of ignorance in France, and consequently of the misery and poverty of the great bulk of the French population, by the following remark of Baron Dupin:—"On a calculé, que sur 25 millions d'adultes, la France n'en compte que dix qui sachent lire et écrire. Il reste donc quinze millions d'individus qui n'ont pas même acquis les premiers élémens de l'instruction la plus vulgaire." If this be true, the stationary condition of French population is sufficiently accounted for; and the fact which Dupin relates, that "two-thirds (twenty millions) of the French people are at this day deprived of the nourishment of animal food, and live wholly on chestnuts, maize, or potatoes," is little surprising.

Since the revolution of July, the French government has been less desirous of founding the safety of the throne upon the false and dangerous basis of popular ignorance, and numerous schools have been established in the provinces, under the title of *L'enseignement mutuel* (upon the Lancasterian

* M. Rollin thus describes the method of instruction followed in these schools:—"The school is divided into several classes. Let the subject of the lesson be—'Dixit dominus domino deo,' &c. One child pronounces the syllable '*Dix-*,' another says '*it*,' and so on. The entire class must be attentive, for the master does not follow any regular order among his scholars in his instruction or examination of them, but passes *ad libitum* from one to the other: when one of them makes a mistake, the master strikes the table with his ferula, and the boy is obliged to pronounce the syllable over again until he is perfect."

plan). The report of M. Cousin, who was officially commissioned to inquire into, and report upon, the system of education pursued in the Prussian free schools, seems to have made a due impression on the government. The French people begin to feel "that knowledge is power;" or, as Stein says, "that it is the cheapest mode of defence;" and that the national decline or prosperity, famine or abundance, must be in accordance with the state and stock of national intelligence. M. Cousin advocates the principle of leaving the conducting of primary instruction in the hands of the clergy, under the persuasion that the clerical order are the most fitted to impart a *religious* education. If party principles and antiquated prejudices are not inculcated in the minds of youth, and due caution is used in the appointment of able teachers, it matters not whether they be clergy or laity. Every education which is pure and moral, and unfolds the means of studying, contemplating, and inquiring into the wondrous works of nature, and the results of liberal science, must be a religious education,—an education which must inculcate religion.

The government have this year voted an addition of 600,000 francs (24,000*l.*) for gratuitous public instruction. Les écoles normales (the schools for the education of teachers) have been extended; and, notwithstanding the opposition of the *Doctrinaires*, who still wish to perpetuate the age of Gothic ignorance, there is every reason to believe that the light of education will take a wider range throughout the monarchy, and the dark ignorance which pervades this land of revolution be progressively dissipated.

Napoleon, with a view of checking the progress of education, and of limiting the sphere of inquiry, imposed a duty of five per cent., under the title of

University duty, on the sum paid for the education of youth in private schools. The proceeds of this tax, or rather the principal portion of them, are allotted to the payment of inspectors, who visit every school once in six months, to examine the scholars, and inspect the general arrangements of the establishments. No individual can hold a school in France, without passing an examination in specially prescribed branches of literature ; and even the most erudite, whose knowledge in some branch of science may be most profound, and who consequently would be a most useful and able teacher, is precluded from holding a school for general education, unless he possesses, in addition, a knowledge of those branches of *classic lore*, which the sages of the university consider indispensable. We shall pronounce no opinion upon this regulation ; it possesses both good and bad qualities ; but it is extremely unpopular in France. The people desire that the channel of instruction may be free, and the parents of the pupils left the sole judges of the capacity of the teacher. The tax of five per cent. they consider as an impost levied by the government, to secure to itself a kind of *surveillance* over the education of youth, and to support inspectors whose services are not required.

Official return of the National Income in 1832.—We shall close these statistical notes of the civil condition of France, by a copy of the official estimate of the national income for 1832,—given with the report of the census made in that year :—

Heads of Income.	Amount in Francs.	Amount in British Sterling.
Net value of all financial property	1,531,508,000	61,300,000
Excess of raw productions, or, revenue of all the agents of cultivation, in- cluding the land-produce used, such as horses, cat- tle, wool, &c.		
Revenue, salaries, and pro- perty of all the agents of commerce and manufac- tures, including all the professions, except those paid by the government,	1,746,511,000	69,700,000
Total	f.6,396,789,000	£255,500,000

The following account of the appropriations of the French soil appeared in *Le Constitutionnel*, February, 1832 :—

“ Sur 52 millions d’hectares,* qui renferment en superficie, la France non compris la Corse,—22,818,000 sont en terres laborables ; 1,977,000 en vignobles ; 359,000 en vergers ; 328,000 en potagers ; 406,000 en chataigneraies ; 975,000 en culture de différens genres autres que les précédentes ; 3,535,000 en paturages ; 3,488,000 en prés ; 6,912,000 en bois taillis ; 460,000 en bois de futaie ; 213,000 en etangs ; 186,000 en marais ; 3,841,000 en terres vagues, landes, et bruyères ; 53,000 en carriers, mines, et tourbières ; 213,000

* The French hectare is equal to about 2:32 English acres.

en batiments; 7,455,000 en routes, rues, places publiques, promenades, rivières, canaux, montagnes steriles, et rochers."

From these details we shall proceed to notice the military and naval force of France.

Military Force.—In means of attack and defence, France possesses, in a military point of view, peculiar advantages over Austria, Prussia, or Russia. Her wide extent of sea-coast, and her natural barriers towards the Spanish and the Swiss territories, enable her to dispense with a military force as a protection against foreign attack in the south and west; while her internal means of intimate communication with her principal military posts,—“Paris in the north, Metz and Lyons in the east, Tours in the west, and Toulon in the south, being all connected by canals and other means of inland navigation,”—enable her rapidly to collect her military forces, and direct them with powerful effect to her vulnerable points in the north and east.

During the reigns of Henry IV. and Louis XIII. the military force of France seldom surpassed 80,000 men. From the era of the siege of Metz by Charles V. until the reign of Louis XIV., no general had commanded a French army of 50,000 men.* It was during the reign of the latter, that the potent levers of France displayed their energy. In the days of Turenne and le Grand Condé, as in the war of 1689, the effective military force of France amounted to 400,000 men; a force greater than the united armies of the confederated powers of Austria, Great Britain, the United Provinces, Spain, Savoy, &c. At the era of the successful Flemish campaigns of the famed Marshals de Saxe and Vauban, (1744—48,) the military force of

* Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV.

France mustered 480,000 men, a number which was exceeded at no period previous to the war of the revolution. "At the end of the year 1791, the French infantry consisted of 105 regiments, of two battalions each; 14 battalions of light troops; and 170 battalions of national volunteers. By the decree of the 5th May, 1792, the number of volunteer battalions was raised to 200, and the strength of each increased from 226 to 800 men. The cavalry was composed of 12 regiments of chasseurs of four squadrons, 24 regiments of heavy cavalry of three squadrons, 18 regiments of dragoons of three squadrons, 2 regiments of carbiniers of four squadrons, and 6 regiments of hussars of three squadrons each; in all, 206 squadrons;—so that the total strength of the French army at this period did not exceed 160,000 infantry, 35,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery."*

The revolution, however, had not yet developed its energies. The decrees of the 23d August, and 5th September, 1793, had hurried the whole French youth to the frontiers; and the official state of the force of the French armies, on the 5th of April, 1794, presents an aggregate of 794,334 men, exclusive of the army of the interior, whose head-quarters were at Paris. This was perhaps the most formidable army that Europe had ever yet seen; it was, however, far surpassed during the following year:—"In the month of March, 1795, France had ten armies in the field, the active force of which amounted to 449,930 combatants; besides 120,850 in garrison, and 338,450 sick, prisoners, or detached; in all, 959,190 men."

But this state of exertion was too violent to be of long continuance; and neither the population of the country, nor its exhausted resources, were sufficient to maintain so enormous a force. Accord-

* *Encyclopædia Britannica*, new edition.

ingly, in the succeeding years of the republic, the aggregate of the different armies seldom exceeded 480,000 effective men, and generally fell short of this number. But when Napoleon had mounted the throne, and had organised the system of conscription, he obtained an unlimited command over the whole of that part of the population capable of bearing arms; and, as he acted on Cato's principle of making the war support itself, he, on most occasions, was enabled to take the field with a predominating superiority of numbers. "The French army, in 1805, amounted to 341,412 infantry of the line; 100,130 light infantry; 77,488 cavalry; 46,489 artillery, and 5445 engineers;—making a total of 650,964 men. But this establishment was afterwards greatly increased; and it is calculated that, at the time of the Russian campaign, there were in dépôts, in the hospitals, and in the field, not less than 1,200,000 men; of whom about 850,000 might be considered as effective."* The confederate army, which marched under the banner of Napoleon in his Russian expedition, surpassed 750,000; of which about 400,000 were *French* soldiers. The total number of the grand army that actually entered Russia, was 613,000;† which was little more than half the number of troops in the pay of the French government. Thus, after the almost total annihilation of this army, in the Russian campaign, the French had still a large reserve, with which Napoleon made so bold a stand in the campaign of 1813.

After severe losses in Poland, Prussia, and Saxony, the effective army numbered, at the commencement of the year 1814, 520,000 men; there were also 122,000 wounded and disabled soldiers on the pension list, and about 160,000 prisoners;

* Encyclopædia Britannica, new edition.

† The second edition of le Marquis de Chambéry's *Philosophie de la Guerre*.

in all, 802,000 men.* From 1815 to 1830, the ordinary peace establishment was rated at 279,000 men, but it seldom exceeded 200,000; and at the era of the late revolution, the *actual* number in service and receiving pay, did not quite reach 160,000 men.† From this era, the army was rapidly recruited; and on the 31st December, 1830, the total effective army was 272,839 men. In December, 1831, it was 398,000 men. On the 31st December, 1832, it had attained the immense strength of 426,733; and the force voted for 1833 (budget presented 1832) was 410,000 men. This force, however, from the probability of the continuance of peace, and the necessity of vigorous economy in the management of the state affairs, the French ministry propose immediately to reduce to 286,000 men; “bien,” as Marshal Soult says, “qu’il soit pénétré de la nécessité de ne point faire descendre, pour l’état de paix, cet effectif au-dessous de 310,000 hommes.” This reduction is to be made principally in the infantry, artillery, commissariat, and baggage train; by a small diminution in the gend’armerie, but scarcely any in the cavalry.‡

The principal feature in the new military regulations of the French army, (*rapport semi-confidentiel du Ministre de la guerre*, May, 1833,) is, to retain, in imitation of the Prussian plan, a large reserved disciplined force, liable to active military service, without the expense of maintaining it

* Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

† The actual force on the muster-roll in July, 1830, was 199,360 men; but of these about 40,000 men were *en congé*, forming a sort of reserve without pay. There were also about 25,000 absent from France on the Algerine expedition.

‡ The French army embraces sixty-five regiments of infantry of the line, of four battalions, and twenty regiments of light infantry, of three battalions to each regiment,—each battalion numbering 800 men. By the new regulation, it is proposed to reduce every regiment to three battalions, being the same number

during peace. By the present law, the French conscript is required to serve seven years: this term of service the minister proposes to divide thus:—"The new levies of each year are to remain three years in active service (*sous le drapeau*); that is to say, the second, third, and fourth after the call.* Their continuance in active service during the fifth year will depend on circumstances—the state of the army, its actual force, &c. At this point their services will virtually cease, being added, during the sixth and seventh years, to the reserve, without pay, and allowed to return home and devote themselves to active employment, but subject to rejoin the ranks on being required. At the expiration of the seventh year, they will receive *leurs congés de libération*."

Le Duc de Dalmatie (Soult) proposes to commence the formation of this army of reserve, by an immediate transfer of from 100,000 to 130,000 men from the effective army of the present year, and to add to it, conformably with the foregoing regulations, 70,000 men in 1834;† forming an im-

as before the late recruitments. There are fifty regiments of regular cavalry, each numbering 900, but mounting only 700 men.

2	Regiments de Carabiniers,	}	Reserve.
10	ditto Cuirassiers,		
12	ditto Dragons,	}	Cavalerie du Line.
6	ditto Lanciers,		
14	ditto Chasseurs,	}	Cavalerie Legères.
6	ditto Hussars,		

Total, 50 Regiments, exclusive of Gensd'armerie, Horse Artillery, &c.

* The levies will not be practically enforced until the second year after the call; that is to say, the levy of 1833 will not figure in the army until 1834.

† The precise number cannot, of course, be defined; for, although the actual number of men voted for the service of the year 1833 is 410,000 men, and it is proposed to reduce them to 286,000—being a reduction of 124,000, to form the reserve; yet it cannot be presumed that the actual army numbers precisely its voted complement.

mediate reserved force of from 180,000 to 200,000 men. This force, he calculates, will progressively increase, and attain, in 1838, the number of 300,000 men,—“ toujours disponibles, toujours susceptibles de se mouvoir, en vertu d’une ordonnance royale, au premier ordre du ministre de la guerre.” He then proceeds to state the prospective military force of France, which may be immediately brought into active service, thus :—

Effective army*	310,000
Reserve	300,000
Garde Nationale mobilisée†	270,000

Total military force in 1838, 880,000 men.

Such is the system proposed by Marshal Soult ; a system, to which, in a military point of view, he is believed to be personally opposed,‡ but in which, from motives of economy, he is induced to concur.§ In addition to this force, la Garde Nationale sédentaire, subject to military service in the towns or districts only to which it is attached, and numbering in its ranks, (with the exception of the peasants, and a few others,) all the able-bodied male population of France, from the age of

* The real effective army is to be, as we have before stated, 286,000 men. It is only nominally 310,000.

† La Garde Nationale mobilisée is composed of those who have volunteered their services to the government, to do duty on any part of the French soil. There is not at present any law to compel the National Guard to move from the spot to which they belong.

‡ *Courrier*, Paris journal, May, 1833.

§ These regulations have not as yet been carried into complete execution. The troubled state of France has induced the ministry to maintain the effective army during the present year at 341,779 men, which includes a corps of reserve, amounting to 25,370 men. But as it is fully understood to be the intention of the government to adopt the above plans as early as circumstances permit, we have noted them as forming the principles on which the peace establishment will be in future maintained.

twenty to sixty years,—forms a militia of about 2,900,000 men. This force, which, besides serving as a fruitful resource for recruiting the army with disciplined soldiers, relieves the government from the necessity of providing a military force for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, and hence enables it to send a greater portion of the effective army into the field.

Naval Force.—The French marine, first raised to importance by the vast efforts of Louis XIV., was, during a portion of his reign, decidedly dominant in Europe. In 1690, the French fleet, consisting of sixty-three ships of the line, seven frigates, thirty-six vessels armed en flute, and fourteen cutters, under the command of the famed Tourville, defeated the combined fleets of England and Holland, *within sight of the British coast (off Beechy-head)*. It however experienced a signal defeat off La Hogue (1692), by which France lost that naval ascendancy which she has never to this day regained. In 1704, however, she was enabled to meet the combined British and Dutch fleets, with fifty ships of the line, eight frigates, and nine fire ships; but ere the end of that war, her naval power was nearly annihilated by the combined fleets of England and Holland. During the long peace which succeeded the treaty of Utrecht, but especially during the administration of Le Cardinal de Fleury, her navy received no accession of force; and her marine was so completely swept away by the British fleets during the war of 1741, that at the peace of Aix la Chapelle (1748), France counted but one single ship of the line in her navy.* The dearly bought experience of the fatal effects of neglecting the navy, stimulated the French government to vigorous efforts to improve its marine

* Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XV.*

during the eight years of peace which succeeded. In the year 1755 (the year preceding the outburst of the seven years' war) the naval calendar of France contained the names of ninety-five ships, mounting from fifty to 120 guns, and 142 frigates and small craft.* Of these, forty-seven ships and eighty-four frigates, sloops, brigs, &c. were captured or destroyed by the British force during the seven years' war. After 1763, France enjoyed a continental peace during nearly thirty years, and her navy received a great accession of strength. In the maritime war with Great Britain in 1778, she was enabled, for a season, aided by the talents of the Comte de Grasse, to contend effectually against England for the supremacy of the seas, until Rodney, by his signal victory, dispelled the illusive hopes of the court of France, and changed its vaunting into grief. From the peace of 1783 to the war of the French revolution, France made vigorous and successful efforts to repair her naval force; and at the commencement of the war in 1793, her navy consisted of seventy-three ships of the line, sixty-seven frigates, sloops, &c., twenty-nine armed brigs, nineteen cutters, and seven gun-boats, exclusive of hospital ships, store-ships, &c. Nearly the whole of this navy, with the ships built during the war, was captured or destroyed by the British fleet ere the peace of 1814.† Since this date she has been slowly, but progressively, adding to her marine force; and on the 1st January 1833, her effective navy consisted of thirty-

* The only ship of 120 guns in the French navy, at this date, was the *St. Louis*. The next in force was *l'Océan*, mounting eighty guns; all the rest were inferior. We doubt the accuracy of this list; it is however, taken from a work published in 1763, entitled "*The State of France*," which contains the entire list of the French navy, as copied from an official document.

† From 1800 to 1815, the British fleets captured or destroyed sixty-three ships of the line, eighty-two frigates, and seventeen corvettes.

one sail of the line, thirty-seven frigates, and 209 vessels of inferior force.*

Every man who enters into the commercial marine is registered in the department to which he belongs, and is liable to be called into the naval service, to serve the government during seven years, when he may claim his *congé de liberation*. This is certainly a forced service, but it is decidedly superior to the *barbarous system* frequently practised to man the British navy.

Revenue.—France, during many centuries, surpassed Great Britain in extent of revenue and pecuniary resources. At the accession of Louis XIV. her annual state income amounted to about 3,500,000*l.*, being about double the revenues of Charles and James II. At his death, in 1715, it somewhat exceeded 8,000,000*l.*; at the close of the seven years' war in 1763, it amounted to 13,000,000*l.* At the era of the revolution 1789, Neckar, in the finance accounts, presented to the states-general on the 5th May of that year, calculated the revenue at 475,000,000 of francs, about 19,300,000*l.* After the treaty of Vienna in 1809, the revenue of the *French empire* reached 1,100,000,000 francs (De Pradt) about 45,500,000*l.* At the restoration, in 1814, the minister of finance estimated the revenue of France for the ensuing year at 547,000,000 francs, or 21,900,000*l.* In 1826 it had been swelled, by additional taxes, to 976,48,000 francs, about 38,100,000*l.* In 1831, the year following the late revolution, it was in-

* Sir James Graham stated, in his speech on the navy estimates, April 1833, that the French navy consisted of thirty-one sail of the line, thirty-seven frigates, &c. We have another account before us, which states the present French naval force to consist of 277 vessels of various sizes; of which thirty-four are classed as ships of the line, and fifty-three as frigates. The difference between these statements arises from a different method of classing the ships.

creased, by temporary taxes, to about 1,122,000,000 francs.* These taxes have, however, in part been repealed; and M. Humann, in his report on the budget for 1834, estimates the receipts for the forthcoming year at 1,000,244,000 francs, about 39,600,000*l*.†

The heads of revenue under which this sum is collected, and the estimated produce, are as under:

	Francs.
Droits directs, including le foncier (land and house tax), la contribution mobilière, taxe sur les portes et fenêtres, supplement to l'impôt foncier, taxe personnelle (capitation tax), &c. &c.	400,000,000
Droits indirects (customs and excise) which attach to a variety of articles of consumption; also the tobacco and salt monopolies, &c. &c.	330,000,000
Post-office and post <i>patentes</i> ,	25,000,000
Stamps, including droits d'enregistrement, domaniales, and a variety of other receipts, including the lottery,	150,000,000
Patentes aux maisons de jeu (gaming houses), sale of wood from the public forests, &c. &c.	95,000,000

Total estimated produce for 1834, *f*.1,000,000,000

* The public income of France was—

	Francs.
In 1819,	808,312,572
1820,	875,352,252
1821,	882,321,289
1822,	949,134,984
1823,	1,092,094,282
1824,	951,994,200
1825,	946,948,411
1826,	976,948,919
1827,	915,729,742
1828,	872,746,938
1829,	1,021,714,602
1830,	1,177,000,000
1831,	1,122,197,435

† This sum includes 20,000,000 francs, which M. Humann proposed to levy, by an additional duty on alcohol, and other spirits and beer; but as the opposition in the chambers resisted the additional tax, the minister relinquished his intention, therefore the revenue for the year 1834 will probably not exceed 980,000,000 francs.

Public Debt.—Before we proceed to lay before our readers a detail of the French expenditure, it will be necessary to notice the amount and annual charge for the public debt.

Previous to the revolution of 1789, the public debt of France amounted to about 6,400,000,000*f.* or 250,000,000*l.*, and absorbed upwards of a moiety of the annual revenues for the payment of its interest and management. The councils which directed public affairs, immediately succeeding the outburst of the revolution, composed of men of hateful and turbulent passions, who, while vaunting of their high principles of national honour, were little scrupulous about the preservation of the national faith; with a zeal for injustice, robbery, and plunder, which has never been exceeded in history, effaced the record of the state obligations from the great book of the national accounts. Napoleon, from deficient credit, effected but few loans during his long wars; but at the restoration in 1814, the sums due for arrears of pay, and supplies to the army, navy, &c., were extremely heavy. At this period also, the claimants under the old regime obtained the restitution of a portion of their property, and the inscriptions progressively entered on *le grand livre*, amounted, in 1816, to 1,901,000,000*f.*, about 78,000,000*l.* sterling. The progressively admitted claims of individuals, and the loans contracted from 1816 to 1825, added 1,998,787,220*f.* to the debt, which, on the 1st January 1826, amounted to 3,900,000,000*f.*, or 157,000,000*l.* sterling.* Since that period the loans contracted by the government have added about 1,200,000,000*f.* to the national obligations; making the total amount of the funded debt in 1833, including the sinking fund, 5,135,000,000*f.*, or about 205,000,000*l.* There is, however, in addition to this sum, a large

* Balbi.

amount of debt under the title of la dette viagère (life annuities), which very considerably swells the annual charge, so that the total sum required for interest, annuities, and sinking fund, is about 365,000,000*f.* or 14,400,000*l.*; from this sum, however, should be deducted the sinking fund, about 73,400,000 *f.* or 2,500,000*l.*, leaving the net annual charge at 11,900,000*l.*

Expenditure.—We now proceed to notice the heads of the public disbursement, which are as follows :—

	British sterling.
Interest and management of the public debt, . . .	14,400,000
Collection of the revenue—(ministre de finance)	4,800,000
Army—(departement de la guerre)*	8,900,000
Navy—(ministre de la marine)	2,100,000
Civil government—(ministre du commerce et des travaux publiques) formerly ministre d'intérieur }	5,500,000
Ministre de culte et de l'instruction publique— (public worship and education) }	1,290,000
Civil list and pensions	675,000
Ministre des affaires étrangères,	243,000
Other miscellaneous expenses,	1,274,000
<hr/>	
Total expenditure †	£39,182,000

* The vote for 1833, was 316,643,006 francs; and for 1834, 226,600,000 francs; being a reduction of about 90,000,000 francs, or 3,600,000*l.*

† The total expenditure for the year 1834 is estimated by le ministre de finance at 999,140,000 francs, which at the exchange of 25-50, is equal to 39,182,000*l.*

SECTION II.—FRENCH POLITICS.

FROM this general outline of French Statistics, we turn to view the character of the French people, and the political condition of France.

Brief review of the political state of France.—It was during the dark ages of barbaric tyranny, while Europe was engulfed in sluggish ignorance, and feudal rights were acknowledged, from the traditionary awe of the common people for the power of their political chiefs, that despotism found its charms, and slavery its votaries. But when the wide spread of intellectual light awoke the reasoning faculties of men to a sense of their degraded condition, the question of civil rights began to be discussed, and the injustice of the antiquated social system made clear to the meanest capacity.

It was this gradual development of intelligence in an improving age, which was the prelude to those contests between the few but powerful advocates of feudal and aristocratical despotism on the one side, and the numerous but less favoured modern claimants for an equality of civil rights on the other, which, during the last forty years, have scarcely ceased to distract France with civil discord.

During such a period, which may be fairly termed a period of transition from an ancient to a modern state of civil society, a government, always biased in favour of a long established political plan of rule, is exposed to the severest trials, and is popularly held forth as an institution at enmity with the well-being of the people. In such cases its safety is best consulted by freely allowing the force of the dominant national feeling to influence its actions; for it may be taken as a general principle,

that if a government attempts to rule in opposition to the prevailing inclination of the people, whether the motive be good or evil, it becomes a species of despotism, which, in a society advanced to a certain degree in civilization, must occasion a contest between the governors and the governed; which contest can but terminate with revolution; and, to use Dumont's words, "the violence of this revolution exactly corresponds with the degree of misgovernment which produced it; the reaction is exactly proportionate to the pressure, the vengeance to the provocation."

These truths have been forcibly illustrated in France. She indeed may be termed the country of revolutions; for in addition to the political causes by which they have been fomented, the love of change operates so powerfully with the French people, that revolutions have become *indigenous* to her soil.

Doubtless the innate disposition of the French people has powerfully contributed to the instability of their government; their vain, credulous, vacillating and irritable temperament, coupled with that love for military glory for which they are so distinguished, having greatly retarded the consolidation of their social compact, since the era of their first revolution. Always in extremes, and impatient of restraint, they enter headlong into wild political theories, vainly seeking to consummate, by acts of sudden and deadly violence, that social bond of political justice and rational liberty which can but grow with the moral improvement of the nation, and mature with the increasing confidence of the public in the institutions of the state. The effect of these deficiencies in the natural disposition of the French has been and must continue during a long course of years, to be grievously felt. The fault is wide-spread; it is the attribute of both the governors and the governed. Since the downfall of

absolutism in 1789, the representative body have never exercised but a weak control over the national mind ; there has been no mutual confidence between the government and the subject ; no practical appeal to the people, founded upon the broad principle of political justice, to confide in the national institutions. All has been distrust and anarchy : party hired to destroy party ; and the authority of the successive administrations supported or annihilated in accordance with the preponderance of force, brute force, possessed by the contending factions.

Thus we have seen France snatched from the oppression of despotism, hurled into the chaos of democratic license, and her social bonds rent asunder — *ab imperio popularis tyrannidis* — after raising on the ruins of monarchy a republic of popular discordance ; dispersing to the winds even the ashes of their departed sovereign ; proclaiming, even from the sanctuary of justiciary courts, the wages of treason against those who should but whisper the probability of the restoration ; and writing on the walls, in characters so large that those who run might read, awful denunciations against the advocates of even the monarchical *form* of government. We have seen her, after vainly endeavouring to preserve, even the symbol of her immaculate republic, abolish, in a few short years, every vestige of its existence, and raise anew despotic power on its ruins. Again, after an interval passed amid the din of arms, the miseries of war, and the vain glories of conquest, the newly chosen prototype of modern despotism, who, by the dazzling success of his military trophies had risen to the highest point of mundane authority, is deserted by the nation, bereft of his sceptre, and the once proscribed dynasty re-invited to the throne. Scarcely was the restoration effected, when constitutional monarchy was again subverted, and the imperial

dynasty re-established ; but, after a short interval, with a rapidity surpassing any historical instance, despotic power was once more subdued, and constitutional government restored. Such, with many less fundamental changes in the principles of the government, have been the successive conflicts between the governors and the governed.

The period of contention, however, had not yet run its course. A representative council was established, and a mixture of democracy infused into the governing system. A democracy which raised the jealousy of the court, and created schism in the relations of the commonalty and the privileged classes. Louis XVIII. determined to impair the force of this democratical influence, and, by a violent exertion of prerogative, obtained a law which gave a double influence or vote in elections to landed proprietors, paying more than 500 francs per annum, direct taxes ; and although this class formed a minority in the roll of electors, the law, in fact, limited the elective franchise to it, and was hence calculated to enable the court to secure, by unworthy means, a majority in the legislative council.

Progress of disaffection, which led to the Revolution of July.—Since the era of the restoration, the French people had always viewed the throne of the Bourbons as imposed upon them by foreign bayonets ; and many of the leading members of the liberal party confidently anticipated the recurrence of an opportunity, when the nation would concur in one general conspiracy to subvert it. There were, however, few opportunities of appealing to the passions of the people : the law forbids the assemblage of more than thirty persons in any place, either public or private, without permission from the police ; and thus no means were open

for the people to declare their sentiments, discuss or canvass the measures of the government, and petition for the redress of grievances. The press, however, offered the channel of communicating to the nation the gradual encroachments of the court on the freedom of election, and the probable subversion of the remaining influence of the liberal party on state affairs ; it was through its instrumentality that the nucleus of disaffection, already grafted on the French people by the mere manner in which the restoration was effected, rapidly enlarged its circle, and diffused a widely spread influence throughout all the different branches of the social compact.

The fall of Villele indicated the progress of popular resistance to the mandates of the court party ; and the dissolution of the national guard of Paris was an evidence of the fears of the government as to the progress of public opinion. When Charles X. came to the throne, it became tolerably evident that the government must either be conducted with more deference to the prejudices of the people in favour of liberal measures, or that it must sink into absolute despotism. That the chamber of deputies must either be a clear index of the public mind, or become the mere register of the commands of the court.

Le Prince de Polignac, who, from his consanguinity to the king, possessed considerable influence in the courtly councils, was appointed ambassador at the court of London. His ambition was to have succeeded M. Villele in 1827, and negotiations were opened with influential men of different opinions to form the projected administration. The idea was, that he could become "the centre of a ministry of coalition : " however, the old and profound unpopularity of the *name* of Polignac, blasted all negotiation in its germ, and he was, for the present, contented to represent the

French king at the court of London. The political views of Prince Polignac seem to have been in exact accordance with those of the British cabinet, respecting the state of affairs in the east of Europe; and the line of policy to which he was disposed respecting the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman empire, then struggling within the mor-tiferous grasp of Russia, was calculated to cause his appointment to the head of affairs to be highly satisfactory to the British government.

Polignac, during his embassy to this country, seems to have well studied the system by which a majority was obtained in the British House of Commons. He saw that England retained but the *shadow* of a representative constitution, that the substance was *gone*, effaced by the *mock plan* of popular elections; and, on his attaining to the object of his ambition, and entering on his high functions, in conjunction with MM. Labourdon-naye, Bourmont, and other colleagues, equally opposed with himself, to democratic principles and deference to the public will, he exultingly ex-claims, “*Nous gouvernerons à la Wellington* ;” *— that is to say, in substance, “ We will obtain a majority in the Chambers by means similar to those practised by the British government; we will preserve the constitution in *name*, provided we can destroy it in *spirit*.” This was a deter-mined declaration of war against the fundamental principles of the constitution. M. Polignac was determined to subtract all political power from the people; and, while pretending to observe the forms of the constitution, to centre irresponsible power in the crown, by securing a majority in the Cham-bers by court intrigues.

The constitutional and liberal parties were active in spreading the alarm, and sounding the tocsin

* *Le Globe*, Paris journal, August 31, 1829.

throughout the nation. They saw the danger of the conspiracy formed against the constitution, and determined, by every *legal* means, to avert it. M. Martignac and the adherents of the old ministry joined their forces to the liberal party, and obliged the Polignac administration to try the effect of their *chicaning upon public liberties*, in a new election.

An opportunity was thus given to make a vigorous stand against the attacks of the "Ultra Doctrinaires." The press declaimed vehemently against the machinations of Polignac, and the liberals strained every nerve to secure a majority on their side. The result of the elections, as is well known, was favourable to the liberal and *juste milieu*, or moderate party, who were thus enabled to disconcert the measures of the government. A second appeal to the people produced no better success; and the ministry, in blind and fatal ignorance of the influence of the public feeling, and the civil convulsions and disorders which were likely to result from these intrigues, determined on abolishing the freedom of the press—the only monitor of the state of affairs—laying prostrate the constitutional rights of election, and depriving liberty of the power of expressing itself by any other means than by tumult and insurrection.

This was the *nisus* of the revolution. It was evident that rational justice and constitutional debate had lost their power, in the predetermination of the court to enforce its mandates. Nothing remained, therefore, but an appeal to arms; and then came the opportunity, so long contemplated by the liberals, of calling into action the military ardour of the people, and directing it against a government, popularly, but unjustly, denounced as "the monument of foreign oppression." M. Sarrans, in his late work, entitled, "Lafayette and the Revolution," pretends, that the design of

the revolution of 1830 is dated many years back ; he says that Lafitte had seriously entertained the idea of it since 1817 ; that from this date, the liberal party had been secretly planning and fomenting a conspiracy against the throne ; or, to use the French phraseology, had been playing “ *une comédie de quinze ans*,” of which the revolution was but “ *le dénouement*.” This, however, is discredited by the great majority of those who are well informed as to the secret springs of the revolution. It was the progress of disaffection to the government, proceeding chiefly from the peculiar circumstances which led to the restoration of the proscribed branch of the Bourbons, fanned into flame by the singularly false course of policy pursued by the regnant administration. On the other hand, the author of “ *Gallomania*” says : “ Undeniable evidences of a premeditated and formidable conspiracy were discovered on the persons arrested on the 28th (the second of the three days) ; tickets of secret societies, which intimated an extensive organization, and pointed out the allotted rallying points ; printed orders of the day, where the different manœuvres necessary were communicated with precision, the construction of barricades, the mode of engaging the troops without risk, by firing from windows, and all other arrangements of war in the street. No kind of detail was forgotten or neglected in these orders. They proved the existence of a plan, *long matured* and *meditated*, and the military experience of its authors.”

State of Parties at the revolution.—The social polity of France, thus loosened by the turbulence of revolution, the dominant party in the state assumed the right of dictating to the nation the prospective plan of government. There were two branches of this party : the liberal monarchists, of which Lafitte was the leader ; and the republicans ;

headed by Lafayette. It was these associated branches of the liberal party who principally figured in the revolution of July, and who raised Louis Philippe to the throne. The ulterior views of Lafayette, who headed the committee of l'Hotel de Ville, were presumed to favour the re-establishment of a republic, to which form of government, it is well known, he was personally favourable. His views of a republic, however, did not extend to its re-establishment in France: he knew the popular attachment of the French people to the pageantry of a court; their habitual instability of character; and the opposition which a republican form of government would encounter from the other great continental powers. He was, therefore, ready to forego the institution of a republican government in *form*, provided he could obtain it in *spirit*; and hence he conceived the visionary notion of "*un trone environné d'institutions republicaines.*" The committee of the "Hotel de Ville" was, however, divided in opinion as to the propriety of proclaiming a republican government; and while deliberating on the subject, Lafayette introducing Louis Philippe to the committee, presents him, as an emblem, with the observation, "*voila messieurs la meilleur des republicues.*" This shews that Lafayette was averse to the establishment of a republican *form* of government in France; but it was upon the condition that the government should be conducted upon republican principles, that the crown was offered to Louis Philippe, who, as *Lafayette asserts*, promised a full observance of such principles in the general arrangements of the state.

Pledges of Louis Philippe.—The pledges which Louis Philippe made to the committee of the "Hotel de Ville" have never been clearly defined; and whatever they might be, it is tolerably certain that

they were but *vague* and *general*. From the extreme difficulty of affairs at this crisis, and the embarrassments which have resulted from these promises, whatever they may have been, it is a matter purely problematical whether Louis Philippe acted wisely in submitting to such general conditions. Had he refused to subscribe to the terms proposed by this notable committee, Lafayette and his party would probably have laid aside their first scruples as to the establishment of a republic; the proclamation, announcing the formation of a republican government, with Lafayette as president, would have openly appeared; and it is not improbable that intimidation would have succeeded in obtaining the sanction of the Chamber of Deputies to the measure.*

The evils which would have resulted from such a proceeding, need only be mentioned to be admitted. The Carlist party, although by no means so strong as was generally represented, would yet have formed an able auxiliary to the despotic governments of Europe, whose hostility was to be seriously anticipated. The tragic drama of 1792-3 would thus have been renewed, and the maintenance of liberal institutions endangered. On the other hand, had Louis Philippe, refusing to treat with the committee of l'Hotel de Ville, waited for the decision of the Chambers, and in the meantime held the reins of government as lieutenant-general du royaume, to which office he had been called by Lafitte and the liberal party, it is more than probable that he would have been called to fill the throne independent of a personal compromise as to any special system of government. However, Louis Philippe had to "choose between a crown

* M. Sarrans says, "that a proclamation had been drawn up announcing the formation of a republic, with Lafayette as president.

and a passport," and it is not easy to decide whether, in times of such popular commotion and extreme difficulty, the citizen king did right or wrong in giving any pledges as to his future plan of government, being conscious that his ability to redeem them must entirely depend on the predominant opinions in the Chambers.*

Le Duc de Broglie's administration.—The composition of the newly elected chamber was ill suited to enable the king to conduct the government upon the plan dictated by the liberals. The *doctrinaires*, or monarchists, commanded a majority; a party, as their title implies, directly opposed to a republic, either in form or spirit. In spite, therefore, of his declared principles, Louis Philippe was obliged to choose his ministers from this party; a measure which ensured a vigorous opposition from the republicans, and liberals who had raised him to the throne. The Duc de Broglie, the present minister for foreign affairs, was appointed president of the council, and the inferior gradations of the ministry filled by men strongly disposed to resist the encroachments of liberalism in France. Nevertheless, the ministry were determined to oppose any interference with the new order of things by foreign governments,

* On Wednesday the 28th July, M. Oudart, the private secretary of the duchess d'Orleans, carried a message from Lafitte to the duke (Louis Philippe) to beware of the "*nets of St. Cloud*." His royal highness, therefore, slept that night in a concealed kiosque (a sort of tent) in his park at Neuilly. On Thursday, when the Bourbon forces were defeated, a message was sent to his royal highness, telling him he must choose between a crown and a passport: he did not choose a passport, but came to Paris on Friday night, when he was called to the office of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. It was on Saturday morning that his consent was given to accept the office, in conformity with the advice of Prince Talleyrand.—*See M. Sarrans.*

and proceeded rapidly to place the country in a condition to repel attack. The army, which at the era of the revolution scarcely exceeded 160,000 men, was rapidly recruited, and progressively augmented, until it reached its maximum, or 426,000 men (see page 57). La garde nationale, which, from the period of the administration of Villele had been reduced, and before the fall of Charles X. entirely disbanded, was re-organised *en masse*, and rapidly armed by purchases from the French and English manufactories: but pecuniary embarrassments, from the difficulty of raising the means to meet the large expenditure of the government, were severely felt, and the threatening aspect of affairs, and the dangerous principle so largely acted upon of associating the citizen and the soldier depreciated the credit of the state, and rendered it a matter of great difficulty to contract a loan.

It was evident that the demands of the state could not be supplied, and the newly raised throne supported, but by ostensibly adopting a pacific course, and discouraging the military ardour of the people to enter headlong into a contest with the absolute states. Le Duc de Broglie's course was extremely difficult; his object was not to provoke hostilities by open intimidation, while he aimed at obtaining the recognition of the citizen king, by secretly influencing the public mind in favour of the recent revolution. With this view emissaries were sent to Spain, to Poland, to Belgium, to Italy, and to the Rhenish provinces; agents, with considerable sums, were hurried off to Belgium and the Rhine; and Lafayette and others were authorised to communicate with Menotti in northern Italy. These operations appear to have been carried on under the *tacit* sanction of the government; and Louis Philippe is charged with having, from his own private purse, expended large sums

in forwarding them.* On the attainment of the grand object of these measures, "the recognition of the citizen king by the leading continental powers," the government determined to check the popular effusions of liberalism, and to consolidate the newly organised throne by a more marked deference to the absolute courts. This course was little calculated to obtain favour with a people flushed with the success of victory, zealous in the cause of national freedom, and highly desirous of carrying liberalism into the dark labyrinths of despotic rule; they viewed the course adopted, as a mean truckling to the shrine of absolutism, a symbol of fear, and a practical negative of the principles upon which the throne of July was established, and "loudly demanded that France should advance her popular principles to the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the southern slopes of the Alps, and there exhibiting herself as an arbitress, should guarantee to the people who wished to be free the power to become so, and to those who preferred absolute power the enjoyment of their chains."† Such a system, however, could not meet the sanction of the doctrinaires, and hence the exterior policy of the French court was confined to a pacific course.‡

* Gallomania.

† Sarrans, p. 321.

‡ The republican party considered the French revolution decisive as to the fate of Spain, and Lafayette wanted to connect the cause of France with that of the Spanish liberals. "He thought that while this would wash out the stain of the armed intervention of 1823, it would, at the same time, relieve France of the necessity of maintaining 30 or 40,000 men on the Pyrenees, to prevent Ferdinand and the Carlists from exciting insurrectionary movements in the south of France." The French government seemed not unfavourable to this project, and "at its secret invitation the Spanish refugees assembled in Britain were called into France. Valdez, Lafo, Navarelle, Ingladu, and other revolutionary chiefs received passports at Paris, on the demand of the sub-prefect for the Pyrenees. The government contributed largely to the 1,000,000*f.* which was collected for the Spanish committee; and

Scarcely was the first shock of the revolution past, when the Belgic insurrection started up, and exhibited in the distance, the long predicted separation of the kingdom of the Netherlands. As a tribute to popular feeling in favour of the spread of liberalism, the government declared it should not be interfered with. The event was a subject of deep anxiety to those governments which, at so great a sacrifice, had succeeded in detaching the Flemish provinces from France, and annexing them to Holland. They considered it as a sure prelude to their reunion with the French monarchy, and to the entire subversion of the political equilibrium established by the treaty of Vienna. However, by this time the military force of France had been immensely augmented; she was too strong to be cut down by a *coup de main*; and the great powers, being ill prepared to enter on an immediate contest with so powerful an adversary, acquiesced, upon the assurance that France entertained no views of aggrandizement at the expense of Belgian independence, and in the hope that a demi-reunion of the states would be peaceably accomplished, by the election of the prince of Orange to fill the vacant throne.

This cession to French principles was accompanied by the manifestos of the triple alliance, de-

it was on the security of the government that Calaz, the Spanish banker, at Paris, advanced 500,000*f.* It was with the tacit authority of government that the agent of the committee at Marseilles embarked men and arms for general Torrijos. Guizot had an interview with Ingladu, the old aide-de-camp of Torrijos, when he put into his hands the 190 four-guinea-pieces destined for colonel Valdez, who was established, with his *dépôt*, at Ustaritz. All the Parisian volunteers who fell into the hands of the Spaniards after the invasion took place, were furnished with *feuilles de route* by order of the sub-prefect of Bayonne. Finally, the French crown gave 100,000*f.* to aid the success of the Spanish revolutionary expedition, and that sum was converted into two letters of credit of 50,000*f.* each, of which one was given to the unfortunate Torrijos.—*Sarrans*, ii. 33—35.

claring that it would oppose any further measures on the part of the French government, tending to weaken or subvert the "continental system," and requiring that republican principles should be discouraged in the domestic policy of France. It was the assent to these requisitions, which has probably influenced the French court in its subsequent system of national and foreign policy; and which, in a great measure, accounts for the absence of vigour in its political plans, and for the little sympathy observed towards the liberals of Europe.

The liberal and republican party, excluded from office by the current of events, were highly incensed at the course pursued, and the seeming absence of gratitude, on the part of the king, towards those who had raised him to the throne; and the Duc de Broglie's government, unable to withstand the vigorous opposition maintained, sunk under the accustomed unpopularity attaching to office.

Lafitte's administration.—Lafitte, who had rendered such essential services to the crown, succeeded the Duc de Broglie as president of the council; and the liberal party, now in power, were desirous of extending the principle acted upon in the Belgian case, by forbidding foreign interference in the Italian dissensions. This gave rise to open discordance between the king and his responsible advisers. Louis Philippe was mindful of the assurances made to the Austrian court, and knew that an open espousal of the cause of the Italian liberals would be viewed by the triple alliance as "*an act of aggression.*" The state of parties in France, the discordance of the social compact, and the full expectation that the Carlists would eagerly seize the opportunity of foreign attack, to aid the hostile movements, and desolate

the country with civil war, were strong reasons for a cautious line of foreign policy. His majesty was hence induced to defer his assent to the measures recommended by Lafitte; who, finding all his bold resolves negatived by the more prudential course determined on by the king, retired, with no small umbrage at the rejection of his counsel.

Cassimir Perrier's policy.—Lafitte was succeeded in office by M. Cassimir Perrier. Few men were better able to conduct the government through the intricacy of affairs, than this gentleman. His natural talents, profound erudition, and liberal views, had gained him a powerful party when in the opposition, and greatly endeared him to the people.* To a rectitude of understanding, which is the sovereign guide and dictator in every branch of civil and social intercourse, he joined, in a high degree, the *suaviter in modo* with the *fortiter in re*; and possessed the rare qualification for a minister of the crown, of saying what was proper, and no more. His party was influential, talented, and unanimous; his principles moderate, with a strong feeling in favour of the monarchical form of government. Liberal in conducting public affairs, he saw the necessity of maintaining peace abroad, and of strengthening the foreign relations of the government, by the full observance of good faith in international engagements. His accession to office took place at a time of extreme difficulty. The people complained heavily of fiscal burthens, and the general absence of profitable employment: commerce was paralysed by the evils always consequent on great political transitions: the expenditure greatly exceeded the income: public credit sunk beneath the pressure of collec-

* In the election of 1831, this gentleman was returned for several different places.

tive circumstances: the Carlists were actively arming in the south and west, to replunge the country into the bitterness of civil strife: while the republicans, or *war-party*, were loud in their complaints of what they termed "Louis Philippe's abandonment of principle." Such was the state of affairs at the time of Perrier's accession to office.

The king and his minister were, however, unanimous as to the line of policy to be adopted; and it was determined, that the re-establishment of public confidence and credit should form the first object of the government, by the firm determination to maintain a pacific course; and that the reassurance of domestic tranquillity should be the chief aim of the administration.

Perrier saw, that to respond to the popular war-cry, by the adoption of a high tone to foreign powers, would infallibly occasion war, which could not be conducted with success without giving free scope to the republican spirit of the people, which might perhaps overturn the throne, and renew the horrors of 1792, and the reign of terror. He determined, therefore, to brave the opposition, and the accusations of the republicans as to a departure from the principles to which Louis Philippe had subscribed on his accession, and to stand the "dauntless advocate of peace." The good effect which the announcement of Cassimir Perrier's plan of policy wrought in the public mind, is well remembered. It relieved the anxiety of established governments, as to the issue of the contest between the pacific Louis Philippe and the *ci-devant* powerful war party—gave stability to public credit—and seemed to promise the consolidation of the newly raised throne.

The course of events offered opportunities to the ministry, to evidence to Europe the unambitious views of the French court. The Belgian diadem,

which had been voted by the Belgians to the young Duc de Nemours, second son of the king of the French, was refused, from deference to the objections urged by the other continental powers; and the French army which entered Flanders in 1831, was recalled immediately it had achieved the object of its movement, namely, “the prevention of hostilities between the Dutch and Belgian forces.”*

The state of Poland created the most lively sympathy in the public mind, and served as a strong rallying point to the party who had been replaced by the Perrier administration, and who, to use M. Sarrans’ expression, were “starving under the eye of a throne, of which they are the pedestals.” Perrier’s policy was non-interference. The cause was not *directly* national; and, from the circum-terran position (to coin a word) of that unhappy country, assistance could not be afforded with any fair prospect of success. The French people, however, viewed the cause of Poland as intimately connected with their own; and the total annihilation of the Polish constitution,—that is to say, a constitution founded on popular election,—as a prelude to the attacks of the despots against the free institutions of France. Yet concession to the popular demand of sending military aid to the Poles, would have been tantamount to a declaration of war against the triple alliance; which, as

* This recall of the French army completely effaced the suspicions entertained by a large portion of the deputies, as to the personal views of le Duc de Dalmatie; who, when, in July, 1831, announcing to the senate the entry of the French troops into Belgium, is reported to have said—“*L’armée est entrée, mais on n’a pu dire quand elle reviendra*,”—a remark, which at the time was construed into a demi-official declaration, that the French forces would permanently garrison the fortresses of Belgium. This lapsus linguæ, however, is, by the result, satisfactorily explained to warrant no such interpretation.

it since appears, was prepared to make common cause with the Muscovite, and to oppose, with its united forces, any movement of the constitutional governments in favour of Poland. The French government were apprehensive of consequences, especially without the full consummation of an offensive and defensive alliance with Great Britain. It has, however, been said in the British house of Commons, and not officially contradicted, "that France *did* actually offer to declare war against Russia, in conjunction with the British government."* Such a course, however, would have been so opposite to the avowed principles of the British cabinet, and, we think, so opposed to the national feeling in favour of a pacific course, that it could not be adopted.

The tide of popular feeling on this subject was at its flow during the prorogation of the Chambers; and on their re-assembling, M. Cassimir Perrier, in conformity with the provisions of the charter of 1830, introduced the republican measure for the abolition of the hereditary peerage,—a measure, which was well calculated to divert the public mind from the passing events on the banks of the Vistula. The execution of this article of the charter could not but encounter violent opposition from the peers created by the former dynasty; and without an extensive exercise of the royal prero-

* That the French government contemplated an armed interference in favour of Poland, and that some promises were held out by France to the Poles, seems probable, from the following answer of general Kniaziewicz (of the Polish legation) to general Lafayette, on the subject of the promises of the French cabinet:—"That it was the minister of foreign affairs in France, who induced us to despatch a messenger, on the 7th of July, 1831, to Warsaw, whose travelling expenses *he* defrayed; and that the object of that envoy, as M. Sebastiani informed us, was to induce the Polish government to hold out still for two months, because that time was necessary for the negotiations."—*Sarrans*, ii. 255, 256.

gative, there appeared no hope of obtaining the assent of the upper Chamber to this suicidal act. The expediency of conforming to the public will, and of adapting the social system to the principles contained in the charter of 1830, were, however, of paramount importance; and hence, by the creation of a large number of voters in the peers, the measure was carried, despite the Duc de Fitzjames, Dreux de Brèze, the Doctrinaires, and Carlists.

Coalition of the Carlists and Republicans.—Popular commotions.—From this time we may date the anomalous coalition of the Republicans and Carlists. The first were deeply incensed at seeing all the places of public trust in the possession of their political opponents; and the promises of “*early compensation*” to those “*generous citizens*,” who had placed the king on the throne, disregarded in the current of events.* The Carlists, encouraged by the intestine dissensions in the south and west, viewed the recall of the ancient dynasty as “the one thing needful” to counteract the prospective decline of their rank and privileges; and, calculating from past experience and a due knowledge of the national character, on the speedy downfall of a republican government, aided its establishment as a certain prelude to hostilities,

* When Louis Philippe was placed on the throne, all the *patriots* who had been convicted for political offences under Louis XVIII. and Charles X., were presented at court; and the aid-de-camp in waiting upon his majesty, announced them, in a loud voice, as “*gentlemen convicted for political offences*.” Lafayette appeared at their head, and advancing towards the king, said, “*these are the political convicts, and they are presented to you by an accomplice*.” The king received them with touching affability; and recalling to the minds of the *generous citizens* the persecutions they had, to his great regret, undergone, promised them his lively interest, and an *early compensation* for all the wrongs they had suffered.

and the restoration of the ci-devant reigning family. Thus we see how easily opposite interests were reconciled in the furtherance of one common object, "the overthrow of the throne."

The opposite factions thus coalesced, made vigorous exertions to mature their projects, and failed not to call on that great engine of popular influence, "the press," significantly termed "the fourth estate," to aid their endeavours. The columns of *La Nationale* and *La Tribune** teemed with the severest invectives against the government, and ably seconded the republicans, while *La Quotidienne*, *Le Drapeau blanc*, and other royalist journals, were equally virulent in their satire, and loud in support of the Carlists. Insurrection was fomented in the south; and l'émeute of the city of Lyons, ingeniously ascribed to causes extra-political, such as the privations of the mechanics and trading classes, proceeding from the stagnation of the silk trade, &c., marked the deep-laid schemes of the Carlist faction. An intimate correspondence was maintained with that lauded heroine of legitimacy, "La duchess de Berri," alias la comtesse Hector Lucchesi-Palli, and the Neapolitan court;† medals, and even money, stamped with the bust of Henry V. were distributed, and every artful device used to prepare the coming of the chaste duchess, and the contemplated rising in favour of the regency.

Contentions in the Chambers concerning the civil list.—Embarrassed state of affairs.—In the senate, the settlement of the civil list was made the subject of oratorical contention. The civil list granted to

* This journal has lately been arbitrarily suppressed, after having endured ninety-six government prosecutions.

† The only court which has, to this day, withheld its recognition of the throne of July.

Charles X. was 32,000,000*f.* The grant proposed by M. Perrier for the reigning monarch was 14,000,000*f.*, a reduction which the unprejudiced portion of the French people considered satisfactory. The case was, however, different with the republicans. Their object was to bring discredit upon the monarchical *form* of government; hence they argued, "that Louis Philippe having transferred his property to his family instead of to the nation," had broken faith with his *fellow citizens*,* and was not entitled to the grant. All opposition however failed, and the annuity was sanctioned by a passable majority. The opposition, defeated in every attempt to baffle the government, determined, during the recess, to organise their force, and concert a systematic plan of parliamentary resistance to ministers. For this object a meeting was held at Lafitte's residence, their views and plans discussed, and the contemptuous whine about Louis Philippe's abandonment of principles urged as a fair cause for directing, by constitutional means, as it is termed, all their efforts to the re-establishment of a republic. However, unanimity was wanting to the consummation of this premeditated act of *lèse-majesté*; and the *compte rendu* (protest), bearing 140 signatures, published as an exposé of their opinions, was confined to constitutional principles, in the hope of "influencing," or rather "agitating" the public mind.

There are few periods in French history, when the aspect of affairs was more inauspicious than at this. The pestilential malady, which, like a destroying angel, had desolated eastern Europe, appeared in all its horrors at Paris; and among its numerous victims was Cassimir Perrier. At his death, new scenes of internal contention were awa-

* The word "*sujets*," or subjects, is in this sense blotted out of the French language.

kened. In the south, the Carlists boldly raised the standard of legitimacy; and the *drapeau blanc* floated on the steeple of St. Laurent, at Marseilles. The landing of the duchess de Berri was alternately announced and contradicted. At court, all was uncertainty and gloom; plots, intrigues, and conspiracies, were the ordinary topics of popular discussion; and the outburst of some diabolical *emeute* to subvert the throne, was awaited with anxious apprehension. At length, the landing of the duchess was openly avowed; and its effects were soon manifested by the civil commotions in La Vendée and the western provinces. The first ebullitions of the Carlist insurrection were silenced by military force and the efficient services of the national guard; but the insurrection was deeply rooted, and only wanted opportunity to develop itself. It is well remembered, how soon this was afforded, and with what alacrity the fire-brands of insurrection kindled their hellish plots in the capital. Montalivet, who had succeeded Perrier as minister of the interior, seems to have had some indistinct knowledge of the progress of the plot, which broke out on the 5th of June, (the day appointed for the interment of general Lamarque,) and, with what appears culpable negligence, to have permitted it to ripen into action: but

Nemo mortalís omnibus horis sapit :

however, no evidence of the premature explosion of a republican conspiracy has been established; and it seems, from subsequent arrests, that the government were uninformed as to the secret springs from whence it emanated. A momentary success attended the insurrection, which enabled the disaffected to raise the barricades, and for a time to defy the military power. The number, however, of the insurgents, was not very large; the great body of the people were either

on the side of the government, or kept aloof from the scene of action; and the national guard of Paris and the environs being firm in their resistance to the insurgents, and aided by a very numerous body of regular troops, effectually quelled the insurrection on the succeeding day.

The republicans were active during the progress of the contest, in spreading reports of the desertion and flight of the king, the meeting of a provisional government, &c.: but his majesty, fearlessly appearing in the streets of Paris, amidst the fire of the combatants and the dangers of the contest, at once frustrated the criminal designs of the republicans and Carlists. It is probable that this bold measure saved him the crown. It was an irresistible appeal to the patriotic and military ardour of the people, and operated so powerfully on the instinctive disposition of Frenchmen, that even the enthusiasm of the conspirators sunk powerless before it.

This attempt at rebellion was imputed to various sources. The ministerial prints were disposed to trace it to the party who signed the *compte rendu* at Lafitte's; and warrants were issued against MM. Garnier-Paget, Cabet, and Labodguere, newly elected members of the opposition: but, whatever might be the first impression of the part taken by the liberal party, there is no proof that they countenanced rebellious acts, or desired to wage war against the ministers with any other weapons than constitutional debate in the senate; although they seemed, ere the contest was decided, desirous of obtaining a renewed promise from Louis Philippe, of a "return to the principles of July;" which, say MM. Lafitte, Arago, and Odillon Barrot, "seem to have been forgotten."*

* It was about four o'clock in the afternoon of the 6th of June, when the king had just returned from visiting, on horseback,

L'état de siège.—Arrest of le Duc de Fitzjames, &c.—The energy with which this rebellion was silenced, left the government in full possession of the requisite authority to follow its own system, and to reject the dangerous line of policy advocated by the *movement* party; and, had ministers used their authority with discretion, and founded their measures on constitutional maxims, they would effectually have disarmed factious opposition. But, partly from a desire to compliment the army, and partly from a presumed necessity of dealing out summary punishment against the re-

some of the scenes of the action which was *still going on*, that Messrs. Lafitte, Arago, and Odillon Barrot, desired a conference with his majesty. Odillon Barrot began the conversation by deploring the disorders which had just taken place; but he excused them by the conduct of the government, which *seemed to have forgotten the principles of July*; and whose meanness, he said, “leads not only to these riots, but, eventually, to anarchy and civil war.” He therefore implored the king to stop the effusion of blood, to silence the cannon which were still roaring, and to prevent further calamities, *by an immediate and complete return to the principles which had placed him on the throne*. The king answered thus:—“Audaciously attacked by my enemies, I exercise my legitimate right of defence. The time is at length come, when the principle of revolt must be put down; and I employ cannon, only to have done with it the sooner. As to the pretended engagements and republican pledges, into which it is said I entered at the hotel de ville, on the day of my accession, I know not what they mean! I have over-fulfilled all the promises I made, and revived *more than enough* of republicanism in the institutions of the state. The pledges of the hotel de ville exist only in the fancy of M. Lafayette, *who is certainly under some delusion*.” He added, “It is unfair to give the ministers either the praise or the blame of the system *I have followed*. *It is my own!* the result of my own experience and reflection. It is founded on the only principles on which I would have consented to take the crown; and they shall hash me in a mortar before I will abandon it. And then, as to the system with which you reproach M. Perrier—who certainly is very innocent of it—what do you mean? what is it? Let us have done with loose, vague expressions: state your facts. Of what do you complain?” &c. —*Quarterly Review, April Number, 1833—Review of M. Sarraus’ work.*

bellious, they determined on declaring Paris in a state of siege, suspending the functions of the national judicial institutions, and establishing martial law in the capital. These measures were not only contrary to the spirit, but to the letter of the constitution. The sixty-second article of the charter expressly says, “Nul ne pourra être distrait de ses juges naturels ;”—a clause which especially protects civilians from trial by military tribunals, and forbids their institution for any other purpose than the trial of military offenders. Accordingly, the court of Cassation decided, that these tribunals had no power to convict, reversed all their judgments, and thus declared the ministers to be completely ignorant of the fundamental principles of that constitution which they pretended to adopt as their plan of rule. Notwithstanding the utter failure of this measure, it was immediately followed up by the arrest of the Duc de Fitzjames, Chateaubriand, and Hyde de Neuville, devotees to the cause of legitimacy ;—an arrest, authorized by no sufficient grounds of suspicion, supported by no evidence of treasonable designs, and serving only to depreciate the character of the government, in the minds even of their most substantial supporters. In short, the government displayed nothing but a series of ill-digested plans, and egregious and ignorant blunders.

We have been induced to follow this train of events, with a view of shewing the state of party feeling in France. We shall now recur to the formation of the ministry subsequent to the death of Perrier.

Ministerial negotiations subsequent to the death of Perrier.—The king, who was determined to continue the line of policy followed by the lately departed minister, would entrust the seals of office to no one who differed in principle from that especial

system. The *compte rendu*, bearing the signatures of more than one-third of the deputies (140), essentially opposed to the policy of Perrier—or rather of Louis Philippe—was, however, a formidable impediment to such a course, and presaged an irresistible opposition to any new administration which should *début* upon the principles of Perrier. It appeared necessary, therefore, to combine with the new ministry a portion of the opposition (*des hommes énergiques*), by some minor compliances with their views.

The formation of a stable administration in France, is a matter of no little difficulty. The sentiments of la garde nationale must be duly weighed, and their approval and support well ensured, ere new official appointments are announced ; for, let the prime minister be who he may, and his measures what they may, he is sure, after a season, to meet public censure, and to undergo the sacrifice of his popularity, as a sort of tax levied for being eminent. There is perhaps no existing community, in which it is easier to gain popularity, and more difficult to retain it, than among the French. Change, for the sake of change, is the very essence of their character ; and the *dramatis personæ*, to gain lasting applause, must pass rapidly before the scene of public life. However, with a view of ensuring, as far as circumstances permitted, a firm government, proposals were made to the leading members of the liberal party to join the new administration ; and M. Dupin (brother to the baron, and the eldest of the three Dupins), a gentleman of splendid talents as an orator and as a statesman, and of great weight with the opposition, was summoned to a royal conference, and a department in the government—that of minister of the interior—offered to him. M. Dupin rejected the offer, but was willing to accept the office of president of the council,

upon certain conditions. These conditions, which, in the opinion of his majesty, struck at the pacific policy he was determined to adopt, were inadmissible; and some influential members of the government being reluctant to act as subordinates to M. Dupin, the expectations of *les hommes énergiques*, of place, power, and patronage, were disappointed.

M. Dupin's language to the king was in substance this:—"If I am to be the responsible minister of the crown, you must conform to my system, not I to yours. I cannot submit to be the ostensible and responsible minister of state, while you, *de facto*, direct the measures of government." The principal differences between M. Dupin and the king related to foreign policy. The king was bound by his engagements to foreign courts, to a certain course, and was desirous of avoiding any measures which might be considered as "*acts of aggression*;" while M. Dupin, whose views were equally pacific with those of his majesty, differed in opinion as to the most certain mode of maintaining peace. He was desirous of asserting, in a bold tone, the independence of the French government, by energetically telling the foreign courts, that France would admit of no dictation as to her plans of policy, either foreign or domestic. However, the king was averse to this system, and therefore preferred choosing a minister whose views were in perfect accordance with his own; or rather, who would consent to become his *mere machine* in the conduct of foreign affairs.

The public viewed with some interest the progress of the negotiations between Louis Philippe and M. Dupin; and the friends of the latter fully expected that the court would be obliged to yield to his demands. However, the *denouement* was otherwise. The Duc de Dalmatie (Soult) figured at the head of the roll, as president of the council;

and minister of war—M. Thiers as minister of the interior, blending the office of minister of commerce and public works—M. Humann as minister of finance—le Duc de Broglie (formerly premier) minister of foreign affairs—admiral de Rigny, minister of marine—and, on the meeting of the Chambers, M. Dupin, with the support of the government interest, was gratified with place as president of the Chamber.

The political and military life of Soult are so familiar to the reading portion of the public, that it is unnecessary to comment upon the aptitude of his qualifications for his present exalted station. His rapid advance from the ranks to the high station of *maréchal de France*, during a period when service was the test, and promotion the reward of merit, evidences that, in a military sense, he possesses talents of no common order. Whether these talents, aided by the luminous counsel of M. Thiers and other colleagues—among whom we may, perhaps, number M. Dupin—will shine with equal splendour in the cabinet, remains to be seen. The line of policy adopted by the present administration, is in full conformity with the well-known disposition of the king; and the political circumstances which have followed, are, in the main, favourable to the stability of the government.

The matrimonial connexion, since cemented between the royal families of France and Belgium, strengthens the interest of France in the preservation of the integrity of the latter country, while it has served both as a well-merited indemnity for the claims of the Prince de Nemours, and as a means of removing any cause of uneasiness which the foreign cabinets might feel, as to the incorporation of the Flemish provinces with France. The success which has attended the arms of France before Antwerp, and the strict punctuality with which she performed the engagements specified in

the late convention with the English government, has evidenced to Europe, the moderation of her views, and her determination to use her powerful arm against the perturbators of the general peace ; and the chances of the renewal of any coercive measures towards Holland, or of any rupture between that country and her rival, Belgium, are considerably diminished by the convention of the 21st May.

Pacification of La Vendée—Decline of the Carlist party, &c.—The internal peace of France has never been seriously disturbed since the memorable 6th of June. The people, harassed by severe military duty, and feeling grievously the effects of riot on the security of property, and on commerce, are anxious to put an end to popular commotion, and to assist the government in maintaining its authority, and securing a permanent tranquillity. The capture of the renowned heroine of legitimacy, the duchess de Berri, and the contempt with which her conduct is viewed by the great body of the people, has given a death-blow to the operations of the Carlists in the south and west. There has, however, uniformly been a marked difference of character between the *tumults* which have taken place in La Vendée since 1830, and the *Vendean war* which desolated France during so many years subsequent to the revolution of 1789. In the prior period, a spirit of frantic military enthusiasm spread itself throughout the mass of the malcontent population ; volunteer corps, formed in the western districts, only invited leaders to conduct them against the troops of the republic ; and receiving money and munitions of war from Great Britain, and other countries in hostility with France, were thus enabled to make so bold a stand against the republican forces.

Of the general nature and sanguinary character of this war, some idea may be formed by the immense sacrifice of human life it occasioned. Dupin states that not less than 500,000 men fell during the eight or nine years which it lasted. The rising of armed bands in La Vendée, Loire Inférieure, &c. since 1830, has been the work of a few influential leaders of the Carlist party. The resistance to the authority of the government, in the first war, proceeded from the multitude, and was supported by their joint resources; whereas, in the recent tumults, it proceeded from a few restless chiefs, and was maintained by such feeble means as a few private fortunes could supply. During the period from 1791 to 1800, the French used to say, "La Vendée ne manque pas de soldats, mais elle manque d'officiers." The case is now just the reverse; and the public prints say, "La Vendée ne manque pas d'officiers, mais elle manque de soldats. Les paysans ne veulent pas combattre." We have had the opportunity of information as to the present and late state of La Vendée, from gentlemen who have passed the greater part of their lives in that province, and who resided there during the former and late disturbances. They say, that a very general change in the disposition of the people is manifest; and that resistance to the government of July is by no means general. The friends of the old dynasty are numerous, but their paramount wish is for tranquillity; and it was only by the most alluring, but delusive promises of reward, that a few armed bands of chouans were organised to support the cause of Henri V. We fully believe, notwithstanding all the flaming accounts of the spread and sanguinary character of the civil war of 1831-2, that not more than 100 lives were sacrificed.

While public justice is upheld, and the govern-

ment conform their policy to the strict line and spirit of the constitutional laws, and refrain from hostilities with foreign states, the Vendéans will not move. Politically speaking, “*La Vendée est morte*”—she is dead to insurrection.

Remarks on the late prosecutions against the Press.

—As Englishmen, naturally jealous of any restraints on the press, and advocates for the free circulation of different political views and opinions, we abhor these official prosecutions.* But it is almost impossible for those of our countrymen, who are unacquainted with French society, to judge of the propriety of instituting such prosecutions, by a contrast with the state of society in England, and the general course of political opposition adopted by the English journalists. The French, unlike the English editors who combat particular measures of the government with a view to their constitutional revision, direct their attacks against the *fundamental* principles of the government; advocating the total subversion of the throne, the re-establishment of a republic, or the re-integration of the ancient dynasty, by force of arms;—a course of writing, which could be tolerated by no independent government, however free the liberty of popular discussion. The object of some of the periodicals was to excite party against party, upon *fundamental*, extra-constitutional principles, of which the result would have been civil war.

Further, there is a wide difference in the degrees of stability possessed by the French and English governments. The first, scarcely planted in the nation, requires a strongly nerved arm to vindicate its conduct and its authority, and a firm

* From July, 1830, to December, 1832, there were no less than eighty-six newspapers arbitrarily seized, or judicially prosecuted.

curb to check licentious and false attacks, which strike at its very existence ; while the British constitution, which no one assails in its *fundamental principles*, stands firmly and deeply rooted in the social system, and secure against all attacks tending to its overthrow.

Prospective changes—Political views of the French people, &c.—The ingenious *ruse de guerre* of the government, in electing M. Dupin to the Speaker's chair, has enabled the ministers to consolidate their power, and silence the opposition of the *movement* party. If we look to the prospective changes in the administration, we should say, that much depends on M. Dupin. While he acts with the government, or rather, while he remains neuter (as Speaker), ministers will command majorities ; but should circumstances induce him to withdraw from the Speaker's chair, and lead the opposition, the present administration could not stand, and Louis Philippe would be obliged to conform his policy to the system advocated by that gentleman. But whether M. Dupin succeed to the head of affairs or not, while the republican party are restrained from political authority, there is no reason to expect any change in the present pacific policy of the French government.

At the period of the revolution of July, and for some months subsequent, there was decidedly a strong popular feeling in favour of war, proceeding from a general opinion that the triple alliance, viewing with a mixture of jealousy and suspicion the change of government in France, would attempt the restoration of the ancient dynasty : the idea was thus inculcated, that it would be better to anticipate aggression, by becoming the aggressors. "The partisans of war," says M. Sarrans, "could see no security or endurance for the revolution of July, but in an assemblage of revolution-

any perturbations, which should tear asunder all the bonds established by the treaties of 1814 and 1815. They could not see how the monarchy of July should be bound to ratify the spoliation of Landau, Sarre-Louis, Chambery, and Huningen. In their opinion, France should make itself as strong by its alliances, as by its own weight; and for allies it should not look to the great powers, but to the secondary states, whom it has taken under its ægis since the wars of the reformation; in Poland, Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark, the independent members of the Germanic body, the freemen of every country. This party loudly demanded, that it should advance its popular principles to the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the southern slopes of the Alps." The opportunity was deemed favourable for regaining possession of the provinces between their present limits and the Rhine, as far as Holland; which river they consider the natural frontier of France. Beyond this limit, popular ambition does not extend; and the national feeling was, to let the revolution take its full swing clear off as far as that boundary.

To have gained, in 1830, military possession of these so feebly protected provinces, which, they say, were pirated from them by the peace of Paris, would not have been difficult, if we may judge of the general military enthusiasm of the people, by the long list of volunteers, who at that time offered their services to the government: but to have *preserved* the conquest, would have been another matter. However, the government wisely thought proper to curb this *precocious zeal*—to commit no "*act of aggression*,"—but to await events. Thus the season for war, passed. The triple alliance have improved their power of resistance; and France, by the advice of her ablest counsellors, declines the contest; and shews her desire for peace, by a reduction of her military

force. Thus, we may conclude, France will not be first to provoke hostilities ; but, if her independence were openly menaced, she would burst every social tie, run frantic towards eastern Europe, spread war, revolution, and devastation, far and wide ; bury all in one common chaos ; and, like an exhausted maniac, fall, powerless, beneath the weight of her own efforts. Towards Russia, she would stir into action all the latent elements of national discord, and hasten the dismemberment of that colossal empire ; while, from Prussia, she would, on the onset, wrest the Rhenish provinces, which the operations of Moreau, Pichegru, and other generals, proved to be so easy of military occupation during the late wars.

In conclusion, we must notice the growing confidence between the governments of London and Paris, and their manifest disposition mutually to support the constitutional principles of the west of Europe, against the absolutism of the east. The recent withdrawal of the French troops from the Morea, and the surrender of that government into the possession of the newly elected king, are additional evidences of the fair principles upon which France acts in her foreign relations.

The firmness which Louis Philippe has manifested in the preservation of the peace of Europe, and in the maintenance of rational liberty, under circumstances of no ordinary difficulty, entitle him to general commendation. France possesses, in her political institutions, the *foundation* of good and liberal government ; and, for the happiness of all, it is earnestly to be desired, that party principles, whether of the Carlists, monarchists, liberals, or republicans, may cease to distract the state ; and that their advocates will join in one general social union, directing their united efforts to the public good.

CHAPTER III.

STATISTICAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF
RUSSIA.

SECTION I.—RUSSIAN STATISTICS.

Progressive extension of territory.—It is impossible to view with indifference, or to contemplate without political fears and jealousies, the colossal power of Russia. The seeds of the greatness of this vast empire, lie hidden in the darkness which envelopes the history of the Slavonian race. That numerous people, bred in the forests of Sarmatia, were almost unknown to Europeans in the Grecian and Roman ages. They appeared in Macedonia, Hungary, and the Roman states, under the command of the Goths, their masters, and under the standard of the Huns, their conquerors, long before they were mentioned in history: migrating into different countries, and, freed at last from the yoke of the Goths and Huns, they formed a mass of homogeneous tribes, from the Elbe to the Borysthenes; some increasing in their native lands; while others were subdued by the Germanic race. The eastern branch of Slavonians, called “Antes,” or Russians, strengthened by the descendants of the ancient Roxolani, extended their numbers over the fertile plains towards the Don and the Volga, and, led by the bold and

restless genius of the Wareguean Scandinavians, sought a theatre for their exploits in the regions of the north and east of Russia, subduing the Almanni, and various petty states which were formed in the vast circles of modern Muscovy. The Hunnic tribes, who had migrated from the wilds north of the Chinese territories, were conquered by the Waregueans, who, in turn, became Russians.

Long before the invasion of the Mongul Tartars, various states existed in central Russia, under the modest title of Dutchies; and when the Scandinavian democracy had been succeeded by despotic dynasties, and Russia had freed herself from the Tartar yoke, the nucleus of her power gradually expanded, and extended itself over circles of immense radii. The Russian conquests under the two Ivans, by which the republican states of Novgorod and Pleskow were incorporated with the empire, and the Kasan, Astrakan, and a portion of Siberia, subjected; increased her territory seven-fold; and every successive reign has greatly added to her vast dominions. In looking at the *extent* of the Russian empire at the present day, we should in vain seek its parallel in ancient or modern history. Neither the extensive dominions of the Macedonian or Roman governments, nor the vast but disjointed states of the Spanish monarchy in the 16th, or of the British in the 19th century, equal the boundless expanse of modern Russia.

Malte-Brun furnishes a table of the progressive expansion of the Russian territory and population since the reign of Ivan I., from which the following is compiled:—

Table, shewing the progressive increase of Russia.

A. D.	Epoch.	Superficial Extent.		Approximate Population, in Millions.	Incorporations by
		In German Square Miles.	In British Square Miles, $21\frac{2}{3}$ to the German Square Mile.*		
1452	Under Ivan I.	18,494	400,538	6	{ Junction of Novgorod, Permia, Tchernigov, Severia, &c. Conquests of Kasan, Astrakan, and in Siberia. Conquests in Siberia. Kiovia retaken. Conquests on the Baltic, and in Persia. Conquests in Asia. Countries conquered from the Turks, and by the first partition of Poland. Conquests in Poland and Finland, Moldavia and Persia.
1505	At his death	37,137	804,635	10	
1584	At the demise of Ivan II. .	125,465	2,728,407	12	
1645	At the death of Michael I. .	254,361	5,501,155	12	
1689	At the accession of Peter I.	263,900	5,718,700	15	
1725	At his death	273,815	5,932,657	20	
1763	Accession of Catherine . . .	319,538	6,923,322	25	
1796	At her death	331,810	7,199,216	36	
1825	At the death of Alexander	367,494	7,862,370	58	

* Malte-Brun says, a German mile is $3\frac{1}{3}$ English miles, and, of course, its square $11\frac{1}{9}$. But this must be erroneous. The Germans count 15 miles to the geographical degree,—which is $4\frac{2}{3}$ English miles nearly, and its square $21\frac{2}{3}$. We have adopted the latter computation, which we presume to be correct. However, both British and German measurements are given.

To this immense extent of territory, must be added the provinces lately acquired by treaties with the Turks and Persians, and by encroachments on the countries watered by the sea of Aral, which add about 170,000 square miles (nearly equal to the superficial extent of France) to the Russian dominions; carrying their total extent to 8,032,370 square miles,—being more than twice the superficial extent of Europe.

Population.—Every two or three years produces some new estimates of the actual population of Russia; but the vague character of the official returns, and the innate propensity of the government authorities to impose on truth, and to publish to the world high estimates of the resources of the empire, cause such documents to be received with caution. M. Herman has written many valuable articles in the *Memoirs of the Academy of St. Petersburg*, on the importance of tables of mortality, and induced the Russian ministers to collect returns of the proportion of births to deaths. From these data, Balbi has, at different times, calculated the population of Russia: in 1822 he fixed it at 54,000,000, and in his work, published last year, he carries the estimate to 60,000,000. M. Hassel published, in 1823, a table of population in Russia, Poland, and the vassal states, in which he computes it at 59,373,700 souls. The following table is abridged from his estimate:—

Divisions.	Area in British square miles.	Population.
European Russia,	1,578,676	44,118,600
Kingdom of Poland,	49,681	3,541,900
Asiatic Russia,	5,793,897	11,663,200
American do.	320,000	50,000
Total	7,742,254	59,373,700

If this estimate is correct, the present population of the Russian empire cannot be less than 63,000,000, a number which surpasses the ordinary computations of several more recent calculators. To the casual reader, the ratio of the increase of Russian population appears extremely rapid; indeed, it is only surpassed by that of the United States of America; but the causes of this increase are very different, and if we contrast the progress of the two countries in density of numbers, we shall find that Russia, through some periods, exemplifies a decreasing ratio, while the United States uniformly increase in population on a given surface: for instance, in 1453, (if Malte-Brun's estimates deserve any credit) the relative population of Russia was about fifteen persons to the square mile. In 1505, it was not quite eight, and in 1825, it was still under eight;* while in America, the increase during the last fifty years has been three-fold on nearly the same extent of territory.† This argues no virtual decrease of Russian population, on any given surface, but leads us to notice that the addition to her numbers is rather attributable to the spread of territory than to improvement in her internal condition, and seems to argue that the intensity of her power diminishes in proportion as she promotes her extension. The migration of the inhabitants of the interior countries traversed by the navigable streams which connect the Neva and the Volga, is very considerable; the bulky produce of the inland provinces is brought down to the Baltic ports by *raftsmen*,

* This, of course, is for the whole empire.

† The population of the United States of America was—

in 1770,	3,921,328
1800,	5,316,577
1810,	7,239,903
1820,	9,637,999

1830, { Free persons,	10,845,735
{ Slaves, . . .	2,010,436
	<hr/> 12,856,171

who, for the most part, do not return : hence the growth of numbers in Finland, Courland, and the maritime provinces is extensive, while the increase in the interior, if any, is extremely slow.

Revenue.—The elements of the Russian public revenue are but imperfectly known, and even if it were possible to obtain correct returns of the payments made in cash, we should still be far from an accurate estimate of the revenues of the empire. The causes of this difficulty are briefly enumerated. Certain public revenues, such, for instance, as the coral fisheries, are never carried into the account. Whole governments are required to furnish provisions for the army in lieu of taxes, and their value never appears in the budget. To these, and several other items, we must add the marble and precious stones it draws from its domains, and the cannon balls from the state foundries, which also never appear in the budget. To these items, also, must be added the value of the public works performed by the serfs of the crown, whose number is said to be 15,000,000. It is impossible to form an accurate estimate of these extraordinary revenues ; it has been carelessly guessed at 2,500,000*l.* : a very moderate estimate. In Malte-Brun's valuable work we find estimates of the ordinary revenues of Russia, varying from 110 to 130,000,000 of rubles ; in the latter estimate the ruble is valued at about 2*s.* 4½*d.* Hence the total amount of revenue in British currency, 13,746,780*l.** Mr. Lowe, in 1823, roundly states the amount of Russian taxes and public burthens generally, at 18,000,000*l.* Adrien Balbi, whose calculations always merit confidence, says, the receipt in 1826 amounted to 434,000,000*f.*,

* In estimating the Russian revenue in British currency, much difficulty arises from the absence of uniformity in the value of the ruble ; some of the items are given in silver rubles, and others in paper rubles, which have fluctuated from 3*s.* 6*d.* to 9½*d.* British.

17,300,000*l.*; but neither of these famed authorities inform us whether this sum includes the various tributes paid by the local governments in military stores, &c.—The royal demesnes constitute a very important item of revenue. Under this head is comprised the *obrok*, or tax paid by the peasants of the crown, the rents of land let on lease, and the produce of the government factories; from these sources about 4,500,000*l.* are collected. The capitation-tax, to which the burghesses and peasants are subject, yields about 2,400,000*l.* The tax on mercantile capital, or merchants' property tax, produces about 250,000*l.* per annum. In the collection of this tax the individual declares, without constraint or judicial examination, the amount of his capital in trade; and his privileges, commercial immunities, and personal consideration depend on the sum specified in his statement. The duties levied at the maritime and inland custom-houses, produce a considerable sum. The former yield about 1,350,000*l.*, the latter are not so productive. The quantity of spirits on which duty is charged is very great; it is difficult to give a correct estimate of it, but the revenue farmers lately paid a sum equivalent to 700,000*l.* per annum for the brandy monopoly. The *iassac*; furs collected from the wandering tribes, yields an uncertain revenue. Five per cent. is levied on the sale of hereditary property, in lands, houses, and vassals. The salt monopoly, so fruitful a source of revenue with most of the continental states, does not produce a large sum to the Russian exchequer. Upwards of four millions and a quarter tons of this useful article are annually made and sold to the people by the agents of the revenue farmers; but the price fixed by the government, "thirty-five copecks the poud," or 1*s.* 3*d.* for forty pounds English, is not levied with a view to extensive profit. The stamp-duties and the post, together, yield about 800,000*l.*

Mr. Hupel says, the government derives a direct annual profit of 1,800,000 rubles from the mines. Gold, silver, copper and iron are found dispersed through the empire in considerable quantities. The Russian Peru extends from Perm to the country beyond the Irkhurst. Iron, the most useful of metals, is more commonly worked on the European side of the Ural mountains, from Perm to Orenburg and Wiatka, and from Nischgorod to Tambof. The lodes of the copper mines are said to be extremely rich, and produce annually about 200,000 pouds.* The iron mines produce about 6,000,000 pouds, or 107,200 tons; about one-seventh the quantity produced in Great Britain. †

We submit the subjoined table of the items of the Russian revenue, rather as an approximation to accuracy than as a correct return :—

Heads of Revenue.	Produce calculated in British currency.
National demesnes, obrok, rents and profits on the government factories, . }	£. 4,500,000
Capitation tax, paid by the burgesses and free peasants, }	2,400,000
Marine and inland custom-house duties,	2,200,000
Brandy, salt, and other commercial monopolies, }	1,850,000
Post-office and posting,	440,000
Stamp duties,	360,000
Merchants' property tax,	250,000
Tax of five per cent. on the sale of lands, houses, and slaves, }	150,000
Mines and mint,	300,000
The Iassac—(conjectural)	150,000
Miscellaneous receipts, including tributes paid by the different governments, . }	3,400,000
Total	£.16,000,000

* The poud is 40lbs. English.

† Cochrane, in his "Travels in Russia," gives some interesting accounts of the Siberian mines.

Public debt. — Russia had scarcely any public debt previous to the French revolution of 1789. The late wars, however, occasioned heavy drains on the future resources of the empire, and the loans were chiefly effected by vast issues of government paper, which the ukase of the emperor made current. Before the peace of 1815, this paper money reached an alarming depreciation, which continued until it fell to the extreme depression of about seventy-eight per cent.; the paper ruble issued at about 3s. 6d. being current at about 9½d. When peace unfolded the opportunity of effecting stock loans, the redemption of this depreciated paper formed a primary object with the imperial government in its financial arrangements. The first official statement of the public debt of Russia, is contained in the financial report made by General Cancrin to the council, on the 31st of June 1824, which states, that the amount of public debt *bearing interest*, at that date, was as follows:— 20,620 rubles in gold; 91,534,318 rubles in silver; 260,628,677 rubles in paper; and 47,600,000 florins of the Dutch loan. But this is exclusive of the government issues of paper money outstanding. Balbi estimates the amount of the Russian debt, in 1826, at 1,575,000,000*f*. (63,500,000*l.*); both these statements are also exclusive of the Polish debt, which, in 1826, amounted to about 5,400,000*l.* British currency. The Russian debt, since contracted in London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Hamburgh, amounts to about 14,000,000*l.*,* carrying the amount of the debt, founded on Balbi's estimate, to 77,000,000*l.* From this sum, however, should be deducted the amount since redeemed by the sinking fund of one per cent., which may be estimated at 3,000,000*l.*,

* This includes the loan contracted in Amsterdam, in December 1832.

leaving the present Russian debt 73,000,000*l.*, or including the Polish debt, 78,000,000*l.*, demanding annually for interest and management about 2,900,000*l.*

Expenditure.—Here, in the absence of official documents, we have little more than conjectural estimates to offer. The first important item of expense is the army, which numbers, as we shall presently shew, 520,000 effective men. To estimate accurately the annual expense of this badly paid, miserable horde, is, for want of official returns, impossible. The French army, in 1832-3, was maintained at an average annual expense of 30*l.* 2*s.* per man, including all ranks; and M. Thiers, in his report on the budget, March, 1832, said, that the French military force was maintained at a less ratio of expense than the Prussian, and that the Austrian forces alone were more economically maintained.* The total military expenditure of Prussia, in the year 1833, divided by the number constituting the *effective* army, gives an average of about 32*l.* 15*s.* per man. Whatever difference there may be between the money price of provisions in Russia and Prussia, there can be but little in the price of other *materiel*—such as arms and military accoutrements; and therefore, with every reasonable allowance for the difference in the pay and condition of the Russian, compared with Prussian soldiers,—for the value of army munitions, furnished by the local governments in lieu of taxes, and for the demi-official license given to the officers, to pay themselves by plundering the provincials, we shall not overrate the expense of maintaining the Russian soldiers in active service, by fixing it at 15*l.* per man, in-

* The sum granted by the Chamber of Deputies was 316,000,000*f.* for the maintenance of 410,000 men.

cluding all ranks ; being less than a moiety of that of the Prussian. At this ratio, the Russian military budget amounts to 7,800,000*l.* per annum, without considering the expense of maintaining the “stolen children” in the military colonies.

The navy figures as a large item of Russian disbursement. The construction of ships of war proceeds at a rapid pace in the Baltic arsenals, but especially at Sevastopol, and Nikolaïev on the Euxine ; the number of seamen employed, according to Balbi’s statement, is 41,000. The annual naval expenditure of Russia is moderately estimated in the Metropolitan Magazine, (October number, 1832,) at 30,000,000 of rubles, which, at the present exchange, is about 1,250,000*l.*; but, as this estimate appears inadequate, we shall call it 1,500,000*l.*

The salaries paid to the employés in the civil departments, are extremely moderate ; yet the civil administration of the forty-nine governments, extending their jurisdiction over so wide a range of country, must occasion heavy demands on the public treasury. The intelligent author of the article in the periodical above cited, estimates this head of public expenditure at 30,000,000 of rubles.

The church establishment, which is indeed economically supported when compared with our own, is divided into three branches—the Greek, the Roman Catholic, and the Lutheran—each of which shares in the revenues allotted by the state for the support of religious institutions. The annual expense of the first—by far the most national—is 519,000*l.*; and for the two latter, 410,000*l.*; forming a total charge of 919,000*l.*

The expenses of the imperial court, and of the corps diplomatique, are also very large. We have seen these items estimated at 32,000,000 of rubles ; but this is decidedly too much. Estimating

them on the same footing as those of the French court, we fix them at 16,500,000 rubles; about 680,000*l*.

Besides these several heads of expenditure, the outlay for public works, miscellaneous grants, pensions, &c., must be considerable. We shall not exceed the truth, by estimating those branches of disbursement at 1,300,000*l*.*

The heads of Russian disbursement, thus estimated, are as follows:—

	£.
Interest and management of the public debt . .	2,900,000
Army, including the ordnance, expense of the } military colonies, &c. }	7,800,000
Navy	1,500,000
Civil government	1,250,000
Church establishment	920,000
Imperial court, and foreign department . . .	680,000
Miscellaneous expense, public works, pensions, &c. &c.	1,300,000
Total expenditure	16,350,000
Estimated revenue	16,000,000
Probable deficiency	£. 350,000

The deficit in the Russian budget probably surpasses the sum above noted; and, if a fair estimate of the extraordinary expenditure incurred in the Turkish, Persian, and Polish wars, were added, it would fully account for the 10,000,000*l*. borrowed during the seven years ending 1832, exclusive of the loan contracted in Amsterdam, now in progress of payment.

Military force.—The absence of official documents relative to the statistics of the absolute governments, has led to many erroneous statements

* It was stated by the Russian government, that the proceeds of the last loan of 4,000,000*l*. were to be applied to internal improvements.

respecting the actual effective military force of Russia ; and whenever the Muscovite minister has made any semi-official declaration, it has always been calculated rather to mislead, than afford authentic intelligence. Thus, with the usual exaggeration as to their military power, the minister of war stated the numerical force of the Russian army, at the opening of the Turkish campaign in 1828, at 930,000 men. Cannabick carries the estimate of the ordinary military force of Russia, to 987,000 men.* Balbi, in his tables published in 1833, referring to the year 1826, states the number, exclusive of the Polish army, (computed at 35,000 men,) to be 710,000 ;† and Schnetzler's estimate, made before the extraordinary levies of 1828, reduces it to 670,000 men. In the March number of the *United Service Journal* of last year, we find the numerical force of the Russian army estimated at 686,000 men, with 1736 pieces of artillery. "These figures," says the *United Service Gazette*,‡ "were borrowed from the work of Huet, being a continuation of the 'Précis de Géographie Universelle' de Malte-Brun." The *Gazette* further remarks, "These details may, in the first instance, have been furnished by the Russian administration ; but we *know*, from good authority, that the *total* of 1736 pieces of artillery, is a *fiction* ; their real number being about one half."

With all these conflicting statements, it would be difficult to arrive at any accurate computation of the numerical force of the Russian army, did not the *United Service Gazette* furnish us with the

* We believe this estimate was taken from the *Politische Journal*, which, in 1820, pretended to publish an official table of the Russian army, making the grand total, 989,117 men, exclusive of the Polish army of 50,000.

† The *United Service Gazette* states Balbi's estimate, including the Polish army, at 1,039,000 men.

‡ June 29, 1833.

following details, which, it says, "are derived from authentic sources," and the most exact which have yet been published :—

<i>Infantry.</i>				Total Men.
12	Regiments of infantry of the guards, each 3 bat-			
	talions of 1010 effective men,		36,000	
104	do. infantry of the line, each 2 batts. of 800,		166,400	
21	do. do. grenadiers, 2 —	700,	29,400	
60	do. do. chasseurs, 2 —	700,	84,000	
<hr/>				
197	Total infantry			315,800
<i>Cavalry.</i>				
65	Regiments of cavalry, of 6 squadrons, each 160 horses,		62,400	
12	do. cavalry of the guards, each			
	of 8 squadrons, . . . 160 —		11,520	
<hr/>				
274	Total regular cavalry			73,920
	Artillery, sappers, and pioneers		35,000	
30	Regiments of regular cossacks, 500 each		15,000	
	Irregular cavalry		80,000	
<hr/>				
304	Regiments.			120,000
<hr/>				
	Total			519,720

<i>Recapitulation.</i>		Total men.
Infantry		315,800
Cavalry		73,920
Artillery		35,000
Regular cossacks		15,000
<hr/>		
Total regulars		439,720
Irregular cavalry		80,000
<hr/>		
Grand total of the Russian army		519,720

The foregoing statement is much below all preceding estimates made within the last twenty years. During the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814,—a period, when every estate owner, from the great wall of China to the Neva, was required to furnish a heavy proportion of the number of his serfs,—the numerical force of the Russian, or more properly, the Tartarian army, probably exceeded 1,000,000 of men. It is from the fact of these immense levies being set in motion at that time, that late authorities have been led to form erroneous calculations of the military force of Russia.

The Polish army consisted, in 1830, of eight regiments of infantry of the line, besides the guards; four regiments of light infantry; eight regiments of cavalry, besides the *yagers* of the guard; two brigades of foot artillery, and two ditto of horse; a corps of engineers, &c.; in all, 36,000 men. Every individual between twenty and thirty years of age, is subject to military service, except in cases of exemption provided by law.*

Naval force.—Russia has never yet figured as a strong naval power. In the last war, she, on two occasions, seemed disposed to act as an auxiliary to a maritime coalition against Great Britain; but the first germ of such a disposition was blasted at Copenhagen, in 1801; and the second stifled by the surrender of her fleet, at the mouth of the Tagus, in 1807. Since the Muscovite government has obtained possession of the countries on the shores of the Black Sea, it has made great efforts to recruit the navy. Sevastopol, the principal station of the Russian marine on that coast, and Nikolaïeu, a minor arsenal in the same neighbourhood, are both rapidly improving, and annually augment the Russian naval power in that quarter. In 1826, Russia had 29 ships of the first and second class, stationed in the Black Sea; and her whole navy consisted of 32 ships of the line, 25 frigates, and 107 sloops, brigs, &c., manned by 41,000 sailors.—(Balbi.) In 1832, she possessed 36 ships of the line, and 23 frigates; with about the same number of small craft as in 1826.† A greater naval force than at any antecedent date, bore the imperial standard.

* Dr. B. Zaydler's Statistical Notices of Poland.

† Sir James Graham's speech on the navy estimates of 1823. The hon. gentleman did not name the number of inferior ships.

SECTION II.—RUSSIAN POLITICS.

The military means of Russia.—From this review of the statistics of Russia, we proceed to consider her physical and military means of resisting hostile invasion, and her powers of aggression.

The inhabitants of the vast space from the great wall of China, or the sea of Okotsk, to the plains of Moravia, or the confines of Breslau, acknowledge the dominion of Russia. On the north, her territories are bounded by the Icy Ocean and the Baltic; while on the south, her dominions extend beyond the mountains of Caucasus. Her frigid clime, barren soil, and savage people, are impregnable defences against the march of an European invading army into the recesses of her territory. Charles XII. of Sweden in the 18th, and Napoleon in the 19th centuries, were alike ruined by the attempt. It seems, indeed, that on the frontiers of these vast regions of starvation, there is written, as a warning to invaders, what Dante found graved over the portal of “Inferno” (hell):

“Oh ye, who enter here! ye heirs of sin,
Leave every hope behind.”*

But Russia, building her power on sterility—strong in her own weakness, and secure against permanent invasion, has yet her vulnerable points. She possesses but few fortresses capable of protracted defence. On the side of Finland, she has

* The original words are—

“Lasciate ogni speranza voi che'ntrate
Lascia pur della vita ogni speranza.”

“These words in darkest characters I saw,
Graved on a lofty arch; when thus I moan'd:
Hard is that sentence—Oh, it strikes my heart!”

*Howard's translation of the lines which follow
the inscription.*

Sweaburg, Helsingfors, and Fredericksham ; in Courland, Riga and Dunaburg ; and in Poland, Ackerman, celebrated as being the place of her treaty with the Porte. Her marine stations are—Kronstadt, on the Baltic ; Sevastobol and Nikolaïeu (or Nicholay), on the Euxine ; and Astrakan, on the Volga ;—all of which are but indifferently fortified, and little capable of resisting attack.

The million of men usually ascribed to the Russian army during late years, and pompously trumped forth by the cunning cabinet of St. Petersburg, to impose on popular credulity, and to convey a high notion of the military power of the Muscovite empire, have no existence but in the brain of speculative calculators. The really effective military force of Russia, we have already shewn, does not quite reach 440,000 regulars, and a predatory cavalry of 80,000 men ; forming together, a force of 520,000 men, or little more than half the number ordinarily computed. It is, furthermore, a satisfaction to know, that, although Russia counts half a million of men on her muster roll, she can send but a very small proportion of them into the field. In so wide an extent of country, possessing so few strong fortresses, and in many parts inhabited by a people impatient of the iron yoke of military despotism, the presence of an armed force is everywhere needed, to overawe the factious, repress revolt, and maintain the authority of the abhorred government. The dutchies of Warsaw and Lithuania alone, find employment for nearly one-third of the whole Russian army. So fully occupied is the military force of Russia in internal police, that, in times of war, the Muscovite forces in the field have heretofore been far less numerous than those of any other of the leading states of Europe. Russia never appeared as a great military power, previous to the

war of 1741; when the British ministers, alarmed at the successes of the French armies in Belgium, under Maréchal Saxe, after the battle of Fontenoi, engaged, by means of a large subsidy, the Czarina Elizabeth Petrowna, daughter of Peter the Great, to send 50,000 men into Flanders. Russia, however, was unable to complete her promised contingent; and, after great delay, succeeded in despatching 30,000 men, who arrived too late to take any share in the campaign of 1747. The aid, however, which her cabinet was unable to afford by force of arms, it accomplished by means of cunning, and M. Bestuchef, by pretending that Russia was on the point of sending more formidable armies of ferocious Tartars to the scene of action, frightened le Marquis de St. Séverin and the French court into terms of peace. Romanzow and Souwarrow, during their most brilliant campaigns, had never more than 30,000 regular troops in their armies.

The inefficiency of the military force of Russia, when opposed to the disciplined troops of France, was strongly illustrated by the campaigns of 1805, at Austerlitz—of 1806, at Pultusk—and of 1807, at Friedland. During these campaigns, although she received heavy subsidies from Great Britain, she on no occasion brought more than 80,000 men into the field. In the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, the heyday of her gigantic efforts, when the ukase of Alexander demanded recruits, even from the remotest extremity of the empire, and all the great barons were taxed a double quota of slaves, her force, actually opposed to the French in Germany, never exceeded 140,000 men; and this complement could not have been maintained, had not British subsidies paid the expenses of the contest. During the late Turkish war, when Russia strained every nerve to augment her army, and made heavy requisitions on her military colonies,

her effective force in the field scarcely exceeded 120,000 men; and the force which passed the Balkan—where 5000 well disciplined infantry, and a few brigades of well appointed artillery, would have effectually overturned all her hopes of conquest, did not amount to half that number. In her late brutal crusade against the Poles, she was unable, after a lapse of nine months spent in collecting and recruiting her forces, to bring into the field, on any one occasion, more than 80,000 men, or arrest, for many successive months, the progress of the Polish army, though it was little more than a moiety of that number.

From these facts, how feeble does the effective military power of Russia appear when placed in comparison with that of France; which, in 1811-12, sent from her *own soil* 400,000 men against Russia; maintained, at the same time, 100,000 men in the peninsula, and large garrisons in her own territories: or even in comparison with that of Austria, which, in 1805, actually maintained 175,000 effective men in active military operations. In our former pages, it is demonstrated that the pecuniary means of Russia are quite inadequate to the increase of her present military force; and it is certain, that without a very large augmentation of her army, she can make but little progress towards the west.* We have thought proper thus briefly to refer to the military power of Russia, as a prelude to our following remarks on her foreign policy.

* We may remark that the plan of associating the citizen and the soldier, so largely acted on in Germany and France, is not adopted in Russia: her youth are not trained to arms during a military apprenticeship, and sent into private life to be ready for military service when called on. A Russian peasant who becomes a soldier remains so during life, hence Russia possesses no such means as Prussia and France of rapidly organizing an army of disciplined soldiers—her military colonies could supply comparatively but few recruits.

Foreign policy of her cabinet.—Conquest is the very genius of the Russian government, and the restless spirit of the ancient Scandinavians has ever been deeply woven in the disposition of their Muscovite descendants. The conquests made by the Ivans and the Michaels, although vast in extent, added little to the political or commercial importance of Russia; it was reserved for the famed Peter to knit into empire the various countries which acknowledged the sovereignty of his sceptre, and to sow the seeds of social organization among the various nomade tribes which peopled the vast recesses of his boundless dominions.

From this period her government has pursued one undeviating course of territorial aggrandisement. In 1708 Russia added Livonia, Esthonia, and Ingria to her dominions; next she obtained the Kuban and the countries situated between the Boug and the Dneister, then the Swedish provinces became a prey to her ambition. The decayed condition of the Turkish and Persian monarchies next offered tempting opportunities for the enlargement of her empire, and province after province was incorporated with her territories. In Turkey she has extended her military occupation to the very foot of the Balkan, while towards Persia the Caucassian mountains no longer oppose a barrier to her progress; and with an army, numbering from 60,000 to 80,000 men, she is preparing to establish her government in Teheran, and subjugate the remnant of the Persian empire.* In fact, Russia has never, from the days of Peter to the present time, concluded a treaty of peace without acquiring additional territory, sometimes, indeed, as in the case of Tilsit, at the expense of her allies. Under the influence and intrigues of the Russian

* Dr. Lyall estimates the ordinary force of the Caucassian army at 80,000 men, the head quarters of which is Teflis.

cabinet, during the long and brilliant reign of Catherine, the integrity of Poland and Sweden, the old bulwarks of Europe, was slowly undermined, and successive portions of these states have become Russian, until the whole of the latter kingdom has fallen within her liberticidal grasp. Alexander was desirous of deriving some advantage from the vast conquests of his predecessors, by the internal improvement of his widely-spread dominions, and was personally less disposed to extend the radii of his empire than his Tartarian ancestors, but hurried on to conquest by the restless spirit of his nobles, he was obliged to conform his policy to the Russian "system." He made two conquests, most important to Russia, most dangerous to Europe, "Finland and Poland." The former provides the means of constructing and manning a navy, while the latter has been converted into a vast military camp, the rendez-vous of an army of observation in the centre of Europe. There is no end to conquest; one province demands another, and as the possession of the Crimea and the shores of the Euxine were deemed necessary to confirm the Russian naval superiority in the south, so may the possession of Sweden, Norway, Copenhagen, and Hamburgh, appear eligible to strengthen her maritime powers in the north. "The Hungarian mountains and Silesian fortresses may, at a future time, form the military frontiers of Poland—such limits may appear necessary to another Ivan, and wherefore may not one appear on the throne of the Czars?" If her means were commensurate with her will, universal empire would alone be adequate to satiate the avidity of Russia.

Peculiar reasons for the present system of policy towards Turkey.—It is, however, towards the south that her encroachments are at the present day principally directed, and the secret springs of her

policy have long been actively working to corrupt the Ottoman grandees, and to stir into action a party opposed to the military reforms of Mahmoud, thus the more easily to obtain the desired object. Commercial as well as political causes influence the Russian cabinet in their designs on the maritime provinces of Turkey, and the secure and free navigation of the Euxine and the Bosphorus forms the very nucleus of her present political system. The course of her great rivers, the Knieper, the Don, the Volga, and the Oural, the two first mingling their waters in the Euxine, and the two latter in the Caspian sea, gives this tendency to her policy. The possession of the sea of Azof and the Crimea, which gave her part of the dominion of the Black Sea, were inadequate to the attainment of her ulterior and chief object, "a secure outlet for her produce, into the Mediterranean;" for, unless she could command the narrow straits of the Bosphorus, the will or caprice of a foreign prince might still retain it in the Black Sea, and thus the finest provinces in the empire would be retarded in their advancement. The inhabitants of the provinces washed by the Euxine, or traversed by the streams which flow into it, fully aware of the advantages which would certainly accrue to them from obtaining the free navigation of the Bosphorus, and thereby an open channel for their produce into the Mediterranean, are consequently well disposed to support the government in those measures towards the Ottoman power which promise the complete realization of these views. In the wars and treaties with Turkey, which have succeeded each other with unusual rapidity, the common object has been to enlarge and confirm the means by which Russian produce might freely pass into the Mediterranean. Every treaty, in fact, has, by a forced interpretation, been a pretext for the continuance of hostilities after a formal ratifi-

cation of peace, signifying better than words can express, that imperious desire which can never cease till it be gratified, perhaps, by the actual possession of the shores of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and the Golden Horn.

The insurrection of the Greeks, and other causes which weakened the ancient defenders of the Crescent, indicated a favourable opportunity for the realization of these hopes. The wary cabinet of St. Petersburg was careful not to mingle at first in this quarrel, and for some time published its complaints; thus collecting means of justification, when it should resolve to take a decisive step. It carefully avoided compounding its cause with that of the Greeks, reserving to itself a liberty of movement, whenever it should appear advantageous. "The non-observance of the treaty of Ackerman, formed the chief subject of complaint in the Russian manifestos; for it was this treaty which contained all the principal stipulations of former treaties, tending to confirm the political, commercial, and maritime system of Russia."* It was the policy of the British cabinet to prevent the Black Sea becoming entirely Muscovite property; and especially to retain Constantinople, and with it the key to the relative navigation of the Euxine and Mediterranean, in the full possession of the Sultan. Hence, by the strenuous exertions of the British diplomatists, aided by other cabinets, who joined in the menace of the British government towards Russia, the latter was induced to accede to certain conditions of peace; which, although leaving the shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in the possession of Turkey, gave to Russia a full liberty of navigation from the Euxine to the Mediterranean sea. The troubles which have since arisen in the Turkish empire, have afforded Russia another opportunity

* Le Constitutionnel, July 25, Paris Journal, 1828.

of improving her advantage, and it was to this end that she sent her legions to occupy the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus, under the pretext of defending the Porte against the attacks of the forces of the rebellious Mehemet Ali.* To have

* The time was extremely favourable to Mehemet Ali, the Egyptian viceroy, for the execution of his ambitious plans against the Porte. "The great powers were fully occupied with their own affairs; France with her revolution; England with her reform; Russia with her Polish subjects; while Austria was employed in repressing revolts in Italy; all seemed to concur in restraining them from military interference in favour of the Sultan. The reforms of Mahmoud, and the suppression of the Janissaries, had excited great discontent among the Osmanlis, who, with indignation, considered the Sultan as the slave of Russia. The Albanians and Bosnians were in open revolt; revolutionary movements had also occurred in several pachalics of Upper Asia; and the Syrians, pressed down by heavy imposts, "such as the saglian poll tax and tithes, and plundered by the insupportable monopolies which the Pachas claimed of almost every useful commodity, wheat, cattle, silk, cotton, opium, &c., were little disposed to act against the Egyptians in defending the government of the Sultan, which may be justly denominated an organised system of plunder. In Syria the most flagrant extortion is practised—property is arbitrarily seized at a mere nominal remuneration, under the mask of government monopolies; the places of public functionaries are openly sold; the course of public justice perverted by bribes; and every species of despotism reigns in its most perfect form. Added to these sources of ruin, religious antipathies fill the measure of national misery and degradation, thus converting this primeval nursery of christianity and intelligence, into a vast wilderness of superstition and ignorance. The Greeks and Turks inhabit the towns, the rest of the population is composed of Arab-Fellahs, inhabiting the open country; Kurds and Turkomans, wandering tribes in the valley of Orontes; Arab-Bedouins, who wander with their tents on the banks of the Jordan, and on the borders of the desert; Ausariehs, adorers of the sun; Maronites, who profess Catholicism; Druses, Mussulmen of the sect of Ali, occupying Anti-Lebanon; and lastly, Naplousians, and other tribes, preserving a kind of independence, all imbued with bigotry and religious antipathies to each other, and rendering Syria an easy prey to any ambitious chief who can bring an organised force into the country. On the first intelligence of the entry of Mehemet's army into Syria, the Porte feigned to consider the invasion as an affair between the Pacha of Acre and the Turkish viceroy, and inquired their respective reason for dis-

retained military possession of this, to Russia, all important ground, would have been a precocious act, as bringing her at once in contact with the combined forces of Great Britain and France : but the genius of Orloff, and the subtlety of the Russian councils, found means to acquire by cunning, what the Muscovite was unable to obtain by force. By the treaty concluded on the 8th July, 1833, signed by Seraskier Achmet Pacha, on the part of the Porte, and Count Orloff and M. de Boutenieff, on the part of Russia, the attainment of all the leading objects of the latter power are promised.

pute ; but the real object becoming evident, orders were given to prepare for war. Unable to subdue the rebel viceroy by force of arms, he determined to fulminate the Mahomedan *fetvah* (anathema) against the traitor Mehemet Ali. The grand Mufti (head of the church), the Cadileskers (chief judges), and the principal Ulemas, declaring the extermination of the rebels to be a sacred duty with all faithful Mussulmen ; those who die while fighting against them, to be angels of the Elysian paradise of the Prophet ; and all rebels, victims to the torments of the Mahomedan inferno. Since the late Russian victories, however, less importance is attached to the *fetvah* of the Sultan, formerly so fatal to the *fermali* (persons excommunicated), and Mehemet Ali escaped the fate of Kleber. While proclaiming this act of outlawry, the Porte transmitted to the accredited ministers of foreign powers, a kind of epistle, in which the difference between the Sultan and his rebellious vassals was officially communicated, and Egypt declared in a state of blockade." Austria, the decided enemy to revolutions, whatever their cause or character, went so far as to threaten the viceroy. England adopted a line of conduct coinciding with that of France, who, even before the fall of Acre, tried to bring about a reconciliation between the Porte and Mehemet Ali. Unfortunately, the French chargé d'affaires, M. Varennes, though decidedly a man of talent, failed, from a deficiency of knowledge in Turkish diplomacy. At length the Porte applied to the British cabinet for military aid, which was refused. Lord Ponsonby was, however, dispatched to negotiate a reconciliation, and to arrange matters ; but his lordship preferring the air of Italy to that of Constantinople, tarried, perhaps by orders from his government, until the Sultan, despairing of British mediation or assistance, threw himself into the arms of Russia, accepted the services of the Muscovite troops to guard his miserable capital, and became the vassal of Nicholas.

This treaty consists of six articles,* which are merely preliminary stipulations to insure the fulfilment of the provisions of the supplementary article, which in fact, is to transfer to Russia the right of closing the Straits of the Dardanelles against foreign ships, to confirm her right of free navigation with the Mediterranean and the Black seas, and her means of maintaining that right; after stipulating, by the third article of the treaty, to provide the Sublime Porte all those auxiliary forces, both sea and land, which circumstances may oblige Turkey to require. The supplementary article says:—"The Sublime Porte, in pursuance of the said principles, *will close, in case of need, the Straits of the Dardanelles, that is to say, it will not permit the entrance of any foreign vessel, even under any pretext whatsoever.*" The words, "in case of need," mean in substance, in case of being required to do so by Russia. This project, which seems strengthened by the "secret treaty," since concluded between these high contracting barbarians, cannot be permitted by any European government, especially the British, to be brought into operation; and it is extremely important to inquire, how far the checks which the British government have opposed, and must henceforth more strenuously direct against the ambitious views of the Muscovite, will act in encouraging the

* The first article, that there shall be perpetual alliance between the contracting parties, having for its object reciprocal defence, mutual arrangement of all affairs which may compromise the tranquillity and mutual effective assistance and conjunctive aid. The second article confirms the treaty of Adrianople, 1829, and the convention of July 1832. The third enables the Sublime Porte, in case of need, to decide on the number of forces, both by sea and land, he may desire. The fourth specifies that whichever of the two powers demands auxiliary forces, shall solely provide them provisions. The fifth requires that eight years' notice shall be given by either party requiring change in these stipulations. The sixth, that the treaty shall be signed at Constantinople, within two months from this date.—(8th July 1833.)

cabinet of St. Petersburg in its favourite object of rivaling the British naval power in the Mediterranean, and of freeing itself from the restrictions imposed by the "Tyrant of the Ocean." This attempt, when without the smallest increase of our peace marine establishment, we could close both the Baltic and the Bosphorus against all the naval force which Russia could, by her most strenuous exertions, send against us, will doubtless appear as chimerical as the project of a Russian overland expedition against our Eastern empire; but when we look to the physical means of Russia for equipping a navy, her inexhaustible stores of timber, hemp, iron, and other materials indigenous to her soil; the abundant supply of sailors and workmen at the disposal of the government, and the rapid growth of her marine since the peace of 1815, due measures of precaution on the part of the British ministers, seem far from unnecessary. Russia, with all her forces, naval and military, would alone be quite unequal to wage a successful contest with Great Britain; but there is a certain something which appears to indicate an approaching rupture with that power, and it seems probable that she contemplates, at no very distant period, the formation of a new maritime confederacy against England.

Probability of an attack against British India discussed.—The foregoing remarks as to the dominant policy of Russia towards the states in the south of Europe, and her *possible* collision with the British government, lead us to notice another favourite project of the Russian cabinet, and which has lately, on various occasions, been brought before the public in literary publications.*

The Russian government seem to have been

* By Colonel De Lacy Evans, and others.

mindful of the maxim, that "ambition is often injurious, by tempting us to prosecute too much at once." Its encroachments or conquests, proceeding from motives purely ambitious, have been effected step by step. The partition of Poland, the Russian encroachments on Sweden, and on the Turkish and Persian territories, were none of them effected at once, but progressively, and by various treaties. However, ambition has an insatiable appetite; its object, when attained, only provides materials for further designs, and its hunger is only increased by that which should produce satiety. We have seen this truth exemplified during a long period, in the policy of the Muscovite court.

The conquest of the British possessions in the East, was a favourite project of the Czarina Elizabeth. The offensive alliance of Russia and Austria, against Prussia and Great Britain (1756,) contemplated also the partition of Turkey, and subsequently an attempt against the territories of the Mogul and British India. The political advisers of Catherine seriously contemplated such an expedition, and it was only deferred by her death and the change of policy concurrent with the accession of the emperor Paul. It formed a chief feature in the Machiavelian policy of Buonaparte; and after the treaty of Tilsit, and the friendly hug on the Niemen, it was to be put in motion forthwith. The resistance in Spain, however, arrested its progress; and the project was not renewed till 1812, when the French, after the subjugation of Russia, were, in conjunction with the Muscovite army, to be transported, by some unknown means, (perhaps by steam) from central Europe across the mountains of the Hindoo Koo, to the fertile plains of the Cabul, there establish dépôts and their head quarters; and from thence pass onward to annihilate the British power in the East. The project,

however, was dissolved by the successful resistance of Russia to the French invaders, which turned all their smiling prospects of military glories and conquests into a sanguinary tragedy of defeat and entire subjugation.

Since that period, however, the Russian government, perhaps from a desire to excite the fears and jealousies of Great Britain, has shewn an eager inclination to attempt a military movement towards India; and several plans of operation are said to be deposited among the archives in le bureau de la guerre, at St. Petersburg. Among these is the report of General Muravieff, of the Russian guards,* who, in 1819-20, was officially commissioned and dispatched to trace the line of military operations, which since the Russians have acquired the free navigation of the Caspian has become so much more practicable.

Commanding the navigation of the principal rivers which traverse the Muscovite dominions, and descend from the north into the Caspian, the Russians would, in accordance with the report of General Muravieff, reject the beaten tracks of Alexander and Nadir Shah, and, in an expedition to British India, ascend the Oxus to Bokhara, or perhaps Balkh;† traverse the mountains of the Hindoo Khoo; pass the Indus at Attock; descend into the Punjaub, and from thence into British India, through the states of Delhi. As to the practicability of such an expedition, there are various opinions; but General Muravieff, it is said, reports that, in a military sense, there are no *insurmountable* obstacles.

The question of the probability of the attempt

* This is the same officer who commanded the late expedition to the Dardanelles.

† The longitude of Balkh, adopted by Rennell from Beaucamp, is 65° 33" east, and the latitude 36° 41" north. In Elphinstone's map of Caubul, its longitude is 66° 15", latitude 36° 30."

has, of late, engaged so much of the public attention, that a brief notice of the country through which an European army must pass in its invasion of British India, may not be uninteresting. In Great Britain we know little of the geography of central Asia; and previous to the publication of Major Rennell's *Memoirs* in 1788, the country between the Caspian and the confines of British India, may be said to have been unknown to Europeans. The Oxus, or Jihoon, is a stream little inferior to the Indus, and much superior in point of volume of water to the Euphrates and the Tigris: according to Marco Polo, the only European on record who ever visited the country at the sources of the Oxus, this river rises in the Beloor regions, or from the Beloor Taugh mountain, at an elevation of several thousand feet above the level of the sea.* Its course is about 1100 miles, and extremely rapid to the eastward of Bokhara. Between Bokhara and Balkh, where the Macedonian army crossed, it is three quarters of a mile wide; its depth more than proportionate to its breadth; and its current so rapid as to render it almost unnavigable. Indeed, the passage, which, although undefended, occupied nine days, was deemed so arduous an undertaking by Alexander's ablest generals, that they advised him not to attempt it, but to return.†

The line of country traversed by the Oxus between the Caspian and the Bokhara, is described by Ritter, in the second volume of his geographical work, published last year,‡ as a narrow strip

* So great is the height of these mountains, says Marco Polo, that no birds are ever seen near their summits, and from the keenness of the air, fires do not give the same heat, or produce the same effect in dressing victuals as in the regions below. The source of the Oxus is laid down in Elphinstone's map in east longitude 73°, and north latitude 38° 15".

† *Erdkund Von Asien*. Berlin, 1832.

‡ Quintus Curtius, Book viii.

of *steppe* land, almost totally devoid of wood, verdure, or productive earth; the soil, everywhere, impregnated with *salt*; covered with drift sand, and bearing little besides the thorny shrubs of the desert. An invading army would thus have to transport every thing necessary to subsistence, even water, as well as the cumbrous munitions of modern warfare, and forage to support the cavalry, artillery horses, and beasts of burthen employed in the conveyance of the baggage and military stores.

Kiava, or Khevah, is the first place of importance on the Oxus, in ascending it. Its distance from the shores of the Caspian Sea is about twenty-five days' march; here depôts would be established, and means taken to secure a communication with Bokhara and Balk; from whence the army would commence its march towards India.

A straight line drawn on Rennell's map, makes the distance from Bokhara to Attock on the Indus, 630 miles, and from Attock to Delhi, 440 miles; and hence the entire rectilinear distance from Bokhara to Delhi, 1070 miles; but, allowing for the inflections which an army must make, the actual distance cannot be less than 1450 to 1500 miles.

Balkh is the ancient capital of Bactria; its ruins still cover a great extent of ground, surrounded by a wall, but only one corner of the city is now inhabited. Elphinstone, whose memoirs relate to 1809, says that it is reduced to a state of insignificance, and was lately under the government of an Afghan deputy appointed by the court of Caubul. The country around is flat, fertile, and well cultivated; it is said to contain 360 villages, and to be watered by eighteen canals, drawn from a celebrated reservoir in the neighbouring mountains. There, on its arrival, a Russian army would probably establish other depôts, while another corps

d'armée would proceed by way of Bokhara, and there also establish reserves, and keep up their communication with Kiava and the Caspian.

On passing the deserts of Bucharía, and arriving at the foot of the Hindoo-Khoo, a barrier would present itself, which, in the ordinary sense, appears impassable to an invading army, encumbered with the ponderous munitions of modern warfare. These mountains are described by all European travellers who have visited Central Asia, as affording a most terrific appearance. Elphinstone, in his memoirs (page 155), says, "On entering the plain of Peshawer, on the 24th of February, 1809, four ranges of mountains were seen on the north; the lowest had no snow; the tops of the second were covered with it, as was the third, half-way down. The fourth was the principal range of the *Indian Caucasus, which is always wholly covered with snow*. We first saw these mountains at the distance of 100 miles, but they would have been visible long before, if the view had not been shut out by the hills through which we travelled. In appearance, however, they were very near; the ridges and hollows of their sides were clearly discernible; and this distinctness, joined to the softness and transparency which their distance gave them, produced a singular and very pleasing effect. The stupendous height of these mountains, the magnificence and variety of their lofty summits, and the awful undisturbed solitude which reigns amidst their *eternal snows*, fill the mind with admiration and astonishment which no language can express. Several of the most remarkable were measured geometrically from the plains of Peshawer, by Lieutenant Macartney, who found their altitude 20,493 feet, and as the plain cannot be less than 1500 feet above the level of the sea, they are consequently 22,000 feet of absolute height, and therefore higher than the loftiest of the Andes,

hitherto esteemed the highest in the world.* When the embassy left Peshawer, on the 20th of June, *the range was still perfectly covered with snow*, though the thermometer at that place stood at 112° and 113° in the shade." The Jesuit missionary Desideri, in speaking of the dreadful cold he experienced in these regions, says "Ces montagnes sont une vraie image de la tristesse de l'horreur et de la mort même;" and from the description of this region given by St. Croix, Bernier, Forster, and other authorities, some idea may be formed of the difficulties of passing an invading army over the Hindoo Khoo, and Himalaya mountains.†

The precise spot where Alexander passed the Hindoo Khoo is not clearly defined by modern geographers; but it is usually considered to have been the Baumeeaun pass, which leads to the present Anderab, or the ancient Drapsaca, in latitude about 36° 20''; or, as Quintus Curtius informs us, near the city of Nisa, where the cold was so excessive, and where the whole army had well nigh fallen a sacrifice to the temerity of its chief. Timoor Bek crossed this pass in 1398, and returned by it from his Indian expedition in the following spring; and it is probable that a Russian-European army invading India, would

* The greatest altitude ever attained by man is 19,400 feet; at this height, says Humboldt, the tenuity of the air was so great, that respiration was difficult. Some of the party fainted, and blood oozed from the eyes, lips, and gums.

† Mr. Kerr Porter, in speaking of the *Western Caucasus*, which scarcely rises to two-thirds of the height of the Great *Indian Caucasus*, represents it as the sublimest spectacle he had ever seen. "No pen can express the emotion which the sudden burst of this sublime range excited in my mind. I had seen almost all the wildest and most gigantic chains in Spain and Portugal, but none gave me an idea of the vastness and grandeur of that I now contemplated. I know not who could behold the *mighty Caucasus*, and not feel the spirit of sublime solitudes awing his soul."

attempt the same route. There the least opposition would put an end to all the hopes of the expedition. Such part of these icy regions as is habitable, is inhabited by a formidable Nomade people (roving Tartars), who would doubtless avail themselves of the opportunity afforded, of reaping a good harvest by the plunder of the Russian munitions; and effectually detaining the supplies of the army one week, would starve it into the necessity of unconditional surrender.

Should the army be enabled to surmount all the mighty obstacles presented by the great Indian Caucasus, it would descend into the Punjaub country, or country of the five rivers. The pass of Attock* is the ordinary route, by which the Macedonian, Persian, and Tartar chiefs—Alexander, Nadir Shah, Mohammed of Ghor, and Achmet Abdalla, the founder of the Afghaun monarchy—have entered it. Pottinger has furnished a table of the breadth of the Indus from Attock to the sea.† At the fortress of Attock, the Indus, according to Pottinger, is 260 yards wide; but is too deep and rapid to be accurately sounded. “At the point of junction with the Cophenes, or rapid river of the Caubul, the scene is grand and terrific. Even

* Lat. 33° 53".

† Extract from Pottinger's table of the depth and breadth of the Indus:—

Latitude.	Places.	Depth.		Breadth.
		Dry Season. Fathoms.	Wet Season. Fathoms.	Dry Season. Yards.
33.53 .	Attock	—	—	260
33.7 .	Kallabaugh	—	—	380
31.52 .	Dera Ismael Khan	2	—	1000
31.28 .	Kaheree	2	—	1200
29.54 .	Dera Ghazi Khan	3	7	1000
29.20 .	Rajunpoor	3	7	1400
28.27 .	Confluence of the 5 Rivers, 8	8	16	2200
27.13 .	Blukor	5	10	1600
26.6 .	Schwan	3	6	900
25.20 .	Hyderabad	5	8	2000

when the two rivers are lowest, the confluence and their course through the rocks before they are lost in the mountains, are full of waves and eddies, and produce a sound like that of the sea in a storm; but when they are swelled by the melted snows of the Caucasus and the Imaus, they create a tremendous whirlpool, the roaring of which is heard at a great distance, and which often swallows up boats, or dashes them to pieces against the rocks." In the rainy season, the Indus rises forty feet perpendicular, but does not spread above fifty yards from its ordinary limits, owing to the great height of its banks, which are of black stone, and are so polished by the stream and the white sand it carries with it, as to resemble black marble.*

It was some distance south of Attock where Alexander crossed the Indus; and Quintus Curtius paints in lively colours the difficulty which he encountered, and the resistance with which king Porus here met the Macedonian invader. The banks of such a river, defended by an Anglo-Indian army, would bid defiance to all the troops which Europe could send against British India.

It is not probable that a Russian army would leave the shores of the Caspian with the open design of invading British India, without previously engaging the alliance of the Afghan princes, with whom, it is well known, the cabinet of St. Petersburg have long been in intimate correspondence.† The Afghan territories, or what may be called Eastern Persia, are governed by the sons of Timoor Khan, who died in May, 1793. One of them,

* This description is given in a note by Mr. Bell, in his edition of Rollin's History, page 189.

† St. Petersburg, August 26, 1829.—"Mohammed Mustapha, prince of the Afghans, arrived here on the 7th, from Orenburg. The Afghans, as well as their neighbour, 'the *Rajah of Lahore*,' who lately had two ambassadors at St. Petersburg, are known to be friends to Russia."—*Franckfort paper*.

“Jah Mohammed Khan,” resides at Peshawer; the other, “Purdel Khan,” holds his court at Candahar; a third brother, named “Dost Mohammed Khan,” who governed at Caubul, was expelled, in 1826, by the other two brothers. The Afghans are a warlike, Nomade people; and these two princes, who are known in India as distinguished warriors, are able to bring about 20,000 men into the field. If, by the assistance of these princes, a Russian army should be enabled to cross the icy Caucasus and the rapid stream of the Indus, they would, doubtless, look for the co-operation of Rundjah Seing, whose dominions bound the British possessions on the north-west. The army of this chief is said to be more numerous than that of the Afghans, well composed, and disciplined by French and Russian officers; and his growing intimacy with the cabinet of St. Petersburg, is looked to with some suspicion and uneasiness, by the Anglo-Indian council. On the first intimation of the march of the Russian forces towards the east, an Anglo-Indian army would, no doubt, either by force or treaty, be sent to oppose their progress on the banks of the Indus; and Rundjah Seing would be obliged to declare himself, and act as the friend or foe of the British interest. Vital importance is popularly attributed, in India, to the alliance of this prince; and indeed, it is probable that the mission of lord William Bentinck, who quitted Calcutta in November, 1832, for the ostensible object of arranging the claims of the Persian princes, and arbitrating between them, was not altogether unconnected with affairs relative to the future alliance of Rundjah Seing with the Anglo-Indian government.

Without the full and entire co-operation of all the Tartar and Persian princes, whose territories lie between the Caspian and the states of Delhi, a Russian overland expedition must be treated as a

mere chimera. If Russia is disposed to trust to an alliance (if it merit the term) with uncivilized hordes of predatory Tartars, it is possible that, allured by the costly prize, she *may* attempt a marauding, plundering irruption, *à la Nadir Shah*, to the states of Delhi; but the success of such an expedition, there is, in the present state of affairs, no reason to dread. To protect the line of communication between the Caspian and the Indus, would require a larger army than Napoleon employed to secure his communication between Wilna and Moscow; and in that service there were not less than 300,000 men employed, or double the force which Russia has ever been able to bring into the field. Indeed, her whole force of 520,000 men, which her revenues cannot support, even in time of peace, without loans from Britain, would prove inadequate to the undertaking; while the immense supplies of recruits required to fill up the ravages of disease, the sure attendant of an army passing from the icy regions of the Hindoo Khoo, to the burning plains of the Punjaub, exposed to sudden extremes of heat and cold, to famine and grievous fatigue, would so drain her western empire of troops, as to leave it exposed to those internal commotions which, fomented and aided by Great Britain, could not fail to hasten the epoch, when the gigantic Muscovite empire must split into numerous independent states.

Russia has been many centuries arriving at her present power. By force of arms, craft, and treaty, she has extended her dominion over an extent of territory, greater than has, in any age or country, acknowledged one ruler. By her successive conquests over the Tartars, the Turks, the Swedes, and the Poles, she has become familiar with victory; her ambition has been fed, her power flattered; and universal empire seems to be the point to which she aspires. But, as Quintus Curtius

says, the business of conquest is two-fold—"to win, and to preserve." There can be no sincere friendship between the oppressor and the oppressed: Russia, by her merciless tyranny towards Poland, has excited the popular indignation of Europe against her: there is rage in the heart, and deep-seated revenge, which *must*, at no distant period, seek, with frantic energy, retributive vengeance for the cruelties inflicted. Lithuania, Finland, and the newly subjected states on the shores of the Caspian and the Euxine, brood over their loss of independence, and wait but a favourable moment, to regain their nationality; and such an opportunity as would be afforded by the absence of the Russian army in the east, could not fail to kindle into flame the latent sparks of disaffection, which now lie smothering beneath the weight of Muscovite tyranny; and then

"Wretched subjects, frantic with their wrongs,
Would, on every side, in fierce rebellion rise,
To crush the crimson'd tyrant."

Whatever cause for apprehension may arise at a distant period, from the progressive encroachments of Russia on the Persian and Bucharian territories, and from the consolidation of her powers, it is impossible to foretel; but she must extend her dominion across the fertile plains of the Caubul, and the frozen Indian Caucasus, and firmly establish her authority in the Punjaub, ere she attempt a crusade against British India.

Alexander, who is styled the "Conqueror of India," never passed the north-western confines of the British Indian possessions. By a singular coincidence of good fortune—"the imbecility of Bessus, the dissensions of the rulers of Eastern Persia, and an alliance with Taxilus," whose dominions bordered on the Indus, the Macedonian arms penetrated into the Punjaub, and advanced

as far as the Hyphasis; but here even the valourous spirit of the Macedonians sunk under the accumulation of difficulties; and all the eloquence of the heroic and victorious scion of Jupiter, failed in prevailing on the soldiers to advance one jot farther. Of the distress of Alexander's army, when arrived on the banks of the Hyphasis, some idea may be formed by the language which Quintus Curtius uses as the speech of Cænus, who thus addressed his sovereign:—"The greatness, sir, of your exploits has conquered, not only your enemies, but even your soldiers themselves. We have done all that it was possible for men to do. We have crossed seas and lands; we shall soon have marched to the end of the world, and you are meditating the conquest of another, by going in search of new Indies unknown to the Indians themselves. Such a thought may be worthy of your valour, but it *surpasses ours*, and our strength still more. Behold these ghastly faces, and these bodies covered with wounds and scars; you are sensible how numerous we were at your first setting out, and you see what now remains of us: the few, who have escaped so many toils and dangers, have neither courage nor strength enough to follow you." Such, says Quintus Curtius, was the language of Alexander's general; and, with every allowance for the romantic and dubious character of the writings of that author, it may be reasonably inferred, that it is by no means a fabulous description of the state of the Macedonian army; since it is very certain, that Alexander penetrated no further towards the east—that he abandoned his Indian conquests—secured the services of king Porus—and effected a peace between that chief and Taxilus, with a view to a safe retreat.

If, by miraculous success, a Russian-European army should ever reach so far, it would present

such a picture, or worse ; and all the eloquence of a Nicholas, addressed to his famished, diseased, and worn-out hordes, would be as ineffectual as the reprimand of Xerxes to the stubborn Athos, or the rhetorical addresses of Demosthenes to the roaring ocean. Nor would a treaty, even if conducted with the genius of an Orloff, be enabled to secure a retreat for the *marauding* army. That never failing conqueror, death, would ravage the Muscovite ranks, and unconditional surrender would be the only resource of a miserable remnant.

British India is not, as yet, exposed to merciless attack from European Russia. It is to internal, not external foes, that British dominion may, at no distant period, be forced to yield ; and the wide spread of European military tactics throughout the Indian peninsula, may, ere ages pass away, create a formidable power against British interests, and seriously menace the existence of the present governing authority. The hosts of Zemindars, Amunees, Potails, Mocuddums, Cornums, and other pitiless revenue officers, are more formidable enemies to British India, than the Muscovites. However, a *ne plus ultra* must be imposed against the encroachments of Russia, and she must be prevented, *coûte que coûte*, from following her course of aggression, and from advancing, step by step, until her territory reaches to the very threshold of the British Indian possessions.

Estimate and General View of the present state of the British Empire in India; shewing the Population, Force, Lands cultivated, Imports, Exports, Revenue, Charges, and Debt; compiled from official documents, and the estimates of the latest authorities.

CAPITAL AND POWER.												
	Popula- tion.*	Troops.		Area in British square miles.	Lands. Cultivated Acres.	Imports into Great Britain 1829.			Exports from Great Bri- tain 1829.			Net re- ceipts from Sub- sidies, from Na- tive Princes, or from conquer- ed coun- tries, 1828 1829.
		Native.	Euro- pean.			By the Com- pany.	Private Trade.	Total.	By the Com- pany.	Private Trade.	Total.	
						£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Bengal	69,710,071	96,889	15,696†	220,312	}	}	}	}	}	}	}	}
Madras	13,508,535	57,749	12,981	141,923								
Bombay	6,251,546	32,421	7,729	59,438								
Prince of Wales's Island, Singapore, and Malacca	107,054			1,317	134,200,000	1,593,412	4,624,842	6,218,284	434,586	3,665,678	4,100,264	8,066,271
Territories in the Deccan, not yet attached to any Presidencies . . .	11,000,000			91,200								
Allied and Independent States . . .	40,000,000			614,610								
Totals	140,577,206†	187,057	36,604†	1,128,800†								22,182,659
												20,918,676
												1,263,428
												58,442,972
												58,442,972†

* The number of Christians in Calcutta, according to the police report of 1822, was 13,138; of whom 2254 were Europeans, and 10,884 half-castes. There were 20,000 half-castes in all the provinces. The attorneys generally belong to that class: families in India, do not inherit by the Hindoo, but by the Mahomedan law. If half-castes marry European women, their offspring are not British subjects; but if British subjects marry native women, their children inherit the right of the fathers.

† The territorial debt, in 1828, was £47,504,558. The grand total of the territorial, political, commercial, and home debts, was, in the same year, £64,263,945., and the assets, £51,195,714; leaving a deficiency of £13,068,231.—(East India House, 16th Feb. 1831.)

CHAPTER IV.

STATISTICAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF
AUSTRIA.

SECTION I.—AUSTRIAN STATISTICS.

Frequent changes in extent of territory.—The territorial dominions of the house of Austria have, from an early period, been exposed to frequent and extensive changes. Only a small part of the vast dominions of the present empire, formed the early possessions of the princes of the imperial house, who descend from the dukes of Alsace, and were originally styled counts of Hapsburg, a title inherited from the castle of that name. Under Charles V., Austria attained the zenith of her power; her dominion extending over Spain and her vast American colonies, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Milanese, Naples, Bohemia, and Hungary; while the whole of Germany had become, as it were, her patrimony. This extensive dominion excited the jealousy of Francis I., who waged the most cruel wars against his rival, for the preservation of the balance of power. Charles, although generally victorious, was unable to secure his entire dominions to his son, Philip II.; but the empire, although severed, continued under the direction and surveillance of the Aulic council of Vienna, until the death of Charles II. of Spain, when the

Spanish crown passed to the Bourbon dynasty. By the accession of the French family to the government of Spain, the political state of Austria was completely changed. The resources, by which she had for so long a period aspired to universal monarchy, and been able to rival the Gallic power, were at once turned into the scale against her; and she heartily entered into the grand alliance of 1701, to realize the hopes she had entertained, of securing the Spanish succession to the archduke Charles, the relation of the reigning emperor. The result of this coalition, however, secured her nothing but the renunciation of Philip V.'s claims to the crown of France. The dismemberment of the states of Austria seemed again threatened on the demise of Charles VI., when the male branch of the house of Hapsburg became extinct. Prussia, with her numerous and well disciplined armies, France, Spain, Bavaria, and the Germanic states, immediately coalesced to dispute the just pretensions of Maria Theresa, to whom the pragmatic sanction had guaranteed the succession. Europe bled at every pore; and, after violent sacrifices, Charles Albert of Bavaria was disconcerted in his projects, and the imperial diadem secured to the grand duke of Tuscany, the spouse of the Austrian heroine.

By her ill-advised and unfortunate coalition with France, in 1756, Austria lost a portion of Silesia, which the Great Lion incorporated with his Prussian territories; but from this period, she gradually enlarged the sphere of her dominions. By the first partition of Poland, in 1772, she obtained Galicia and Lodomeria; in 1776, the Bukowine was added; in the following year, the Innviertal was acquired; and in 1795, she obtained considerable additions in Poland. Her reverses in subsequent times, appear to have been

but the prelude to the expansion of her power. During the late wars, Francis II. saw his capital, thrice in the space of ten years, menaced by, or in the possession of, the armies of Napoleon, and was thrice obliged to purchase peace by cessions of territory. By the successive treaties of Leoben (Campo Formio) in 1797; Luneville in 1801; Presburg in 1805; and Vienna in 1809; Austria lost the Flemish provinces, the states of Lombardy, and her Italian possessions beyond the Save; all her provinces on the west of the Rhine, with Tyrol and Saltzburg; and large portions of territory beyond the Inn, to form the newly created kingdom of Westphalia, and the duchy of Franckfort; while her hereditary influence in the Germanic Diet was transferred to her adversary, by the newly fashioned confederation of the Rhine. These losses were apparently sufficient to paralyze her power, and incapacitate her from any speedy renewal of efforts to redeem her fallen fortune; but ere the lapse of four years, she reappeared on the theatre of war, with forces surpassing any previous limit, contributed powerfully to bring the contest to a successful issue, and, with the exception of the Netherlands, regained all her ancient possessions; spreading her territories from the course of the Inn in the west, to the gates of Belgrade in the east, over an area measuring, according to Blumenbach, about 261,800 British square miles.

Population.—During the late war, no official accounts of the population of the Austrian dominions were furnished; indeed, the changes in her geographical limits were so frequent, that little accurate information could be collected. Subsequent to the peace, the government obtained returns from the different kingdoms, provinces, and states; from which Blumenbach compiled tables,

an extract of which is annexed. He computes the total population at that date (1816), at 28,040,662, and the area 12,204 German square miles. In 1818, Lichtenstern stated the population of the empire to amount to 28,808,000, comprised in the following classes :—

Slavonians	13,182,000
Germans	5,442,000
Italians	4,226,000
Hungarians	4,225,000
Wallachians	1,246,000
Jews	487,000
	<hr/>
Total	28,808,000
	<hr/>

By the census made in October, 1825, a large increase seems to have taken place, the population being returned at 31,625,000. This, perhaps, is the most correct of the various accounts which have appeared. The ratio of increase, from the peace to that period, was, according to Dupin, about one per cent. per annum. Hence the population in 1833, if it progresses in the same ratio, is about 33,800,000; but, adding 15 per cent. to Blumenbach's statement, which we think a fair increase, it amounts to 32,236,889 souls.

The following account of the distribution of the Austrian territory, subsequent to the treaty of Vienna, is compiled from tables furnished by Blumenbach :—

Divisions.	Area, in British square miles.	Population in 1833, adding 15 per cent. for increase since 1816.
The kingdom of Bohemia . . .	20,780	3,683,831
The Margravite of Moravia . .	9,068	1,933,074
The Dukedom of Silesia	7,890	1,205,572
Austria above the Enns; Circle of the Inn and Hansruck . }	4,600 }	870,430
Saltzburgh	2,886 }	
The Duchy of Styria	8,667	909,913
The Duchy of Carinthia	4,148	320,275
Illyria, and part of Croatia . .	5,448	538,010
The Coast district	3,825	486,390
Tyrol and Voralberg	11,299	825,173
The Lombardo-Venetian king- dom	19,828	4,727,764
The government of Dalmatia . .	5,967	339,351
The kingdom of Galicia	33,119	4,318,771
Civil Hungary, Croatia, and Slavonia	88,916	9,430,000
Civil Transylvania, and Tran- sylvanian military frontiers }	24,280 }	1,736,500
Bannat, and Slavonian fron- tiers	4,894	461,440
Warasdiner military govern- ment	1,463	123,298
Carlstadter military govern- ment	3,613	217,341
Bannat regiments	1,178	109,756
Total	261,869	32,236,889

Revenue.—From the extreme paucity of documents relative to Austrian statistics, we are precluded from furnishing a detailed account of the revenues of the empire; indeed the fiscal laws embrace so many different tariffs, and the revenue

is collected on such various plans, that, in the absence of official returns, an approach to accuracy could scarcely be made. Hungary, Bohemia, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and the Illyrian States, have all their separate exchequers and different plans of taxation. The German dominions furnished at the peace of Paris about 110,000,000 of florins;* which, calculating the florin at twenty pence, is equal to about 9,160,000*l.*, Bohemia contributes about 25,000,000 florins,† and the Italian States 24,000,000; together about 4,080,000*l.* Balbi in 1826 carries his estimate of the revenues of the empire to 440,000,000 francs, about 17,600,000*l.*; from the improving condition of the States of Austria, it may be fairly presumed that her revenues at the present date are not under 18,500,000*l.* In Hungary, where the possession of even a small landed estate ennobles the proprietor, the lords of the soil pay no taxes. The peasants are the *misera contribuens plebs*, who, although they pay all the taxes, enjoy no political advantages. The capitation tax, and the produce of the royal demesnes, mines, &c. are here the principal sources of revenue. The well-meant endeavours of Joseph II. to equalize the imposts on land, were strenuously resisted by the overbearing Hungarian aristocracy; and hence the emperor was obliged to revoke his decrees, abolish his reforms, and give up his plans in despair. Besides the payment of the taxes, the peasants are also obliged to lodge and subsist the troops, and furnish forage and provisions to the army without payment. In other parts of the empire the principal heads of revenue are custom-house duties, a duty of 200 per cent. on salt, land taxes, stamps, and post,—a tax on offices, places, and pensions, lottery, mines, and mint, commercial monopolies, and the produce of the royal demesnes.

* Ockhart.

† Malte-Brun.

National debt. — Before the French war of 1792-3, the states which, at the present day, form the Austrian empire, were free from the burden of public debt. The arrears of the war,—the vast sacrifice of national property, and the free use of the credit of the government by the issues of paper currency, rendered extensive loans necessary, as soon as peace opened the possibility of effecting them. The operation of these claims on the resources of the government, carried the Austrian debt, in 1826, to 1,700,000,000 francs, or about 66,000,000*l.* sterling (Balbi). In the seven years elapsed since that time, the new obligations contracted have amounted to about 12,000,000*l.*, making the total debt 78,000,000*l.*; but the sum since redeemed by the Sinking Fund being nearly 4,000,000*l.*, the present debt of the Austrian empire may be computed, in round numbers, at 74,000,000*l.*, annually demanding nearly 3,800,000*l.* for the payment of its interest and management.

This deduction from the means of the government, leaves a disposable revenue of only 14,700,000*l.*, of which the army, although more economically maintained than any in Europe (except that of Russia), must, supported at its present complement, absorb at least a moiety. We shall not presume to furnish a detailed estimate of the state expenses of Austria, there being no data nor official documents on the subject, from which we could hope to arrive at a fair approximation to accuracy.

Military force.—The vast territorial extent of the Austrian dominions, and the deficient means of communication between her widely spread provinces, render the military movements of Austria slow, and her defective concert in military operations especially remarkable. The time thus re-

quired for the development of her force, gives her enemies a great advantage in attack, while her power seems to expand with the prolongation of the contest. This was especially instanced in the war of 1741, when, forced to the very brink of subjugation by the impetuosity of the first onset, she was enabled before the termination of the struggle to maintain, with the assistance of British subsidies, an army of 200,000 men, to overawe Germany, carry the war into the heart of France, and secure the chief objects for which she contended. In 1788, the forces of Joseph II. numbered 364,000 men, which, if directed by experienced generals, would have been quite equal to protect Austria against the attacks of the French republicans in 1793-4. Yet her army in the Netherlands scarcely at any time exceeded 25,000 men;* and it was not until the campaign of 1795, when her enemies had immensely increased their forces (see page 57), and the opportunity of triumph had passed, that she assumed an imposing military attitude.

In the campaign of 1805 she had upwards of 400,000 men on the muster-roll. The Archduke Charles led an army of 95,000 into Italy, with which he achieved some brilliant exploits; and General Mack was sent with an army of 80,000 men to await the junction of the Russian forces on the Iller; but Napoleon, with an army of 220,000 strong, poured like a torrent through Franconia and Bavaria, and at Ulm obliged the Austrian general and his legions to capitulate as prisoners of war.† The defeat of her arms at

* Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

† In vain did General Mack represent to his government the insecurity of his military position, and press for the orders of the minister (without which he dared not move), for permission to fall back on the advancing Russians; a disregard of his remonstrances was the precursor to the disasters which speedily followed: he was amused by accounts of the rapid progress of

Austerlitz deprived her of the means of resistance, and obliged her to yield to the forces of the French emperor. After the peace of Presburg in 1805, Austria made strenuous exertions to improve the numerical strength and discipline of her army; and encouraged by the successive defeats of the French in the Spanish peninsula, she was induced, in 1809, to renew her coalition with Great Britain, and again to measure her strength against France. At this time her forces numbered about 470,000 men. At Aspern, the improvement in the efficiency of the Austrian troops was fully apparent; but they were unable to withstand the impetuosity of the French at Wagram, or to save Vienna from the grasp of the Corsican. Towards the close of 1813 the Austrian forces numbered upwards of 500,000 men, and the actual force in the field under Schwartzenburg reached nearly half that number. Since the peace, the menacing attitude of the Hungarians and the Gallicians, and the avowed aversion of the Italians to the power which governs them, have been subjects of great uneasiness to the court of Vienna, and induced the government to maintain the army on the full peace establishment, or 271,404 men;* but since the revolution of July measures of precaution, against the effects of French *propagandism*, and the plans recommended by the republican party (see pp. 77-78), have induced the Austrians to recruit largely, and her military forces at the

the Muscovites, the impossibility of the French army reaching him before the concentration of the allied forces, and assured that the powerful diversion to be made by Great Britain on the coasts of France would relieve him from half the enemy's force; Napoleon, however, knew too well the advantage of rapid operations, and captured the whole of the general's forces ere the junction of the allies, although the Russians arrived on the very day promised.

* Balbi.

commencement of the year 1833 numbered 341,537 men.

The military regulations of Austria are in a great measure similar to those of France, Prussia, and the German States, but in some parts of the empire special contingents of troops are furnished. Hungary supplies a force of 63,000 men; 17,000 of which are infantry, and 46,000 cavalry.* In order to keep alive a spirit of military intelligence and familiarity with active service, to which a long period of peace is so unfavourable, it is the practice of the Austrian, as of other German governments, to have yearly assemblies of large bodies of troops, which, during an entire month, perform a kind of mock campaign under the most experienced generals, and go through those various marches and counter-marches which occur in regular warfare. These important military reviews are usually conducted in Austrian Italy, where large assemblies of troops are supposed to be usefully employed in overawing the disaffected. The Austrian force in Lombardy is usually about 50,000 men, 10,000 of which form a kind of reserve.

* It has been said with truth that the Hungarian troops form the flower of the Austrian army; they have played a prominent part in all the battle-fields of Germany and Italy. Their cavalry is scarcely surpassed by any in Europe, for the horse is not only as brave as his rider, but, like the centaurs of old, the two appear to be but one and the same creature. The general features which characterise the Hungarian soldier, are, a gallantry which borders upon rashness, a singular skill and obstinacy in executing the orders given him, however hard or difficult of performance they may be, and a great attachment to his officers. The appearance of the Hungarian troops is acceptable to the eye; their steadiness of manner, their lowering melancholy look, their dark shining hair, black mustachios, and ivory teeth, in conjunction with the fine contour of an expressive set of features, give them a right martial appearance.—*United Service Journal*.

Marine force.—Austria has heretofore been considered as a purely military power. At the peace of 1815, her navy was merely nominal, and she resigned the guardianship of the Ionian Islands to Great Britain, for want of a marine force to protect them. Since that period, she has established a kind of admiralty board at Venice, and extensive arsenals at Trieste and Porto Querto, with minor establishments on the coast district, for the construction of ships. From these ports she has launched, since 1815, three ships of 50 guns and upwards; eight frigates, of from 38 to 50 guns; and sixty-one armed vessels of inferior force.* The increase of the naval power of Russia, of the rising states of Greece and Egypt, and the formidable marine supported by the Porte, impose upon Austria the policy of maintaining a navy, to protect her political and commercial interests in the Mediterranean; and she seems to neglect no opportunity of adding to her marine force.

From this imperfect view of Austrian statistics, we proceed to notice the political character of Austria, and the policy of her government.

* Balbi.

SECTION II.—AUSTRIAN POLITICS.

Absence of national unity.—There is no connecting link of nationality between the various sections of the Austrian empire. It is an heterogeneous mass of nations and people, separate in character, language, habit, religion, and we may add, government; held together by the vinculum of a common fealty, and of submission to the same sceptre. The Dalmatians and the Hungarians—which latter boast descent from the Romans, and retain in some degree their language, but who are more properly descendants of the Gothic and Finnic tribes—are as distinct from the Silesians and Styrians, as the Venetians and Tyrolese are from the Bohemians and Gallicians. Each of these has its peculiar dialect—Latin, modern Greek, Slavonic, Italian, and German; while they number four principal divisions in religion—Roman catholics, Protestants, the members of the Greek church, and Jews. A considerable number of Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Albanians, and various other petty tribes, are also to be found in various other parts of the empire.

The absence of union is as remarkable in the social, as in the political condition of the Austrian empire. Here we find no regular progression of property and intelligence, no middle class of people, or connecting links between the extremes of the wealth and rank of the nobility, and the poverty and degradation of the peasantry: the whole empire consists of the vast domains of the aristocracy, and the miserable tenements of the labourers. This is in a great degree attributable to the almost entire absence of foreign commerce, and the delay in the total abolition of the

feudal system.* It is easy to imagine, how greatly these fundamental causes of disunion must weaken the power and political stability of Austria, and how difficult a task it is to reconcile the conflicting interests of the various sections of the empire. In Hungary and Galicia, the progress of disaffection is evident; while the avowed aversion of the Italians to the power which rules them, contrasted with the attachment of the Germans to the established government, offers another illustration of a want of sympathy between the integral portions of the state. The government, however, has long shewn a desire to reconcile these various interests, and has been liberal in dispensing gratuitous education to the humbler classes, especially in the German territories; yet is by no means disposed to the establishment of a representative assembly, where the varied demands of the different states might meet due investigation and needful concession. Indeed, the establishment of a general representative legislative assembly at Vienna, composed of deputies from the various states, seems incompatible with the political position of the empire, and by no means well calculated to reconcile discordant interests; but to the institution of constitutional assemblies in Bohemia, Galicia, the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and ducal Austria, the march of events seems slowly, but regularly progressing.

Policy with regard to Spain.—From the 14th century to the treaty of Versailles in 1756, the Austrian and French courts were incessantly engaged as rivals for dominion. The long and sanguinary wars between the Austrian emperor,

* It was not until 1743, that Maria Theresa issued her decree, abolishing vassalage, and granting the rank of farmers to all who cultivate six acres of land.

Charles V., and his contemporary, Francis I., mark the mutual jealousy of the dynasties of Bourbon and Hapsburg. Spain and the Netherlands were the real objects of contention; and these unfortunate countries were for a long period the theatre of contest, serving as the great cemeteries for the multitudes of human beings sacrificed to the ambition of rival princes. At the death of Charles V., the crown of Spain and the Indies devolved to his second son, Philip; which event, although effecting a political division of the vast dominions of the late emperor, yet retained to Austria her predominating influence in the affairs of the Spanish peninsula. While French interests were excluded from Spain, her Gallic neighbour waged the most cruel wars against her: Catalonia was ruined by the protracted contest; while, under Louis XIII., and in the early years of his bigoted successor, France made great acquisitions in the Low Countries. In 1659, Philip IV., to propitiate his powerful neighbour, Louis XIV., concluded the Pyrenean treaty, by which the Spanish king agreed to the matrimonial alliance of his eldest daughter, the Infanta Maria Theresa, with the youthful and amorous Louis.* This union of the French and Austro-Spanish families was viewed with great jealousy, not only by all the European maritime powers, but by the Spaniards themselves; and considered by all parties, as the prelude to the union of the Spanish and French crowns. To satisfy the discontented Spaniards, and to soothe the suspicions of the Austrian and other governments, the marriage articles embraced

* This intermarriage was an old project of the French, who were always considered the principal instruments in defeating the one contracted with our Charles I., who, when Prince of Wales, made a romantic excursion into Spain, to fetch the Infanta.

the formal renunciation of the Infanta, of her pretensions to the Spanish crown ; for which sacrifice she received a large pecuniary dower, as compensation. While Charles IV. remained the rightful heir to the throne of Spain, the prospect of a French succession, through the female line, was only viewed as a possible occurrence, which was still further provided against, by the formal renunciation made by the Gallic queen. But when the failure of the male line appeared probable, the aggrandizing spirit of Louis excited lively fears, not only with Austria,—to whom, as a purely continental state, the preservation of the balance of power was of the highest importance,—but also with Great Britain, which, from its geographical and political position, had less cause to dread the preponderance of France.*

At the accession of the Orange family to the British throne, the jealousy of the English at the aggrandising policy of the French king, which had slumbered during the reigns of Charles and James II., was roused into action, and Great Britain bound herself to assist Austria in taking and keeping possession of the Spanish monarchy, whenever, by the death of the Spanish king without heirs male, the Bourbons should attempt to enforce their preten-

* In March, 1676, the English Commons addressed Charles II., representing “ that the minds of your majesty’s people are much disquieted with the manifest danger arising to your majesty’s kingdoms, by the growth and power of the French king, especially by the acquisitions already made, and the further progress likely to be made by him, in the Spanish Netherlands ; in the preservation and security whereof, we humbly conceive, the interest of your majesty and the safety of the kingdom are highly concerned ; and therefore we most humbly beseech your majesty to take the same into your royal care, and to strengthen yourself with such stricter alliances as may secure your majesty’s kingdoms, and preserve and secure the said Netherlands, and thereby quiet the minds of your majesty’s people.”—*Com. Journal*, vol. ix. p. 396.

sions to the crown of Spain.* The wars of 1689, which followed, produced the treaty of partition, by which France compromised all claims to the Spanish succession; but Charles II., who died in 1701, bequeathing his crown to the Duc d'Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV., the French king, regardless of the treaty of partition, developed his ambitious projects, and placed his grandson, Philip V., on the Spanish throne. This perfidy roused a general indignation in Europe, and led to the grand alliance of 1701, by which Great Britain engaged to assist Austria in enforcing the claims of the Archduke Charles to the Spanish crown. The emperor, Ferdinand III., dying without issue, the imperial crown devolved to his brother, who acceded to the empire under the title of Charles VI., an event which made it less desirable that he should succeed in his claims on Spain; hence by the treaty of Utrecht, 1713, Philip V. was confirmed in his title as king of Spain, on a formal renunciation of his claims to the crown of France; and as the main object of the war was to prevent the union of the Gallic and Spanish crowns, a union which the Spanish nation would by no means permit, a new law of succession was effected, which purposed to prevent the regal authority from devolving to a foreign prince, by excluding females, under certain exceptions, from inheriting the throne.† Thus in every successive generation,

* The princes and states who had neglected or favoured the growth of the power of France, which all of them had done in their turns, saw their error, saw the necessity of repairing it, and saw that unless they could check France by uniting a power superior to her's, it would be impossible to hinder her from succeeding in her great designs on the Spanish succession.—*Extract from Bolingbroke's Letters.*

† The law of 1713 establishes a preference of males to females in all possible cases. By the statute of Philip V., if no male heir could be had, a female was to inherit; and in case neither descending from the original stock could be found, the crown was to pass

the family connexion between the reigning dynasties of France and Spain became less intimate; and while Philip V.'s law of succession remained in force, the European continent, and especially Austria, had no cause for jealousy on that point; but the late abrogation of this law (May 1830) seems to sweep away all these principles, for which the allies of 1701 made such enormous sacrifices, and to strike at the very root of the treaty of Utrecht, the provisions of which were considered so essential to the preservation of the balance of power.

The importance which Mr. Pitt, afterwards lord Chatham, attached to the preservation of Philip V.'s law, is evidenced by his correspondence with Sir James Gray, the British ambassador at Naples in 1758. Ferdinand VI. was then in his last illness, and a strong party was formed in Madrid to defeat the law of 1713, by transferring the crown to Philip of Parma. So anxious was George II. to prevent the violation of Philip V.'s law, that he directed Mr. Pitt to inform the British minister at Naples of the existence of the plot, which he did under date December 1, 1758; and the fact was made known to king Charles of Naples and his queen.*

to the house of Savoy. The law for regulating the succession is to be found in the *Novissima Recopilacion*.—*National Code*.

* The court of France seeing it could no longer count upon the re-establishment of the king's health, has renounced the designs laid during the illness of the queen, and what had been ripened since the death of that princess. To these has succeeded another design; it has been in agitation three weeks, or a month preceding the 14th of November, the date of the intelligence, viz.:—To engage the king of Spain to abdicate, and remit the crown in favour of Don Philip. However, this project prevents not France from employing the greatest management towards the court of Naples, in order to put Don Carlos, as they call him, in their interest, in case he should mount the throne of Spain. In a word, the affairs of that kingdom make the chief object of the attention of the court of Versailles, and there will very shortly happen a great change in Spain.—*Mr. Pitt's confidential letter to Sir James Gray*.—*Extracted from Mr. Walton's pamphlet*.

The preservation of the law is of no less importance in 1833 than in 1758, and we feel convinced that the question "who is the rightful successor to the Spanish throne?" must shortly engage the attention of the leading European governments, and that they must soon recommence protocolling on the subject. The question is of infinitely more importance to Austria than to Great Britain. The preservation of the European or rather continental equilibrium, would scarcely furnish, to the British nation, a *popular* cause for war—the British people have too much good sense to sacrifice their blood and treasure in a cause which is not national—but with Austria the case stands on other ground. Aware of the feeble tenure by which she maintains her authority over the eastern portions of her empire, she would direct her efforts in opposition to changes in the fundamental law of Spain, which abolished the agnatic or male lineal succession; she would suffer no renewed "family compacts" to which such changes *might* lead, and which would threaten her dominions in the west. Austria withholds her recognition of Donna Isabella, and seems to feel the necessity of caution against the recurrence of a *Pyrenean treaty*; the Aulic council of Vienna evidently doubts the justice of the views entertained by Lord Grey, who says, "the arrangement for the queen to inherit is founded upon the ancient constitution of the country, and that she is now sovereign *de facto* and *de jure*."*

The new law of succession, if it is understood to abolish the *Auto acordado* of Philip V., *might* possibly awaken the dormant claims of the Hapsburg dynasty to the Spanish crown, and hence deeply sow the seeds of a renewal of such grievous wars as during the 17th, and early years of the 18th centuries, crimsoned the soils of Spain and

* Speech of Lord Grey, 4th February, 1834.

Flanders with human gore.* Austria views with mistrust the consolidation of French interests in Belgium; and although she reluctantly permitted, what some consider, the implanting of the Orleans' dynasty in that country, she would decidedly resist the accomplishment of a similar project beyond the Pyrenees;—we have been disposed to connect the question of the Spanish succession with Austrian politics, viewing it as one, from which, in the absence of a vigilant policy, the most unhappy consequences may arise, especially as regards the European continent.

Decline of Austrian influence in Germany.—The influence of Austria in the affairs of Germany, seems to date its decline from the period when Prussia first merged into monarchy. By the rebellion of the latter against her political parent, in 1741, Austria lost a part of her Silesian provinces, and sunk in her patrimonial influence over the vast expanse of the Germanic empire. In 1756 she formed the “monstrous alliance” with France, concocted under the auspices of Baron Kaunitz, and the Abbé de Bernis; the

* The present Austrian emperor, is the grandson of Maria Theresa, daughter of Charles VI., who was acknowledged as king Charles III. of Spain, by Great Britain, Holland, and other states, and addressed by the title of “majesty,” by pope Clement XI., 10th of October, 1709. He was also proclaimed king, in Madrid, in the autumn of the following year, when after the battle of Almenare, 21st July, 1710, the allies entered the capital. The title of the Austrian family to the Spanish crown, would be through the female line: hence if the ancient law of succession is *agnatic*, the Austrian family have no claim; but if *cognatic*, and the pragmatic sanction of Ferdinand VII. is considered as abolishing the law of Philip V., then it seems to us, that the claims of the present archduke Charles of Austria, are equal to those of Donna Isabella; the only circumstance which impairs his claim, is, that Austria being a party to the treaty of Utrecht, accepted the renunciation of Philip V., and acknowledged the Bourbon dynasty as heirs to the Spanish crown.

object of which was to obtain, by an overpowering force, the restitution of Silesia; subsequently the Czarina Katherine joined the coalition—when, in strict accordance with the Russian system, the partition of European Turkey formed the ambitious object of these aspiring dames; but the combined efforts of Prussia and Great Britain defeated the scheme, and the Great Lion was confirmed in the possession of the contested ground. From this period Austria disclaimed French alliance, and the memorable words of Joseph II., “Il n’y a plus de Silésie,” announced to Europe that the possession of that province should be no longer an object of contention. In the war of 1793, Austria but feebly defended her Flemish provinces, and seemed more disposed to concentrate her power, and maintain her authority in Italy. Napoleon thrice dictated terms of peace to the cabinet of Vienna; but although he claimed some of the western territories, as the fruit of his victories, and curtailed the influence of Austria in Germany, he saw the impolicy of impairing her resources, and by indemnities in Italy for her loss of territory in the west, maintained her as a strong barrier against the encroachments of Russia. At the peace of 1814, the emperor renounced his claims to the Flemish provinces, and readily assented to the formation of the new kingdom of the Netherlands. The Austrian policy at the general peace, was to exclude France from the influence she had assumed over the Germanic states during the war; with this view, she consented to the incorporation of the provinces between the Rhine and the Meuse with Prussia, which was thus advanced to the confines of the French and Belgic territories, forming a barrier against French encroachments in that quarter; while the newly organized Germanic confederation, which comprises 14,000,000 of people, and

furnishes a combined force of 120,000 soldiers, was destined to strengthen the same object. At the peace of 1815, the course of the Inn, was made the north western boundary of the Austrian empire, giving her an accession of territory which had long been an object of her ambition, and as forming a national and defensible barrier against invasion from the west. This being acquired, Francis II. renounced the antiquated title of the emperor of Germany, which had formerly involved Austria in the most grievous wars, and sharing with Prussia the old family influence of the house of Hapsburg in the affairs of the Germanic states, seemed desirous of removing every impediment to the maintenance of the peace of Europe. Since the late French revolution, Austria has enlarged the exercise of her authority in repressing that eagerness for the establishment of liberal government, which has of late so especially characterised the minor states of the Germanic confederacy. Here she treads on dangerous ground; no part of the European continent marches so rapidly in the course of intellectual improvement, or requires so large a share of real reform in the plans of government. The Krudner* system of rule, no longer harmonises with the growing intelligence of the Germans, and the courts of Vienna and Berlin may as well attempt to dam up the sources of the Rhine and the Danube, as to stifle the springs of public opinion, which must unerringly effect a liberal change in the political institutions of the Germanic states.

The growth of Austrian power in Italy.—But while we view the progressive decadence of the

* The name of the hypocritical old woman who is said to have suggested the idea of the holy alliance (in 1815). George IV. declined the invitation of the allies, to become a member of the holy league, as being incompatible with the liberty of the subject.

Austrian regime in Germany, we find its nucleus gradually expanding over the various states of Italy. The Italian peninsula, in fact, has become what Germany formerly was, "the patrimony of the House of Austria." The Venetian States, the Milanese, and Tyrol, are integral parts of the empire; Modena, Parma, and Tuscany, are governed by the princes of the Hapsburg family; while the court of Vienna assumes a directing influence over the Sardinian, Papal, and Neapolitan dominions. The sovereignty of Italy seems to be a main point with Austria; and any foreign interference tending to impair her influence over the Italian governments, seems to touch the very nerve of her jealousy. Lombardy is the most precious gem in the imperial diadem; and the danger which menaced the Austrian authority in that quarter, following the insurrectionary movements which broke out in Modena and Parma after the late French revolution, and subsequently at Bologna, and other parts of the papal states, excited the most lively fears in the Vienna cabinet. The march of the Austrian troops into central Italy in 1832, was a grievous offence to the French liberals, and Louis Philippe's ministers were obliged to insist upon their recal, by threatening that, in case of refusal, a French army should cross the Alps. The subsequent expedition to Ancona was merely intended to explain to Austria, in terms which could not be misunderstood, that France had an equal right of interference in the affairs of Italy. Such measures, viewed by the Aulic Council as "acts of aggression," are most calculated to excite resistance; but while Austria is left to pursue her own plans in the Italian peninsula, and her territories are secure against hostile invasion, her efforts will be strongly directed to the preservation of the peace of Europe.

The insecurity of her Eastern dominions.—It is towards the east that the Austrian dominions present the most vulnerable points. The independent and menacing spirit of the Hungarians ; the indifference of her Polish subjects to her authority ; and the claims of the cabinet of St. Petersburg to Eastern Gallicia, which the Austrians are well aware is only another name for Red Russia, are matters of great uneasiness with the imperial court.

In Hungary, the great bulk of the people are retained (in spite of the edicts of Maria Theresa and Joseph II.) in the most abject servility, by an overbearing aristocracy. The nobles are divided into two classes,—the lords of extensive domains, and those who cultivate the farms. The nobles may possess land in any part of the kingdom, while the burgesses can only acquire hereditary property within the jurisdiction of a burg.—Joseph II., in 1798, decreed that every Hungarian should possess the right of acquiring hereditary property, and that the taxes, which are now entirely borne by the peasants, should be equalized ; but the Diet peremptorily refused its sanction to the decree, and it was necessarily revoked.*

“These differences,” said the members of the Diet in their remonstrance, “constitute our privileges ; they may be taken from any of us for a capital crime, but what crime have we committed ? The kingdom of Hungary is as independent of Austria, as Hanover is of England ; we obey no emperor ; Joseph II. is not our king ; he has not taken the oaths, he has not been crowned, he is an usurper.”† Such language to an absolute

* Such consequences followed the proclamations of Napoleon to the Prussians, when he invaded their country in 1806.—*Schlätzer Staats Anzeigen*, vol. xiv. p. 121—xv. p. 336.

† Captain Sherer gives an interesting account of the Hungarian Diet, and speaks of the independent and bold character of

monarch must convince Austria of the insecurity of her tenure in Hungary; and she cannot but feel the danger to which her territories are exposed by their contiguity to the states of the aggrandizing Russians. It is strongly affirmed, that Russian emissaries are already active in fomenting the resistance of Hungary to Austrian authority; and when we reflect on the low state of civilization in this kingdom, the wrongs which the numerical force of the nation endure through bad government, and the inflexible character of its governing plan, surprise would scarcely be excited were the peasantry to flock to the standard of an invader, who allured them with even vain promises of immediate emancipation.

The political state of Austria presents to the contemplative reader every feature of insecurity. Foreign attack and internal discord are both to be dreaded. A conciliating and pacific policy, and the continuance of amicable relations with her ancient ally (Great Britain), in opposing the designs of Russia against Turkey, appear to be the course best adapted to her present position.

the speeches of the members. The president, who exercises great control over the assembly, is appointed by the court of Vienna. Captain Sherer compares the Diet to a high-spirited prancing horse, and the president to its rider, who, holding the animal with a sharp bit, checks him at will. The restiff animal, if not well managed may, however, some day throw his rider.

CHAPTER V.

STATISTICAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF
PRUSSIA.

SECTION I.—PRUSSIAN STATISTICS.

Origin and growth of the Prussian monarchy.—The Prussians are supposed to spring from a branch of the Slavonian race, known by the Romans, as Venedes, or Wends, mixed Gothic tribes, who inhabited the countries watered by the Vistula and the Nieman; they were denominated Prucksi, or Prutsi, and were probably connected with the Borusci, a more eastern tribe, or with the Po-Russians, a Slavonic people whose name signifies the neighbour of the Russians.

These tribes supported, during a long period, their independence, and in the middle ages seem to have attained to some degree of civilization. But in the 13th century they were subdued by Wildermar, king of Denmark, who unfurled *dunabrog*, (the red and white banner of the holy cross),* and desolated the greater part of Prussia and Livonia. The Polish princes, unable to check their incursions, implored the assistance of the Teutonic knights, a religious and military order, which originated during the mania of the crusades, the chief duty of which, was to subdue the infidels who refused to be converted by the miracles and

* Presented by the pope to the Danish king.

sermons of the missionaries: for nearly two centuries this order continued to rule Prussia, which was held as a fief of Poland. The authority of the Teutonic knights began to decline after the battle of Tannenberg, 1410; and by the peace of Cracow, in 1525, was completely annihilated, by which the constitution of the country was radically changed. Prince Albert of Brandenburg, the great master of the order, was acknowledged hereditary grand duke of Prussia, and did homage to the Polish monarch for his petty states in the north. The elector Albert, in 1618, added the duchy of Prussia to the states of the electoral house of Brandenburg, which has since that time kept possession of it. By the treaty of Wehlaw in 1657, the duchy of Prussia was raised to an independent sovereignty by the elector Frederick William. In 1700 his son and successor assumed, of his own accord, the title of king, and the following year the emperor Leopold, with his own hands, placed the royal diadem on the head of the Prussian monarch. The troubles following the death of the emperor Charles VI., 1740, provided Frederick II. an opportunity of enforcing his claims on Silesia. By the peace of Breslaw, Berlin, and subsequent treaties, the crown of Bohemia had renounced not only possession, but all its right to that duchy, and hence the cabinet of Berlin argued that they had become sovereign dukes of the country, and not subject to the emperor. The weakness of the Austrian government enabled the king of Prussia, in a great degree, to realize his claims, and hence he greatly extended the area of his kingdom. The seven years' war desolated the country, and added but little territory to the Prussian dominions. By successive treaties and partitions, Prussia has obtained, or assumed a kind of sovereignty over various German duchies, which have elevated the monarchy to rank, in the present age, among the

leading European powers. Here, however, as in the dominions of the house of Austria, the want of national identity is particularly striking. Without natural boundaries, the geographical figure of the kingdom of Prussia is extremely irregular; and being composed of various detached portions of territory, such as Saxe-Weimar, part of Saxony, Neufchatel, &c., it is rendered particularly open to attack.

In breadth, the Prussian dominions vary from 70 to 360 English miles. The rectilineal distance from Dantzic, at the mouth of the Vistula, to Ratibon on the Oder, would give about 360 miles, being the maximum breadth.—A right line drawn from the walls of Thionville to Tilsit on the Niemen, would describe a distance of about 1200 miles, being the extreme length. The superficial area of the entire dominions of Prussia, is 104,656 British square miles.

Population.—Little is known of the population of Prussia previous to the commencement of the 18th century, when it is said to have numbered about 700,000; but by the pestilence which raged on the European Continent in 1709, she lost more than one-sixth of her inhabitants;* her numbers were, however, augmented by the settlement of large bodies of Saltzburgers, protestants who took refuge in Prussia from the persecutions of the fanatic bishop; and these emigrations were followed by others from Switzerland, Alsace, and the Palatinate.

By the addition of a part of Silesia in 1741, about 500,000 people were added to the population of the Prussian dominions; but the progress of increasing numbers was retarded by the seven years' war; and in 1772, Eastern Prussia num-

* Susmilch (*Gattliche Ordnung*) says that twice this proportion fell by the plague.

bered only 750,000 souls. Since this period a great change has taken place. By the partition of Poland, the Prussian monarchy obtained what was formerly Polish Prussia, and the territory of Netz, which contained a population of about 416,000 souls. By these additions her population was rapidly increased, and attained, in 1795, to about 4,005,000 souls ;—there being in

Eastern Prussia	964,000
New Ditto (Poland)	817,000
Western Ditto	1,387,000
Southern Ditto	837,000
	<hr/>
	4,005,000

Napoleon, however, in 1807, overturned the frail edifice erected by Frederick the Great.—Prussia renounced almost all her Polish territories, and found herself reduced to nearly her ancient limits. By the treaty of Vienna, however, she obtained the restitution of nearly the whole of her Polish provinces, and extended her dominions and influence over a vast expanse of country towards the west. By the census of 1817, the population of the ten provinces was 10,537,566, which, by the official return made in 1827, had increased to 12,552,278.

The following is an estimate of the population of the ten provinces in 1833, founded upon the official returns of 1827 ; also the superficial area of each province, according to Hassel :—

	Inhabitants.	Area in square miles.
Silesia	2,665,600 . .	14,861
Brandenburg	1,756,500 . .	14,939
Saxony	1,530,300 . .	8,492
Westphalia	1,310,200 . .	7,565
Lower Rhine	1,154,600 . .	6,432
Juliers, Cleves, and Berg .	1,105,300 . .	3,638
Eastern Prussia	1,043,200 . .	15,115
Posen	1,110,100 . .	11,251
Pomerania	902,400 . .	12,353
Western Prussia	798,900 . .	10,010
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	13,377,100	104,656

The average density of the population of Prussia was, in 1833, about 128 to the square mile; but in this, as in every other political feature of the monarchy, the irregularity is very considerable. In the provinces of Juliers, Cleves, and Berg, which border the French and Belgium frontiers, and which were for several years an integral part of the French empire, the density of inhabitants is equal to 338 to the square mile; while in Eastern Prussia, it is 69, and in Western Prussia and Pomerania, only 57.

Revenue.—Until a late date, the Prussian financial system was so incongruous and irregular, that the sources from which the revenue was derived were scarcely known to those most interested in the affairs of the state. Every province had its separate tariff; and in many of the provinces, the communes, or districts, were subject to peculiar fiscal regulations. In Westphalia, alone, there were five different modes of taxation; and throughout the whole of the Prussian dominions, the number amounted to no less than *sixty*.

The provinces wrested from France were governed by the same financial laws to which they had been subject under the French régime;—the Saxon provinces also retained their former tariff. In some of the provinces direct taxation was scarcely known, and the revenue was almost entirely raised by taxes on consumable commodities; while in others nearly the whole revenue was raised by direct imposts on lands and buildings, and by the capitation tax, a system which gave rise to incessant smuggling, great impediments to interior commerce, and necessitated an undue and vast expense in the collection and protection of the revenue. This system continued until the close of the year 1817, at which period the net revenue contributed by the several provinces was as under:

	Guilders.
Silesia	13,500,000
Saxony	10,417,000
Brandenburgh	9,000,000
Juliers, Cleves, and Berg	8,670,000
Westphalia	8,413,000
East Prussia	8,100,000
Lower Rhine	7,000,000
West Prussia	3,750,000
Posen	3,100,000
Pomerania	3,000,000
Total	74,950,000*

The value of the guilder is about two shillings English, hence the total amount of the Prussian revenue, in the year 1817, was 7,496,800*l.* sterling.† From this period began a new plan of Prussian finance; the laws of 1818 and 1820 abolished all local tariffs, and established a fixed ratio of taxation throughout the entire monarchy, calculated to produce a small but growing excess over the revenues collected under the old system, and very considerably to economise the charge for collection. This amelioration of system, joined to the progressive expansion of resources, carried the revenue of the year 1826 to about 8,250,000*l.* sterling.‡ In 1829 there was a partial reduction of taxation; but the actual amount of revenue received, so far from diminishing, has been progressively but slowly increasing, attaining in 1832 about 8,500,000*l.*

The absolute governments of Europe publish but few financial statements, and hence the estimates of various statistical authorities are deficient in that accuracy of detail, which characterises the official documents of the representative states. Malte-Brun, Hassel, Balbi, and other writers have, however, furnished some estimates of the various

* The contribution of each province in English currency is immediately found by striking out the cipher.

† Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

‡ Balbi.

heads of the Prussian revenue, from which we are enabled to subjoin a statement, offering a fair approximation to accuracy.

Since the late financial reforms, which are intended to strengthen the union of the Prussian Federal States, the custom-house duties form the largest item in the Prussian revenues. The *grund steuer*, or land-tax, is said by Malte-Brun to amount to 25 per cent. of the estimated rents, and is exclusively charged on proprietors.* Hassel estimates its produce, in 1827, at 265,000*l.* for three provinces. A distillery is considered an indispensable adjunct to every well managed farm. The quantity of spirits produced from potatoes and grain is very large; and the duty, about sixpence per gallon on spirits, containing about 80 per cent. of alcohol, yields a considerable revenue.† The national domains and public forests are said to produce about one-third of the total revenue;‡ but we find no confirmation of this estimate. Malte-Brun states the amount arising from the national domains and forests, in 1821, at 8,407,000 florins, and the amount arising from the *sale* of domains at 1,500,000 florins; being together rather under one-eighth of the total revenue. The state monopolies of salt, porcelain, earthenware, posting, lotteries, &c., figure as important items of revenue, yielding collectively about 10,100,000 florins. The

* The crown estates, which are ordinarily held by persons whose ancestors possessed them from the crown, were formerly exempt from the *grund steuer* (land-tax); but according to the new laws, not only these estates, but those of the nobles are subject to the tax.

† It is considered that two bushels of potatoes yield as much spirits as one of barley; the residue is supposed to be equal to two-thirds of the value of the material before the wort is extracted from it, and is usually consumed by the draught bullocks raised and employed on the farm. Nine bushels of potatoes to one of malt, is the ordinary material from which the spirits are extracted.—*Jacob's Reports*.

‡ Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

gewel steuer, or duties on licenses to trade, produce about 4,000,000 of florins; besides these various items of taxation, there is also a considerable sum raised expressly for disabled soldiers, and the widows and orphans of those who fall in battle, and for roads, bridges, schools, and the support of the poor; these taxes are not levied on any particular class, but are collected as well in the towns as in the country. We proceed to collate, in a tabular form, the various items of revenue :

	Guilders.
Custom-house duties, and other indirect taxes, including the spirit duties,	42,000,000
Direct taxes, including the land tax, capitation tax, &c.	15,000,000
Domains and forests—9,000,000 sale of domains, 1,500,000,	10,500,000
Mines of tin and salt,	850,000
State monopolies—porcelain and earthenware, 300,000; salt monopoly 6,500,000; game 200,000,	7,000,000
Stamps, including the <i>gewel steuer</i> , or licenses to trade,	4,000,000
Post office and posting,	1,500,000
Lotteries,	800,000
Extraordinary receipts,	3,380,000
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Guilders	85,030,000

Public debt.—The public debt of Prussia at the close of the war in 1815, amounted to about 26,000,000*l.* sterling, besides a considerable debt in paper issues, said to have amounted to about one-seventh of the total currency of the state.* The loans contracted from this date to the year 1826, and applied partly in liquidating the arrears of the war, and partly in the redemption of the treasury notes, carried the funded debt in the latter year to about 29,100,000*l.*—(Balbi.) The loans contracted by the Prussian government since 1826, chiefly since 1830, in consequence of the increased

* Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

military expenditure, occasioned by the turbulent state of Europe, following the revolution of July, amount to about 8,000,000*l.*, carrying the total debt of Prussia to somewhat more than 37,000,000*l.*; but the operation of the sinking fund of one per cent. having effected a reduction of about 2,500,000*l.*, the total amount of debt, in 1833, did not exceed 34,600,000*l.* demanding for interest, management, &c., the annual sum of 1,900,000*l.*

State expenditure.—We now proceed to notice the general heads of public disbursement. The army, during the year 1833, cost 3,989,600*l.** The navy can scarcely be admitted into the scale of charge, the whole marine force of Prussia consisting of but two or three revenue cutters. The annual charge for the support of public worship is about 525,000*l.* per annum. Malte-Brun calls it 300,000*l.* Prussia maintains no exclusive church establishment; the ministers of every order or sect, whatever be their denomination, receive their fair proportion of the funds allotted for the maintenance of religious institutions, and in no European state is christian harmony, liberality, and benevolence more general. In this respect she offers a grand example for our imitation. The civil administration of the twenty-eight governments figures as a large item in the Prussian budget. The interior police costs annually 345,000*l.*, and the administration of justice 258,000*l.*

The expenses of the courts of Berlin and Potsdam, so renowned for military pageantry, although supported with scrupulous economy, constitute an important item in the Prussian budget. The expenses of the royal household were estimated in 1817, at 200,000*l.* per annum.† In the estimate of Prussian disbursement before us, this item of charge is not distinguished from those for the

* German Papers.

† Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

home department, foreign affairs, and pensions: the first amounts to 375,000*l.*; the second, which includes the charge for the corps diplomatique, 90,000*l.*; and the third (pensions), no less than 405,000*l.* The amount annually expended on public works is very considerable: within a few years, upwards of 2500 miles of main road have been formed, an extensive line of canal cut, and Berlin, Dantzic, and other cities, embellished. These, with the miscellaneous items, will account for the total disbursement of the state revenue.

We collate the several heads of state expenditure as under:—

	Gulden.
Interest, management, and sinking fund of the public debt	19,000,000
War department (army)	39,900,000
Religious worship	5,250,000
Justice, 2,580,000; interior police, 3,450,000	6,030,000
Home department	3,750,000
Commerce, 2,361,000; foreign affairs, 900,000	3,261,000
Treasury, 1,749,000; finance, 400,000	2,149,000
Pensions	4,050,000
Various other items, public works, &c.	3,200,000

Gulden * 86,590,000

Military force.—The reverses sustained by the Prussian arms in the early part of the late war, and especially during the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, clouded the military renown which so especially characterized the forces of Prussia in the reign of Frederick the Great. The trophies won at Rosbach and Schwerdnitz, were sullied by the events of Jena and Pultusk, evidencing the decay of the military excellence of the Prussian soldiers, and the decline of the military power of the state. At Jena, while the effective army numbered 230,000 men, and 700 pieces of artillery,†

* 8,690,000*l.* British currency.

† Edinburgh Encyclopædia.

Prussia was scarcely able to interrupt the rapid progress of the French forces; and at Tilsit, she was obliged to purchase peace, by the surrender of half her territory, and submission to the most humiliating conditions.

By this treaty, she consented that her standing army should never exceed 40,000 men, a condition insisted upon by her conqueror, as a guarantee against the renewal of any attempt on the part of Prussia, to recover her lost possessions; but which proved the very means by which she was subsequently enabled to re-establish her former dominion. It was, in fact, this condition which led to that peculiar system of military organization in Prussia, which is so generally eulogised. Stein, who became minister after the peace of Tilsit, conceived the idea of evading the obnoxious clause by a plan of organization, which, while it complied with the letter of the treaty, actually trained the whole able-bodied male population of the state to the exercise of arms. Aided by the military genius of *Scharnhorst*,—a name which will always fill an honourable place in Prussian history,—Stein proceeded in the execution of his plan. The standing army, composed chiefly of young men under twenty-five years of age, was maintained at its full complement of 40,000 men. These, under the direction of experienced officers, were trained to military duties during a certain period, then dismissed, and a like complement called to the ranks. Thus, during the six years of peace which succeeded the treaty of Tilsit, a large proportion of the male population, of ages from twenty to thirty-two or thirty-three years, was regularly disciplined, and trained to the exercise of arms. A spirit of patriotism diffusing itself throughout the country, and the latent flame of intellectual light growing into power, and spreading its genial warmth throughout the various ranks of Prussian

society, the moral condition of the people was improved; and, in 1812, they eagerly leagued against the power, whose laws they had been obliged to obey during the previous twenty years. After the defeat of Napoleon in his Russian expedition, Prussia, although ill provided with money or military means, rose *en masse*, and formed an army of 110,000 disciplined combatants. Brandenburg readily furnished its contingent; and the inhabitants of Berlin resolutely determined to resist a division of the French army, which had marched against the capital. A lively military ardour pervaded the whole country, and an army of 200,000 men was, as it were, simultaneously brought into active operations against the enemy. The peace of 1814 offered a full opportunity of perfecting and consolidating the system, which from its commencement had promised, and subsequently proved, to be so effective and economical; and in September of that year, a royal ordinance enacted the general principle, upon which the Prussian military force was to be henceforth regulated.

There are three principal divisions in the military forces of Prussia;—1st, the standing army; 2d, the Landwehr (militia) of the 1st and 2d banns, or levies; and, 3d, the Landsturm. Every born subject of Prussia is obliged, at the age of twenty years, to enter on military duty; when he becomes attached to the standing army, or the landwehr. The 1st levy of the landwehr consists of young men of ages from twenty to twenty-five years, who act in concert with the standing army during war, and are trained to military exercise on stated days in *every month*.* The 2d levy of the landwehr, consisting of men not less than twenty-five, or more than thirty-nine years of age, is usually em-

* The staff of this division receives pay during peace.

ployed as garrison or district guards—a sort of *garde nationale*—and is exercised during certain days in the year. These divisions form a kind of reserved force, from which *les cadres* of the standing army are recruited, if necessary. The land-sturm consists of veterans, between the ages of thirty-nine and fifty, who are reserved for cases of extreme peril or difficulty.

Every soldier in the standing army is required to serve three years; after which, he has the option of retiring, and becoming attached to the landwehr: but, should he decide on continuing his military profession, every opportunity is afforded for his advancement in rank. He may also obtain his *congé* for an undefined time—liable, of course, to recall; but, in this case, he neither receives pay, nor obtains promotion.* The grand annual reviews of the Prussian armies are conducted on the most extensive scale; they usually continue a whole month, during which time the troops undergo a rigid inspection; and, in order to keep alive an active spirit of military enthusiasm, go through a kind of mock campaign. These reviews are usually attended by his Prussian majesty, the princes of the royal family, and the most celebrated generals in the service.

The numerical force of the Prussian army is usually maintained on the same nominal complement during peace; but the numbers in active service are, according to circumstances, so many less than that complement. In 1821, Malte-Brun returns the total force of the army at 164,500 men. In June, 1833, the *United Service Gazette* furnished

* It is a general rule in Germany, France, and we believe, with the exception of Great Britain, throughout the greater part of Europe, that an officer or private soldier, on obtaining his furlough, whether it may be for a few days, weeks, or months, receives no pay from the day he quits, until the day he rejoins the ranks.

a statement of the Prussian military force, which agrees with Malte-Brun's estimate, except in the gens d'armerie, in which it makes a diminution of about 5,300 men.* The total force being 159,190 men; of these, however, 37,000 men are en congé, reducing the total number of effective men receiving pay to 122,000. The following is a statement of the force:—

<i>Infantry.</i>		Number of men.	Total force.
6 Regiments of the royal guards	17,908	
40 Ditto of infantry of the line	104,712	
Total infantry			122,620
<i>Cavalry.</i>			
40 Regiments		19,132
<i>Artillery.</i>			
9 Brigades		15,718
<i>Gens d'armerie.</i>			
9 Detachments		1,720
Total nominal effective army			159,190
Deduct on furlough			37,190
Total really effective army			122,000
<i>Militia.</i>			
Landwehr of the 1st bann	230,000	
Ditto 2d ditto	180,000	
Total militia			410,000
Total military force			532,000

* We think the United Service Gazette must be in error—it is not probable that the gens d'armerie has been reduced from 7000 to 1700.

SECTION II.—PRUSSIAN POLITICS.

Reforms in the social condition of Prussia.—If the wars of Napoleon proved for a season disastrous to Germany, they were more than any other political circumstance instrumental to her subsequent improvement ; for from the very depths of humiliation into which they plunged her, has sprung up a spirit of independence, industry, and intelligence, which had long been buried under the weight of a government essentially aristocratic in its nature. In few modern states, has the progress of civilization and social improvement been more rapid and substantial than in Prussia. Previous to the memorable campaign of 1806-7, the old Slavonic, or rather Teutonic laws, which gave the whole property of the country to the nobles, and debased the great bulk of the people to the condition of slaves, were in full force ; none but the nobles could possess property in land, nor could landed property be transferred to any but a noble. The *bauers*, or peasants attached to the estate of their lord, served him without recompense ; they could not change their place of residence, or absent themselves, even to complain of injustice, without his especial permission ;—they were incapable of holding property ; their children could follow no other occupation than that to which their parent was doomed ; nor could their daughters marry without the consent of their superiors : in fact, the whole body of agricultural labourers, which indeed constitute nearly the entire population of Prussia, were little removed from a state of slavery. In a nation thus constituted, but little respect for the institutions of the state could exist among the people, and still less could it be expected that the nation would energetically resist the invasion of a foreign potentate, who offered

emancipation and civil liberty to all who would join his standard. This was fully proved by the events of Napoleon's Prussian campaign in 1806-7. No sooner had the French emperor passed the Prussian frontier, and advanced to the plains of Jena, than thousands of the Prussian peasantry, and hireling troops in the pay of Prussia, flocked to his standard ; thus adding to the force of attack, weakening the power of defence, and enabling the invader to make a rapid conquest of the entire Prussian monarchy. The danger, injustice, and wretched policy of these restrictions on personal liberty, was thus fatally demonstrated, and the necessity of associating the entire people, by the speedy removal of the civil disabilities which separated the community into distinct classes, was freely admitted by the government.

Stein, who became minister after the fatal treaty of Tilsit, determined promptly and effectually to carry these reforms into execution, to rally round the throne the affection of the people, to give the peasantry a political existence, and to interest them in the maintenance of the national institutions and privileges. Hence article 6 of the law of the 9th of October, 1807, enacted " that from henceforth the relation of villanage should no longer be contracted, either by birth, marriage, or contract." By article 7 of the same law, the provisions of article 6 were extended to all those then in hereditary villanage ; and by article 8, it was declared that, after Martinmas day, 1810, " the state of villanage should cease for ever throughout the Prussian dominions."

Concurrent with this substantial and fundamental change in the social condition of the peasantry, ameliorations were introduced affecting the condition of the farmers, by new regulations respecting the interchange of lands, and by a general and liberal revision of the laws concerning

landlord and tenant.* The object of this revision, which will be better understood on perusal of the subjoined note, was in a high degree liberal and worthy; its tendency was to create that which had never before existed in the Prussian dominions, “a general community, united in one social system, by confederative links throughout the several gradations of society—a free peasantry, small freeholders, farmers, and ascending ranks to the wealthy landed proprietor.” These reforms naturally suggested the necessity of widely diffusing the means of elementary education, and disseminating, throughout the higher orders, that systematic education which, in earlier days, had been considered as only adapted for those who were dependent on their labour for a maintenance.

In 1809, a period of great pecuniary difficulty with the Prussian court, the king, at a vast personal sacrifice, founded the university of Berlin. After the peace of 1814, the university of Bonn was established for the Rhenish provinces, and the

* By the old law, none but a noble could purchase the estate of a noble; a restriction which kept the greater portion of cultivated lands in the possession of the aristocracy, and prevented capital directing itself to agriculture.

The tenantry might be said to be divided into two classes; “tenants on hereditary leases, and tenants for life or for terms of years.” In the former case, the landlord was bound, on the death of the tenant, to admit his heir or some near relative to the vacant possession. In the second case, the landlord, at the expiration of the lease, could not himself take possession of the estate, as proprietor, but was bound to supply the vacancy by a new tenant; and whatever might be the improvement in the value of the lands, he had no power to increase the rent.

By the edict of 1807, the sale and purchase of land was made free; and by the law of 27th July, 1808, the tenants who held hereditary leases, were at once converted into proprietors, to the extent of two-thirds, on giving up the remaining third to the landlord; and tenants holding life leases or leases for terms of years, above a certain limit, acquired proprietary rights on giving up one-half to the landlord.—See *Blackwood's Magazine*, July Number, 1833.

academical system established by Frederick the Great, received a vast extension. Throughout the Prussian dominions, every town or village is bound, by law, to have a school of primary instruction (*elementar schule*) furnished with efficient teachers, and other requisites for imparting elementary education. In districts where the population is both catholic and protestant, a school for the children of each religion is maintained. The total number of these schools in the towns, amounted, in 1832, to 2462, of which 1696 were protestant, and 766 Roman catholic. In the villages, the number was 17,623, of which 12,809 were protestant, and 4,814 Roman catholic, making the total number 20,085; which, according to Dupin, were attended, in 1826, by about 670,000 scholars; at the present day the number cannot be less than 800,000.* It would be foreign to our subject to enlarge these details by entering on the system of education followed in the Prussian primary schools; the luminous "*rapport sur l'état de l'instruction publique en allemagne*," made by M. V. Cousin, published in 1833, contains matter of great interest on the subject, and will well repay for the time necessary to its perusal: that these extensive and important reforms are the basis of a better system, none will dispute; but we must not suppose that it is in the power of any human institution to effect a simultaneous change in the political condition of a state, or to root out confirmed habits and natural prejudices deeply grafted in the social system. Time is necessary to the expansion of real national reform; for although the spring may issue from

* In Prussia, the moral duty of sending children to school is enforced by law. By article forty-three of the general code, it is provided, "that every inhabitant who cannot or will not provide his children with education at home, shall send them to school at the age of *five*; after that age no child shall be allowed to be absent from school, except for special reasons, and with the consent of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities."

the higher orders of the state, the current must receive the tribute of many sinuous and minor streams, ere it swells its column, expands its surface, and dispenses its many blessings to the lower classes. We must not suppose that political, or rather national, changes are so easily effected in Germany as in Great Britain. In England it is the people who reform the government; but in Prussia it is the government who reform the people. In the first case, reform virtually precedes legislation; and in the second, follows it. Thus in Prussia, even at the present day, various opinions are entertained as to the soundness of the views which dictated the policy of liberating the husbandman; and even among the peasantry, many are found who prefer their ancient mode of servitude to present liberty.*

We have adverted in the foregoing remarks to the social improvements of Prussia, though not immediately within the limit of the subject before us, for the purpose of shewing, that "irresponsible power," which Canning calls "tyranny," and which forms the chief feature in the Prussian government, has, during late years, been so wisely tempered with moderation and liberality, that his Prussian majesty has, in some degree, expiated the crime of which he stands convicted, for having refused or indefinitely deferred the promised organization of a representative government.

The royal pledge to grant a representative constitution.—It is asserted, and the assertion has never been officially denied, that, on Prussia renewing the contest with France in 1813, the king, to encourage his people to vigorous efforts, promised that on the restoration of peace a free constitution should be organized, and an elective legislative assembly chosen; this promise was confirmed by

* Jacob's Reports.

the edict of the 22d of May, 1815, when by the restoration of Napoleon to the Gallic throne, Prussia was again roused to new exertions. By this edict it is decreed, "that there shall be a representation of the people; that for this purpose the provincial estates, where they already exist, shall be remodelled, and arranged according to the wants of the time; and where they do not already exist, they shall be re-organized." Art. 3,—enacted, "that out of the provincial estates a general representative body shall be elected, which shall assemble at Berlin." Art. 4,—"that this representative body shall have a deliberative voice on all matters of legislation, which concern the personal rights and property of the subject." Such was the published law of May, 1815; a law which may fairly be styled *still born*, for, on the speedy success of the allies and the total overthrow of Napoleon's throne in the succeeding month, all intention of carrying it into execution was abandoned, and uncontrolled power maintained in its ordinary absolute character.

Prussia formerly possessed petty representative assemblies called Estates (Staendes), elected by the landed proprietors, the cities, and the rural communes, which exercised a deliberative voice in the legislation of the provinces in which they were assembled; but these assemblies have long ceased to meet, except in some of the Saxon communes, where they have been lately established, with power little differing from that of our local vestries. These assemblies being thus politically defunct, no medium of communication exists between the governors and the governed. The voice of complaint is hence silenced, and the collective talent of the nation rejected by the arbitrary forms of the government.

That the present enlarging sphere of human intelligence, and the progressive improvement of the

Prussian social compact will tend, and is, in fact, rapidly tending, to the establishment of free institutions, none, who are not wilfully blind to the course of events, can doubt. The prudence and foresight, which is so peculiarly the attribute of the cabinet of Berlin, cannot fail to determine the moment when resistance to the public demands can be no longer attempted with safety ; and the time cannot be very far distant when his Prussian majesty must discharge, with interest, the obligation he contracted by the edict of the 22d of May, 1815. The popular meetings at Hambach, the attempted revolt at Franckfort, and the quivering of the Germanic States, have doubtless tended to retard the development of the constitutional views of the Prussian government, and been instrumental in causing that arbitrary act of authority, by which the Diet have suspended the functions of the representative assemblies of the free Germanic States.

Foreign policy.—Nothing is more suitable, to consolidate the improvements which Prussia has lately introduced into her social system, than the preservation of peace, and there is no reason to doubt that this forms an important feature in her political plans. The treaty of Vienna left her in full sovereignty over the Silesian provinces, so long the subject of contention with Austria, while towards the French frontier it extended her dominion over indefensible territories, which can only be preserved by the continuance of a pacific course towards France ; this desire for the duration of peace has, indeed, descended into a crouching timidity in reference to her more powerful neighbours. The acquiescence of Prussia in the views of Russia and Austria, in abolishing the Polish constitution in defiance of the sanctity of treaties, and her accordance of a renewed right of dominion,

founded on the *reconquest of the Duchy of Warsaw*, the sovereignty of which Nicholas had always affected to maintain, were proofs of an intimate but dangerous alliance with the Muscovite emperor. Whether the springs of this policy arose from fear of Russian power, lest the uncivilized hordes of the Scythian regions should be let loose against the independence of Prussia, unless she passively submitted to be a tool of Russian oppression; whether she contemplates a share in the future conquests of the Czar, towards the west; or whether, conscious of the crime of which she stands convicted as a robber of Polish independence, she anticipated the force of that retribution which the very nature of things provides, to punish oppression, and hence joined her co-brigands against the attempt of the Poles to recover their lost rights, must remain secret in the councils of the cabinet of Berlin.

The part acted by Prussia in the Belgian and Dutch negotiations—subjects, full of importance to her interests—was vacillating, insincere, and unworthy. To Holland, she was neither friend nor foe; neither impartial mediator, nor just arbitrator. She concurred with England in the resolve to guarantee the execution of the twenty-four articles, but withdrew, and refused to fulfil the guarantee when its accomplishment was demanded by the Belgians; and finally suffered her ally to be expelled by force of arms from the disputed ground, within a day's march of her territory.

In this case the independence of Prussian policy appeared paralyzed by the conflicting views of the cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburg. In the Belgian affairs, Prussia dreaded to act in defiance of the dictates of the Russian autocrat, (the intimate family ally of the Dutch king); but was equally in dread of the march of a French army against her western frontier. and the blockade of

her Baltic ports by a British fleet—she was thus obliged to declare her neutrality.

Prussia, unaided by co-operating allies, is quite unequal to maintain a prolonged contest against any of the leading European powers. Physical force she possesses, which consists in her numerous and well-disciplined militia; but her very limited pecuniary resources incapacitate her from maintaining a large effective army in the field. Since the war of 1740-1, when, with the vast treasures amassed by the second Prussian monarch, Frederick the Great possessed himself of Silesia, Prussia has never been able to maintain two successive campaigns without a subsidy. In the war of 1756, the great Frederick received 700,000*l.* per annum from the British treasury: throughout the late wars, during the chief part of which she remained neutral, the expenses of her campaigns were mainly paid by Great Britain, and the limited expenses she provided from her own resources still remain inscribed on the great book as *national debt*; although, by the way, nine-tenths of the whole are in the hands of British capitalists. After the battle of Pultusk (campaign of 1807), her resources were so completely annihilated, that the British government, from pure motives of compassion for fallen greatness, granted his Prussian majesty a stipend of 80,000*l.* for the support of his family and household. At the present day, a season of peace, when her budget annually exemplifies a deficit of ways and means to meet the charge, a small increase of expenditure would involve her in inextricable difficulties. Her public credit, pre-eminent among the continental nations in time of peace, would sink rapidly under the pressure of war expenditure, rendering loans quite out of the question. Joined to these securities for the continuance of a pacific course, we may also notice the defenceless position of her frontiers, and

the defect of her national identity; a defect, which keeps her continually on the *qui vive* against hostile irruptions. It is almost impossible to imagine a country less protected by natural barriers, or more open to invasion and occupation, than Prussia; her fertile provinces on the Rhine and the Moselle, immediately under the cannon of the French fortresses, may be said to belong to her but by sufferance of France. The fortress of Sarre-Louis, however strengthened by art, could afford but a feeble defence against invasion. The inhabitants of these provinces are essentially French, descendants of the persecuted protestants, who fled to escape the cruel massacres, fomented or ordered by that infernal fiend Charles IX. (1572), and by Louis XIV., on the revocation of the edict of Nantes (1685), and who retain their ancient language, manners, and inclinations. These, with the inhabitants of Posen, West Prussia, and Saxony, the former Poles, the latter Saxons, retaining their deeply rooted prejudices against the power which has deprived them of their nationality, can feel little attachment to Prussian institutions. With such elements of discord, Prussia, unaided by Great Britain, would be but a weak opponent to France; nothing could be so adverse to the best interests of Prussia, as a rupture with either the British or French nation; and there is fair reason to presume, that her cabinet will steadily pursue that pacific course, which has tended so much to the prosperity of the country during the last eighteen years.

Table of Mean Temperatures in various parts of Europe, according to the centigrade thermometer.

Months.	Upsala.	Copen- hagen.	London.	Paris.	Geneva.	Zurich.	Buda.	Rome.	Palermo.
January - - -	-5.49	-1.54	+1.92	+2.99	+1.16	-3.17	-2.69	+7.18	+10.18
February - - -	-2.98	-2.67	3.27	4.01	2.87	0.94	+0.65	8.18	10.78
March - - -	-1.48	-1.11	5.95	6.14	5.86	4.51	+3.64	10.71	12.11
April - - -	+4.54	+5.89	7.80	10.46	9.74	7.58	9.63	13.71	14.51
May - - -	+9.55	11.63	11.95	13.60	16.75	15.30	18.37	18.11	17.71
June - - -	14.54	16.80	15.16	16.64	17.06	16.55	20.19	21.58	20.46
July - - -	17.07	18.30	16.66	17.98	17.72	18.68	21.82	23.18	22.38
August - - -	15.75	16.68	16.46	17.56	14.70	18.43	22.01	22.88	23.18
September - - -	10.97	14.28	13.54	15.10	10.85	14.14	16.77	20.07	21.57
October - - -	6.03	8.65	9.09	10.03	18.01	9.60	11.01	16.77	19.77
November - - -	0.08	3.28	4.99	6.18	5.03	3.58	4.69	12.07	15.57
December - - -	-3.95	-1.20	2.57	2.77	2.22	-1.21	0.50	8.48	12.30
Winter - - -	-4.14	-1.80	+2.58	+3.26	+2.08	-1.15	-0.85	+7.95	+11.31
Spring - - -	+4.21	+5.47	8.57	10.07	9.78	+9.13	+10.55	14.18	14.78
Summer - - -	15.79	-17.26	-16.09	17.39	-17.16	17.82	21.34	22.55	-22.02
Autumn - - -	5.69	8.73	9.21	10.44	10.12	9.10	10.82	16.30	18.97
Annual average -	+5.39	+7.42	+9.12	+10.79	+9.79	+8.73	+10.45	+15.24	+16.77

The most remarkable feature in this table, is the inequality of climate in places situated in or about the same latitudinal parallel. The British Isles, wholly exposed to the climate of the ocean, are liable in a less degree to the sudden effects of the great conflicts between the maritime and continental winds, and are never subject to excessive heat or extreme cold; while the Continent, exposed to the chilling blasts of mountainous regions, and the

sultry gales which pass over the arid plains of the Arabian and African deserts, experiences all the fatal effects of both extremes. The lowest temperature in London, situated in $51\frac{1}{2}$ north latitude, is $+1.92$, which is the average for the month of January; while at Zurich, situated more than three degrees south of London, the mean temperature in the same month is -3.17 . The winters of London are hence much warmer than those of Zurich. At Buda, in latitude $47\frac{1}{2}$, it is -2.69 , from December to March, being colder than London; but from May to October, the reverse is remarkable. In the month of August, the temperature at London is $+16.46$; while at Zurich, it is $+18.43$; and at Buda, $+22.01$. On the average of the year, our climate is warmer than that of Switzerland, and somewhat colder than that of Hungary.

Relative locality, the state of cultivation, and the general characteristics of a state, are as much to be considered in estimating the climate of a country, as its distance from the equator. The atmosphere above the surface of the Atlantic, while it retains the cold temperature of winter, is often attracted to the European continent, and fills the space of an atmosphere more rarified by heat. These changes frequently happen in early springs; and are the cause of those returns of winter so detrimental to the human constitution, and so ungenial to vegetation, which are common to the whole of western Europe, particularly the north-west of France, Holland, and Denmark. If, after the flux of this tide of the frigid and moist atmosphere of the ocean, a dry, cold east wind blows from northern Asia, we experience that rude temperature, the frequent occurrence of which, in the time of our ancestors, the Celts and Germans, was partly owing to the uncultivated state of the east of Europe. As cultivation improves, drainage progresses, and lands are cleared, the climate must slowly become warmer and more salubrious. In Great Britain, where cultivation and drainage have of late years been much extended, the climate is decidedly improved; and as our Continental neighbours progress in the same course, the effects will become proportionably more important.

The snow line commences at various elevations, according to the situation of the mountainous regions, the character of the surrounding country, and the obliquity of the sun's rays. On the Pyrenees it commences at an elevation of 8400 feet; and on the Alps somewhat lower. Etna is always covered with snow at the height of 9000 feet. Esmarch observes that in the north and north-east of the Dofrines, where the solar rays fall obliquely, the snow line descends to 3000 feet above the level of the sea; and De Buck calculates the limit of perpetual snow in the marine part of Lapland, at 3300 feet.

THE NAVY

OF

THE STATES OF EUROPE IN 1826.

Countries.	Ships of the line.	Frigates.	Sloops, Brigs, &c.	Total.
Great Britain	165	117	324	606
France	110	0	213	323
Russia	32	25	107	164
Ottoman empire	18	24	90	132
Holland	12	33	56	101
Sweden and Norway	10	13	238	261
Spain	10	16	30	56
Denmark	4	7	14	25
Portugal	4	6	37	47
Austria	3	8	61	72
States of the King of Sardinia and } the Two Sicilies }	4	8	17	29
Kingdom of Greece	1	0	25	26
Papal States	0	0	8	8
States of the Grand Duke of Tuscany	0	0	1	1
Prussia	0	0	1	1

The above table is given in Balbi's late work ;—his method of classification is as follows :—"All ships carrying fifty guns and upwards, he classes as ships of the line. Ships carrying from thirty-eight to fifty guns, as frigates; and all under that force, as vessels of small force (batiments inferieurs): but as a general rule, excepting only Sweden, he excludes gun-boats and bomb-ketches from this latter class. In the Swedish marine, he includes this latter class of vessels, because the peculiar construction of their decked gun-boats (cannonières pontées) authorises their being rated as brigs. This method of classification would make it appear that the French marine includes no frigates; there being, in 1826, no ship in the French navy rating between thirty-eight and fifty guns; but, according to the classification adopted by the French admiralty, the list of ships composing the navy on the 1st of January, 1827, included 39 ships of the line, 51 frigates, and 213 smaller vessels.

It is necessary to remark that, notwithstanding this list of formidable navies, the number of ships armed, or in a condition for active service, forms but a very minor proportion to the number on the marine roll. Sweden, for example, although possessing a numerous marine, has seldom in active service any naval force, except some paltry flotillas, merely to exercise her young officers in naval tactics. The total number of British ships in commission in 1833, is only 118, of all gradations. France has seldom more than forty ships in commission, manned by 13,000 men; while Russia has a larger proportion always in active service.



which sum was borrowed during, or subsequent, 1800000l., nearly the whole of
and Austria (the three former being debtors, price of bankruptcy, and have
long since burst the ties of confidence between, we have the welcome
consolation that it is a firm security against the, Europe, will be employed to
effect no further destruction than that of quietly

* The military force of Great Britain, as published, forces of other states, we have
deemed it proper, in order to form a comparative view of a numerous militia.

PART II.

THE DOMESTIC CONDITION OF GREAT BRITAIN.

CHAPTER I.

POPULATION.

SECTION I.—EXPANSION OF NUMBERS, AND POWER OF MAINTENANCE.

FROM the foregoing review of the statistical and political condition of the leading continental states, we turn to the more important object of our work ; namely, an inquiry into the Domestic Condition of Great Britain. This subject we shall treat of, under the heads of Population—Poor Laws, and the state of the Working Classes—Agriculture, and the Corn Laws—Currency, Commerce, and Finance.

Theories as to the effects of the increase of British population.—Few subjects, of national importance, have given rise to a greater prolixity of writings and debate, than that of the practical operative effect of the increase of our numbers. The different theories sustained by the popular essayists, as to the *natural limit* of the multiplying power of the human race, have been long familiar to the reading portion of the public.

It is assumed by Mr. Malthus, and other writers of acknowledged talent, “that, population being limited by the quantum of subsistence; and the power of augmenting the supply of food, being inferior to the multiplying tendency of the human race; the means of support must progressively diminish, and privation and misery increase in relative proportion.”

“There is a law in human nature,” Mr. Malthus *informs us*, “by the force of which, man has a tendency to increase in a geometrical progression, whereas his subsistence can only be increased in a concurrent arithmetical progression;” and, on the strength of this lugubrious assertion of the physical fecundity of the soil, and of the resources of human ingenuity, he portends the certain and rapid approach of a time, when, population having outgrown the means of subsistence, famine, with all its attendant horrors, must succeed.

In proof of the soundness of this doctrine, the proselytes to the Malthusian creed apply the principle to the present state of England; appealing, first, to the increasing number of parochial dependents; secondly, to the growing deficiency of profitable employment for the labouring classes, and the consequent fall in the price of labour; and, thirdly, to the annual insufficiency of the produce of the *British* soil to supply the demand. Such, they say, are the practical evidences of the incontrovertible reasoning of Malthus.

On the other hand, the opponents to the Malthusian creed,—Messrs. Sadler, Gray, Godwin, Everett, and other excellent writers,—contend, firstly, that the supply of food may be extended, in a ratio superior to that of consumers; secondly, that every man who comes into the world is endowed with the means of supplying, not only sufficient for his own wants, but of producing that excess, which renders the average provision for

each individual more abundant, and is hence conducive in multiplying the means of enjoyment; thirdly, that, by a greater variety of peculiar ingenuities, an extended means is furnished for supplying the varied demands of increasing numbers. Hence they infer, that a growing population, instead of tending to diminish the ratio of employment and subsistence to each individual, is directly conducive to its increase, and to general and individual abundance, in proportion to the multiplying ratio of people. Unwilling to admit that the evils noted by the anti-populationists are the effect of increasing numbers, they appeal to the progressive expansion of the aggregate annual national income and capital,—the decreasing ratio of mortality, evidencing the improving condition of the community,—and the frequently illustrated fact, of the national physical ability to produce a very rapid and large addition to the ordinary quantity of our agricultural productions. The low rate of wages, the overstock of labourers (if it exists), and the privations of those afflicted by poverty, they ascribe to various causes, by no means connected with the numerical advancement of population: such as impediments imposed on the free course of productive industry, by taxation; the inequality in the distribution of the national income, arising from the vast number of state annuitants; the restrictions on the more equal division of land, by the operation of the law of primogeniture; excessive charges on agriculture, by the operation of the monopoly enjoyed by the landowner; the tithe accorded to the church, &c. Such are the leading tenets of these literary disputants, and such the explanations given in support of their separate theories.

Fundamental as these differences of opinion may appear, yet, if we understand the reasonings advanced, they all seem ultimately to converge and

harmonize in a remote sequel. That the produce of a man's labour, directed with ordinary ingenuity to the cultivation of the soil, is superior to the adequate support of a family, is admitted by both parties; and hence it is obvious, that, whatever may be the mathematical series of the increase of the human family, the production of food is susceptible of the same ratio of increase, by the labour created; that, in fact, there is, and must continue to be, a natural creative sympathy between the growth of numbers and the production of food, until all the waste and desolate places on the earth are brought to the highest point of fruitful cultivation. The real question at issue is, as to which of the progressions will continue the longest. However, our subject recalls us from the task of examining the above question upon general principles, and directs us, ere we proceed further, to note the progressive increase of our numbers during past years, and to attempt an elucidation of the causes of such increase.

Progressive increase of numbers.—The public records, previous to the commencement of the 18th century, are very imperfect as to our numerical condition. In the age of queen Elizabeth, James, and Charles I., the population of England and Wales was vaguely computed at about 5,000,000, and that of Scotland at somewhat less than 1,000,000. Since the year 1700, decennial returns have been furnished.

The official returns of the population of England and Wales, made previously to the commencement of the present century, were deduced from the excess of registered baptisms over burials; a plan, which, although liable to many inaccuracies, furnishes the general materials for computing a fair *approximation* of the actual *relative* state of our numbers. The last four decennial returns were

calculated on a more systematic and more correct plan ; the census being prepared from accounts collected from every householder, by district officers, enumerating the actual number of inmates.

The following table refers only to England and Wales.

Previous to the census of 1801, there were no *official* returns of the population of Scotland.

Date.	Population of England and Wales, deduced from the excess of registered baptisms over burials.	Decennial increase per cent.
1700	5,475,000	
1710	5,240,000	0
1720	5,565,000	6
1730	5,796,000	4
1740	6,064,000	4
1750	6,467,000	6
1760	6,736,000	4
1770	7,428,000	10
1780	7,953,000	7
1790	8,675,000	9

These returns, with the exception of that of 1710, all demonstrate a progressive increase of numbers, but in a ratio by no means regular : the average excess, during the ten decennial periods, is about six per cent. The interruption to the general tendency of increase, during the decennial period ending 1710, if the returns for that period are not erroneous, may be attributable to the general prevalence of war during these years, and the absence of a large portion of our able-bodied population, in military and naval services.

The total increase during the ninety years ending in 1790, is a fraction above 58 per cent.

The returns of the enumerated population of Great Britain, in 1801, 1811, and 1821, give the following results :—

Years.	Population of					
	England and Wales.	Increase per cent.	Scotland.	Increase per cent.	Great Britain.	Increase per cent.
1801	8,872,980	$2\frac{1}{4}^*$	1,599,068		10,472,048	
1811	10,150,615	$14\frac{3}{4}$	1,805,688	$12\frac{1}{2}$	11,956,303	$14\frac{1}{4}$
1821	11,978,875	$17\frac{3}{4}$	2,093,456	$10\frac{1}{2}$	14,072,331	$17\frac{1}{4}$

These returns *exclude* the number of men in the military, naval, and other services of the state ; which, in 1801, was 470,598 ; in 1811, 640,500 ; and in 1821, 319,300. To these must also be added, those engaged in the mercantile marine, numbering, in 1821, about 145,000 men ;—so that the total population of Great Britain, in 1821, was 14,536,631, exclusive of absentees not enumerated.

The improved plan, upon which the returns of 1821 and 1831 are presented to the public, enables us to particularise, in the subjoined table, the proportionate number of the sexes, and their relative increase.

* Although, during the decennial period ending 1801, various intervals of dearth, and great distress, were experienced, it is not probable that the increase of numbers was, as the accounts shew, only $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. This apparent disparagement in the ratio of increase, is, doubtless, attributable to the defective returns of 1790. All the official tables of population referring to the ten decenary periods of the last century, differ materially from Mr. Finlayson's calculations, published in the present year ; and from the well-known accuracy of this gentleman's political arithmetic, they possess great claims to public confidence.

Summary of the Population of the United Kingdom, in 1821 and 1831.*

	1821.				1831.				Ratio of Total Increase.
	Males.	Females.	Total.	Proportion of Males to Females.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Proportion of Males to Females.	
England	5,483,679	5,777,758	11,261,437	As 949 to 1000	6,375,394	6,713,944	13,089,338	As 949 to 1000	16 $\frac{1}{2}$
Wales	350,487	366,951	717,438	957 —	394,075	411,161	805,236	957 —	12 $\frac{1}{2}$
Scotland	983,552	1,109,904	2,093,456	885 —	1,115,132	1,250,675	2,365,807	889 —	12 $\frac{3}{8}$
Army, Navy, &c.	319,300	319,300	277,017	277,017	13 $\frac{3}{8}$
Total, Great Britain	7,137,018	7,254,613	14,391,631	As 983 to 1000	8,161,618	8,375,780	16,537,398	As 974 to 1000	14 $\frac{1}{3}$
Ireland	6,802,093	7,767,401	15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Total, Great Britain } and Ireland }	21,193,724	24,304,799	14 $\frac{1}{3}$

The total number of sailors employed in the mercantile marine in 1829, was 154,808.

* These returns slightly differ from those furnished in the "Preface to the Abstract of the Population Returns of 1831," published in 1834; but as we find it impossible to make any two official accounts exactly correspond, we have adopted the former summary, with the corrections which appeared necessary.

The most striking feature in the preceding returns, is the uniformity in the proportionate number of males to females, in 1821 and 1831. The proportionate number of the *births* of the former to the latter sex, is about as 10.435 is to 10.000. The desolating effect of war ceasing its destructive ravages among the male population, it is fair to presume, that the proportion of males to females progressively approximates: but this theory is disproved by results; for, with the exception of Scotland, where a small relative increase is noticed, the proportion was precisely the same at the termination of both decennial periods. The corollary is clearly indicative of a greater sum of mortality among males than females; and the results are especially remarkable in their relative precarious tenure of infant life. See table, p. .

The returns of the population of Great Britain, for the three last decennial periods, shew some disparagement in the relative ratio of increase; but a more correct view of the regularity of the progressive growth of our numbers, is given by the following notice of the increase in the number of the female sex, which, in the decennial period ending

1811,	. .	was	. .	14:15
1821,			15:71
1831,			15:45;

thus exhibiting but a slight variation from regularity in the ratio.

Thus having shewn the actual numerical progress of the British community, we shall not pause to inquire, whether the theory—"that man, obedient to the laws of nature, has a tendency to increase his numbers in a geometrical progression"—harmonises with practical fact; but shall proceed to draw some general and particular conclusions, as to the causes which have favoured the augmentation of our numbers.

Improvement in the condition of the people.—That

the procreative inclination in the human race is concordant with the ability of individuals to provide for dependents, is a generally admitted truth; and hence it naturally follows, that the rapid growth of numbers is indicative of an improving condition in the state of the national community. We need only take a retrospective glance at the progress of British society, from a state of barbaric rudeness to its present condition of affluence and refinement, to find ample testimony of an improved and improving condition. The present, or rather late, state of the inhabitants of the remote villages in the Highlands of Scotland, or the west of Ireland, exhibits a picture of what England was in the primeval and middle ages of her history. Even in the days when our Henrys and Edwards plumed themselves with the trophies of France, how often has famine spread all its horrors over city and village. "Men, women, and children perished of actual hunger, and those who survived kept themselves alive by eating the bark of trees, acorns, and pig-nuts." Sir F. M. Eden, in his excellent work on the state of the poor, furnishes, in his notice of a record of the assessment of the town of Colchester, in A.D. 1377, a curious instance of the poverty of England in those days. Colchester then ranked foremost in the catalogue of English boroughs, and, according to Chalmers, "contained about 4400 inhabitants; it was assessed in pursuance of a subsidy to Edward I., of one-fifteenth of the value of all movable property. The value of the whole of the household furniture, clothes, money, corn, horses, and other cattle, provisions, and *stock in trade*, was 518*l.* 16*s.* 0 $\frac{3}{4}$ *d.*; and the gross sum collected, although gathered with the most rigid exaction, amounted to no more than 34*l.* 12*s.* 7*d.*" What a contrast would appear in a similar assessment on the property of a town of like importance at the present day! If we can form a reasonable estimate of the value of move-

able property, from the well known tables of Mr. Colquhoun, applying to the year 1812, the average amount of movable stock belonging to 4400 people, is at least 152,000*l.*;* an increase far surpassing any reasonable depreciation in the relative value of money, and unfolding a comparative amelioration in the condition of the community, bordering on theoretical fiction.

It was not until subsequent to the settlement of the long disputed right to the British crown, following the events of the memorable battle of Bosworth, that the nation made any important advances in the career of improvement; and even from that date to the revolution of 1688, the improvement in the great majority of the people was slow in comparison with that of subsequent periods: Hollingshed, in his *Chronicles* (1576) says, “there are old men yet dwelling in the village where I remain, who have noted three things to be marvelously altered in England within their sound remembrance; one is the multitude of chimnies lately erected, whereas, in their young days, there were but two or three in most uplandish towns of the realm.”—The second is, the great amendment in lodging; “for, said they, our fathers and ourselves have lain full oft on straw pallets covered with a sheet, under coverlets of dogs’ wane and hop harlots, and a good round log under their heads as a bolster. If it were so, that the father or good man of the house had a mattress or flock bed, and thereon a sack of chaff to rest his head upon, he thought himself as well lodged as the lord of the town; as for servants, if they had any sheet above them it was well, for seldom had they any under their bodies to keep them from the pricking straws that ran oft through the canvass, and rased their hardened hides.—The third thing they tell us of, is the exchange of trene platters into pewter, and wooden spoons into silver or tin;

* Ireland is included in this estimate.

for so common were all sorts of trenc (wooden) vessels in those times, that a man could hardly find four pieces of pewter in a good farm-house.”*

By a contrast with the present state of the British community with that represented by Hollingshed, we may judge of the improvement. There are now few who are doomed to repose their weary limbs on straw, with a log of wood as a bolster;—none who linger out a miserable existence on acorns and pig-nuts. Every inhabitant of England, however low his condition, is assured against the extreme severities of fate, and moderately supplied with wholesome diet and a comfortable lodging. But it was not until about the middle of the last century, when, by the rapid and substantial improvements in mechanical science, manufactures received so great an extension, that the increase in the produce, and consequently in the price of manual labour, marked the dawn of a new career of national prosperity, and hence of general amelioration in the condition of the working classes. It was by the growth of sacred genius; and hence the solid improvements in manufactures introduced by the famed Arkwright, Watt, and other eternally honoured members of the human family, and the subsequent application of the power of *steam to manufactures*, or rather to machine-factories, that the comforts of life have been more amply dispensed; the naked clothed, the hungry fed, the houseless lodged, human life prolonged, and the fruitfulness of marriage augmented. These effects will be seen in remarking the

Decrease in the ratio of mortality.—The decreasing ratio of mortality, especially since the decennial period ending in 1780, is seen by a reference to the subjoined table, being a return of the annual proportion of deaths to the total population in each ten years, from the commencement of the last century.

* This is England in the “golden days of Queen Bess.”

In ten years ending	1700	the average mor- tality to the po- pulation was .	England and Wales.	England exclusive of Wales.
			1 in 39. ¹⁰ / ₈	
	1710	„	36.1	
	1720	„	33.5	
	1730	„	31.1	
	1740	„	35.2	
	1750	„	40.4	
	1760	„	41.8	
	1770	„	41.2	
	1780	„	40.1	
Five ditto,	1790	„	45.18	
	1800	„	47.75	1 in 48
	1810	„	53.78	„ 49
	1820	„	59.22	„ 55
	1830	„	55	„ 51

Every return since 1780 shews a rapid decrease in the ratio of mortality, except that of 1830, which, in some slight degree, differs from the return of 1820 ; but as accuracy, in the full force of the term, cannot be expected, it is fair to presume that there was no increase in the ratio of mortality during the last ten years, especially as it is evident to rational observation, that the condition of the working classes, during the five years ending 1830, has been more favourable than during the quinquennial period ending 1820. Witness the general scarcity of the years 1816 and 1817, and the decadence of our commerce in the year 1819.

The country more conducive to longevity than the towns.—That the agricultural counties are more conducive to longevity than where the mass of the inhabitants are centred in large manufacturing or trading towns, is repeatedly demonstrated by the subjoined table of the ratio of mortality in every English county, calculated on the quinquennial average ending 1800, 1810, 1820, and 1830. The counties are ranked in accordance with their density of population.

Counties.	1800 1810 1820 1830				Counties.	1800 1810 1820 1830			
	One burial in					One burial in			
Middlesex . . .	37	36	45	41	Buckingham . .	50	49	53	52
Lancashire . . .	47	49	51	46	Hertford . . .	54	57	53	56
Surrey	42	44	49	49	Wilts	60	57	63	57
York, West Riding	49	51	57	51	Southampton .	46	46	61	56
Kent	41	38	50	49	Cambridge . . .	45	30	55	45
Warwickshire . .	52	43	48	58	Huntingdon . .	46	49	61	46
Gloucester . . .	55	61	60	61	Stafford	49	52	51	51
Nottingham . . .	51	52	54	51	Salop	54	59	54	53
Chester	51	49	52	52	Devon	49	50	59	58
Worcester	46	51	53	51	Sussex	55	52	68	58
Durham	43	49	53	52	Rutland	50	54	62	52
Somerset	55	53	61	58	York, East Riding	55	48	54	51
Suffolk	56	54	65	59	Dorset	62	56	63	58
Derby	52	58	59	54	Hereford	65	60	60	57
Cornwall	58	62	69	64	Northumberland	57	54	57	52
Leicester	49	58	56	53	York, North } Riding . }	53	51	61	55
Northampton . .	51	53	55	50	Monmouth	72	64	66	69
Essex	44	45	58	52	Lincoln	50	49	59	51
Berkshire	51	53	54	52	Cumberland . . .	54	52	54	54
Norfolk	47	50	59	52	Westmoreland . .	50	53	52	56
Oxford	53	56	57	53	Wales, 12 counties	64	64	67	69
Bedford	51	48	57	54					

In Middlesex, the county most dense in population, the ratio of mortality is the greatest.* The counties of Kent, Surrey, and Huntingdon, stand next in point of insalubrity. The fact that Kent counts among its population a large portion of the superannuated invalids of the army and navy, in some measure, accounts for the excess in the ratio of mortality. Surrey, which includes the densely peopled districts of Southwark, Lambeth, and its environs, partakes, in a great measure, of the character of Middlesex; and the ratio of mortality is hence influenced by the same causes. Hun-

* The density of population in Middlesex is rather above *seven* persons to the statute acre. Surrey counts one to an acre; Lancashire, rather more than one; Warwick and Stafford, one to every two acres; Nottingham and Chester, the same proportion; Hampshire, Devonshire, and Norfolk, one to three acres; the other counties are less densely peopled. The general average for England and Wales, is one inhabitant to every two acres and a half. If we divide *England* into north and south, by a line drawn from the Wash in Lincolnshire to the Severn, the population of the eighteen counties north of the line, is 6,130,581; and of the twenty-two counties south of it, 6,958,755.

tingdon, probably, owes its insalubrity to its humid atmosphere and marshy soil. The agricultural counties of Monmouth, Suffolk, Sussex, Devon, and Cornwall, appear highly favourable to the duration of human life, returning an average mortality of 1 in 62, against 1 in 46, attaching to Middlesex, Surrey, Lancashire, Kent, Huntingdon, and Cambridge.

Question: has population increased from advancement in the ratio of marriages?—The late rapid increase of British population has been usually ascribed to the great advance in the value of labour during the period of commercial excitement concurrent with the late wars; and it was expected, that on the cessation of this temporary stimulus, and the occurrence of such periods of embarrassment as those following the peace of 1815, matrimony would be discouraged, and population checked.

It is in some degree true, that the proportion of marriages to the total population, was greater during, than previous to the war; for although the official returns shew a decreasing ratio of marriages from the years 1789 to 1810, of about 3 per cent., yet that decreasing ratio is more than counterbalanced by the increase of numbers under the nubile age, and by the great increase in the numerical complement of the army and navy, subsequent to the commencement of hostilities in 1793, which services are peculiarly unfavourable to marriage. Subsequent to 1809, the returns shew an actual diminution of marriages; and this contrasted with the growth of population, furnishes a further evidence, that our numerical advancement is consequent on the extended duration of human life.

The following table shews the proportion of marriages to the entire population in periods between 1780 and 1830:

Periods.	Proportion of marriages to the entire population.
1780 to 1789 1 in 117
1790 to 1799 1 in 119 $\frac{1}{2}$
1806 to 1810 1 in 121 $\frac{1}{2}$
1816 to 1820 1 in 126 $\frac{1}{2}$
1826 to 1830 1 in 128

Effect of the poor laws on the increase of numbers.
 —The operation of the poor laws is usually considered to have been conducive to the expansion of population, but the returns shew, that the increase of numbers in the agricultural, is far inferior to that in the manufacturing districts, where the influence of the “system” is slightly felt.

The increase of numbers from 1821 to 1831, in eighteen English counties, almost entirely agricultural; as Devon, Essex, North Riding of York, Bedford, Suffolk, Berks, Oxford, Westmorland, Northumberland, Cambridge, Norfolk, Buckingham, Lincoln, Wilts, Huntingdon, Northampton, Hereford, and Rutland, is only $10\frac{2}{3}$ per cent.; while in the following ten counties, or districts, remarkable for their manufactures, Lancaster, York (West Riding), Warwick, Stafford, Nottingham, Chester, Durham, Monmouth, Worcester, and Salop, the increase has been $22\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. Nor do the official accounts sanction the generally received opinion, that the poor laws tend, more than any other cause, to promote marriage; the following returns shewing that the ratio of marriages is inferior in the agricultural to that in the manufacturing counties.

PROPORTION OF MARRIAGES TO THE POPULATION, DURING FIVE YEARS, 1826 TO 1830.	
AGRICULTURAL COUNTIES.	MANUFACTURING COUNTIES.
Hertford - - - - - 1 in 175	Lancashire - - - - - 1 in 115
Essex - - - - - 1 in 154	Middlesex - - - - - 1 in 103
Hereford - - - - - 1 in 152	Warwick - - - - - 1 in 120
Wiltshire - - - - - 1 in 148	Nottingham - - - - - 1 in 122
Oxford - - - - - 1 in 141	Chester - - - - - 1 in 123

The comparative ratio of baptisms offers another confirmation of the above thesis :

Agricultural counties.						Manufacturing counties.					
Hertford	-	-	-	-	1 in 36	Lancashire	-	-	-	1 in 34	
Hereford	-	-	-	-	1 in 36	Middlesex	-	-	-	1 in 31	
Essex	-	-	-	-	1 in 35	Nottingham	-	-	-	1 in 31	

These results clearly indicate, that the theory of those who trace the primary cause of our rapid numerical advancement to the operation of the poor's law is erroneous: it is more properly the power of steam than the power of the poor laws which adds to our population.

The fruitfulness of marriage considered in connexion with the expanding term of human life.—The fecundity of marriage must depend on a variety of circumstances, of which the most important are climate, and the duration of human life. The inhabitants of countries situated within the tropics, arrive at the age of puberty much earlier than the inhabitants of temperate climes, or of the cold regions of the north; twelve to thirteen years being the nubile age of the Brazilians, while with us, it can scarcely be less than twenty-three or four years. The age of man is, upon the authority of Holy Writ, three-score years and ten; but this rather relates to an extreme limit, and is not supposed to predict the *average* term of human life, at least we find no modern examples where such a term has been realised.

In *England*, where the annual mortality during the last thirty years has not exceeded 1 in 50, and where the term of human life, commencing at the nubile age, (23), has reached 35.8 years, the average fecundity of marriage is, according to Mr. Sadler, 3.66, or for the United Kingdom, 4.95; And there is no reason to doubt, that the ratio of the fecundity of marriage, and the increase of population, will be co-equally augmented with the expansion of the *vie moyenne*, commencing

at the connubial age. To what extent this may be carried in our favoured country, it is impossible to portend. Modern improvements have doubtless vastly contributed to mitigate the effect of epidemic disorders and loathsome diseases, especially among the poor; the improvement in the quality of food; the more general sufficiency of comfortable clothing, and suitable habitation; the better appointment and more numerous establishment of charitable institutions, and the great expansion of medical science, have doubtless all tended to prolong the average duration of human life. Indeed, during late years, useful and liberal science are so powerfully disseminating their influence in improving the condition of the human race, that population rapidly grows with its growth, and we appear verging towards that period, when "Untimely deaths shall be unknown," and when "the child shall die a hundred years old," (Isaiah, chap. lxxv. ver. 20). We may suppose, from the extraordinary ages of the Patriarchs in the antediluvian ages, that that universal, and never failing conqueror, "Death," made but few attacks upon youth. Adam was 130 years old before the birth of his third son "Seth," and attained the age of 930 years. Seth was 105 years old ere the birth of his son Enos, and reached the extended term of 905 years: and Methuselah, the oldest of the patriarchs, was 187 years of age ere the birth of his son Lamech, and died at the age of 969 years.* In the early periods of the post-diluvian ages, the natural death of a person under the age of puberty, was considered as something extraordinary; and

* The accuracy of these terms has been very reasonably doubted by various ingenious writers, and the researches of *M. Kennicott de Rossi*, and other learned men, have proved, that the Hebrew traditions of the ages of the patriarchs are not exempt from various interpretations, some of which make the age of Adam 139 instead of 930 years, and reduce those of other patriarchs in different degrees.

“in the dawning years of the Grecian republics, the decease of a person under the nubile age, was considered as an event at once so dreadful, and so much out of the course of nature, that it was thought improper to perform the funeral rites in open day, and the body was disposed of in the silence and obscurity of the night.” A fact which seems to indicate, that disease had, even then, scarcely begun to rear its hydra head.

Effect of the improvement in medical science.—There is no doubt but that a sufficient supply of the necessaries of life is the most *effectual* antidote to disease. Medical science, however, justly claims its fair commendation; and from an article which appeared in the *Westminster Review*, April, 1832, we are enabled to elucidate the practical effect of its improvement. “Sir William Petty, who died about the era of the revolution of 1689, states, that the proportion of deaths to cures in St. Bartholomews Hospital, was, in his time, as 1 to 7; in 1741 the ratio had diminished to 1 in 10; in 1780 to 1 in 14; in 1813, to 1 in 16; and in 1827, to 1 in 48. From the years 1799 to 1808, the mortality by consumption amounted to about 27 per cent. of those who became ill. From 1808 to 1813, it diminished to 23 per cent.; and from 1813 to 1822, it still further decreased to 22 per cent. The entire half of our population was, at one time, destroyed by one disease, “small-pox;” the mortality by which, at the present time, is but fractional. Typhus fever was once accustomed to visit this country as an annual epidemic, and to slay one out of every three it attacked; whereas, at the present day, it seldom appears as an epidemic, and its average mortality does not amount to 1 in 16.”

In other diseases, such as measles, scarlet fever, hooping cough, &c., there have been similar diminutions in the ratio of mortality, and they are no

longer regarded with the terror in which they were once viewed. Furthermore, the number attacked by these diseases is very considerably diminished. Such effects, doubtless, augment not only the fruitfulness of marriage, but, in a compound ratio, the increase of our numbers.

Comparative ratio of mortality in various States of Europe.—In other states of Europe, the gratifying results we have herebefore detailed as applying to Britain, are not attained in the same degree ; and we shall shew, by a comparison of the ratio of mortality in England and Wales, with that of other countries of Europe, and the states of America, that the attributes of the former, whether physical or acquired by art, are highly favourable to the preservation of human life.

The following results are given in a letter from Sir Francis Ivernois to Mr. Rickman, dated the 23d March, 1827, and subsequently printed for the use of parliament.

Table of the comparative ratio of mortality.

Countries.	Annual proportion of deaths to the total population.
England and Wales . . .	1 in 59
Sweden and the Danish States	1 in 48
Kingdom of the Netherlands .	1 in 43
France	1 in 40
United States of America .	1 in 37
Prussia	1 in 36
Wurtemberg	1 in 33

Such were the general results of Sir Francis Ivernois' calculations, the report of which is accompanied with comments, of which the following is a copy.

En Swède et dans les états Danois, où la mortalité a été toujours moindre qu'ailleurs, elle paraît être 1 sur 48.

Dans le Royaume des Pays-bas, où L'Archiviste vient de publier une serie de six années, finissant au 31 Decembre, 1825, les rapports sont les suivants. Naissances, 1 sur 27 ; mariages, 1 sur 132 ; mortalité, 1 sur 43.8. Le *maximum* de cette mortalité est en Zeland, 1 sur 31.4 ; et le *minimum* dans les Namurois, 1 sur 57.9.

En France, la mortalité diminue depuis quarante ans, de 1 sur $37\frac{1}{2}$ à 1 sur 40.*—Dans les etats unis d'Amerique, en 1825, la mortalité fut 1 sur 37.

En Prusse, où l'on a fait une serie de registres depuis onse années, la mortalité est encore dans le rapport precisement la même qu'elle etait il y quarante ans, 1 sur 36. Le gouvernement de Wurtemberg, publia les tableaux, pour l'année 1825, d'où il resulte que la moyenne y a été 1 sur 33.

The foregoing remarks warrant the conclusion, that the increase of British population, and the prolongation of the lease of human life, are consequent on the improved and the improving condition of the community ; hence we are led to notice the causes which have concurred to extend the national and individual income ; and thus to ameliorate the condition of the people. Here the attention of the inquirer is forcibly directed to the vast and growing expansion of our productive power ; by the rapid advancement of mechanical science.

Increase of productive power.—Nature, bountiful and wise in all things, has furnished us with the

* On the 30th January, 1825, M. Fournier read a note from M. Benoiston de Chateauné, on the decrease of the ratio of mortality since 1775. He says that, 50 years since, out of 100 children born, 50 died the first two years, now the proportion is 38.5 ; in the former time $55\frac{1}{2}$ in a hundred died before attaining the age of ten, now the proportion is $43\frac{7}{10}$. Only $21\frac{5}{10}$ men reached the age of 50, now the proportion is $32\frac{5}{10}$; then only 15 in 100 reached the age of 60, now the proportion is 24 ; formerly the deaths were 1 to 30, now the annual mortality is 1 to 39.

elements of wealth, and endowed the human mind with an infinite variety of peculiar talents, that her unsparing gifts may be rendered available to the supply of our varied wants. But labour is the price which the soil demands for her productions, and it is by labour alone that they can be matured and rendered subservient to human enjoyments. It is hence evident, that in proportion as the force of labour is multiplied, so are the essential necessities to subsistence rendered more abundant. Were we provided with documents illustrative of the proportion of the British population engaged in the various branches of productive industry two or three centuries since, they would, in all probability, shew a proportion of from 85 to 90 per cent. employed in the cultivation of the soil, producing scarcely an excess of food over the consumption of the community. Indeed, so deficient were the productions of the soil in the reigns of the Plantagenets, that the exportation of grain was prohibited under severe penalties, until the 15th of Henry VI., a time when the population scarcely exceeded 4,000,000. How limited at this era, ere machinery appeared as an helpmate to labour, must have been the means of acquiring the many other necessities of life, such as clothing, fuel, and habitation, equally essential with food; and how limited were the means of obtaining the productions of foreign climes, so needful to the comfort of the people. A community such as the British, at that era, principally occupied in the productions of the prime necessities of life, and whose labour yielded but a small surplus over the actual consumption of the labourers engaged, possesses but slender means of attaining to those social pleasures, which a knowledge of the fine arts inspires, or of providing for that portion of every well organised society, who devote themselves to the study and diffusion of science, or to the per-

formance of those nobler sorts of services, which afford protection and assistance, improve the mental and moral faculties, add to the amusement, and heighten the pleasures of civilised life.

It is by the development of individual ingenuity, slow in its first movement, but, as it were, by the power of attraction, accelerating its pace in its progress towards various centres, that united capabilities harmonise in the perfection of invention, unfold the means of augmenting the fruit of labour, and hence of attaining to higher enjoyments.

Enlarged use of machinery.—It is evident, that any invention which tends to augment the quantity of the productions of a given sum of labour, must increase also the power of maintenance. If, in fact, the sum of useful commodities be doubled, by the aid of machinery, without any increase in the number of labourers; it is clear, that the income of each labourer must receive a like augmentation; and this augmentation of income clearly provides a superior power of maintenance, which marks the intimate connexion between the growth of income and the increase of numbers.

In tracing the increase of the productive power of Great Britain, we shall limit our inquiry to the year 1780, a period when productive industry was stimulated by the operation of the war. At that time, the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland scarcely numbered more than 13,800,000; and according to Dupin's tables, the productive force was equal to the manual labour of 31,281,000 effective labourers. From the year 1780 to 1826, the addition to our numbers was about 8,700,000 souls; the population in the latter year being about 22,500,000, and the increase of productive power, during the same period, equal to the labour of 28,925,000 men; carrying the total productive power of Great Britain and Ireland, in 1826, to

the equivalent labour of 60,206,000 workmen. The medium, or annual average increase of population, from 1780 to 1826, was 189,100 souls, while the average annual increase of productive power was equivalent to 628,010; so vast has been the increase of *inanimate* mechanical power. In the year 1780, the proportion of productive power to the population was 2.26; to each individual in 1826, it was 2.76; evidently proving, that the *power* of the United Kingdom to maintain her inhabitants in 1826, was superior to that of 1780 by .50 to each individual, or the produce of one effective labourer to every two inhabitants.

So much for the theory of the *diminishing ratio* of the *power of maintenance*, with the increase of British population.

If the foregoing comparison was continued to the year 1833, we feel convinced that it would demonstrate a far greater ratio in the increase of our productive force; the application of steam power to weaving, navigation, the transit of merchandise by land carriage, &c., having, during the last seven years, received so rapid an extension.

But, although the expansion of the national *power* of production is generally admitted, there are many, who, though deeply read in the science of national wealth, yet, while abstractly viewing the practical effects of the rapid introduction of machinery, doubt that the *power created* is actually employed, and that such portion of it as may be in active operation, meets its recompense at the hands of consumers. Were there no official documents to guide us in establishing the negative of this opinion, the natural conclusion, that mechanical power could not, for a series of years, continue in an increasing ratio of supply without a corresponding demand, would be sufficient; for it is a self-evident maxim, that where there is no increasing demand, there can be no increasing supply.

But, leaving this theoretical view of the question, let us look for proofs of a more substantial character. We shall first refer to the expansion of the cotton manufacture.

The annual average quantity of cotton wool spun

from the year		lbs.
1763 to 1787	was about	4,000,000
The year 1786	—	19,900,000
1805	—	49,920,000
1812	—	61,285,000
1820	—	137,407,000
1826	—	162,889,000
1832	—	273,249,000

The entire value of this branch of manufacture, in 1769, did not exceed 200,000*l.*; in 1824, Mr. Huskisson, in the House of Commons, stated its annual produce to be 33,500,000*l.*; Mr. Kennedy, in 1827, valued it at 36,000,000*l.*; and at the present day, it cannot be less than 40,000,000*l.* In 1818, the number of power-looms in Manchester, Stockport, and its vicinity, was 2000; in 1827, it was 45,000; and at present, the number is upwards of 70,000. More than 850,000 weavers, spinners, bleachers, &c., are employed in this manufacture; 111,000 engineers, masons, joiners, machine makers and others; at least an equal number are employed in the production of the coal, iron, and other elementary commodities used in the manufacture, and in transporting and distributing its produce. If we contrast the quantity of cotton wool spun in 1832, with that in 1812, which may be taken as a fair average for the years 1810 to 1814, the increase is 450 per cent., while the growth of population does not amount to the decimal. The quantity of sheep's wool shorn, spun, or otherwise consumed in England, in the middle of the seventeenth century, was under 20,000,000 lbs.; at present it is estimated at 100,000,000.* The quantity of foreign wool spun in 1820 was 9,778,000; and in 1832, 27,668,000;

* M'Culloch's Dictionary.

being an increase of about 280 per cent., while the increase of population is only 18 per cent. The woollen manufacture, to foster which, in the days of the Plantagenets, so many curious and cruel Acts were passed, gives employment at the present day to above half-a-million of men, women, and children, and produces annually, property valuing 22,000,000*l.* The quantity of coal raised in the year 1780, was about 2,500,000 tons;—in 1833, about 18,000,000 tons.*

* The quantity of coal actually raised, has been estimated as high as 28,000,000 tons; but Mr. Taylor computes it at only 15,580,000 tons, an estimate which is usually considered much too low; and considering the vast increase in the consumption of this important article since the repeal of the duty, it may be moderately estimated at 18,000,000 tons. The inquiry as to the quantity of coal in Great Britain, and as to the probability of a future deficiency of that most important mineral, has engaged the attention of several scientific geologists. Mr. Taylor has given it as his opinion, that the coal fields in Durham and Newcastle alone will furnish the present ratio of supply for 1700 years. Dr. Buckland thinks this estimate greatly exaggerated; but in his evidence before a committee of the House of Commons, he approves of a passage in Bakewell's *Geology*, which states that the coal beds in South Wales, are sufficient to meet the present demand for 2000 years. The passage is as follows, "Fortunately we have in South Wales, adjoining the Bristol Channel, an almost exhaustless supply of coal, and iron stone, which are as yet nearly unwrought. It has been stated, that this coal field extends over 1200 *square miles*, and that there are twenty-three beds of *workable* coal, the total average thickness of which is ninety-five feet, and the quantity contained in each acre is 100,000 tons, or 64,000,000 tons per square mile, (forming a prodigious total of 76,800,000,000 tons); if from this we deduct one half for waste, and for the minor extent of the upper beds, we shall have a clear supply of coal equal to 32,000,000 tons per square mile. Now if we admit 5,000,000 tons from the Northumberland and Durham mines, to be nearly equal to one third the total consumption in England, each square mile of the Welsh coal field would yield coal for two years' consumption; and as there are 1000 to 1200 square miles in this coal field, it would supply England with fuel for 2000 years after all our English coal mines are worked out." The Newcastle formation is very extensive, and contains 5,575,680,000 cubic yards of coal—extending in length about twenty-three miles. The beds in

The increase of population since 1780, is about 90 per cent.; while the production of coal has augmented 730 per cent. The quantity of British iron smelted in the year 1780 did not exceed 70,000 tons; in 1831 there were about 300 coke furnaces in work, which, upon the average, produced about fifty tons per week, or the enormous quantity of 750,000 tons per annum; equal to four-fold the joint produce of the Russian and Swedish mines, on which a century since we were chiefly dependent; and twice the quantity produced in the known world.*

Previous to 1793 England was dependent on foreigners for the supply of copper; in 1829 the quantity produced in Cornwall exceeded 10,000 tons of pure metal; and if to this we add the produce of the Welsh mines, the total quantity annually raised is not less than 13,000 tons, equal in value to about 1,450,000*l*.

In 1791, the import of flax into Scotland Staffordshire, Warwickshire, Worcester, and Leicester, besides those in Scotland, are also of immense extent. It is computed that 2,200,000 tons of coal are annually consumed in London and the neighbourhood, being an annual average quantity to each person of about $1\frac{8}{15}$ tons, or $7\frac{3}{4}$ tons to each family of five persons. Biddle of Wallsend (one of the best informed coal engineers), says "that the grand total of the number of persons employed in the north country and London departments in the coal trade is 45,500, exclusive of those employed in out-ports, and in discharging ships." Another writer says "the grand total of the number of individuals engaged in the coal trade may be set down at 180,000, and the total capital employed in it is moderately computed at 10,500,000*l*."

* The quantities produced in 1827 in the different districts were, in

	Tons.			
Staffordshire . .	216,000,	produced by 95 furnaces		
Shropshire . .	78,000	—	31	—
South Wales . .	272,000	—	90	—
North Wales . .	24,000	—	12	—
Yorkshire . . .	43,000	—	24	—
Derbyshire . .	20,800	—	14	—
Scotland . . .	36,500	—	18	—
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	690,300		284	

amounted to about 2,440 tons ; and of hemp, 299 tons ; and the quantity of linen exported was 7,842,000 yards. In 1831, there were 15,010 tons of flax, and 3082 tons of hemp imported ; and the quantity of linen, sail-cloth, &c. exported, was 57,500,000 yards.*

It would be no difficult task to multiply practical abstract illustrations of the concomitant increase of productive power, with its useful application ; to shew, in fact, an income augmenting in a superior ratio to the increase of numbers ; but in order to give a general idea of the expansion of commercial and manufacturing industry, we shall shew, in a tabular form, the progressive increase in the quantity of British and Irish produce and manufactures exported.

EXPORTS.

Years, and annual average of years.	British and Irish Pro- duce and Manufactures exported from Great Britain,—Official value.	Irish Produce and Manufactures exported from Ireland.	Total.
	£.	£.	£.
1786-92	14,750,000		
1792-98	17,100,000	536,000	17,636,000
1798-1801	22,647,000	484,300	23,131,300
1802-8	22,662,000	477,200	23,139,200
1809-13	28,113,000	767,200	28,880,200
1815-19	38,176,200	943,440	39,119,640
1820-24	39,544,600	620,230	40,164,830
1825	48,024,952	705,515	48,730,467
1826	46,453,022	697,668	47,450,790
1827	40,332,854	632,882	40,965,736
1828	51,279,102	942,832	52,221,934
1829	52,019,728	768,319	52,788,047
1830	55,465,723	747,319	56,213,042
1831	60,492,637		
1832	60,090,123		

* Dr. Small's Statistical Account of Dundee.

The apparent stationary amount of the exports from Ireland, direct to foreign parts, is by no means an evidence that her trade has not participated in the general extension. Since the Union, the export trade of Ireland has been chiefly carried on through Great Britain. Without entering on the subject of the general improvement of Ireland, we shall here merely state that, according to Sir Charles Whitworth's tables, the total value of Irish exports to Great Britain during the *seven* years ending 1729, was 2,307,722*l.* ; while the value of her exports into the *single port* of Liverpool in *one year*, 1833, was no less than 7,456,692*l.**

From these returns, we learn that the increase in the quantity of British manufactures exported in 1830-31, in comparison with the year 1792,—a period of boasted commercial prosperity,†—is nearly 450 per cent. ; while the increase of population is only 70 per cent.

Extension of tillage since 1780.—After examining these extracts from official documents, our readers will, perhaps, be inclined to admit that the application of our productive power to manufactures, has fully kept pace with its growing supply :—that is to say, labour is as much in demand, as applying to manufactures, in 1832, as it was in 1780. But they will, perhaps, contend, that this extension of manufacturing industry merely evidences the rapid progress of revolution in our accustomed system of production : and that by the transfer of labourers from the plough and the harrow to the loom and the anvil, agriculture has suffered in proportion to the growth of manufactures. We are ready to admit, that the income arising from agriculture has not grown in full pro-

* See speech of Mr. Spring Rice, April, 1834.

† See Mr. Pitt's speech, budget, 1792.

portion with the growth of population ; and as we have measured the foregoing comparisons from the year 1780, we shall note the degree of the expansion of agriculture since that date. From 1780 to 1794, there were 450 Inclosure Acts passed, the annual average number being 30 ; from 1797 to 1803, the average annual number was 83 ; and the total number, 581 ; in 1811, the number was 134 (the highest number ever known) ; in 1814, it was 119 ; in 1816, 49 ; 1827, 21 ; 1829, 24 ; and in 1831, 10. The total quantity of land brought under cultivation in the fifty-one years ending 1831, is about 2,810,000 acres, yielding an additional annual income of about 18,000,000*l.* sterling. But this, it may be said, is not a fair view of the extension of our agriculture, the productiveness of land being regulated rather by the labour employed, than the extent of land brought under cultivation. We shall, therefore, notice the comparative production of agricultural provision in the periods referred to. After the Act of 1773, we became rather importers than exporters of corn : and during the quinquennial period ending 1785, import decidedly predominated. During the eighteen years ending 1791, the excess of our import of wheat over export, was 1,267,922 quarters ;* being, upon the annual average, about 70,000 quarters—a small deficiency, but enough to prove that the agricultural productions of Great Britain were rather *inferior* than *superior* to the demand. During the four years ending 1832, the total quantity of foreign wheat entered for home consumption, was 4,795,700 quarters ; the annual average being 1,008,800 quarters. Thus consumption has out-grown production by about 940,000 quarters of bread corn per

* The deficiency in the quantity of wheat, may be taken as a fair criterion of the general deficiency of agricultural productions.

annum ; a quantity about equivalent to the support of one million of people (one twenty-fifth part of the population of the United Kingdom). But what does this prove ? Merely that while our numbers have increased about 10,200,000 since 1780, or 90 per cent., the production of food has lost in its relative increase about 4 per cent. ; while the expansion of trading and manufacturing income has been 400 per cent. When we consider the rapid migration of the inhabitants of the country to the towns during this period ; or rather the vast increase in the proportion of consumers to producers of agricultural produce, the minuteness in the inferior ratio of the corresponding increase is the most curious result, which can only be accounted for by the improved methods of cultivation, and the progressive substitution of mechanical power for manual labour.

Increase of town population.— But the means of support is no less real, because the advancing ratio of population has been superior to that of agricultural productions. The inventions of Arkwright, Hargraves, Watt, and others, have given another direction to our productive power, and created another branch of opulence, infinitely more than adequate to our very limited dependence on other countries for supplies of grain. The application of ingenious machinery in Great Britain has given full force to the efficacy and labour of man, and produced an immense increase of income by the superaddition of value to raw materials of comparatively small cost. How this revolution in our commercial, or rather productive, system tends to concentrate population, is illustrated by the following example of the increase of our towns : *—

* It will be remarked, that one-sixth part of the total population of Great Britain inhabits eight towns, the least populous of which contains more than 100,000 inhabitants.

Increase in the eight principal towns of Great Britain during the ten years ending 1831.

	Population in 1821.	Population in 1831.	Increase per cent.
London, Westminster, South- wark, and suburbs*	1,225,694	1,471,941	20
Manchester, Salford, and sub- urbs	154,807	227,808	42
Glasgow (city) and suburbs . .	147,043	202,426	38
Liverpool (borough) with Tox- teth Park	131,808	189,242	44
Edinburgh (city)	138,235	162,403	18
Birmingham and suburbs . .	106,721	142,206	33
Leeds	83,796	123,393	49
Bristol	87,779	103,886	19

In these eight towns, containing 2,623,305 inhabitants, the late decennial increase is 547,442 ; being an advancing ratio of $25\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. ; while the average increase in Great Britain is $15\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. ; indicating a great increase in manufacturing population, the existence of a superior inducement for the direction of capital and labour to manufactures than to agriculture, and a comparative superiority in the condition of the town workman over that of the country labourer.

Advantages of concentrated population.—But let us take a more extended view of the national advantages of population tending to concentrate in towns.

It is indicative of the rapid growth of mechanical talent, and the increase of skilled labour, which produces in a given time a greater value than common field labour ; an advantage which, naturally allied with a commercial spirit, ensures to us a kind of natural monopoly in trade and manufactures. It is from the combination of mechanical talent in

* The population of London and its suburbs, within a circle struck with a radius of eight miles from St. Paul's Cathedral, was, in 1821, 1,481,500 ; and in 1831, 1,776,500 souls (official report).

large towns, that the several co-operative branches of any particular manufacture are prosecuted with a degree of economy and dexterity unattainable in thinly peopled districts; and that the various operations in the manufacture of the same article are more readily divided among different classes of workmen, whose attention being constantly directed to one simple manipulation, enables them to acquire a surprising degree of dexterity, which improves the work and facilitates the operation.* Such advantages cannot fail to attract and concentrate capital—not only in the establishment of manufactories, but in the enlargement of the means for rendering the superiority more effective; such as in the formation of canals, roads, and rail-ways to connect the manufacturing towns with the sea-ports; thus combining the local advantages possessed in different districts, and immensely improving the power of competition.†

It is, in a great measure, from this cause that we maintain a decided superiority in foreign trade and manufactures over our continental rivals. Our Gallic neighbour, who perhaps possesses all

* The report of the Committee on labourers' wages, 1829-30, notices the minute subdivision of labour in the manufacture of steel and metal ware in the town of Sheffield. It says, "Here (in Sheffield) the trade in hardware is divided into manufactures of table knives, scissors, razors, files, saws, edge-tools, britannia-metal goods, silver and plated ware, nails, and several other *distinct branches* of manufacture, each limited to the production of a simple article. These several trades are again minutely subdivided. For instance, the manufacture of knives is branched in forgers, grinders, handle makers, and finishers. Of files, into forgers, grinders, cutters, and hardeners: again, the subordinate branches of each tool are classed into first, second, and third-rate workmen." It would be easy to multiply examples of the minute subdivision of labour: the trade of needle makers, or potters, would furnish interesting illustrations.

† The length of turnpike roads in England and Wales in 1823, was 24,531 miles; the annual income, 1,214,516; debt, 5,200,000*l.*: at present their extent is above 30,000 miles. The total length of canals in Great Britain at the same date,

the elements for the attainment of great perfection in manufactures, can never rival us until her

exclusive of those under five miles, was 2889 miles : at present the length is above 3000 miles. The following is an official summary of the subscribed capital of eighty corporate canal companies, and their amount of dividends in 1825 :—

23 companies have expended	£3,734,910	{ producing no dividend yet.
14 — — —	4,073,678	. £ 92,281 dividend.
22 — — —	2,196,000	. 112,400 —
11 — — —	2,073,300	. 216,024 —
10 (dividend 20 per cent)	1,127,230	. 311,554 —
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£ 13,205,118		£ 732,259

The average dividend on property invested in canals, is about $5\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. The canals in Scotland are many and important, especially the magnificent canal of the Forth and Clyde, and the Caledonian, in which latter undertaking no less than 986,924*l.* have been expended since 1803. The rail-roads are at present sixty in number, independent of that between Manchester and Liverpool, which cost nearly 1,000,000*l.* Other extensive rail-roads are in progress, which are destined to connect the metropolis with the great manufacturing districts in the north and south, east and west. Works of such magnificence can only be compared with their *prodigious utility*. The names of “Meteor” and “Novelty” will descend to posterity along with those of Stevenson, Ericson, and Gurney. To illustrate the wonderful power of these loco-motive engines, we need only say that the engine called the Sampson, in May 1832, drew fifty wagons laden with goods, making with its own weight 233 tons, from Manchester to Liverpool (thirty miles) in two hours and forty minutes. Their speed is unlimited. The engine which conveyed Mr. Huskisson to Manchester, after the ever deplorable accident which terminated his valuable life, moved at the rate of twenty-seven miles within the hour. The Novelty moved at the rate of thirty-two miles ; and at one time, when its speed was noted, at the rate of *forty miles an hour* ; being quicker than a migratory pigeon can fly. Improvements in the engines are rapidly progressing ; the consumption of fuel has been reduced from 1.63 to one pound of coke per ton, per mile. The superiority of a rail-road over a canal is *safety, certainty, economy, and velocity*. (See Observations on Steam-carriages and Rail-roads, by Gurney, Partington, Cumming, Lardner, and other authors).

————— “ How wonderful is man !
A beam ethereal, sullied and absorpt ;
Though sullied and dishonoured, still divine.”

government can infuse a spirit of commercial enterprise throughout the community, which can alone make them available. The national spirit in France is opposed to manufactures; the rich prefer the army and the liberal professions, and are generally content with a competency, rather than run the risk and trouble of trade; the lower classes have their native prejudices, and there is a general want of enterprise and inclination to embark capital in great commercial undertakings and national improvements. The French labourers do not like the sedentary life of a weaver, or the immured existence of a miner, whilst their smiling fields and luxuriant groves are so tempting and so much more congenial. Hence their population is comparatively scattered—their roads bad—their canals few—their immense strata of coal and iron lie buried in primeval beds—and their power of competition is viewed by the British manufacturer with easy indifference.

Question as to the effect of machinery discussed.—Notwithstanding the admitted expansion of national income, and, in a general sense, the national advantage arising from the progressive economy of manual labour, by the introduction of mechanical power; yet, its beneficial influence on the *condition of the working classes*, is not only very generally doubted, but in various publications has been absolutely denied. It is viewed as depriving the greater portion of them of their only capital, “labour,” and hence curtailing their means of purchasing those commodities necessary for subsistence, however low the price at which they may be obtainable. Now, with the vastly increased and increasing power of machinery, which we have before noticed, did no means exist of interchanging the surplus of our productions over our consumption, for the products of foreign climes, the tendency

to overstock, and thus to outrun the means of purchase is admissible: but, in that case—if every market in the known world was *effectually* closed against us—it could only effect a revolution in our commercial plan; for as it is evident, that a surplus quantity of manufactures can only be paid for by a surplus quantity of raw produce, the effect would be a transfer of the mechanic to the plough, until the value of the two branches of production would be precisely equal. However, such a case is, in the ordinary sense of the word, “impossible;” and the tendency to overstock is far, very far, removed by the continually growing opportunity of barter, which the free navigation of the ocean affords. Looking, therefore, to a wider range for our commerce than a mere isolated trade, it is evident, that until the demands of ultramarine people for British productions, and of the British people for foreign merchandise are fully answered—a time which will never arrive, till the dawn of the millenium—increased productions must always provide additional means of purchasing; for, let it be remarked, consumption is by no means regulated by the *wants* of the people, but by their *means* of buying; and every invention which tends to cheapen commodities, increases the means of attainment, and facilitates consumption. Thus we find, that notwithstanding an increase of from 400 to 500 per cent. in the annual quantity of British manufactures produced at the present time, compared with 1780 or 1785, the tendency to overstock is by no means more powerful; and we may fairly portend, that at the close of another half century, when our manufactures will have progressed in a similarly advancing ratio, it will still be equally distant; for, as the quantity produced by a given sum of labour, increases, so the price, *pari passu*, diminishes; and hence, the productions being more easily attainable, the consumption of them

augments in the same degree.* It is this increase in the consumption of commodities, upon *natural* principles, that gives the decided negative to the assertion, that the economy of manual labour abridges the demand for it; that machinery robs the labourer of his capital, "labour;" and by depriving him of work, deprives him of the means of purchasing the necessaries for subsistence, however cheap they may be afforded.

The tables published in 1811 and 1821, with the population returns, embracing an analysis of social life, furnish, apparently, very conclusive evidence on this point; representing an immense increase in the number of families engaged in trade and manufactures. The returns of this nature, referring to 1831, but only published in the early part of the present year, have been handed to us by Mr. Rickman, so well known for his kind and ready assistance to those engaged in statistical investigation. These tables discover important errors in the decennial returns of 1811 and 1821: we shall give them as they appear at the conclusion of the three decennial periods, and explain, in a subsequent paragraph, the necessary corrections.

* This is surely very evident; but some, mentally blind, either cannot, or will not, understand it. Is it not clear, that if by the aid of machinery, a commodity is produced in an hour, which without such aid would occupy a day, the manufacturer can afford to exchange it for another commodity, which represents an hour's instead of a day's work? If this is admitted, surely the consumer more easily obtains the commodity, if he is only required to work an hour instead of a day for it. Price, in the sense of money, has little to do with the question; money is only used to facilitate the interchanges; "it is the oil of human industry, which softens all the movements and turnings of circulation."

ANALYSIS.

Shewing the number of Families, in Great Britain, in 1811, 1821, and 1831, employed in trade, manufactures, and agriculture; and the number of Families engaged in the various professions, subsisting on independent annuities, wholly supported by charitable contributions, or not gaining a livelihood by trade or agriculture; also the proportion which each class bears to the total population.

Classes.	1811				1821				1831			
	England and Wales.		Scotland.		England and Wales.		Scotland.		England and Wales.		Scotland.	
	Number of families.	Centesimal parts.	Families.	Centesimal parts.	Families.	Centesimal parts.	Families.	Centesimal parts.	Families.	Centesimal parts.	Families.	Centesimal parts.
Engaged in trade, manufactures, or other mechanical employment.	969,633	45	169,417	42	1,159,975	47	190,264	42	1,227,614	42	207,259	40
Agriculture, Horticulture, &c.	770,199	36	125,799	32	847,957	34	130,699	29	834,543	28	126,591	25
All others, embracing annuitants, professional men, (except army and navy) and those having no accoutoned employ.	412,316	19	106,852	26	485,491	19	126,997	29	849,717	30	168,451	35
	2,152,148	100	402,068	100	2,493,423	100	447,960	100	2,911,874	100	502,301	100

Between the years 1811 and 1821, trade and manufactures appear by these returns to have somewhat increased; but between 1821 and 1831, they shew a diminution: the centesimal proportion of families employed in trade having fallen from 46 to 42; yet no decay was visible in this branch of industry, and considerable surprise was excited when this result appeared. The paradox of increasing trade and diminishing employment was not at first discovered to spring from an inconsiderate notion, that in 1811 and 1821 many were included in this class who were not employed at all; but it seems that a large proportion of labourers, such as miners, fishermen, those engaged in inland navigation, road-making, &c., which in the late returns (1831) numbers 608,712, were classed either as traders or agriculturists; but when in 1831 a column was assigned to useful labour, of whatever kind, the returning officer classed these in it, but placed their families in the column assigned to non-productives—swelling the number of the latter class, and diminishing that of the agriculturists and traders. It thus appears that out of 1,018,168 families (30 per cent.) classed as non-productives, 608,712 are actual labourers, and 78,669 males employed as domestic servants; reducing the total number to 328,787. If to this number we add the professional men and the domestic servants, the total proportion of those designated as “all others than agriculturists and traders,” is reduced to about 18 per cent. Of these, a large proportion (nearly half) are superannuated labourers (inmates of workhouses, &c.); and, with some other necessary deductions, the number of those who constitute annuitants, independent gentry, legislators, clergy, the heads of land, and the *ornaments* of civilised life, is reduced to a very small proportion. If on these considerations we reduce the proportion of the non-productive column to 18 per cent., which it certainly,

in the widest sense, does not exceed, and add the difference (12 per cent.) to the manufacturers and agriculturists, in the proportion of eight to four, the centesimal parts for 1831 will stand thus:—

Manufacturers and Traders. Agriculturists. All others.
Families: 50 32 18

which forms a more correct medium of comparison with the returns of 1811 and 1821; and to common observation is clearly more warrantable, in furnishing a *relative* view.

The subjoined is an analysis of British society abridged from the official report.

ANALYSIS.

	Males above twenty years of age.	Males under twenty years of age.	Agriculture.			Trade.		Capitalists, bankers, professional or other educated men.	Labourers employed in labour not agricultural.	Other males twenty years of age, except servants.	Male Servants.		Female servants.
			Occupiers employing labourers.	Occupiers not employing labourers.	Labourers employed in agriculture.	Employed in manufacturing, or in chimney.	Employed in retail trade, or in handicraft, as masters or workmen.				Twenty years of age.	Under twenty years of age.	
ENGLAND	3,199,984	3,176,643	141,460	94,883	744,407	314,106	964,177	179,983	500,950	189,389	70,629	30,777	518,705
WALES .	194,706	199,757	19,728	19,966	55,468	6,216	43,226	5,204	31,571	11,180	2,145	1,179	42,274
SCOTLAND	549,821	564,995	25,887	53,966	87,292	83,993	152,464	29,203	76,191	34,930	5,895	2,599	109,512
Total . .	3,944,511	3,941,395	187,075	168,815	887,167	404,317	1,159,867	214,390	608,712	235,499	78,669	34,555	670,491

These returns being duly investigated upon the principles already explained, are conclusive as to this fact, that while machinery has, to a vast extent, economised the application of *manual* labour in proportion to the force employed, its progressive introduction has been accompanied with an important addition to the demand for mechanics; and are thus direct evidences against the opinions of those who, assigning a *limit* to consumption, consider that every new discovery is a calamity,—because, as they say, it merely cheapens the article to the consumer, at the cost of the producer. We have before observed, and may repeat, that there is no such thing as a limit to the *wants* of society, nor ever can be. Whatever facilitates the means of attainment, creates new demand: the cheaper an article of necessity becomes, the more it is used; and when the most pressing wants are supplied at a diminished cost, new wants appear; and so long as the means of attainment exist, new demands for the products of labour arise, and new channels for employment are provided. M. Say, in speaking of the increase of employment in the English cotton manufacture, says, upon the authority of an English manufacturer of fifty years' experience, “that in ten years after the introduction of machines, the people employed in the trade, spinners and weavers, were more than *forty* times as many as when the spinning was done by hand. It has been calculated that in Lancashire alone there was, in 1825, as much yarn produced by machinery and human labour, as would have required twenty-one million three hundred and twenty thousand persons to produce with the distaff and spindle.* This immense power might be

* To give an idea of the value and extent of the machinery employed in the cotton factories, and the immense economy of manual labour, we quote the following statement made by the editor of the *Quarterly Review*, in 1826. “Supposing 350,000

supposed to have almost superseded human labour in the production of cotton yarn. It did no such thing ; it gave a new direction to labour that was formerly employed at the distaff and spindle : but it increased the quantity of labour altogether employed in the manufacture of cotton at least a hundred-fold.”* The increase of the consumption has been about coequal with the diminution of price. About the middle of the last century, the production and consumption of English cottons was about 16,000,000 of yards, of which about one-fourth was exported. At present the production is about 800,000,000 of yards, of which about 400,000,000 are retained for home consumption, and the rest exported, to purchase foreign commodities.

Of the increase of comfort arising from this extra production, some opinion may be formed by the bare mention of the above comparisons. At the former period the consumption of cotton goods was, on the average, about one yard per annum to each individual ; at present it is increased to about eighteen ; and yet millions of English people, to say nothing of the hundreds of millions of demi-civilised and savage inhabitants of the globe, *demand* increasing supplies, — a *demand* limited only by the means of attainment.

It has been calculated that one bushel of coals consumed in the furnace of the most approved

men are employed in the cotton manufactories ; fifty years ago it would have required forty-two millions of men (or fifty-three millions, according to some economists), to produce the same result.” So that one man’s labour is now as effective as the labour of 120 men fifty years ago. The stupendous machinery employed in the several British manufactories, is powerful enough to raise in a few hours, and several yards from the ground, the largest pyramid of Egypt, in the construction of which, according to Herodotus, 100,000 men were employed for twenty years, and the weight of which is calculated to be 10,401,000 tons.

* Results of Machinery.

steam engine, will, in a few minutes, raise 20,000 gallons of water from the depth of 348 feet, a work equal to the labour of twenty men for a whole day with a common pump.* A bushel of coals at the pit's mouth is perhaps worth about threepence; while the day labour of twenty men employed to drain the pit could not cost less than fifty shillings. Here, therefore, is a case where machinery enters into an *irresistible* competition with human labour, and apparently monopolises a vast field for employment: but, so far from diminishing the demand for human labour in the coal trade, it has vastly contributed to augment it; and at the present day it is calculated that there are not less than 200,000 families supported on the profits arising from digging, transporting, and distributing coals, without calculating the immense field for employment provided in the several branches of commerce connected with the coal trade; such as ship-building, engineering, hardware manufacture, &c. It may, perhaps, be said, that although the demand for labour has increased in this trade since the vastly extensive substitution of steam power for manual labour, it would have increased much more had the steam engine never been brought into competition with it, had rail-roads and steam-carriages never been used to transport the coal from the pit's mouth to the place of shipment, and other means of economising human labour never been introduced:—to dig, raise, transport, and distribute, by manual labour, the quantity of coal consumed at the present day, would, if it could be done at all (which it could not), employ at least all the able-bodied labourers in Great Britain; but there would be no funds to pay them, there would be no people to produce other commodities to exchange for the coal; the miner would receive his wages in coal, but he could

* Abridged from "Results of Machinery."

obtain no bread, no clothing, and no other lodging than the excavated subterraneous vault: he might, indeed, if foreign ships visited the British coast, perhaps barter his coal for corn of foreign growth, but he would obtain but a scanty meal. The British community would, in fact, be little removed from a savage state. However, this could not come to pass: without steam power to pump the water from the pits and raise the coal, it could not be produced under twenty times the present price, if it were possible. The consequence would be, that all trades depending on cheap fuel must cease; the iron mines could no longer be worked with advantage; the power looms must cease; the founderies, and the manufacturers of hardware, glass, porcelain, and pottery, must change their system and curtail their operations; and the poor man, who now gets his cheap coal fire, must go without, or obtain some cheap substitute, as turf, or the dung of animals, articles in very general use among the French and German peasantry, to whom the horrors of a severe winter can be better imagined than described. Were there no machinery employed, the consumption of coal would sink to one-thousandth part of its present amount, and the number of hands employed to one-tenth the present number; while the diminution of employment in every other branch of commerce would involve all in one common ruin, break down all the ramparts which now protect private property, assuredly effect national bankruptcy, and, perhaps, make us the dependent colony of some powerful state. The French government, which is making great efforts to connect by rail-roads the populous districts of France, voted during the session of 1833, about 25,000*l.* for the study of engineering, applicable to their formation, and numerous lines have been selected where they are to be constructed. One road is already formed, from St.

Etienne to Lyons; another, it is reported, will connect Calais with Paris; a third, Rouen and Havre de Grace; and so on. The home supply of iron is totally inadequate to the accomplishment of these great undertakings; and already have the government been obliged—absolutely compelled—to reduce their tariff on the importation of British iron, and to permit interested parties to contract with English houses for the needful supplies. Here is a direct and new foreign demand for the productions of British labour and capital, proceeding entirely from our confirmed superiority in heavy machinery: did coal cost as much in England as in France, which it would do, were not our machinery more effective, and our means of production more powerful, iron could not be afforded on lower terms, and no inducement would be offered to France to become our customer.

We shall give one more illustration of the results of machinery in adding to the demand for manual labour.—It is well known that the ancients had no clothing for the legs. Cloth bandages were introduced during the eleventh or twelfth century: Henry VIII. wore none but cloth hose. In 1561 queen Elizabeth was presented with a pair of black *knit* silk stockings, which were sent from Spain as an article of great curiosity, and from that time she ceased to wear cloth hose.* In 1589, Mr. William Lee, of Woodborough, Nottinghamshire, invented the stocking-frame, he applied in vain to the queen's government for assistance to enable him to establish a manufactory near Nottingham; but his appeals were disregarded, upon the plea that "it would deprive the poor stocking-knitters of their subsistence."† Lee afterwards, by the assistance of the French government, established his manufactory at Rouen. At his death—in the reign

* Howell's History of the World, and M'Culloch's Dictionary.

† See Beckman's History of Inventions.

of James I.—some of his workmen returned home and established the manufacture in Nottinghamshire: before this invention, a single pair of badly knitted stockings was deemed by the British monarch a present of great value. Even a century since, not one person in five hundred wore stockings; but by successive improvements the article has become so cheap, that now not one person in a thousand is without them; and instead of receiving small foreign supplies, to answer the demands of a few rich individuals, our exportation of hose amounts in value to no less than 1,200,000*l.* per annum, being six-fold the total value of the entire cotton-manufactures produced in 1760; and in the place of the manufacture of stockings and lace being limited to the employment of a few female knitters, as it then was, it now employs at least 50,000 families, while it has provided a source of work for the industrious females in figuring the lace, which machinery, by greatly diminishing the price, has brought into general use.

The adversaries of the progressive improvements in machinery, driven from their strong-hold by the proofs furnished against the supposed dogma, that every machine displaces a certain sum of manual labour, yet seek to illustrate their favourite maxims, instancing the depreciation in the wages of mechanics, which machinery is supposed to effect. Now, it is clear, that where the national income, or production, increases in a ratio superior to the growth of numbers, if the income were equally distributed, it would provide a corresponding increase to each individual; but, although the fact of the superior ratio of the income is fully established, it by no means follows, as it ought to do, on natural principles, that the operatives obtain their *full* share of the extra income. For the very nature of the economy of labour being to augment the value of money in proportion to commodities,

and the wages of labour in a populous country being, too frequently, nicely meted, according to the *minimum* necessary for human sustenance, it follows, that the price of labour sympathises with the depreciation in the price of commodities, or rather, the appreciation of money; and that those possessing *fixed* annuities in money, deriving income from lands, or regulated fees (fees allowed to agents of the law, for example), in some measure monopolise the benefit arising from the increased productiveness of labour. It is this undue distribution of the national income (an evil which in such a society as the British, can be remedied only by slow degrees), that has led superficial observers to denounce the use of machinery as causing privation and distress; and to say, against every principle of human reason, "that the creation of wealth produces poverty, that abundance is the very cause of famine." That such incongruities, however paradoxical it may appear, are sometimes found to exist, as in the present state of the Irish community, is true; and that sudden *transitions* in a certain *system* of manufacture, cause a *temporary* suspension in the demand for labour, is equally admissible; for "there is no general good without a partial evil." But, that a universal injury is effected by the expansion of productive power, is a doctrine so inconsistent with every rational principle, that it can never be sustained by the most ingenious reasoning.

Evidences of the increase of the earnings and expenditure of the labouring classes.—That the wages of labour have participated in the general reduction of prices cannot be denied; but we contend, that the reduction has not been equivalent to the fall in the price of commodities. The relative prices paid to the Manchester weavers for piece-work, afford no fair criterion for judging of the price of labour,

because modern improvements have greatly facilitated the process of manufacture ; nor, do we think that the rates noticed in the report of the Parliamentary Committee on labourers' wages, which are decidedly favourable, afford conclusive evidence on the subject.* A more satisfactory solution of the question is to be found in the augmented ability which exists to purchase taxed articles, which do not immediately come under the head of necessaries.

The following table contrasts the increase of consumption of various commodities, with the increase of population.

Commodities.	Consumption in 1814.	Consumption in 1833.	Increase of con- sumption per cent.	Increase of popu- lation.
Tobacco, lbs. . . .	15,000,000	20,000,000	31	24
Sugar, cwts. . . .	1,997,000	3,655,000	83	24
Coffee, lbs. . . .	6,324,000	22,952,000	183	24
Tea, lbs. . . .	19,224,000 in 1820	31,548,000 1830	65	24
Spirits, gallons, Bri- tish and Irish . . }	8,666,000	22,690,000	160	15

These returns are sufficiently conclusive as to the general amelioration in the condition of the community ; but perhaps a more solid proof is to be found in the comparative amount of the total revenue in 1815 and 1833.

The revenue raised by taxes in 1815, the greatest in amount ever collected, was . . }	£ 70,403,000
The amount of the taxes since remitted, to 1832, was }	34,137,000

Leaving the amount of revenue for 1832, had no increase of consumption taken place . }	£ 36,266,000.
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* The ordinary rate of wages paid to the Sheffield mechanics, was reported in evidence before the committee, 1830, to be, for the first class of workmen, 25s. per week ; second ditto, 20s. per week ; third ditto, 16s. per week.

Amount of revenue in 1832, supposing no increase in the productiveness of taxes since 1815.	Actual amount of revenue for the year 1832, ending 5th Jan. 1833.	Increase of revenue per cent.	Increase of population.
£ 36,266,000	£ 51,686,000	43*	22½

Thus illustrating a ratio of increase nearly in a two-fold proportion to the growth of population.

These returns refer to a time, not of great commercial distress and general want of employment, but to a period accounted the heyday of commercial and national prosperity; a period, when Europe viewed with astonishment, the power and grandeur of the British empire, and when our surplus wealth was so abundant, that the armed forces of the greater part of Europe were paid with British gold.†

With these facts before us, can it be longer doubted, that the working classes have participated in the general expansion of income, that the development of human ingenuity has been accompanied with a vast amelioration in their condition; or, that while the rich have grown in wealth, the poor have not been impoverished? Until these propositions are negatived, it must be admitted that the power of maintenance and the condition of the people have, to this time, improved with the growth of population.

* The appreciation of money since 1815 has been fully 60 per cent., consequently, the 51,000,000 of 1833, is equal to 79,000,000 of 1815, which makes the actual increase of property contributed, 100 per cent.

† According to official statements, it appears that in 1814-15, England had one million of fighting men in her pay.

SECTION II.—PROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF THE INCREASE
OF BRITISH POPULATION.

IN the foregoing section we have attempted to prove that our power of maintenance has progressed in an equal, or rather in a superior, degree to the growth of numbers; and to maintain—in contradiction to the opinion of Judge Hale, who, about 170 years since, gravely declared from the bench, that “the more populous we are, the poorer we are”—that population and wealth have to the present day been growing up together.

But we now come to the point which involves the *ne plus ultra*,—the prospective effect of increasing numbers. The public mind is greatly divided on this subject: some viewing our numerical advancement as producing penury and national decadence; while others hail it as a means of progressive alleviation from present burdens, and as an arm of power in our political condition.

Question as to the natural limit of population discussed.—Presuming that there is in the womb of time a period when population will attain its maximum, and when it will be no longer possible to make the earth yield additional food for increasing numbers, population may then be said to have reached its extreme *natural* limit; but the world has yet to learn the extent of that limit:—During the wars of King William and the latter years of the reign of Queen Anne, when the rise in the price of wheat appeared to have acquired permanency, an opinion widely prevailed that tillage had reached its terminus, and the practicability of any considerable addition to our produce was considered an irrational expectation. Yet since that

time our numbers have trebled, and we find in 1833 and 1834 our home produce quite equal to the maintenance of our population. However, while the world is in total ignorance of the utmost extent of the physical qualities of the soil when called into action by the utmost effort of human ingenuity, we may be allowed to use the ordinary calculation, which, in the present state of agriculture, assigns two acres of ground, of average quality, for the subsistence of one person. Hence an isolated nation, deprived of all foreign intercourse, would, if its population increased beyond that proportion, no longer possess the means of subsisting them, and the community would suffer all the consequent miseries:—yet, such a case never has, and we fully believe never will occur.

But supposing Great Britain to be entirely dependent on her own resources, she is far from having attained a limit to her population, even according to the foregoing estimate. The superficial area of Great Britain is about 57,000,000 acres; and by a late survey it appears that there are 34,014,000 acres enclosed or under cultivation; supporting a population of about 17,000,000.* Of the 23,000,000 of acres still remaining in a state of nature, there are 9,900,000 said to be capable of improvement, being about the area at present in corn cultivation; and we may fairly presume, capable of supplying as much grain as in the pre-

* State of Cultivation in Great Britain and Ireland:

	Cultivated.	Improvable.	Barren.	Total area.
England .	25,632,000	3,454,000	3,256,000	32,342,000
Wales . .	3,117,000	530,000	1,105,000	4,752,000
Scotland .	5,265,000	5,950,000	8,523,930	19,738,930
Ireland .	12,525,280	4,500,000	2,416,664	19,441,944
British Isles	383,690	166,000	569,469	1,119,159
<hr/>				
Acres.	46,922,970	14,600,000	15,871,063	77,394,033

This table is given in the third report of the Emigration Committee. 1829.

sent day is required for the support of our entire population.* Hence should the present ratio of the increase of our numbers continue, the foregoing calculation leads us to consider that the British population would arrive at its *terminus* in about forty-seven years. This reasoning, however, cannot apply in fixing an *actual* terminus to the increase of numbers in such a country as Great Britain,—a country intimately connected in commerce with nations producing a vast excess of food over their ordinary consumption, but deficient in the means and science of manufacture. No war or political convulsion could effectually prevent our obtaining adequate supplies, not only from our colonial possessions, but even from belligerent nations; private interest, and that selfishness which is so general and so *useful* a compound in the innate disposition of the human race, being sufficient to effectually traverse every political attempt to annihilate transmarine commerce where *gain* offers an inducement.† In the year 1801,

* The area of England and Wales is computed at 37,094,000 acres, thus apportioned :

3,250,000	wheat.
1,250,000	barley and rye.
3,200,000	oats, beans, and peas.
1,200,000	clover, rye grass, &c.
1,200,000	roots and cabbages cultivated by the plough.
2,100,000	fallow.
47,000	hop-grounds.
18,000	pleasure-grounds.
17,300,000	depastured by cattle.
1,200,000	hedge-rows, woods, &c.
1,300,000	ways, water-courses, and buildings.
<hr/>	
32,065,000	total cultivated.
5,029,000	commons and waste lands.
<hr/>	
37,094,000	total acres.

† When Louis XIV. had resolved to invade Holland, in the year 1672, le Marquis de Louvois commissioned le Comte de

when England suffered all the sad effects of deficient seasons, and the course of events had involved her in hostilities with all Europe, the import of foreign grain exceeded that of any preceding year in the annals of her history: and if any further proof were necessary of the impossibility of preventing the arrival of imports by sea, even by the most vigilant measures, we could appeal to the modern instance of the futile attempt of the Miguelite government of Portugal to starve the inhabitants of Oporto into subjection. In our inquiry, therefore, touching the natural limit to our numbers, we must investigate the question as to how far the capability exists of augmenting the excess of food in those countries from which we usually receive imports, and which are as dependent on us for supplies of manufactures as we are on them for supplies of food.

If, as we shall endeavour to shew, there exists in Europe a physical power for the production of food, superior to the demands of its inhabitants, and that the stimulus to make this power operative is to be found in the offer of a sufficient value in other commodities, no permanent scarcity of food is likely to occur, while we possess the means of producing a surplus of manufactured commodities equal in value to the foreign supply of food required. These means we always must possess, while

Bentheim to purchase of the Dutch the ammunition, arms, and provisions found in the garrisoned towns of Holland, in order that the meditated conquest might be the more easily effected. By this means the stock of ammunition and provisions was considerably diminished. Prince Maurice, in conversation with a Dutch merchant, expressed his astonishment and indignation at this lack of patriotism on the part of the Dutch traders. "Monsieur," answered the Dutchman, "si on pouvait par mer, faire quelque commerce avantageux avec l'enfer je hasarderais d'y aller brûler mes voiles."—*Anecdote related by Voltaire.*

M. Beaujour, in his sketch of the United States, says, "A Bostonian would go to hell in search of his fortune."

the art of printing, which is the bulwark of every useful science, the national physical attributes, and the opportunity of obtaining an adequate supply of raw materials used in manufacture, are preserved.

Estimate of the quantity of land cultivated in Europe.—In our statistical table (p. 191), the area of Europe, exclusive of sundry European isles, is noted at 3,650,000 square miles, or 2,336,000,000 British statute acres. Now, the natural limit to population we have presumed to be a general density of numbers, equal to 320 persons to the square mile, or one inhabitant to two acres of ground; and the actual density of numbers in Europe in the present year, is computed at sixty-three persons to the square mile, or rather less than one-fifth of the *natural* limit, supposing there may be no future improvement in the method of tilling the ground. But from this calculation we are disposed to make a large deduction in the superficial area of Europe, and to exclude from the productive area such portions of territory as the wild regions of the Dofrafeld and Lapland; the mountainous districts of Switzerland and Italy; the inhospitable regions of the Carpathian and the Balkan mountains, and, of course, the surface covered by lakes and water courses.

We are in some measure left to speculate upon the extent of land thus to be excluded; but if, as an average, we take the proportion which the barren or unprofitable land of Great Britain and Ireland bears to the total superficial area of the kingdom, it will amount to about four-nineteenths, or rather more than one-fifth (see table, page 242). With a similar deduction from the area of Europe, it leaves the superficial extent cultivated, or capable

of being fertilized, at 1,856,000,000 acres; and the population at seventy-nine inhabitants to an improvable square mile; being rather less than one-fourth the *natural* limit, or 320 inhabitants to the like space. To determine what proportion of this area is already under cultivation, is a problem which such statistical documents as have been, to the present time, published, offer no accurate means of solving. However, some specific data have from time to time appeared upon the subject, from which we shall endeavour to form a fair approximate estimate. We have already shewn that in Great Britain, the proportion is one person to two acres of *cultivated* ground. In Ireland, the proportion of cultivated ground is much less, the extent being 12,500,000 acres, and the population 7,800,000; being $1\frac{5}{8}$ acres to each individual; and Ireland annually exports about one-fifth of her total agricultural produce.* France, exclusive of wood lands, has a fertile area of about 34,000,000 of hectares (see page 53), equal to nearly 79,000,000 British statute acres; supporting a population of 32,500,000, being at the ratio of about $2\frac{3}{8}$ acres to a person; but this cultivated area includes about 6,000,000 of acres in vineyards, chestnut, olive, and other fruit groves, of the produce of which a large portion is annually exported; indeed France is rather an exporting than an importing country of physical productions. Hermann tells us, that European Russia has $61\frac{1}{2}$ millions of desiatims of land (about 160,000,000 acres), under tillage, and $\frac{7}{2234}$ of the total area

* Imports from Ireland into Great Britain in 1826:—Oxen, 57,395; sheep, 62,819; swine, 73,912; horses, 2,496; bacon and hams, 338,218 cwts.; beef and pork, 143,725 barrels; butter, 641,226 cwts. In 1830:—Wheat, 525,000 quarters; oats and oatmeal, 1,697,509 quarters; corn spirits, 684,000 gallons, &c. The imports are much increased since these years. Of pigs, bacon, butter, poultry, &c. the increase has been immense.

(about 29,000,000 acres), in meadow and grass land; leaving about 862,000,000 acres of unexplored desert land. Little faith can, however, be placed in any specific statistical accounts emanating from the faithless government of Russia; and, although there is no doubt that M. Hermann has official authority for his statement, we very much question its accuracy, or even approach to accuracy. In the countries situated on the coast of the Euxine, between the Pruth and the Kuban, including the Crimea, agriculture has made a rapid progress; and in the north,—the irrigated districts of Finland, and the countries washed by the Baltic, between Memel and St. Petersburg,—considerable improvement is evident. However, her exports of the raw produce of the land are immense. In tallow alone they amount annually to 2,500,000 cwts.; and in corn, hemp, flax, hides, &c., her exports amount to half her home consumption. From the defective state of Russian agriculture, and the little labour bestowed on that portion of the Russian lands which, although figuring in the expanse of the cultivated area, yet are scarcely reclaimed from natural unproductiveness, a great deduction from the estimate of M. Hermann is warranted, but we shall not underrate the extent of the actual cultivated area of Russia, and call it 190,000,000 of acres, being at the ratio of about four acres to every inhabitant. In estimating the total cultivated area of Europe, we shall take the averages of the foregoing calculations. Thus:—

Great Britain	2	cultivated acres to each inhabitant.
Ireland	$1\frac{5}{8}$	ditto
France	$2\frac{3}{8}$	ditto
Russia	4	ditto

$$10 \div 4 = 2\frac{1}{2} \text{ average.}$$

It is an admitted principle, that upon the ge-

neral average, supply and demand are precisely equal ; hence it is fair to presume, that just so much land is cultivated as is required to *supply* the consumption : for were a larger area brought under tillage, and an excess of food produced, agriculture would of course experience those severe checks which were so forcibly portrayed in England in 1821, 1822, and 1823 ; and the loss to the cultivators would give another direction to the investment of capital. Upon this self-evident proposition, we may hazard an estimate of the present extent of the *fertile* area of Europe, calculated upon the present population, and the average measure of land cultivated, namely, $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres to each inhabitant. Thus :—

Population.	Acres.	Total extent cultivated in British Statute Acres.
230,000,000	+ $2\frac{1}{2}$	= 575,000,000

This extent of cultivated area, deducted from that portion of the superficies of Europe adapted for cultivation, but at present uncultivated, leaves the vast unimproved space of 1,281,000,000 British statute acres in Europe *alone*, inviting the labour of man to produce food equal to the abundant support of 512,000,000 of people ; a number approaching to three-fold the population she has attained since the days of Noah.

Probability of supplies of food from Continental Europe.—Such, we presume, to be the capacity of *Europe* to provide for increasing numbers, and whether the increase be in Britain, France, Holland, or any other particular nation, supply must always flow, whither it is most demanded. But the especial difficulty exists, not in the power of production, but in the defective means of transporting the produce to shipping ports ; a difficulty which, in such inland positions as Poland, Hungary, the Austro-Germanic provinces, and other

parts of Europe, materially tends to retard the progress of agriculture.*

It is necessary, therefore, in the present age, to limit the prospect of supply to those countries, whose opportunity of commerce is enlarged by the aptitude of their geographical position, and the means of inland navigation; in fact, to what is usually termed, the corn-exporting district of Europe, which lies between the 48th and 56th degrees of north latitude, and includes the north of France, the German and Danish states, the Prussian dominions, a portion of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and other Russian provinces on the shores of the Baltic. These countries possess a soil and climate especially suitable to the production of bread corn; and the advantage of cheap communication with the sea, by means of the Rhine, the Meuse, the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, the Dwina, and the Neva, many of which are connected by canals. In density of population, this tract of country is little more than one-third that of Great Britain and Ireland; therefore, no inadequacy of production to meet the demand, arising from deficiency of territorial space, can reasonably be anticipated for centuries to come; and in proportion as the demands of additional consumers offer a sufficient inducement to extend tillage, so will labour and capital be directed to augment supplies; and this inducement

* Mr. Jacob, in his reports, says, "that in some parts of Germany the expense of transporting a quarter of corn to a shipping port is equal to 50 per cent. of its value on arrival." And we have heard it stated, on the authority of a native of Spain, that, in plentiful seasons, fine crops of wheat have been known to be left to rot on the ground in Castile and Arragon; the price, although rating about 30s. per quarter (British) at the shipping ports, being too low in the interior to indemnify the proprietors for the expense of harvesting the grain. The cost of transporting produce 200 miles to the shipping ports on the backs of mules, or in wagons rolling over a trackless country intersected by mountains, can be easily conceived.

must expand in proportion to the general depreciation in the price of manufactures, reckoned against agricultural produce.

But an objection to the policy of relying on these countries for supplies is founded on the frequently illustrated fact, that an unfavourable season in this country is usually concurrent with a deficient harvest in those states situated in the same climate as Great Britain; and, consequently, that the power of supply is sensibly diminished at the very time when it is most needed. The fact is undeniable; and did no extended means of purchasing foreign food exist, England might experience the recurrence of such direful famine as afflicted her during the latter five years of the sixteenth century. But this probability, which indeed might occur with a boundless uncultivated area, is, in the present day, materially diminished:—improvements in navigation, and the extension of commercial intercourse, enabling us more readily to bring supplies from distant states.

It is generally found, that when seasons prove deficient in one climate they are abundant in another, indeed the rationality of this proposition may be metaphysically demonstrated. The seasons of 1799, 1800, and 1816, extremely deficient in the north of Europe, proved abundant in Spain, Italy, Sicily, and the shores of the Levant and the Euxine. At the present day, agriculture progresses rapidly in the marine districts, between the Dniester and the Don, and the expansion of capital and science must tend to enlarge the means of commercial intercourse with those countries.

Probability of supplies from the colonies.—But our views of increasing supplies are not necessarily

limited to Europe ;—the British colonies in America offer an unlimited area for the extension of agriculture.—Digressing somewhat, let us look to the power and present state of our colonies. Banister “on Emigration,” estimates the cultivated and uncultivated areas of British America to be 145,000,000 of acres. The progress of the Canadas in population, capital, internal improvement and political importance, has surpassed the most sanguine expectations. In the year 1714, the whole population of the Canadas was only 27,000 souls; and in 1783, twenty-four years after the English had conquered them, it amounted to no more than 113,000;* at the present time it exceeds a million, chiefly able bodied males. The “Quebec Act,” passed in 1774, significantly called the “Blunder Act,” was revoked in 1790, by the Act called “Constitutional,” which founded the prosperity of these colonies, and their improvement has continued uninterrupted ever since. In Canada alone, according to the last demi-official statement, 27,000,000 of acres are occupied by, or have been granted to, private proprietors;† besides upwards of 25,000,000 granted to the companies, and as much more apportioned to the crown and the clergy.‡ In New Brunswick the

* Chartrain’s Memoirs.

† See Banister on Emigration.

‡ The plan adopted by the government in distributing the colonial lands is attended with the greatest inconvenience to the settlers, and baneful effects to the advancement of the colonies. The lands are parcelled out in regular figures, such as parallelograms, or squares, and subdivided into portions, of which the government reserve two, one for the crown, and another for the clergy; these portions remain unoccupied and uncultivated, and the settlers who cultivate the contiguous lands are, as it were, shut in, without roads or any ready means of transporting the produce of their farms. Surely the government ought to adopt means for remedying so injurious a result. It is but fair that the crown and the clergy should contribute their proportion of expense in opening the lands.

cultivated area is very great; and in Nova Scotia it already exceeds 160,000 acres. Since 1811, the extent of new lands brought into cultivation has trebled. The monopoly of the British timber trade, granted to these colonies by the Act of 1810, has trebled their commerce; and the shipping engaged in this trade surpasses 430,000 tons, employing 21,000 seamen. An immense capital has been sunk in the internal improvement of the country, especially in promoting the interior navigation, in connecting the immense lakes or inland seas of Erie and Ontario, and in opening a water communication between Montreal and Kingston, by the Rideau and Ottawa rivers. Up to the 31st of December, 1829, 349,262*l.* were already expended, and the total estimated expense was 576,757*l.** Sir Henry Parnell estimates the capital already invested in these colonies at between 50,000,000*l.* and 60,000,000*l.*; and Pebrer calls the value of property annually created, 17,620,629*l.* The tide of emigration to these countries in labour, talent, and capital, hurries on with surprising rapidity. The number of settlers who arrived at Quebec, from the commencement of the year 1832 to the 15th of October, was 49,281; the number of vessels 915, measuring 273,813 tons; while, in the same year, 300,000 sovereigns were deposited in the Canadian banks, chiefly by emigrants.† With such a power of production, growing up with astonishing rapidity in this part of the British empire—a power of supply certainly increasing upon an equal ratio with the extending demand of consumers,—where—while our marine superiority is upheld,—shall we fix a limit to the means of Britain to support an augmenting population?

But we may rationally extend the view. The climate of southern Africa is perhaps the most

* Ord. Office, 26th March, 1830. (Byham).

† Letter to Mr. Pebrer, from a friend in Canada.

genial to production of any in the known globe, and the small supplies of wheat to this country from the Cape of Good Hope have been peculiarly excellent. The productive power of this part of the British empire is rapidly extending. "The motley population, composed of the most heterogeneous elements, French emigrants and Hottentots, English and Caffraes, Dutch and Negroes, Portuguese descendants and savage Boshmen,"* has doubled itself since 1811, and at present numbers 160,000 souls. To the present time the cultivation of the vine has formed the chief object of the British settlers, but the discouragement which the government seem inclined to impose on the importation of Cape wine into the British ports will probably induce the Cape settlers to give another direction to their labour and capital. The uncultivated area of the colony is boundless, the means of transport cheap and expeditious.

Australia is perhaps at too great a distance to supply Great Britain with grain on easy terms, and the climate appears better adapted to the growth of fine wool, cotton, sugar, indigo, and other productions common to the warm countries of the east; but if Australia progresses in the production of wool, increasing supplies of that commodity may powerfully tend to stimulate corn cultivation in Europe.† The Saxon, Silesian,

* Barrow on the Distribution of Population.

† It has been questioned, whether corn, shipped to England from the eastern coast of New Holland, would retain its quality during so long a voyage. The American plan of shipping flour in preference to wheat, would diminish the risk and the expense of transport, could the means of insuring its good quality on arrival be clearly established. We remember, that some time subsequent to the termination of the late rupture with the United States of America, a proposal was made to the British admiralty to adopt the American plan of packing gunpowder in metal (copper) *air-tight barrels*, in lieu of wooden barrels, then ordinarily used. The reason assigned for this recommendation was, "that while the quality of the British gunpowder was so

and Hungarian farmers experiencing the effects of the successful competition of Australia, might direct their capital and labour to the production of grain.

We need not further speculate upon the power of Great Britain to subsist her inhabitants, her colonies possess all the elements of unlimited production. They are the limbs of that gigantic body, "the British empire," which receive their strength and vigour from the *mighty heart*; while by a strong and reciprocal motion, they increase its vitality, action, and power. From the various parts of her boundless empire;—from the banks of the Plata, the Jumna, or the Ganges; *—from the valleys of the Cordilleras, or the shores of the Americas,—supplies will progressively increase with the expansion of demand. Peace, a powerful marine, and the free navigation of the ocean, are sufficient securities against starvation.

Our readers will be enabled to estimate the power and importance of our colonies, by a perusal of the annexed tables.

Our next object is to disprove the theory, that population has a *universal* tendency to double itself every generation.

deteriorated after a voyage as to make it necessary to change it, the American powder being packed in air-tight barrels always retained its pristine excellence, an advantage which gave the Americans great superiority in action with British ships. The proposal was adopted by the admiralty, and the principle has proved completely successful." Does not the same principle apply to the preservation of the quality of flour, or indeed any other commodity? We doubt not, but that if flour were packed in large metal cisterns (not copper) made air tight and well filled, it would preserve its original quality during the longest voyage.

* A quantity equal to two cargoes of wheat and flour, or 9853 quarters of wheat, was imported into Liverpool last year from Calcutta.

General view of the British possessions in North America; shewing the population, lands cultivated and uncultivated, value of productions raised, imports and exports, value of fisheries, and total value of each possession; to which is added, in the following page, a general summary of the power, capital, and commerce of all the British colonies. Deduced from the most recent official documents.

POWER, CAPITAL, AND COMMERCE.

	Population, the latest census 1829.	Lands.		Estimated value of productions raised annually. £.	Imports into the United Kingdom. £.	Exports from the United Kingdom. £.	Estimated value of the fisheries. £.	Tonnage.		Aggregate value of each colony. £.
		Cultivated. Acres.	Uncultivated. Acres.					Inwards. Tons.	Outwards. Tons.	
Canada, Lower and Upper	612,188	8,066,666	100,000,000	9,737,102	569,451	1,117,421	—	227,909	221,694	32,617,811
New Brunswick	72,932	800,000	20,000,000	2,551,982	213,842	274,922	1,000,000	—	—	6,476,663
Nova Scotia	142,548	1,333,333	12,000,000	3,476,440	61,701	297,966	50,000	155,249	133,469	13,337,332
Cape Breton	23,473	40,000	2,000,000	92,402	243,628	373,817	500,000	30,146	31,738	641,331
Prince Edward's Island .	60,088	66,666	1,200,000	288,578	52,666	53,300	—	17,820	31,246	1,196,664
Newfoundland	—	13,333	—	1,420,792	—	—	—	—	—	7,630,665
Hudson's Bay	—	immense.	immense.	53,333	—	—	—	—	—	200,000
Total	911,229	10,309,998	135,200,000	17,620,629*	1,141,288	2,118,459	7,550,000	431,124	418,147	62,100,466

* Including Fisheries.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE POWER, CAPITAL, AND COMMERCE, OF ALL THE BRITISH COLONIES.

Colonies.	Population.	Lands.		Estimated value of property annually raised.	Imports into the United Kingdom.	Exports from the United Kingdom.	Tonnage.		Military force, including the king's troops in the colonies.	Estimated value of colonies.
		Cultivated.	Uncultivated.				Inwards.	Outwards.		
British dependencies in Europe . . . }	247,701	Acres. 208,100	Acres. 39,600	£. 2,146,998	£. 1,622,974	£. 55,319	Tons. 37,728	Tons. 52,231		27,115,094
Dependencies in North America . . . }	911,229	10,309,998	135,200,000	17,620,629	1,141,288	2,118,459	431,124	418,147		62,100,466
West Indies . . . }	733,617	2,476,095	3,926,698	22,496,672	9,087,914	5,521,169	263,333	252,992	282,700	131,052,424
British dependencies in Indian Ocean . . . }	1,034,736	580,000	1,652,080	4,291,332	654,666	372,026	14,133	9,439		27,509,781
Africa	154,046	274,240	—	1,067,065	496,683	895,206	37,981	39,614		6,444,398
Australia	80,500	300,000	immense.	520,000	33,191	96,123	8,979	28,719		2,685,000
East Indies	89,577,206	134,200,000	—	313,200,000	6,218,284	4,100,264	—	—		1,611,077,354
		148,348,433		361,352,656	19,255,000	13,158,566			282,700	1,867,984,517

Uncertainty in the ratio in the increase of population.—If the thesis of Mr. Malthus, “that population has a tendency to increase in a geometrical proportion,” be true, then, whatever may be the physical fecundity of the earth, a *terminus* to the increase of the numbers of the human race is rapidly approaching; for the present population of the earth, (say 800,000,000), being doubled every succeeding generation, or twenty-five years, would, in a century from the present date, amount to 12,800,000,000 souls; which, taking the territorial superficies of the known globe at the usual calculation of 37,000,000 of square miles, would give a density of numbers equal to 346 persons to the square mile, or greater than what is termed the natural limit. Such a calculation, however, carries with it the proof of its own fallacy, there being no instance on record of the continuation of such a ratio of increase during many successive generations. Even the reference of Mr. Malthus to the increase of numbers in the United States of America—a nation increasing, not from the excess of births over deaths, but from a vast and continued influx of people, in the flower of their age, from every civilised country of Europe, bringing with them the capital and improvements of European nations, does not furnish an illustration of his thesis. In 1770, the population of the United States was 3,921,000; and if the ratio of increase had been geometrical every twenty-five years, it would have become in 1820, 15,684,000, while the actual population in that year was reported by congress to be only 9,637,000; nor is there any probability that it will become 19,274,000 in the year 1845. (See note, p. 103).

Indeed, the tenets of those who concur in the opinion that population, actually increasing from the excess of births over deaths, has a reduplicative

tendency during a period of twenty-five years, appear, on examination, so ill grounded, that it is difficult to conceive how they can be maintained in public estimation. To shew the impossibility of population increasing according to the full operation of such a tendency, it is only necessary to apply the calculation from the postdiluvian age. According to the improved chronology of our English Bibles, the deluge was in the 1556th year from the creation,* and 2448 years before Christ; hence the present is the 4282d year from the flood. We are told in holy writ, that the entire population of the world, at the instant on which the ark landed on the summit of Mount Ararat, consisted of our common ancestor Noah, and his family, in all eight persons. Now, presuming that in this primeval age, when the springs of life were reinvigorated by the especial mandate of God to Noah and his sons—"Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," the human race increased in a ratio equivalent to a reduplication of numbers every twenty-five years, thus

The exponents or generations	1	2	3	4	5
The terms or population	8	16	32	64	168 &c.;

the population would have attained to the present number of the inhabitants of the earth (800,000,000) in $24\frac{1}{2}$ generations, or 612 years.

But if this ratio of increase was continued to the present time; or to the 171st generation, the inhabitants of the earth would be so numerous, that no words in the English language could describe even the average number to the square foot of ground.† It is indeed impossible to define the ratio of the tendency of the human race to augment their spe-

* Josephus reckons the period before the flood to be 2256 years.

† The reduplication of 8 to the 171st term, gives 49,974, and 46 other numerators, and the average number of inhabitants to the square foot of ground, would be 77, and 29 numerators.

cies ; the numerous checks to the expansion of numbers, independent of the limitation of territorial space, rendering the operation of that tendency various and uncertain.

The foregoing position illustrated by reference to ancient records.—Even with such records as ancient history furnishes, it would not be difficult to prove the very irregular progress of population ; and we think it might be shewn, with reasonable probability, that in the remote ages of Cyrus, Cambyses, Artaxerxes, and successive Persian monarchs, the population of the then known globe was not greatly inferior to its estimate in the present day. Let us examine the first point on the basis of the earliest recorded facts.

The earliest data by which we can calculate the increase of the human race, we find in the first chapter of the second book of Moses, where the number of Israelites that came down into Egypt from the land of Canaan is recorded to have amounted to *seventy persons*. The date of this immigration was B.C. 1706. Now it appears, that in the year B.C. 1490,* when the Jewish kingdom was established under a theocracy of which Moses was the divinely commissioned agent, a registration of the Israelitish families was made, by which it seems that the total number of “fighting men,” that is to say, men above twenty years of age, capable of bearing arms, was 603,550, exclusive of the tribe of Levi;† and calculating that this able-bodied male population did not exceed one-fourth part of the total number of the Jews, it may be fairly presumed that the total number of the Israelites was not less than 2,400,000 souls. Thus during the space of 215 years, which elapsed from the

* This was the second year after they came out of Egypt.

† The number of all *males* of the tribe of Levi, from a month old and upwards was 8600. (Numbers i. ; iii. 28).

descent of Israel with his family to the departure of the people under Moses, a period of great affliction to the Jewish people, they multiplied from 70 to 2,400,000 souls, or at the ratio of 340 per cent. every twenty-five years; an increase so great, that were not the facts recorded in the book of truth, human reason would doubt their veracity. We cannot suppose that this enumeration included a mixed multitude of Egyptians, who had accompanied the Jews and Canaanites who had joined them in the wilderness, as it is expressly said "that the Israelites were numbered by the generations after their families;" thus shewing their genealogical descent from Israel. The reduplication of numbers, however, from this date was far less rapid; and notwithstanding the accession of territory gained on the eastern banks of the Jordan and the valleys of Lebanon, under Joshua, and the extension of the kingdom in succeeding reigns, the total number of the people in the reign of David, B.C. 1017, a period of 473 years from the Exodus, scarcely doubled the number registered under Moses. The record of this second enumeration is found in the second book of Samuel, chap. xxiv.; where it says, "There were in Israel 800,000 valiant men, and the men of Judah were 500,000." This it seems did not include the number of troops in the king's service, which was 288,000, besides a body-guard of 12,000 men attendant on the princes of the ten tribes, carrying the total Jewish army to 300,000 men,* and the number of the able-bodied population above twenty years of age, to 1,600,000; there was, however, at this time an army of observation, numbering 30,000 men, on the frontiers of the Philistines' country,† which were included in the number of 500,000 men of the people of Judah, reducing the total to 1,570,000. Now, calculating the able-bodied

* 1 Chronicles xxvii.

† 2 Samuel, chap. v. vi.

males at one-fourth of the population, the grand total becomes 6,280,000 souls. It hence appears that during the 215 years which elapsed from the descent of Israel into Egypt, to the Exodus, they increased at the compound ratio of 340 per cent. every twenty-five years; and that from the planting of the Jewish nation in Canaan to the thirty-seventh year of the reign of king David, a period of 473 years, the increasing ratio was only *six* per cent. every twenty-five-years. This diminution in the ratio may perhaps be accounted for as the effect of the sanguinary wars in which they were engaged through a long period of their history. Indeed it is difficult to conceive how their immense armies were maintained, when we find that those in military service numbered a fifth of the total able-bodied male population; a proportion which the resources of no modern state could support, and which, if attempted, would cause that deep and widely spread poverty which could not, according to human reasoning, fail to impair the resources and diminish the population of the state; indeed, from the general tenor of the history of the Jews, from this date, it seems probable that the nation continued to decline until the period of the Jewish captivity by the Assyrian and Babylonian princes, B.C. 606 to 530.

Thus, it appears that there is no especial physical tendency in people, even when possessed of the finest and most favoured portion of the known globe, "a land flowing with milk and honey," to increase in a certain regulated ratio; and further, that where the people are diverted from the useful occupations of life to the destructive profession of arms, poverty, the natural consequence, checks the progress of the increase of numbers.

Modern instances are not wanting, to prove the depopulating effect of the mal administration of national resources. Spain, Portugal, and the

dominions of the Mahmoud countries, possessing vast tracts of territory in primeval sterility, are all slowly tending to depopulation. Now to the second point.

Probable amount of the population of the Old Continent before the Christian era, and its subsequent small increase.—If authentic documents could be obtained of the comparative population of the globe, at various periods of history, it is not improbable they would prove, that the human race, so far from increasing their numbers in a progressive geometrical ratio, have added but very few to their numerical sum during the last 2000 years. The only means furnished by the ancient historians of computing the probable population of the nations of antiquity, are the accounts given of the armed forces they were enabled to bring into the field, which, on some occasions, far surpassed the most numerous armies of modern times. Herodotus, to whom we are chiefly indebted for information on the polity and history of the ancient world, says, that “Darius, whose empire extended from the Peloponnesus in the west to the banks of the Hydaspes in the east, and from Sarmacand in the north to Syene on the confines of Ethiopia in the south,” headed 700,000 men in his expedition against the Scythians (B.C. 514); while his fleet, which numbered 600 ships or vessels of war, was manned by 180,000 mariners.

The eastern expedition against Greece (B.C. 490), which ended with the total defeat of the Persians by Miltiades on the plains of Marathon, was composed of an army of 500,000 men, and between 500 and 600 ships.* But the most numerous army which history, either ancient or modern, records, is that which Xerxes collected for the subjugation of Greece, or rather of all

* Plut. in Moral. p. 829.

Europe (B.C. 481): Herodotus, whose account of this colossal force is confirmed by Plutarch and Socrates, says, "Xerxes crossed the Hellespont, and arrived at Doriscus, a city standing at the mouth of Hebrus, in Thrace, with 1,700,000 Asiatic infantry, 80,000 horse, and 20,000 men attached to the equipage of the army, carrying the total number of Asiatics to 1,800,000; the nations which submitted to him on the Thracian side of the Hellespont, added 300,000 men to his army, which made the total number of his land forces 2,100,000 men. His fleet, when it left the Asiatic shores, consisted of 1207 ships, to which the Europeans added 120 vessels, the total being manned by 301,610 mariners: besides this fleet he had 3000 small galleys, transports and victualling ships, which were manned with about 240,000 men; so that when Xerxes arrived at Thermopylæ, his land and sea forces numbered 2,641,600 men, exclusive of the accompanying *crowd*, which usually attended the eastern armies, consisting of servants, eunuchs, women, sutlers, &c., the number of which it is computed was equal to that of the forces." So that the whole number of those who followed Xerxes into Greece was 5,283,220; being, without question, the most numerous body of people ever assembled under one chief. Now, if we calculate that the actual force which Xerxes *brought out of Asia* (2,318,000 men*), was in the proportion of one to fifty of the population, a proportion which, even in modern times, has never been equalled in Europe. The total number of the inhabitants of the Persian empire was 111,500,000, being at least three-fold the population of the

* Land forces - - - - -	1,800,000
1207 ships, 230 men each -	277,610
3000 transports, 80 each -	240,000

2,317,610

This excludes the European troops and mariners.

states situated between the Bosphorus and the Hydaspes at the present day.

Of the numerous population of the other parts of Asia we may form some idea, from the immense armies which Alexander encountered in his invasion of India. Without enumerating the forces which opposed him in Massaga, and other provinces on the west of the Indus, we may remark, that king Porus, whose dominions were situated between that river and the Hyphasis, stretching eastward across the present Punjaub, opposed Alexander's passage across the Indus, with a detachment of 30,000 foot, 4000 horse, and 300 chariots. Quintus Curtius, who minutely details the history of the Macedonian expedition to India, further says, "that while Alexander was meditating about passing the Hyphasis, he was told, that further in the country lived the Gangaridæ and Prasii, whose king was preparing to oppose his entry into his dominions, at the head of 200,000 foot and 80,000 horse, reinforced by 8000 chariots and 6000 elephants." We have no exact information of the limits of the dominions of the kings of the Gangaridæ and the Prasii; but this *terra incognita*, which may be named the country watered by the Ganges and the Jumna, was evidently capable of sending a greater number of men into the field than the whole of British India at the present day.* We need not further enumerate the immense forces of the Malli, the Catheri, and the Oxydracæ, which opposed the retreat of the forces of the ambitious Macedonian. Enough has been said to establish a fair presumption, that so much of Asia as was known to the ancients was then infinitely more populous than the same tract of country at the present day.

Ancient European literature is silent as to the numerical condition of the Chinese; and from the

* The Anglo-Indian native army numbers 187,000 men.

conflicting and contradictory accounts of the present population of China, it is difficult to find proper data for estimating the comparative density of numbers in that portion of the eastern world. Klaproth, in 1827, in his appendix to the travels of the Russian mission, states, on the authority of an official document, the population of China Proper, of Liao Toungh, including the countries subject to the emperor, and the army (numbering 913,500 men), to be 155,249,897 : later authorities have added very considerably to this number ; and the celebrated Dr. Morrison, than whom no British subject is better acquainted with the Celestial empire, *quotes* a Chinese work, the “ *Ta-tsing*,” published by authority in 1825, in which the number of the inhabitants of fourteen provinces present an aggregate amounting to 352,866,012 souls ; a number so *startling* as to be almost incredible. *Three hundred and fifty millions of human beings!* more than one-third the whole family of man, separated almost entirely from the rest of mankind, obeying *one head* and *one* system of laws, cherishing the same national feelings, using the same written language, and that language symbolic, and shewing no signs of improvement in the rudiments of the arts and sciences, is a phenomenon so wonderful, and apparently so contrary to divine revelation, as to make the most credulous pause ere he places reliance on the estimate ; he can but look at it as a *mendacious exaggeration*.* We give, as a curious document, the following account of the progression of population in China :

* In Mr. Montgomery Martin’s work, vol. i. page 447, we find a curious document relative to the statistics of China, taken, we presume, from Dr. Morrison’s work ; from want of space, we can only give some of the totals, as under :—Extent of China Proper in square miles, 1,225,823 ; population, 352,866,012 ; fixed revenue, 11,513,281*l.* ; military force, 1,139,000 ; persons to square mile, 288.

Chinese enumerations from the year 1393.

Years.	Population.	Authorities.
1313	60,545,811	Kang-Keen-e-che.
1743	157,301,755	Amiot—Pekin documents.
1762	198,214,553	Grossier—ditto.
1792	307,467,200	Anglo-Chinese College Report.
1813	361,693,879*	Chinese official documents.

It being well authenticated that the Chinese, whose laws give an uncontrolled power to every head of a family over the persons of his offspring, use the most violent checks to the increase of numbers, not by the non-intercourse system of Malthus, but by the practical science of guarding against domestic wants by emigration,† and the

* This census, taken in the eighteenth year of Keating, includes the population of Tartary, the dependent provinces, and colonies.

† Extract from a document prepared by John Crawford, Esq., late resident at Singapore, and read before the East India Committee :

“The emigrations of the Chinese take place from the same provinces which conduct the foreign trade, viz. Canton, Fokien, Chekien, and Kianan : emigrations from the two latter, however, are not frequent, and seem to be confined to Tonquin and the Philippine Islands. In some countries the emigrants are excluded from political motives ; and in others, distance or want of room affords them no encouragement to settle. Like the European nations, they are excluded altogether from settling in Japan on political grounds ; the government of Cochin China also affords them no encouragement from the same reason ; and the Dutch and Spanish governments of Java and the Philippines have always looked on them with a considerable share of suspicion. Distance, and above all, the existence of a dense and comparatively industrious population, excludes them from the British dominions in Hindostan, where we find only a few shoemakers and other artisans, and these confined to the towns of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. The emigrants, I think, are invariably of the labouring classes ; their whole equipment for the voyage in ordinary cases consists of little else than the coats on their backs, a bundle of old clothes, and a dirty mat and pillow to sleep on.

The Chinese are not only intellectual, but physically superior to the nations and tribes among whom they settle. A Chinese is at least two inches taller than a Siamese, and by three inches taller than a Cochin Chinese, a Malay, or a Javanese, and his frame is proportionably strong and well built. Their superiority in personal skill, dexterity, and ingenuity, is still greater. The different classes of Chinese settlers not only live apart and keep

“prudent exercise of infanticide,” this document, alleging an increase of 160,000,000 of people in one empire during half a century, is so astounding, that we feel some difficulty in reconciling it, or in offering a fair approximate estimate of her present population. An appeal to our most correct authorities will furnish no assistance ; let us therefore take the medium of the estimates furnished by Klaproth and Morrison, and fix the population of China, including its dependencies and Tartary, at 260,000,000 of souls. This part of the world may be called the “terra incognita” of the ancients; and history furnishes but slender means of comparing its present with its ancient power. Sinæ, which is now the country of the Cochin Chinese is the extreme eastern limit known by the Grecian and Roman historians, and is rarely mentioned by them. China has never menaced the independence of other nations, and has never, like the four great empires, figured as a conquering belligerent, or aspired to universal dominion ; it offers no resemblance to the predicted fifth monarchy. Marco Polo, in the 13th century ; was the first who made Europeans acquainted with this immense country, and from

distinct from the settlers of other nations, but also from each other. There is a wide difference between the character, habits, and manners of the Chinese settlers, according to the parts of China from which they proceed. The natives of Fokien have a higher tone of character than any of the rest. Among the emigrants from the province of Canton there are three classes, viz. those of the town of Canton and its neighbourhood, the natives of Macao and other islands in the river, and the natives of some mountainous districts of the same province. The Chinese of Macao and other islands are held in very little repute among the rest of their countrymen ; but the third class, who are numerous, are the lowest in rank. Their most frequent employment is that of fishermen and mariners ; and it is from among their ranks that European shipping, when in want, have occasionally received hands to assist in their navigation ;—of all the Chinese these are the most noisy and unruly.

the information collected by the researches of modern authorities, it seems that since the foundation of the *Tsin* dynasty (B.C. 220), a vast population has migrated from the north and west to the south and east parts of the empire. The Chinese annals, and the elaborate researches of the elder Deo Guiges, prove that a great Tartar irruption took place about this time; and it seems fair to presume, that the Scythian tribes of the Asii, Pasiani, Tochari, and Sacarauli, whose numbers are described as *overwhelming*,* and who inhabited a vast tract of country north west of China, at the present day almost depopulated, were then, in point of numbers, equal to any probable increase of inhabitants in the Chinese empire since that remote period. In estimating the comparative population of eastern Asia, much must necessarily be left to conjecture; and the writings of the Jesuits, the researches of Dr. Morrison, Deo Guiges, Du Halde, and the eccentric Klaproth, furnish the best materials for the study of those who feel interested on the subject.

In computing the population of Africa in the Carthaginian ages, we shall find equal evidence of the existence of densely peopled countries. Herodotus says, that Egypt, in the days of Amasis, B. C. 569, counted within her territories, 20,000 inhabited cities, and “an *incredible number of inhabitants*.” Thebes vied with the noblest cities in the universe: its magnificence and its hundred gates, are justly celebrated by Homer;† and history records, “that it could send out at once, 200 chariots, and 10,000 fighting men at each of its gates.”‡ If such is the fact, the total number of the inhabitants of this city must have exceeded *three millions*. Memphis, with its stately temples, Syene, Lycopolis, and other ancient Egyptian

* History of the Huns and Turks, by the elder Deo Guiges.

† Book ii., ver. 1, 381.

‡ Rollin, book i., c. 1.

cities, are also justly celebrated for their vast extent, and the immensity of their riches and population.

“400,000 soldiers were kept in continual pay, all “*natives of Egypt*,” and trained up in the most exact discipline.”* From the extravagant rate of expense at which this armed force was supported, it is fair to presume that it did not bear an excessive proportion to the total number of inhabitants, which proportion, calculated as 1 to 100, makes the total population of Egypt at that era, 40,000,000 of souls.†

The Carthagenians under Hamilear, B.C. 481, maintained a land force of 300,000 men, besides an *immense fleet*;‡ but as these were chiefly mercenaries, drafted from Spain, Gaul, and Italy, they furnish no correct notion of the population of the Carthagenian territories. Hannibal, in his expedition against Italy, commanded about 100,000 men,§ and fought the famous battle of Cannæ with about 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. Strabo, in his Geography, says, that the Carthagenians possessed 300 cities in Africa before the commencement of the third Punic war; and Dr. Shaw states, that their dominions extended, from east to west, about 1636 British miles. The distance towards the south cannot be determined; but it is supposed that the whole extent, from the desarts of Sahara to the Mediterranean, varying from 50 to 200 miles, was under the dominion of the Carthagenian republic. Without further research into the statistical

* Herodotus, i., c. 11, p. 164—168.

† No country in Europe, at the present day, supports an army numbering more than a centime of its population. “Every Egyptian soldier was allowed twelve auroræ per diem, a piece of land, being nearly an English acre of ground, exempt from all tax or tribute, and a daily allowance of five pounds of bread and two pounds of meat. The guards, about two thousand in number, each received, in addition to this allowance, a quart of wine.”—(Herodotus).

‡ Diod. i. xi.

§ Livy, book i.

annals of other African nations, sufficient evidence is already adduced to shew, that the Egyptian and Carthagenian states, alone contained, at this era, more than the entire population of Africa at the present day, which Malte-Brun estimates at 70,000,000 souls.

Now looking to the immense resources of all the oriental and African nations mentioned by ancient historians, compared with their feeble and degenerate character at the present day, we find nothing to warrant an opinion that they have increased in population. The present wonder-telling returns of the number of the Chinese, although offering evidence that some increase of population has taken place in that empire during the last 500 years, by no means proving that the Asiatic continent is at the present time more densely peopled than it was before the Christian era.

Europe has probably received some increase of population since this period; but, that the southern and south eastern parts of Europe were by far more densely peopled in the days of Alexander and Paulus Æmilius, than in the present day, there is every fair reason to suppose. It will be remembered, that the European states on the Thracian side of the Bosphorus, added 300,000 men to the army of Xerxes.* The Lacedemonians and Athenians, had about the tenth of this number under arms. When Paulus Æmilius conquered Macedonia, 150,000 men in Epirus were sold for slaves; and if we estimate these at one-fourth of the whole population, as they were probably all those of a military age, the total number of the inhabitants of ancient Epirus, the most barren and mountainous district in Greece, would be 600,000; and esti-

* This is certainly a most extraordinary number. We never read of such Grecian armies employed under their own kings. The Macedonian and Grecian army, which made the Indian expedition, did not number one-third the above. Perhaps the 300,000 men, if they ever had existence, were chiefly drawn from Egypt.

mating the whole population of Greece, north of the Isthmus of Corinth, at three-fifths of *the density* of the Peloponnesus, the total inhabitants of ancient Greece numbered 8,500,000; being equal to the whole population of the total European dominions of Mahmoud, and the states of the new Grecian monarchy at the present day.

That Italy was densely peopled, may be inferred from the immense forces that the Roman republic, in its early days, was enabled to send into the field. Æmilius and Varro, who opposed Hannibal at Cannæ, commanded an army of 80,000 foot, and above 6,000 horse, a force equal in number to the whole of the Italians under arms at the present day. Gelon, who governed Sicily, offered the Lacedemonians (B.C. 481), on certain conditions, an auxiliary force of 20,000 foot, 2,000 light-armed soldiers, and 2,000 horse; besides a fleet of 200 vessels of war; and Diodorus Seculus says, that in the days of Timoleon and Hiero, it contained 5,000,000 of inhabitants, and that Agrigentum and Syracuse each contained 800,000 people. Of the state of the western parts of Europe at this era, history makes little mention; but that Spain was a densely peopled country, although divided into numerous factions, may be inferred from the long and determined resistance it offered, first to the Carthagenians, and subsequently to the Roman arms; and as some confirmation of their resources, we may notice that Polybius says "there were upwards of 40,000 men employed in the gold mines of Nova Carthago. The revenue of Abdal Rahman, third khalif of Andalusia in Spain, a kingdom not exceeding one tenth of the present extent of the Spanish monarchy, exceeded 6,000,000*l.* sterling.*

If our limits permitted, we could offer more ample testimony of the riches and resources of ancient empires, and deduce from the amount of revenue

* See Edition of Rollin, by Mr. Bell, chap. vi. p. 223 (*note*).

they contributed, enlarged evidence of the density of their population; but enough has been said to convince the impartial inquirer, that the inhabitants of the Old Continent have not added very extensively to their numbers since the second century prior to the Christian era.*

The Gallic and British records bearing testimony of the increase of inhabitants in the north west of Europe, we shall admit an expansion of numbers amounting to 100,000,000; an increase which, we firmly believe, would not be warranted, if correct documents furnished the necessary data for determining the fact. Now presuming the population of China to be 260,000,000, we may estimate the present population of the Old Continent at 760,000,000. Hence, during a period of 2000 years, the population of the three grand divisions of the habitable globe has increased from 660 to 760 millions, or about 15 per cent.; and perhaps when another 2000 years may have run its course, the present 760,000,000 may become 860,000,000. Where, then, is evidence of the

* Sir John Malcolm, in his *Sketches of Persia*, states the present revenue of that empire at 3,000,000*l.* sterling, and observes that the revenue under Darius was much the same. The calculation of Herodotus, reduced into French money by Rollin, makes the revenue of Darius equal to 44,000,000 francs; about 1,700,000*l.*; but as the revenues were mostly contributed in corn, horses, camels, forage, and other commodities, and no means exist of determining the value in money of such commodities, little confidence can be placed in the calculation. We are told by Pliny, that Cyrus carried away from Babylon and the Lesser Asia, not less than equal to thirty-four millions sterling. The statue of Belus was valued at three and a half millions sterling, and the whole of the statues and decorations of Babylon alone were valued, as Diodorus affirms, at 21,000,000*l.* sterling. Justin states (book xiii.) that the revenue of Alexander, drawn from his Persian conquests, amounted to 300,000 talents annually, or rather more than 58,000,000*l.* sterling. The difference in these accounts is so vast, and the calculation of Herodotus apparently so inadequate to the maintenance of the immense forces of Persia, that there is fair reason to believe the revenues of ancient Persia very much exceeded Sir John Malcolm's estimate.

tendency of population to increase in a reduplicative ratio every succeeding generation? It is nowhere to be found in nations advanced to a certain degree in density of numbers; and in extending the inquiry to either of the principal divisions of the globe, the theory sinks into a mere chimerical idea.—Let us here pause, to consider the vicissitudes of the social world.

Reflections on the revolutions of society.—The plan of the universe, which fixes the destinies of empires, and the rise, progress, and perfection of the arts and sciences, are curious objects of contemplation. Four times have the distributive families of nations congregated into “mighty aggregates,” and formed the universal monarchies predicted in holy writ. The Assyrian, planted by Nimrod and his hunter tribes, first rose from primeval weakness through a long course of conquest into vast extension and unlimited power, until debased by luxury, effeminacy, and licentiousness, it shook before the rising power of Persia, and fell before the conquering sword of Cyrus: on its ruin was erected the Persian monarchy, which, boundless in extent but defective in social organization, first received its check from the hardy mountaineers of Lacedæmon, and then rapidly sinking beneath the resistless bravery of the Grecian forces, prepared the foundation of the Macedonian monarchy. Social organization had made some progress, and the resources of this mighty empire had begun their development, when the Roman strength, which had been growing through the long course of two centuries, was measured against it; and in turn it yielded to the all-conquering legions of the “Queen of Empires.” Thus the collective might of the human race has manifested itself in the erection of *four great monarchies*, each successively triumphing over an antagonist, barbarous in comparison with

itself, "and each by and through that very superiority in the arts and polity of civilization."* If we confine our view to nations, we see them gradually emerge from a state of barbaric rudeness, and proceed until they acquire a taste for, and practise, all the elegances of civilization. They cultivate the arts and sciences — become renowned in arms, and make extensive conquests; they sink into luxury and effeminacy, become the prey of invaders, and by degrees lose all those noble qualities which once distinguished them above the other nations of the earth. But there is a certain point of depression, as well as of exaltation, from which human affairs naturally return in a contrary direction, and beyond which they seldom pass, either in their decline or advancement. Thus we contemplate the states of ancient Greece rising gradually through successive ages, from a state of ignorance, barbarism, and poverty, to the highest point of intelligence, civilization, and national prosperity; and after extending their conquests over the greater portion of the civilised world, gradually retrograding and, at length, sinking into their pristine ignorance, foreign dependence, and moral degradation; and then, as it were, reappearing in the horizon, reasserting a national existence, and reascending in their orbit to a state of intelligence and political importance. Egypt erst illumined the world with her refulgent rays

* The first empire of the Assyrians, which begun B. C. 2204, and ended at the death of Sardanapalus, who terminated his life by burning himself in his palace (B.C. 767), subsisted more than 1450 years; out of its ruins three others were formed, the Assyrians of Babylon, the Assyrians of Nineveh, and the Medes. After the death of Cyaxares and Cambyses, Cyrus, who succeeded his father and his uncle in their dominions, united the empire of the Medes with that of the Babylonians and Persians, forming the Persian empire (B. C. 536). This empire subsisted 206 years, and ended with the assassination of Darius (B.C. 330). The Macedonian continued dominant until B. C. 146, when Macedonia became a Roman province.

of intellectual splendour, carried her conquests over Ethiopia, Lybia, Armenia, Cappadocia, and Thrace ; in fact, spread her dominion from the Danube to the Ganges ; and after amassing the riches of the universe, and rising to the highest point of mundane prosperity, regressed into effeminacy and weakness, became a prey to foreign domination, and returned to the lowest state of primeval barbarity. After traversing the dark vale of chaotic barbarism during the long period of 2000 years, again she begins to reascend, and to dart forth those beams of light which predict the revival of her political importance. Those who cast their eye on the revolutions of society, will perhaps find that civilization, national prosperity, and *population*, have rather shifted their *ground* than added to their *sum* ; and that the total number of the inhabitants of the globe, and the *sum* of human enjoyments, have remained nearly the same under all changes since a remote age. If they are lost in one part of the world, they are found in another ; and thus has the wise Disposer of events provided that nothing shall be irredeemably lost through man's perversion of nature's gifts. Thus the physical capacity of the earth to provide food for her inhabitants, always existing upon certain immutable principles, nothing but an extensive sphere for international commerce is necessary to make that capacity available. If, by the revolutions of society, a certain spot on the globe increase in population beyond its power of provision, then that faculty with which the Divine Creator has endowed the human race, provides the means of transporting the superabundant produce of other countries to answer the wants of the too densely peopled country, which thus becomes, as it were, the city which is supplied with food by the surrounding district. "*Be fruitful and multiply, replenish the earth and subdue it ;*"

(that is, *cultivate* it), is the divine command ; and while this immutable mandate remains on the theocratic statute book, which it must do as long as the laws which govern the universe operate, or as long as the earth moves in its annual orbit, it is *treason against the Majesty of Heaven*, and a *libel against the beneficent designs of providence*, to predict that the physical fecundity of the earth can ever be inadequate to supply a sufficiency of food for her inhabitants. To attempt, therefore, to calculate the period when the human race will be brought into the world without the *possibility* of obtaining subsistence, can be but the work of the *infidel*. To human reason, guided by the present imperfect state of human knowledge, there is evidently yet an uncultivated area equivalent to the support of ten-fold the present inhabitants of the earth ; and according to the progress of population during the last 2000 years, countless ages must elapse ere the land be fully subdued.

Prospective effect of the substitution of inanimate for animate power.—Yet, however erroneous the opinion of various writers as to the natural *terminus* of population, the British government appear to concur in the didactical theory, that the principal cause of partial poverty in the British community is traceable to a redundancy of inhabitants, and hence that emigration is the panacea which is to cure all the disorders of our social condition. We deny the efficacy of the proposed remedy ; but if deficiency of physical power to support the population of the British Isles were really the cause of poverty, the transcendent faculty of the human mind,

Unbroken as the sacred chain of nature,
That links the jarring elements in peace,

is ready with invention and improvements to increase the capability of support, and devise new

means of subsistence, by the substitution of inanimate for animate power.

Mr. Alexander Gordon, who has illustrated, in a most instructive and useful volume, the national advantages of elemental loco-motion applied to steam-carriages, says, "At present the *animate power* employed in the commercial transportations of this great kingdom, is estimated at about 2,000,000 of horses; each horse consumes as much food as is necessary for the support of eight men; hence the conversion of its consumption to purposes of human subsistence, would, if carried to this practical extent, amount to a quantity of food equal to the support of 16,000,000 of people." He further says, "The reduction of farming consumption (the bug-bear of the project), will be met and compensated by a steady and proportionate demand from other quarters; whilst in the United Kingdom, the 8,100,000 acres of land now required to feed the horses, together with the capital sunk in their purchase, will, when both are applied to other and general purposes, amply compensate for the change." If instead of 20,000 horses, we keep 30,000 fat oxen, butchers' meat will be always cheap to the operative classes; whilst the quantity of tallow will, of course, make candles cheap, and so many hides lower the price of leather. The same may be said of more sheep and woollen cloths. Colonel Torrens, in his evidence on this subject before a Parliamentary Committee, says, "If steam carriages could be ultimately brought to such perfection as entirely to supersede draught horses on the common roads (not including horses used for other commercial and agricultural purposes), there would be food and demand for 8,000,000 of people. But when we take further into consideration, that diminishing the expense of carriage would enable us to extend cultivation over soils which cannot now be profitably tilled;

and that it would have the further effect of enabling us to apply, with a profit, additional portions of labour and capital to the soils already under tillage, I think it not unfair to conclude, that were elementary power on the common roads completely to supersede draught horses, the *population*, wealth, and power of Great Britain would at least be doubled." Here is a direct and substantial remedy for an overgrown population (did it exist), and thus we see that when we are but approaching to that point which the most sceptical consider the "natural limit" to our numbers, a new provision appears, sufficient for the support of a population equal to that which has grown up in Britain since the era of the creation.

Inequality in the distribution of property.—The bane of the country is not a deficiency of national income to support the population, but the inequality in the distribution of that income; the amount of property annually produced in Great Britain is moderately estimated at 310,000,000*l.* sterling,* (some writers make it considerably more)†; averaging about 93*l.* 19*s.* to every family of five persons; an ample sufficiency for comfortable subsistence. Yet, so immoderately unequal is the distribution of property, that while about 80,000 families, or one-fortieth of the population, enjoy upwards of eight-fortieths of the income, or 65,000,000*l.* sterling,‡ the agricultural portion numbering about 800,000 families, or ten-fortieths of the population, scarcely obtain three-fortieths of the property raised, or 20,000,000*l.* sterling. This

* We have made this calculation from Mr. Colquhoun's tables, allowing for changes since the date of his publication.

† Pebrer estimates the annual income of the United Kingdom at 514,823,059*l.*

‡ Mr. Marshall, in his tables, published 1825, allows a much larger sum to 80,000 families.

not only explains the cause of the wretchedness of the many and the vicious prodigality of the few, but also the mysterious, apparently irreconcilable, but indubitable fact, of the rapid progress of national wealth concomitant with an increasing number of parochial dependents. Such, however, is the defect in British society—a defect in some degree common to every state acknowledging the rights of property, and arising from the very constitution of the social compact; but in Britain, especially entailed by the heavy amount of the state obligations, which annually subtract 30,000,000*l.* sterling from the wages of labour, to be added to the incomes of more fortunate claimants. The general tenor of our reasoning in this chapter has, we believe, shewn that the national income has uniformly increased with the expanse of numbers, and we doubt not that the same causes will continue to produce the same effects. But, it is evident, that this increase of property has been, and must continue to be, produced by the operative classes, or by that portion of the people which creates an *excess* of commodities over its consumption.

Emigration.—To curtail, by emigration, the number of those who are able to produce an *excess* over their consumption, must naturally cause the burden of providing for those who produce nothing, and yet largely consume, to press the more heavily; since, the proportion subtracted from the wages of labour must be augmented in an even ratio to the diminution of the number of labourers. Evident as the foregoing principles are, the government, supposing that the remedy for a deficiency of employment is to be found in transporting the *élite* of the British population—the ingenious mechanic, and the youthful, sturdy husbandman—to the distant shores of Canada and Australia,

obtained a parliamentary grant, to be distributed in *bounties* or passage money to emigrants ; and an act of the senate enabling parishes to mortgage the parochial assessments in order to raise a fund to facilitate the emigration of the working classes. Of all remedies for the privations endured by the British people, none is so egregiously wrong, and so contrary to every sound principle of government ; none so indicative of the absence of knowledge in the fundamental principles of our resources, as that of encouraging the emigration of labourers at the cost of those who remain ; and it is evident that the system, carried to any great extent, must effect a deep aggravation of the burdens under which the country at present labours. If the internal resources of Great Britain are duly investigated, it will be found that they are quite adequate to render both general and individual wealth more productive at home than in any other country, and to diffuse a greater sum of human happiness throughout the various classes of her community. Our extensive manufactures, which have so powerfully tended to raise our country to its present state of wealth and mighty power, afford full scope for both genius and industry ; it is no want of the means of supporting an increase of numbers which can sanction the government in offering encouragement to native talent and capital to emigrate. The strength of the nation depends on the increase of population, not only as a means of defence *but as an extended means of subsistence ; as an enlarged power of maintenance, both collectively and individually.* The trade of Great Britain can never be accelerated in its increase through the growth of our colonies by emigration. Important as may be our external commerce, yet our internal trade is superior to it. “*England is England’s best customer,*” and the largest consumers of her manufactures are her own inhabitants. Every emigrant therefore dimi-

nishes the demand for our productions, and impairs our power. Hence, whatever advantages emigration may unfold to the mechanic, the field labourer, or the small capitalist, certain it is that the nation must lose by the separation. To the emigrant the question of improved condition is indeed speculative; for, however poor the condition of the labourer at home, the law ensures to him protection against absolute starvation; but to the newly located emigrant—provided with no capital, in an unknown and unexplored country, dependent for every necessary on the precarious productions of the soil or the chase, his means affording no sufficient guarantee of a suitable maintenance until some years after his first location—no protection is offered, and the ulterior improvement in his condition is by no means certain. Generally speaking, all mankind feel a natural instinctive desire to continue in that country which gave them birth, where their ancestors have lived and died, and where their fondest recollections are connected and centred; and the severest distress, or perhaps the apprehension of it, is required to induce them to leave their native land, endure all the perils of a long sea voyage and the hazards of providing themselves in a barbarous country, for the *chance* of obtaining the means of a livelihood. While so much remains to be done at home, which would tend to ameliorate the condition of the ingenious mechanic and the laborious husbandman; while the vast tracts of uncultivated land in Britain, invite colonization in our own native isle; while so many opportunities of national improvement present themselves, requiring but the labour and capital, the government desire to dispense by emigration, offering by the advantages of intimate co-operation, profits far greater than those attainable by the colonization of the bleak wilds of Canada or the arid plains of central Australia; it is the duty of the government to pause

ere they, contrary to every principle upon which civil society is formed, renew the proposal to *expatriate* a portion of our English labourers, whose only crime is poverty, wrought by the waste of the national resources in wars in times past, and the restrictions to international commerce in times present.*

To one part of the government plan of emigration our objections are less determined; we allude to the parliamentary grant to enable females, between the ages of fifteen and thirty, to obtain their passage to the Australian colonies.

In Great Britain the late accounts shew a numerical superiority of population, amounting to about 490,000, in favour of females. Various causes have contributed to produce this disproportion, such as the superior ratio of mortality among males; their more frequent emigration, and the increased number of that sex who die abroad. In Australia the opposite effect is produced by the immigrations being greatly in favour of males. The accounts just received from Sydney, made up to the 22d August, 1833, enable us to shew the extent of this disproportion. The total population of that colony at this date was 55,591,† of which were

Males.		Females.	
Free born, above twelve years of age . . .	15,518	Free born, above twelve years of age . . .	8,254
Under that age . . .	5,068	Ditto under that age . . .	4,755
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Free males . . .	20,586	Total free females . . .	13,009
Male convicts . . .	19,384	Prisoners . . .	2,612
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Total males . . .	39,970	Females . . .	15,621

* Lord Howick's bill proposed that an individual emigrating at the cost of a parish should on his return home lose all claim to parochial settlement; should, in fact, surrender a portion of his civil rights. The late poor law commissioners strongly object to this clause as unnatural, and unworthy of the British legislature.

† There were in New South Wales at this date: Protestants, 33,573; Roman Catholics, 15,165; Jews, 367; Pagans, 41; uncertain, 1,505. Of the Catholics, 8168 were free.

Thus the proportion of free males to females is about as 100 to 68 ; of convicts as 100 to 13, and in the total population as 100 to 39. Such a disproportion very materially retards the progress of the colony ; and as the natural course of emigration from this country is ordinarily of the male sex, there appears no immediate prospect of remedying the evil, unless a portion of the excess of the British female youth can be induced, by the moral certainty of improving their condition, to emigrate. With due caution on the part of the local government, such a change of country may be made highly advantageous to both the colonists and the female emigrants : while much as the British people might regret the loss, the prospective advantages of the measure would reconcile them to the sacrifice. But we are fully persuaded that no relief to the people of England can be consequent on a systematic plan of emigration, and that no redundancy of population does, will, or ever did exist.

A deficiency of employment must occasionally arise in every large commercial and manufacturing community engaged in branches of trade subject to speculative changes and temporary depression, from a slackness of foreign demand, the caprice of fashion, or the march of invention ; but the effect is always transitory, and caused in no degree by an excess of numbers ; for, is it not evident, that in a population increasing from an excess of births over deaths, the ratio of such increase being greatest in that portion of the community under the pubert age, and hence incapable of labour, the demand on the able-bodied population must always be greater than where numbers are stationary or decreasing ?

For relief we must look to more substantial means than the emigration of labourers. A more equal distribution of the national income must be effected, not by the adoption of the "*Lex Agraria*,"

but probably by a liberal revision of the law of primogeniture, with a view to the more equal division of landed property ; *a subject which, at no distant period, must be seriously considered by parliament.*

In France, the abolition of “ le droit d’ainesse ” is popularly considered as one of the most beneficial among the many doleful achievements of the revolution of 1788-9 ; and that it has been, and continues progressively instrumental, in creating a *middle class of people* so little known in that country during former ages, is evident to the most careless observer ; while its powerful and extensive effect in promoting agricultural improvement, is equally manifest.

We must look also to the progressive abolition of restrictions to free trade, to the annulment of all commercial monopolies, and to economy in the distribution of the state revenue. These are the sources from which relief can flow ; and the prospective continuance of that greatest of all national blessings, “ peace,” as well as the liberal policy of the British government, offer fair pledges that it *will* flow with increasing force :—in proportion as these ameliorations are introduced ; so will appear the incontrovertible proposition, “ that the true prosperity of Britain, and the expansion of her strength and resources, are to be found in the productive powers of an industrious and *numerically increasing* people ; and that amid all the transitory calamities of the state, there is no reason to deplore a growing population.”

TABLE OF MORTALITY.

Ages of 3,938,496 persons buried in England and Wales during the 18 years, 1813 to 1830. Also, the proportion of mortality at various ages; and of the numbers who attain respective ages; the whole compiled from the latest official documents.

Ages.	Males.	Females	Total.	Proportion of burials to the total number.	
				Proportion to total of those who attain the respective ages.	
				In millesimal parts.	
Under 1 year.	436,946	341,147	778,083	197 $\frac{3}{4}$	1000
1	139,426	127,017	266,443	67 $\frac{1}{4}$	802 $\frac{1}{4}$
2	78,114	75,900	154,014	39 $\frac{1}{4}$	735
3	47,860	46,773	94,633	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	695 $\frac{3}{4}$
4	33,693	32,076	65,769	16 $\frac{3}{4}$	674 $\frac{1}{4}$
5	24,854	23,340	48,194	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	657 $\frac{1}{2}$
6	19,376	18,091	37,467	9 $\frac{3}{4}$	645
7 to 12	75,080	68,405	143,485	36 $\frac{1}{2}$	635 $\frac{1}{4}$
Total	855,349	732,749	1,588,048		
Comparative mortality against females.					
13 to 15	30,373	34,578	64,951	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	598 $\frac{3}{4}$
16 to 20	68,551	75,049	143,603	36 $\frac{3}{4}$	582 $\frac{1}{4}$
21 to 25	75,956	83,945	159,901	40 $\frac{1}{2}$	545 $\frac{1}{2}$
26 to 30	67,898	79,668	147,566	37 $\frac{3}{4}$	505
31 to 35	60,390	69,096	129,486	32 $\frac{3}{4}$	467 $\frac{1}{4}$
36 to 40	65,002	72,542	137,544	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	434 $\frac{3}{4}$
41 to 44	46,696	49,134	95,830	24 $\frac{1}{4}$	400 $\frac{1}{4}$
Total	414,869	464,012	878,881		
Comparative mortality against males.					
45 to 50	84,238	79,760	163,998	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	376
51 to 55	67,837	63,558	131,395	33 $\frac{1}{4}$	334 $\frac{1}{2}$
56 to 60	79,373	74,739	154,112	39 $\frac{1}{4}$	301 $\frac{1}{4}$
61 to 65	85,529	83,438	168,967	43 $\frac{3}{4}$	262
	316,977	301,495	618,472		

Ages.	Males.	Females	Total.	Proportion of burials to the total number.	
				Proportion to total of those who attain the respective ages.	
				In millesimal parts.	
66 to 67	39,512	39,855	79,367	20 $\frac{3}{4}$	218 $\frac{1}{4}$
68 to 69	35,131	34,520	69,651	17 $\frac{3}{4}$	197 $\frac{1}{2}$
70	26,187	27,766	53,953	14	179 $\frac{3}{4}$
71	16,008	16,154	32,162	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	165 $\frac{3}{4}$
72 to 78	144,437	150,675	295,112	75 $\frac{3}{4}$	157 $\frac{1}{2}$
79	15,576	16,433	32,009	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	81 $\frac{3}{4}$
80	20,666	24,951	45,617	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$
81 to 85	69,906	78,246	147,252	37 $\frac{1}{2}$	62
86 to 90	31,703	39,512	71,215	18	24 $\frac{1}{2}$
91 to 95	8,035	11,449	19,584	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
96 to 100	2,141	3,701	5,842	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{3}{4}$
101 to 105	336	695	1,031	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
106 to 110	53	91	144		
110 to 114	11	18	29		
117	—	1	1		
118	1	—	1		
119	1	—	1		
120	2	1	3		
124	1	—	1		
	335,064	369,693	703,957		

Our limits are insufficient to enable us to give the entire table of mortality as furnished by the official authorities; we have yet thought it necessary to note the first seven periods separately, as illustrative of the great excess of mortality among infant males compared with females. The *average* of the quinquennial periods (except in the cases annexed), will in general furnish the annual sum of mortality.

At the termination of the first twelve years, about one-third of those born, are with the departed; the proportion being against males in the ratio of 855 to 732 females (nearly). After this term (12 years) to the age of 44—the middle period of life, and by far the most hazardous to women,—the comparative mortality shews a different result; being as 46 females to 41 males. At the termination of this period, when procreation ceases, female life is comparatively the most secure; the average mortality from the ages of 45 to 65, being about as 63 males to 60 females. The comparative security of life subsequent to this is slightly in favour of males. The tables shew a great excess of mortality among females; but it should be remarked, that the excess of female population after this period of life is nearly twelve per cent. over the male (see table of ages), and the ratio of mortality is hence by so much greater, without indicating any comparative insecurity of life.

In collating this table from the official documents before us, we cannot but remark the extraordinary mortality it evinces at the termination of each decade of man's life, from the age of thirty years. In every instance from thirty years of age and upwards, the mortality in the year which terminates the decade, very greatly exceeds that in the preceding and succeeding years: as a matter somewhat curious, we shall shew these instances—

Age.	Mortality.	Age.	Mortality.	Age.	Mortality.
29 . .	26,630	49 . .	23,689	69 . .	33,038
☞ 30 . .	31,027	☞ 50 . .	33,527	☞ 70 . .	53,953
31 . .	23,201	51 . .	20,911	71 . .	32,162
39 . .	23,778	59 . .	25,782	79 . .	32,009
☞ 40 . .	33,513	☞ 60 . .	43,273	☞ 80 . .	45,617
41 . .	20,989	61 . .	26,084	81 . .	27,425

This strikes us as something extraordinary; it seems to say that at these periods a man is under the influence of some physical change, when he either surrenders or renews his life lease. The disciples of the profound Cuvier can perhaps explain this.

The following *official* table of the ages of 10,530,671 inhabitants of *England and Wales*, on the 28th of May, 1821, is important, as furnishing data for estimating our productive power, national strength, and other useful calculations :

Ages.	Males.	Females.	Total.
Under 5	791,579	774,689	1,566,268
From 5 to 9 . .	693,858	682,457	1,376,315
— 10 — 14 . .	603,613	569,366	1,172,979
— 15 — 19 . .	509,586	535,569	1,045,155
— 20 — 29 . .	755,780	901,338	1,657,118
— 30 — 39 . .	593,662	649,507	1,243,169
— 40 — 49 . .	482,329	500,977	983,306
— 50 — 59 . .	342,204	352,160	694,364
— 60 — 69 . .	231,509	249,184	480,693
— 70 — 79 . .	115,032	124,648	239,680
— 80 — 89 . .	29,587	36,315	65,902
— 90 — 99 . .	2,253	3,280	5,533
— 100 and upwards	60	129	189
Total . .	5,151,052	5,379,619	10,530,671

Any proportions may be easily found ; and we need scarcely add that those proportions may be fairly applied in estimating the ages of the inhabitants of Great Britain at any period.

CHAPTER II.

 POOR LAWS, AND THE CONDITION OF THE
LABOURING CLASSES.

 SECTION I.—HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE POOR LAWS,
AND THEIR CHARGE AND EFFECT ON LABOUR AND
CAPITAL.

THE matter of the preceding chapter, intimately connected with an inquiry into the relative condition of the British community, in some degree prepares us for discussing the subject proposed in this.

We shall first give a brief, historical retrospect, of the state of British society during the early reigns of the Norman dynasty. Secondly, note the progressive expansion of the charge for the support of the poor, and the practical operation of the system on the condition of the working classes. And thirdly, the remedial measures recommended by the late commission, and adopted by parliament.

Low condition of British society in the Middle Ages.—The servile condition of the majority of the British people immediately subsequent to the assumption of the English crown by William the Norman (1066) was such as to render them little else than the property of the several baronial landed proprietors, or the mere slaves of ambitious chiefs. None who had unhappily been born in bondage, or who had fallen into that state, could

acquire any right to property, all disposable commodities possessed or acquired by the bondman being understood legally to belong to the baron to whose estate he was attached ; * even the lifeless body of the serf was at the free disposal of the baron, and the *morte-main* (dead hand) was required in testimony of that right.† Servile and detestable as such a state of vassalage may have been, and injurious as it was to the progress of national improvement and civilization, yet the bondman was relieved from all anxiety as to the provision of himself and family during old age or infirmity, by the legal obligation contracted by the estate owner to give him his support, as the purchase price of his services. Thus, while the nation consisted of but two classes, the landholders and the servile cultivators, the latter transferable with the estate, and the appendages of slavery descending in hereditary succession from the parent to the child, motives of interest induced the rich to maintain the poor ; and hence, except in times of dearth, the labourer was assured of the necessities of life.

Gradual abolition of the feudal system.—By various edicts of the council, but more especially by the mandate of the pope of Rome, issued towards the close of the eleventh century, for the emancipation of christian slaves, some beneficial reforms were introduced into the feudal system, and baronial rights becoming less arbitrary, were confined, during the twelfth century, to a legal demand on the tenantry for so many days' labour in the week or month, to be applied to the

* Besides the *adscripti glebæ* (slaves attached to estates), there were other serfs transferable by sale ; for by the decree of the great council held at Westminster 1102, the selling of slaves in open market, which had hitherto been the custom, was prohibited.

† The Statute of Mortmain was enacted in 1279, to check the requisitions of the clergy.

baronial domains. Under this conditional system of manumission, the middle classes progressively increased their numbers ; but having, as the purchase price of their freedom, forfeited all title to maintenance on the property of the landlord, they became, in sickness or old age, destitute of provision, and hence dependent on the eleemosynary contributions of the more affluent.

The long wars of the chivalrous Edward III. and succeeding princes, however calamitous in the abstract to national improvement, were yet not without their good effects in aiding the emancipation of the bondman, as they unfolded the means of purchasing freedom by military service. Nor were the ravages of the deadly pestilence which distinguished the fourteenth century, without the admixture of beneficial consequences to posterity ; since they were a means of imparting to those who survived, a just idea of their own importance, by increasing, for a season, the value of services in accordance with the diminution of numbers.

The progress of freedom and civil rights, and the growing political influence of a middle class, is forcibly evinced by the tone of the populace, who resisted the royal authority during the memorable insurrection of Wat Tyler (1381). And although this burst of public feeling was silenced by the craft of the court, it had its important effects ; since the manifestation of determined resistance to political injustice, by the physical force of the nation, served to limit the power of the landlords from reimposing, and to restrain the lower orders from resubmitting to, the degrading condition of bondage.

Thus the social condition of the people diverged into various distinctions, and in proportion as they acquired opportunity to direct themselves to those branches of commerce best suited to their varied

capacities, manufacturing industry received additional encouragement. This was forcibly exemplified during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when special chartered privileges were given to those towns, wherein manufactures, chiefly woollen, had taken deep root. These privileges assured protection to those, who, forsaking the service of their landlord, sought refuge in the chartered towns, where the higher wages and better appointment afforded to mechanics, offered additional allurements to the labouring classes to migrate from the country, and thus secure their manumission.

Institution of poor laws.—Important and beneficial as have been the results of this early extension of British staple manufactures, not only in enlarging the national resources, but in aiding the cause of individual freedom and civil rights; yet it is to this change in the previously accustomed means of livelihood, that we may clearly trace the emanation of a compulsory cess for the support of the poor. For the progress of society, when free, tending to favour a growing inequality of property, the less fortunate or the less prudent, neglecting to lay up store for the day of need, and having no claim on the property of the barons, as in the ancient state of villanage, became chargeable on the funds of the more wealthy.

That the rapid growth of a class of freemen, who from incapacity, misconduct, or misfortune were unable to support themselves by labour, was productive of many cases of indigence and poverty, we find evidenced by the fact of the attention of parliament being first summoned by 12th Richard II., (A.D. 1388), to devise some means of supporting “*impotent* beggars and others having no means of livelihood.” This Act, the first on record, regarding the state of the poor,

recites, “ that a *convenient* sum shall be paid and distributed yearly out of the fruits and profits of the several *churches*, by those who shall have the said churches in proper use, and by their successors, to the poor parishioners, in aid of their living and sustenance for ever.” Such were the funds to be set apart for the provision of the poor ; and although the wording of the enactment fixes no specific portion of the church revenues as applicable to the contemplated object, yet it appears to have been the evident intention of the legislature, that the poor should be supported out of the ecclesiastical revenues alone, as it moreover appoints the clergy to act as the guardians of the poor, and declares, by another clause, that the *clergy* shall be liable to maintain them.

This provision for the needy, necessary as it was at the time of the enactment, subsequently became of the greatest importance, from the total abolition of the feudal system, caused by the civil commotions which distinguish this and the following century of our national history.

Causes which led to the total abolition of the feudal system in England.—The regal claims of the Plantagenets, first successfully enforced by Henry IV., were the prelude to those disastrous contests between the representatives and adherents of the houses of York and Lancaster, which during 200 years crimsoned England’s soil with the blood of her people. During this melancholy period, when the laws were without power, the crown without authority, and the foundations of public security shaken by the impunity of licentiousness, every temptation, device, and means were resorted to, to swell the forces of the contending chieftains. Freedom,—emancipation from villanage,—protection and rewards to renegades—and other alluring advantages, were offered to

those who should join the standards of the party chiefs. Thus every bondman who could bear arms possessed the full opportunity of purchasing his freedom by military service. So general indeed was the effect of these violent commotions and frequent revolutions in the regal government, that at the accession of Henry VII. the race of villains is said to have been extinct, and universal freedom to have reigned in Britain.

Such were the principal causes which concurred to abolish hereditary slavery; but as an alloy to the great moral good which they effected, they planted deeply the seeds of individual pauperism, and hence the root from which sprung a compulsory cess for the support of the poor.

Effect of the Act of Richard II. and Statute of Labourers.—Subsequently to this time the notice of parliament was frequently summoned to the state of the poorer classes;* and even in this early period of the system, the statutes in favour of the poor appear to have had a tendency to cause the labourers to regard the legislative provision as a means of dependence, in the place of availing industry; and hence to cause demands for higher wages by those who laboured. This opinion, whether at the time well or ill founded, gave rise to the remarkable Act of the 20th Henry VIII. commonly called the "*Statute of Labourers*," which sought to regulate the price of labour, hours of work, mode of life, and impose other equally futile regulations for the government of the working classes; provisions which, if enforced, could but tend to encourage idleness and indifference to labour, or the emigration of the most expert workmen; and hence especially ill calculated to afford advantage to either the rich or the poor. The measure

* 2d and 19th Henry VII.; 6th Henry VIII.; and 22d Henry VIII.

evidences a lamentable deficiency of knowledge on the part of the government in the elementary principles of national wealth, and stands opposed to the clear axiom, "That the collective self-interest of individuals is always in unison with the welfare of the community."

Several other experimental attempts to improve the poor laws were made during the reign of Henry VIII; one of which, noted in the Act of the 22d of that monarch, cap. 12, authorised the justices of the peace "to grant licences to such poor people as they might consider most in need, to beg alms within certain districts; "a mode of provision which, although still practised in a neighbouring country (France), was found to be attended with many inconveniences, and inadequately adapted to the desired object. This Act was followed by that of the 27th Henry VIII. which directs the parochial or head officers of separate towns to collect alms in order that "sturdy vagabonds and valiant beggars may be kept to continual labour, and directs every preacher, parson, vicar, and curate, to exhort, move, stir, and provoke people to be liberal for the relief of the impotent, and for keeping and setting to work the said sturdy vagabonds."*

Increase of parochial dependents.—Such were the principal regulations for the support of the poor until the era of what is usually termed the *reformation*; when the court, influenced by a marauding, plundering policy, determined to annihilate the ordinary sources from which the poor had hitherto been relieved. To this time the people had been

* The tyranny of the laws of this despot's reign is strikingly evidenced by the following clause of this Act: "A sturdy beggar is to be whipped the first time; his right ear cropped the second; and if he again offend, to be sent to the next gaol till the quarter sessions, there to be indicted for wandering, loitering, and idleness; and if convicted, shall *suffer execution as a felon and an enemy of the commonwealth.*" 27 Henry VIII.

taught to consider the revenues of the church and of the monastic order (revenues chiefly derived from bequeathed endowments) as a fund destined not only for the dissemination of Christian knowledge and spiritual consolation, but for the support of the poor in the day of need. Hence the subversion of the whole monastic order; and the despoiling of the poor to gratify the avarice of the rich, and feed the insatiable appetite for lucre, which so especially characterised the first two princes of the Tudor family, could not but be inimicable to the great majority of the people. In order, therefore, to appease the disaffection so generally manifested, the court, pretending to some concession in favour of the community, promised "that the revenues derived from the abbey lands should not be appropriated to the use of the crown, but applied towards the maintenance of the civil and military government of the state; and that no demands should be henceforth made on the subject in the shape of loans, subsidies, or aids of any kind whatsoever."* Time has shewn the little respect paid to this parliamentary resolution: no portion of these revenues having ever been applied to the promised purposes; the property of the church, the resources of the poor, and the patrimony of the monkish order, being distributed to the luxurious great, for objects of political intrigue, and the burden of providing an equivalent, transferred to a "taxable people." To the success of this conspiracy of the nobility to despoil the church and the poor of their patrimonial rights, the minority of Edward VI. was highly favourable; no sufficient, co-existent power centering in the executive authority to curb the unbounded appetite for plunder which distinguished the ruling faction. Hence the administrators of the royal functions found themselves obliged to purchase political

* 35 Henry VIII.

influence from such as were enabled by their wealth and power to support their measures; and for this end dealt out the late properties of the church with lavish prodigality. Some pretence to a more just appropriation of the ecclesiastical revenues was, however, manifested by 1 Edward VI. c. 14, which recites “that the revenues of church lands should be applied to *goodly purposes*, such as the building and support of grammar schools,* the augmentation of the income of the universities, and the better provision of the helpless poor;” yet few of these provisions were complied with. Such intemperate use of power, masked by a pretended zeal for the reformation, could not fail to have baneful effects on the condition of those who had hitherto been relieved out of the church revenues. Various attempts were made by parliament, 3 and 4 Edward VI. c. 16; 5 and 6 Edward VI. c. 2, to raise funds for their relief by voluntary subscription. The first recites “that in Whitsun-week, the minister or churchwardens shall appoint collectors to *gently ask* every man and woman what they of their charity will give towards the relief of the poor, and if any obstinately or frowardly refuse to give, the bishop is to send for him to *induce and persuade* him by charitable ways and means.” So desirous were the sycophants of the court, who had seized the sources of relief, to throw the burden of supporting the poor on the incomes of the people. All these endeavours, however, appear to have been ineffectual:—the wrongs inflicted on society were too violent to be remedied by appeals to the generous passions of individuals. The evils progressed:—numerous hosts of supplicating monks, whom a life of seclusion had unfitted for the busy scenes of commerce, and multitudes of helpless poor, echoing the grievous calamities inflicted by the confiscation of that property from

* This Act gave birth to Christ’s Hospital.

which they had been accustomed to receive relief, irresistibly demanded an efficient protection against the severities of fate. The 5th and the 14th of Elizabeth, after, in the preamble, evincing the great increase of beggars ("rogues, vagabonds, and sturdy beggars"), and the consequent evils, empower the justices of the peace "to tax and assess all the inhabitants dwelling within the said division to a certain weekly charge, according to the circumstances or incomes of parties, to be applied in support of the poor." These Acts, however, which appear to have been intended rather to facilitate voluntary contributions, than to organise a regular plan of assess, were found insufficient; and hence, after some other attempts to avoid the necessity of a general compulsory levy, all former statutes relative to the poor were consolidated into the notable Act of the 43d of Elizabeth, 1601.

The 43d of Elizabeth.—This Act, forced upon the government by the dire distress of the working classes, during the dearth of 1594-5-6-7, and the interruption to commerce consequent on the prevalence of war in the Low Countries, Spain, Italy, and other parts of Europe,* provided "that the wardens and overseers of the poor should levy upon the inhabitants of their respective *parishes*, such sufficient sums as should be necessary to support the aged and infirm parishioners, and for setting to work *all persons using no ordinary and daily trade of life to get their living by.*" By another clause, the justices of the peace are allowed a discretionary power, to the effect that should they deem the inhabitants of any particular parish

* During this period thousands of persons died from absolute want of nutriment. The price of wheat, which in former years had rated at about 10s. per quarter, rose in A.D. 1593, to 64s.; in 1594, it receded to 56s., and in 1595, to 53s.; but in the following year it rated in the Bristol market at 20s. per bushel, supposed to be equal to about 480s. per quarter, or 24*l.* of our present money.

too poor to contribute, then to tax other parishes within the district. Another clause empowered magistrates to raise a fund within the county for the relief of prisoners in gaols, as also for indemnifying those who might suffer by fire, water, internal commotion, or other casualties ; or for such other local purposes as the major part of the district magistrates assembled, should deem convenient. Checks against the undue use of authority were introduced, by which an appeal was provided for those who might feel themselves aggrieved.

Such are the chief provisions of this well-known statute ;—provisions which, by a lamentable misconception, are said to form the *basis* of our present *system* ; and which, framed with all that caution and stern judgment which characterises the administration of Lord Burleigh, are well adapted, if rigorously maintained, to form the model of a well defined plan for the support of the helpless and the relief of the unfortunate.

The policy of the Act 43d of Elizabeth discussed.—The policy of this enactment, standing as it does not only on the broad basis of philanthropy, but on the no less stable foundation of political justice, has, from the subsequent corruption of its principles, been the subject of doubt ; and various have been the attempts of the legislature to consolidate and improve its provisions, or rather, to adapt them to an altered state of society. Without question, it is consistent with natural law, that the land should support those who till it ; and that the helpless and indigent poor have a rightful claim on the funds of society, if their misfortunes be a consequence of the social compact. Nay, it is a condition upon which civil society is formed, and the introduction of private property assented to, that every member of the community should be secured against the severities of fate, and that none be left to perish

from absolute want, if from physical incapacity they be unable to earn a subsistence. While human nature is accessible to the influence of humanity, we *must* feel that the support of the helpless is a *sacred* obligation; and such natural dictates justify a government in enforcing from the affluent contributions in aid of the indigent, as a debt due from the rich to the poor. But the crying evils in the practical operation of the poor's law, do not arise from its *use*, but its *abuse*. The Act has been considered to impose an obligation, not only of providing work for the labouring classes, but also to counterpoise the effect of dear seasons or depression of wages, by an allowance out of the poor's fund. The words, "for setting to work all persons using no ordinary and daily trade of life," have been construed into an *obligation* to provide work, and in fact, to pay those who *do* use an ordinary and daily trade of life. This practice is replete with futility, as being rather a cause of poverty, than a source of relief; and as serving only to pay the wages of labour from funds collected from its proceeds; coupling the evils of the expense of its collection and distribution, depressing wages to the minimum necessary for a bare subsistence, and swelling the apparent burden to an amount which, to a foreigner, would convey the erroneous impression that England counts among her population a greater body of extreme poor than any other country in Christendom.

We now approach the second section of our inquiry, the extension of the poor-rate charge.

Annual charge for the support of the poor towards the close of the 17th and commencement of the 18th centuries.—The condition of the working classes, during and for some years subsequent to the reign of Elizabeth, is represented to have been very deplorable, and the assessments for their relief to

have been so inadequate, that many died of absolute want. But respecting the amount of the levy, or the number of claimants, history is silent; nor do we find any datum upon which to found a fair estimate, until towards the close of the 17th century (1673), when it is reported to have approximated to 700,000*l.*; a very large sum, considering the high value of money, and the comparative paucity of population.

The next estimate we meet with is contained in the tables of Gregory King, prepared A.D. 1684, in which he states the amount of money levied in England, exclusive of Wales, to be about 665,000*l.*, and that in Wales 34,000*l.*; being a sum total of 699,000*l.* The inspector, Davenant, says that subsequently the amount of money very much increased in consequence of the great burden of the wars; and that at this time (1695) as much is collected for the poor as for the government of the state in peaceable times, estimating this sum at 1,000,000*l.* sterling. Of the number of poor then chargeable on the parochial funds, we find no positive estimate; but from the immensity of the sum collected, and the very low rate of wages, (about fivepence per diem), we expect it was very large; probably as one in ten to the total population, or about 500,000.

The wars of William III., with their consequent evils,—taxes, loans, national debtism, confiscations, corn laws, monopolies, and other financial machinery,—depreciating the natural wages of labour, tended materially to augment the cess for the support of the poor, and the growth of that deplorable poverty so especially remarkable during the early years of the reign of Queen Anne. That pauperism had much increased during the late years, appears evident from the preamble of the Act of 1702, relative to the poor; but from the stimulus given to productive industry through the operation

of the war expenditure, it does not appear that the amount of the sum levied received much extension during the war period which succeeded.

The economy and good management introduced into every state department by the ministers of George I., was productive of the most beneficial results, and checked the spread of pauperism. The amount of the assess declined with the prolongation of peace, and in spite of a great increase of population, receded to an average of about 520,000*l.* for the three years preceding the outburst of the Spanish war, 1739. That unfortunate contest, in which the fame of the British fleets was sullied at Carthagená, and the invincibility of the British army, dispelled at Fontenoi, could not but affect the condition of the English labourers; hence the amount of the cess for the three years ending 1750, reached an annual average of about 690,000*l.*

Increase of charge after the year 1750.—From this date we trace a rapid increase in the amount of the charge. Our interference in the affairs of the Continent, by the war of 1756, brought with it a large increase of taxation: the early years of the war were also marked by deficient seasons, and a great rise in the prices of the prime necessities of life. A great expansion of the parochial assessments was the consequence, evinced by the official return of 1760, which stated the amount to be - - - - - 960,000*l.*

The rise in the price of provisions continued permanent; and, notwithstanding a peaceful interval of eight years, the amount of the assess in 1770, reached - - - - - 1,306,000*l.*

The amount continued to progress, and at the commencement of the ever to be deplored contest with the American colonies, in 1776, reached - - - - - 1,520,000*l.*

At the termination of hostilities in 1783, the amount was officially returned at - - - - 2,132,000*l.*

Thus we find, that in the short period of seven years the increase in the amount of the poor's rate was nearly 80 per cent., in consequence of the vast expenses of the war; the interruption to foreign trade; and the derangement of commerce by the loss of the American colonies.—The return to peace in 1783 restoring undisturbed opportunity of international commerce, would appear calculated to diminish the pressure of the poor's rate; but, at this time, our financial and domestic condition was materially changed. The disastrous war had caused a permanent addition of 100,000,000*l.* to the national debt, and added greatly to the amount of the peace establishment. This waste of capital, subtracted from commerce, could not but impair the sources of production; and the vast sums annually abstracted from the wages of labour, to meet the increased claims of state annuitants, could not but favour the growth of that disproportion in the distribution of the national income, which is the very *nisus* of individual poverty, and the very bane of the social compact.

The operation of these causes was soon apparent in the condition of the people. The rich became richer, obtaining a higher rate of interest for their dissipated capital; and the poor poorer, larger contributions being required of them to indemnify the capitalist. The chasm between the wealthy proprietor and the tiller became wider, and the property of the small freeholder, or dependent tenant, merged into the possession of the large estate holders. The consequent depression in the wages of labour, with the defective system in the management of the funds, concurred to carry the amount of the cess in 1790, to 2,560,000*l.*

Vast increase of charge during the late wars.—Thus the increase in the amount of the cess was nearly 100 per cent. in twenty years, but the course of events soon effected a still further addition to

the amount. The operation of the war increasing the price of every necessary of life, urged the government to measures which totally perverted the intention of the original poor laws; and by well intended, but fatal interference, changed that which was before a blessing, into a curse. The 43d of Elizabeth never contemplated, as objects of relief, industrious, able-bodied persons; it merely ordered that they should be "set to work," and that the old, impotent, or decrepid, not able to work, should be maintained out of the funds. The 9th of George I. enabled parishes to purchase or hire, or *unite* in purchasing or hiring a workhouse, and to contract for the maintenance of their poor; enacting, that any person who should refuse to be lodged in such houses, should not be entitled to receive relief. This Act was a barrier to the innovation of corruption; it acted as a test of the degrees of want professed by the applicants, tended materially to check pauperism, and in many instances to occasion its positive diminution. Additional force was given to this measure by the enactment of 1782, commonly called "Gilbert's Act," which aimed at the extension of the workhouse system, or rather, the rendering it more effective, by bringing numerous capacities into one centre, and thus improving the division of labour, or the classification of the able-bodied inmates. To this period, the allowance system seems to have been entirely excluded from practice. The first adoption of this plan was authorised by the 33 Geo. III., 1792, which enacted, that "the overseers should, during the absence of militia men, grant relief to their families, by an allowance of money out of the poor's funds, according to a certain scale."—The barrier to abuse once rased, corruption went on rapidly. In 1795, the effect of war, and a deficient season, occasioned a rapid rise in the prices of the necessaries of life: bread corn, which averaged 52s. 8d. in 1794, became in this year

72s. 11d. ; but the rates of wages could not immediately adapt themselves to the altered value of money. The county of Berks. took the lead in counterpoising this deficiency of wages out of the poor's funds. Sir Frederick M. Eden says, "in many parishes relief was granted, not only to the impotent, but to the able-bodied and industrious." And about Easter, 1795, the magistrates of the county, assembled at Speenhamland, resolved, "that they should act with uniformity in the relief of the impotent and infirm poor, by a table of universal practice, corresponding with the supposed necessities of each family." This resolution was not in direct opposition to the Act of 43d Elizabeth, but it seems to have laid the foundation for the allowance system, which, in the following year, was sanctioned by parliament. The 36 Geo. III. c. 23, repealed the clause of 9th Geo. I., which prohibited relief to those who refused to enter the workhouse, and empowered the magistrates to order, "*at their discretion,*" relief to any industrious poor person at his home or house. This is truly termed, "the fatal deviation from previous policy." The plan of out-door relief to able-bodied paupers, was partially adopted immediately after the passing of this Act: but according to evidence collected by Mr. Maclean, it was only occasional, till the distressing dearth of 1800 and 1801, when "the magistrates of the bench of Chichester recommended the various parishes (*instead of advancing wages in proportion to the times*), to make certain allowances, in consideration of the higher price of corn.* Relief out of the parish funds was here acknowledged to be a portion of the wages of labour: it was no longer a remedy for unexpected calamity, nor was its receipt a badge of degradation; it was received by the applicants, not as the generous gift of virtuous and unassuming charity, but as a recompense which the labourer had a

* Report, 1834. App. A. Part i. p. 546.

right to claim," for availing industry. When we look to this perversion of the original institution, in conjunction with the operation of the war, we can scarcely feel surprised at finding, in the year 1800, a period of distressing dearth,—the amount returned at - - - - - 3,861,000*l*.

Subsequently to A.D. 1800, this nucleus of mal-administration spread its baneful effects over a larger sphere. The plan of out-door relief was adopted throughout the southern counties—in Essex, Oxfordshire, and elsewhere—and regulated scales of allowances were distributed throughout the several districts. The evil effects of this equalization of the wages of industry and idleness, honesty and dishonesty, were soon apparent; the paupers and labourers claimed the parochial allowance as a regular *pension*; and industry was paralysed by the knowledge, that it produced no extra wages to the labourer. The weekly pay out of the poor's fund was received as a right, and regarded by the labourers sometimes as "the county allowance," sometimes "the government allowance," sometimes "the Act of parliament allowance;" but always as "*our income*."* Thus the amount of the levy increased in a ratio with the perversion of the legitimate objects of the original Act, attaining, in 1810, 5,407,000*l*.; and in 1812, 6,680,000*l*.

The charge in subsequent years was as under—

Average of the years.	Sums expended for the relief and main- tenance of the poor.	Payments for other purposes, such as military charges, law costs, church repairs, gaols, &c.	Total sums expended.
	£	£	£
12 and 13	6,656,106	1,860,347	8,516,453
13 — 14	6,294,581	1,880,817	8,175,398
14 — 15	5,418,846	1,762,402	7,181,248
15 — 16	5,721,829	1,214,071	6,935,900

* Report of Mr. Okeden, Appendix, Part i. p. 1.

Here the accounts shew an annual decrease in the amount of expenditure, proceeding not from any reformation of the defective management, but from a rapid fall in the price of corn subsequently to the year 1812, and a large diminution of militia charges consequent on the termination of the war. The prospect which peace unfolded, of a diminution of charge, was, however, clouded by the unfortunate deficiency of the harvest of 1816, which concurred with the derangement of the commercial system, arising from the transition from war to peace, to kindle a degree of suffering among the labouring classes unknown since the memorable dearth during the latter years of the reign of Elizabeth. The effect was to augment the amount of the charge for the support of the poor to a sum unprecedented, and never since surpassed in the annals of history.

Average of the years	Expended for the relief of the poor.	Expended for other purposes.	Total sums expended.
1816 and 1817 . .	6,910,925 <i>l</i> . . .	1,210,720 <i>l</i> . . .	8,121,645 <i>l</i> .
1817 and 1818 . .	7,870,801 . . .	1,432,332 . . .	9,313,133

Gradual diminution of charge from the year 1818 to 1824.—A more pleasing prospect opened with the year 1818. The foreign demand for British manufactures was proportionate to the immense imports of agricultural produce from various parts of Europe and America; and a consequent revival of commercial activity reduced, in some degree, the number of claimants for parochial relief. After the year 1819, the seasons proved more than ordinarily favourable; and more discrimination being used in the disbursement of the funds, by the partial adoption of the clause of 59 Geo. III. c. 12, which authorised the appointment of paid and permanent officers to act as assistants to the annually chosen overseers, the amount of the cess shewed a gradual diminution, as seen by the following table.

Average of years.	Expended for the relief of the poor.	Expended for other local purposes.	Total sums expended.
	£	£	£
1818-19	7,516,704	1,408,905	8,925,609
1819-20	7,330,254	1,342,658	8,672,912
1820-21	6,959,251	1,375,686	8,334,937
1821-22	6,358,704	1,336,533	7,795,237
1822-23	5,772,962	1,148,240	6,921,202
1823-24	5,736,900	1,137,598	6,874,498

Fluctuations in the amount of the assess, from the year 1825 to 1832.—Such was the cheering prospect unfolded of a gradual reduction of this formidable charge, which would doubtless have continued, had the price of grain remained low, and the commercial embarrassments of 1825-6 been avoided by greater caution on the part of capitalists. The disarrangement and loss of capital in those years, concurrent with a progressive rise in the price of grain, seems to have negated the economy introduced by the appointment of assistant overseers, and by other reforms suggested by the Act of 59 Geo. III. The sums expended increased slowly during the years 1825-6; but the deficient harvest of 1827 added half a million to their amount, to which a like sum has been added during subsequent years.

The following table shews the amount expended in each year, from 1824 to 1832, inclusive :—

Average of years.	Expended for the relief of the poor.	Expended for other local purposes.	Total sums expended.
	£	£	£
1824-5	5,786,989	1,212,199	7,009,188
1825-6	5,928,505	1,246,145	7,274,650
1826-7	6,441,089	1,362,377	7,803,466
1827-8	6,298,003	1,372,433	7,670,436
1828-9	6,332,411	1,280,320	7,612,731
One year.			
1830	6,829,042	1,332,238	8,161,280
1831	6,798,888	1,540,198	8,339,087
1832	7,036,968	1,585,952	8,622,920

The relative increase or decrease of pauperism in accordance with population.—The relative increase or diminution of pauperism is, however, but imperfectly illustrated by the foregoing tables of the actual amount of *money* distributed in each year for the relief of the poor. An estimate of the amount distributed in provision (bread), not money, is here necessary. To form this calculation, we must reduce the money expended into corn, at the prices of the particular years. Since 1815, there have been no official returns of the actual number of persons annually relieved out of the poor's fund; hence, in estimating the average measure of relief given to each individual, we shall take the returns for 1813, 1814, and 1815, as data for ascertaining the quantum of relief distributed to each person in succeeding years.

Number of persons relieved.

	1813	1814	1815	Average
Poor permanently relieved } in workhouses . . . }	97,223	94,085	88,115	93,141
Poor permanently relieved } out of workhouses . . }	434,441	430,140	406,887	423,819
Parishioners occasionally } relieved }	440,249	429,770	400,971	426,996
Total number of paupers } relieved }	971,913	953,995	895,973	943,956

Now the average price of wheat during the three years ending 1815, was 80s. 7d.; and the average amount annually expended for the relief of the poor during the same period, was 6,132,719*l.*, equal in wheat to 1,511,739 quarters. So that the average quantity distributed to each pauper stands thus:—

Annual average number of persons relieved during 3 years, ending 1815.	Quarters of wheat distributed.	Average quantity to to each person in Pecks. Qr. Bs. Pks.
943,956 ÷	1,511,739 =	51, or 1 4 3

Thus, assuming that fifty-one pecks of wheat are the average annual measure of relief distributed to each claimant, we shall be enabled to form a fair

approximation to a correct estimate of the numbers relieved at any particular period ; and hence shew the relative numbers of paupers to the total population. In the following table we have, for the first two periods, 1684 and 1695, reduced the amount of the assessments into quarters of rye, that grain being then the bread corn of the humbler classes.*

Table, shewing the proportionate number of persons to the total population receiving parochial relief at various periods, from 1684 to 1832.

Years.	Amount expended for the relief of the poor.	Price of bread corn.	Equal in quarters of corn to	Number chargeable on the parish funds, allowing 51 pecks of corn to each person.	Total population of England and Wales.	Proportion of paupers to total population, in parts of 100.
		Rye.				
1684	699,000	20s.	699,000	438,588	5,200,000	8.43
1695	950,000	22	836,636	505,340	5,350,000	9.44
		Wheat				
1750	713,000	31	460,000	289,804	6,467,000	4.49
1766	1,330,000	41	649,511	407,732	7,300,000	5.85
1776	1,520,000	44	690,909	433,511	7,800,000	5.55
Average.						
1782-4	2,132,000	43	991,627	602,607	8,020,000	7.51
1790	2,567,000	42	1,222,380	748,645	8,675,000	8.63
Average.						
1801-3	4,268,000	80	1,067,000	667,524	9,168,000	7.26
1808-10	5,407,000	90	1,201,555	753,914	10,488,000	7.19
1812-14	6,553,000	100	1,310,600	822,141	11,050,000	7.44
1815-17	6,700,000	78	1,718,461	1,078,250	11,470,000	9.40
1818-20	7,268,000	73	1,991,233	1,249,401	11,780,000	10.63
1821-23	5,956,000	50	2,108,980	1,266,811	12,110,000	10.55
1824-26	5,817,000	62	1,876,387	1,098,909	12,650,000	8.76
1827-29	6,357,000	61	2,082,262	1,307,771	13,220,000	9.88
1830-32	6,888,000	63	2,186,666	1,391,633	13,890,000	10.1

* From some statements contained in Sir F. M. Eden's work, respecting the diet of the labouring classes, it seems, that the relative consumption of the different sorts of grain, at the era of the revolution, was, of barley 27, wheat 14, and rye 10. It was not until about the date of the accession of George III., 1760, that wheat was generally substituted by the working classes, and adopted in the workhouses for inferior grain.

The minimum rate of pauperism appears to fall in the middle of the last century, a period remarkable for the cheapness of provisions, favoured by a strict application of the principles of the original statute. After the wars of 1756, some increase seems to have taken place, which received a great extension during the years following the peace of 1782, a period of great commercial embarrassment and deficient trade. The proportion of pauperism calculated on this scale, continued in about the same ratio during the whole period of the late wars: but with the peace, a large increase is remarkable; and the years 1817 and 1818, shew the largest proportion of pauperism. Subsequently, the proportionate number somewhat diminished; and the years 1824 and 1825, being a period of great commercial activity, the average for the triennial period ending 1826, decreased to about $8\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. on the total population. But the loss of commercial capital in the latter years, and the deficiency of employment of which it was productive, concurred, with the two unfavourable seasons of 1828 and 1829, to swell the number of parochial dependents in the years 1830 to 1832, to 1,391,633; exceeding, in the aggregate, any preceding enumeration, and bearing a proportion to our total number, little less than that noted in the most disastrous seasons.*

* It is necessary to remark, that the table (p. 309) is not placed in our volume as an official return of the actual number of paupers receiving parochial relief, but of the measure of relief distributed in each successive period, calculating the value of money by its power of purchase, and the number of paupers to whom it has been distributed by the returns of 1813, 1814, and 1815; presuming that they offer a fair average for computing the measure of relief distributed to each individual—a plan for calculating the relative degree of pauperism at different periods, which, from the admitted inaccuracy of the returns of the actual number of paupers relieved, affords a fair means of forming a just opinion upon the subject.

Comparative pressure of the charge on the payers of poor-rates.—Let us here look to the progress of the charge in another point of view,—its relative pressure on the productive industry of the country; or, on those contributing to the support of the poor.—This we shall calculate, not according to the actual sum of money contributed per head, but (reducing the contributions into corn value), by the actual amount of subsistence contributed. We shall trace this calculation from the middle of the last century, 1750, being the earliest date for which we find *an official return*.

Table of the relative amount of contribution for the support of the poor, calculated in quarters of corn (wheat), and its comparative pressure per head, on the relative population.

As the prices of corn may be seen by reference to the foregoing table; it is not necessary here to repeat them.

Periods.	Yearly sum expended for the maintenance of the poor in quarters of corn.	Population of England and Wales, about	Average contribution per head in pints of wheat.
1750	460,000	6,467,000	35
1776	690,900	7,800,000	45
1790	1,193,150	8,675,000	70
Average			
1797-1803	1,016,180	9,168,000	56
1808-10	1,201,550	10,490,000	58
1815-17	1,718,460	11,470,000	74
1818-20	1,991,230	11,780,000	86
1821-23	2,108,980	12,110,000	88
1824-26	1,876,380	12,650,000	89
1827-29	2,082,262	13,220,000	80
1830-32	2,186,666	13,890,000	80

Such have been the variations in the actual contributions for the poor; shewing, that since the year 1750, the tax has increased nearly three-fold, notwithstanding a duplication of inhabitants; and inferring that pauperism has spread in a three-

fold ratio with the increase of population. This, however, arises from causes very different from those which the comparison seems to suggest. It proceeds from no decline of the national resources, but solely from the corrupt plan upon which the poor fund is distributed ; and if the sum paid out of the parochial funds in the shape of wages for labour were deducted, the actual burden would be found little, if at all, increased, since the most favoured period of our national annals.

The effect of the poor law on the condition of the labouring classes. — The fundamental principles upon which the British poor laws were enacted, are in every sense commendable. They were intended to secure the performance of the sacred duties of benevolence, to those who, from misfortune or physical incapacity, might be reduced to want ; and as in every civilised community where freedom reigns, cases of extreme necessity will arise, from the very nature of the social compact, it becomes the duty of the government, to whom the rights of society are confided, to provide a remedy ; so that none be left to perish, from need of the common necessities of life. But this is the limit of the duty imposed on the state : every measure of relief to the poor beyond that limit, destroys the very *motives* for exertion, and impairs the vital springs of national prosperity. We have seen that poor laws arose on the decline of the feudal system, and grew out of the very depths of aristocratic tyranny, becoming the more and more important as the nucleus of freedom and social order enlarged its vivifying sphere. The statutes of the Plantagenets and the first two crowned heads of the Tudors, in favour of the poor, are all tainted with sanguinary and tyrannical clauses,* and seem to

* The inhumanity of the savage laws against beggars is illustrated by the following notice of some of the clauses of the Acts

have been wrung from the villanous government by a people merging from a state of secure but ignoble vassalage, into the more precarious but less degrading condition of individual independence. The provisions of these Acts appear to be indefinite, and to give no security to the decrepid or unfortunate, against the extreme severities of fate ; but it was this security, and this alone, which the ministers of Elizabeth intended, when they provided a compulsory assess for the relief of the poor. Although every reign since the age of the Tudors furnishes numerous enactments respecting the management of the poor, it does not appear that the principles of the Act of 1601 were essentially invaded, until about the middle of the reign of George III. The successive enactments passed during this period, of which the most important were the 9th of George I. and 22d George III., did not recognise as objects of relief the able bodied and fully employed labourers ; they offered him no alluring inducements to leave the path of industry and moral integrity, to become the parish pensioner and worthless delinquent :—the 9th of George I. made the workhouse the test of the necessity of the claimant. It had reference to two classes of poor, the able bodied and passed in the reign of the Tudors. By 1 Edward VI. a beggar shall be taken for a vagabond, branded on the shoulder with the letter V. and adjudged a slave for two years to any person who shall demand him ; to be fed on bread and water, and caused to work by beating, chaining, or otherwise ; if he run away within that period, he is to be branded on the cheek with the letter S. and adjudged a slave for life : if he run away again, he is to *suffer death* as a felon. The 14th of Elizabeth recites—sturdy beggars shall for the first offence be grievously whipped, and burnt through the gristle of the right ear with a hot iron of the compass of an inch about ; for the second, be deemed felons ; and for the third, *suffer death* without benefit of clergy.

Dr. Burn, in speaking of the early statutes against vagrancy, says, “ This part of our history looks like the history of savages in America ; almost all severities have been exercised against vagrants, except *scalping*.

the impotent ; to the first it offered work, to the second necessary relief ; and notwithstanding the corruption of principles, which always progresses in the absence of firm checks and rigid responsibility ; and the occasional laxity of a due discrimination, the rate was kept moderate, and the independence of the mass of English labourers preserved. It is the ever to be regretted Act of 36 George III., though conceived by the philosophic mind of Mr. Pitt, which has degraded the most useful portion of the British community to the condition of the *adscripti glebæ* of the feudal times, widened the chasm between the landed proprietor and the laborious peasant, and brought the majority of the working classes under the withering shade of the deadly upas.

This Act, as we have before observed, repealed the 9th George I., which prohibited relief to those who refused to enter the workhouse ; it authorised the magistrates, “ at their discretion,” to order out-door relief, or in other words, to pay a supplement to wages out of the poor’s funds. All protection to the maintenance of the first principles of the institution were thus removed ; and time only was required, by the development of this mischievous and ignorant provision, to produce a lamentable revolution in the moral character of the people, to substitute idleness and licentiousness for industry and frugality, and to work the most injurious results in the condition of the state. Our political economists say, the most valuable knowledge to a statesman, is to know when to do nothing ; how sadly deficient was Pitt in this qualification ! One of the first effects of the power thus delegated to the magistrates was seen in their fixing the minimum rate of wages : this minimum ratio depending, not on the quantity or quality of the work performed, or at all governed by the fact whether the claimant is or is not em-

ployed, but on a nice calculation of the quantity of food necessary for his support, according to the price of provisions and the number of his family : the great demand for labour during the war, and the consequent high prices it commanded, in some degree tended to retard the operation of the *poison* which this *fatal* measure contained. Yet, even the prosperity which so especially favoured British agriculture during that period, could not wholly resist its mortiferous effects on the industrious habits and condition of the labourers ; and its powerful re-action on the landed interest. We see indeed, that during this hey-day of commercial prosperity, when trading income increased fully 300 per cent. ; when the wages of mechanics and the salaries of employés advanced in a similar degree ; and when foreign capital, talent, and labour, were attracted to this country from all parts of Europe, by the allurements of high profits and ample remuneration—notwithstanding all the convincing evidences of a high state of domestic prosperity (fleeting we admit), we see that during this period, the sum collected to maintain the poor and unfortunate agricultural labourers, on a scale just sufficient to sustain vitality, increased no less than 5,300,000*l.*, or 300 per cent. The government were too fully engaged in the work of conquest, and in legislating for property and intelligence, to regard the claims of poverty and ignorance, and the system progressed in its mischievous career, unheeded by those at the helm of affairs. But at the peace, when its fatal effects were severely felt by a higher class, through the great depreciation of landed income, a general demand was made for legislative aid. The great source of depreciation was imperfectly known, and hence unavailing remedies were applied.* In 1817, a parliamentary committee reported on the state of the administra-

* The Corn Bill of 1815.

tion of the poor laws, in nearly the same terms as the one that has just appeared. Its main features were, the admission of an absence of due discrimination on the part of the parochial officers, and the recommendation of the appointment of salaried officers to act as assistant overseers. This gave rise to the Bill of 59 Geo. III.,—adopting the recommendation of the committee,—which seems to have imposed some temporary check to the progress of the *abuse* of the poor laws. The parliamentary reports of 1822, 1824, and 1828, all bear evidence to the miserable state of agriculture, the distressed condition of the labouring classes, and the mal-administration of the poor laws: information on these matters came from all quarters; the press teemed with innumerable publications on the subject, all confirming the existence of the crying evil, and urging the government to arrest its march, by a decided *veto* against the mal-appropriation of the eleemosynary funds.* Still, nothing of importance

* Mr. Collett, of Cambridgeshire, says, in his evidence before the parliamentary committee of labourers' wages in 1824, "Were I to detail the melancholy, degrading, and ruinous system which has been pursued, with few exceptions throughout the country, in regard to the unemployed poor, and in the payment of the wages of idleness, I should scarcely be credited beyond its confines. In the generality of parishes, from five to forty labourers have been without employment, loitering about during the day, engaged in idle games, insulting passengers on their road, or else consuming their time in sleep, that they might be the more ready and active in the hours of darkness. The weekly allowances cannot supply more than food; how then are clothing, firing, and rent, to be provided? By robbery and plunder;—and these so artfully contrived and effected, that discovery has been almost impossible. Picklock keys have readily opened our barns and granaries; and the lower orders of artificers, and even in one or two instances, *small farmers*, have joined the gang, consisting of from ten to twenty men. Corn has been sold by sample in the market of such mixed qualities, by these small farmers, that competent judges have assured me it must have been stolen from different barns, and could not have been produced from their occupations. Disgraceful as these *facts* are to a civilised country, I could enumerate many more, but recital would create disgust." This evi-

was done ; and towards the close of 1830, the embers of disaffection, which had long been smothering beneath the weight of the most goading oppression, burst into flame, and spread the terrific glare of incendiarism throughout the country. Rapine and plunder then formed the availing resources of the labourer ; and the laws lost their power of restraint against a multitude, impelled by direful famine to rebellion.* Such was the state of the agricultural population, and the rapid decline of landed property, when the present administration took office. It was then necessary to do something ; and to every reasonable inquirer, who has perused the ponderous volumes of Reports on our domestic condition—from the committee on the poor law—on agriculture—on labourers' wages, &c., it must appear, that there was already sufficient information before parliament, to authorise some immediate and decided measures ; yet delay was found more convenient : matters of high (we had almost said higher) import, engaged the attention of ministers. The

dence, it is necessary to remind the reader, was given in 1824, yet nothing was done to remedy so glaring an evil. Mr. Collett is perfectly right, in saying that the detail of facts would scarcely be credited beyond the confines of the country. When the author, during his residence in France, has occasionally spoken of the English plan of paying wages out of the poor's fund, his observations have invariably occasioned surprise. The Frenchmen rejoining, " Est ce possible, que le gouvernement Anglais si renommé pour sa sagesse, puisse permettre un de tel système de Continuer ? "

* Answers to the subjoined general question of the poor law commissioners to the overseers of parishes—" Can you give the commissioners any information respecting the causes and consequences of the agricultural riots and burnings of 1830 and 1831 ? "

(From Sherington, Bucks.) " I consider the burnings and riots of 1830 and 1831, to have been *caused by the poor laws.* "

(From Over, Cambridge.) " I consider they arose from the feeling of hatred on the part of the poor man, *brought on by the present poor laws.* "

The Duke of Wellington, very shortly after his retirement from office, attributed in his place in parliament, the rural rebellion of 1830, mainly to the mal-administration of the *poor laws.*

all-absorbing *Parliamentary Reform Bill*, the panacea for all state disorders, was in progress; and it was found *more convenient* to refer the question of *poor law reform* to commissioners of inquiry. Their report is before us; and a more lamentable tale of the progress of social disorganization, destruction of capital, and national ruin, never appeared; in fact, it seems to verify the stigma of the French, who have long called our poor laws, “la plaie la plus dévorante de l’Angleterre.”

Mr. Whateley, in his report from Cookham, thus describes the effect of the allowance system on the condition of the labourer:—

“This allowance of ‘head money’ adapted itself to the circumstances of each family, without any reference at all to their moral qualities. The consequence was, that all distinction between the frugal and the prodigal, the industrious and the idle, the prudent and the thoughtless, was at once destroyed; all were paupers alike: the most worthless were sure of *something*, while the prudent, the industrious, and the sober, with all their care and pains obtained only *something*, and even that scanty pittance was doled out to them by the overseer. Like the Israelites in the Wilderness, they gathered some more and some less, yet he that had gathered much had nothing over, and he that had gathered little had no lack; they only gathered every man according to his *eating*: wages were no longer a matter of contract between the masters and the workmen, but a *right* on the one, and a *tax* on the other; and by removing the motives for exertion, the labourer was rendered as far as possible totally unworthy of his hire. The moral and intellectual character of the good old English labourer who, in former times, had boasted with honest pride that he never was beholden to a parish, was destroyed altogether; all habits of prudence, of self respect, and of self restraint, vanished; and since a family was a sure passport to a parish allowance, it is not to be wondered at that the most improvident marriages were the consequence of this most pernicious and most demoralising system.”*

The truth of Mr. Whateley’s remarks is indeed too abundantly proved by the evidence collected by the commissioners in various parts of the country. The allowance system is there exhibited in all its varied forms of mischief, and in all its

* Report. Appendix A. p. 11.

baneful effects,—such as indifference to labour, decline of industry, concubinage, poaching, thieving; in short, an utter abandonment of every moral principle is too clearly demonstrated. We shall extract a few, out of the list of cases with which the report abounds, shewing the general results of the plan :—

“ In Westoning, Bedfordshire, there is scarcely an able bodied labourer in the employment of individuals but what receives regular relief on account of his family, whether in or out of employment. The change that is made in the characters and habits of the poor, by once receiving parochial relief, is quite remarkable, they are demoralised ever afterwards.”*

“ The general applicants for relief are generally of one family ; the disease is hereditary, and when once a family has applied for relief, they are pressed down for ever.”†

“ This system (the allowance) is a crying evil, working great mischief and distress, carelessness and indifference about his family in the mind of the labourer.”—(Report from Stokumber, Somerset).

Mr. Stuart says, “ the effect of allowance is to destroy all ties of affection between parent and child. Those parents who are thoroughly degraded and demoralised by the effects of allowance, not only take no means to train up their children in habits of industry, but do their utmost to prevent their obtaining employment, lest it should come to the knowledge of the parish officers, and be laid hold of for the purpose of taking away the allowance.”‡

The overseer of Kettering says, “ the paupers employed by the parish, on the roads, never work except when the surveyor or his deputy is present ; immediately his back is turned, a man who gives himself any trouble is laughed at by his companions ; their remark is, you must have your 10s. or 12s. a-week whether you work or not ; I would not be such a fool as to work ; and of course they do any thing but work. If there is a wood near, they run into it to steal firing, which they hide, and carry off at a convenient time ; and universally they are in the habit of stealing any little thing that comes to hand.”

Mr. Richardson, of Northampton, says, “ if a man has a family he receives as much from the parish as he would from any farmer ; accordingly, labourers are indifferent as to pleasing or displeasing their employers ; they quit with the remark, ‘ I can get as much on the roads as if I worked for you.’ ”

* Mr. Barker's Evidence Extracts, p. 84.

† Evidence of Mr. Hobler.

‡ Appendix A. Part. p. 347.

Mr. Majendie states, "in Sussex, labourers refuse work, unless of a description *agreeable* to them; at Eastbourn (1832) men receiving from 12s. to 14s. per week from the parish, refuse to work at threshing for a farmer at 2s. 6d. and a quart of beer per day. The fishermen, secure of *pay without labour*, refuse to go to sea in the winter."

We could fill the remaining sheets of our volume by multiplying quotations from this report; but the recital of many of the cases there adduced could but create *disgust*, and excite the most lively fears as to the preservation of the state resources. They all bear melancholy evidence of the degrading and ruinous system which has been pursued; and, in a national sense, of the incalculable injury which the productive powers of the state and the resources of individuals have sustained, and must yet sustain, through the operation of such a perverse and unnatural deviation from the elementary principles of government.

It is clear, that the funds collected under the assessment can but be a part of the wages or produce of labour; and that the tax must increase in a ratio with the depression of wages. In fact it is obvious, that the greater the charge for poor's rate on the produce, the less remains to be divided among the producers, and *vice versa*. Hence it is evident, that where the income spent in the parish is produced in the parish, the plan of receiving from the labourer with the one hand and paying him with the other, the actual funds received can, in a financial view, effect no possible advantage, but on the contrary, sacrifice in a manner worse than useless, whatever sums are expended in the collection, distribution, and general management of the funds. Thus, various items of disbursement, such as law charges (always considerable), removal of paupers, expenses of overseers and officers, besides the frauds practised on the parochial authorities, of which so many cases are cited in the late committee's report, and the time consumed

in the process, are all clear and unnecessary losses to the labourer, and diminish his wages in relative proportion.

In ordinary course, labour—did no artificial impediment exist—would seek employment where it found the best compensation ; and in general, it would be best compensated where it produced commodities of the greatest value, or rather, produced the greatest property. Ere the comparatively recent improvement of manufacturing machinery, labour produced a greater value, applied to agriculture than to manufactures ; and hence, the productive industry of the country was principally directed to agriculture ; but recent improvements have transferred the most important branches of manufacture from the cottage door to the factory, and the great stimulus given to manufacturing industry, has had the effect of raising the wages of the artisan to nearly two-fold that of the field labourer. So that, in natural course, this inducement to migrate from the country to towns, would cause those flowings from the higher to the lower channels, that is, from those overstocked, to those understocked branches of industry, which would bring the rate of wages in both departments more nearly to a level. But here the poor law system intervenes : to that portion of labourers employed in agriculture, who, from depression of prices, and a consequent slackness in the demand for labour, *may* constitute a redundant body of labourers in that particular branch of industry, and who would hence seek employment in other branches of commerce, where the proportion of the demand for, to the offer of labour, was more nearly equipoised, it says ; “ Your absence from profitable employment shall not impair your condition : although *you earn nothing*, you shall be *supported* from the *earnings* of others, just upon the same ratio of stipend as when you were employed ; with this

proviso, that while you are able to work, your services shall be at the disposal of the parochial authorities. Under this arrangement, the parochial officers have always at their disposal, a large body of labourers, which are brought into the field of competition with other labourers, and their services sold,—“knocked down,”—to the highest bidder, just like the gangs of negroes in the West Indies; the parish agreeing to counterpoise the deficiency, between the wages received and the scale of allowance, out of the parochial funds.* This is just the rotation of the system, and thus the rate of wages is kept at its *minimum* to the whole collective body of labourers. “The plan ensures to the labourer all a slave’s security, without his liability to punishment:” it relieves him as to any anxiety in procuring subsistence, and hence retains him in an ignoble dependence, or unprofitable employment, who would else have directed his labour and ingenuity to other resources. The dispersion of hands from branches of over-stocked labour is thus restrained; the glut is longer perpetuated, and a more lengthened depression of wages the certain result. Hence, what the legislature intended as a boon, and the humane, but unconscious, consider national benevolence, proves a sore bereavement to the objects whom it is intended to benefit.

But let us briefly review its effects in another point, namely, in perpetuating ignorance, and

* In many places, the roundsmen system is effected by means of an auction. Mr. Richardson states, that in Sulgrave, Northamptonshire, the old and infirm are *sold at the monthly meeting to the best bidders*, at prices varying from 1s. 6d. to 3s. per week; that at Yardley-Hastings, all the unemployed men are put up to sale weekly, and that the clergyman of the parish told him he had seen ten men the last week, “*knocked down*” to one farmer for 5s., and that there were at that time about 70 men out of a body of 170, let out in this manner.—Report. Appendix I, part i., p. 140.

in impeding the diffusion of useful education among the poor.

Low state of education among the labouring classes, its effect, and the importance of improvement.—It has been already shewn, that the operation of the poor law is to retain wages at a *minimum* rate ; that rate being such as provides no means of educating a family, or of discharging the moral obligation of parents to children. It is evident, that where the earnings of parents are barely adequate to procure the prime essentials to subsistence, the family must be deprived of even those common rudiments of education which might lead to their attaining mechanical skill ; and this deprivation, narrowing the sphere of their usefulness in a great degree, renders them incapable of adapting themselves to any other kind of employment than that which their parent has ordinarily followed. The special commission of 1830 and 1831, forcibly unfolded to public view, the prevailing ignorance among the English peasantry ; and we do not doubt, but that the prolonged continuance of an excess of labourers in agricultural districts, and the consequent inadequacy of wages, with all other accompanying evils, are, in a very great degree, attributable to the absence of primary instruction among the rural population. We especially invite our readers to peruse the subjoined notes, illustrative of the lamentable ignorance which prevails in the rural districts.* We may yet observe, that

* Evidence of the ignorance of the peasantry : Committed for rioting ; destroying machinery, &c., and tried before the judges of the special commission in 1830, &c. :

Berkshire.—Of 138 persons committed to Reading gaol, 25 only could read ; 76 could neither read nor write : 120 were under 40 years, varying from 35 to 18 years.

Hants.—Of 332 prisoners committed for trial at Winchester, 105 could neither read nor write ; nearly the whole were deplorably ignorant of even the rudiments of religious knowledge.

the annexed accounts of the low state of intelligence among the labouring classes, bear reference to an adult population, whose youth was passed during a period when no inconsiderable portion of the rich, and the generality of the clerical body,

Kent.—About one half of the prisoners committed to Maidstone gaol could neither read nor write, and nearly the whole were totally ignorant with regard to the nature and obligation of religion.

Abingdon.—Of 30 prisoners tried, 6 only could read and write, 11 could read imperfectly, the remainder were wholly uneducated.

Berks.—Of 79 prisoners convicted at Aylesbury, only 30 could read and write.

Sussex.—Of 50 persons put on trial at Lewes, 13 only could read and write, 12 could read imperfectly, and only one could read well.

These statements were attested by the local authorities, and deduced from the correspondence of the British and Foreign original Lancastrian school society: they are contained in the appendix to Mr. Joseph Hume's letter to a minister of state, printed for private distribution.

This absence of education does not appear limited to the peasantry. Mr. Moylan, who acted as revising barrister under the Reform Act, says, "The general ignorance and stupidity of the overseers in country parishes in Cheshire and Nottinghamshire, surpassed any thing I could have previously conceived. In some of the agricultural parishes, we found a ✕ substituted for the overseer's signature for the list of voters. Many lists were made out and signed by the village schoolmaster, or some other person who accompanied the overseer in attendance on our court, and who was alone competent to answer on his behalf any inquiries we deemed it requisite to make." Mr. Maclean says, "In 1832, I revised the list of voters for the western division of Sussex; and in the present year, I revised the lists of the northern division of the county of Essex. In both counties, I met with many overseers apparently perfectly unable to comprehend, from reading the Reform Act, what they were required to do. Many were unable to write at all, and others could with difficulty affix their names to the lists. Few were capable of furnishing any information, or of understanding any distinction between a *freehold* and a *leasehold* qualification." The Rev. Robert Ellison, rector of Slaugham, Sussex, says; "It is difficult to get a person in villages to audit accounts. My vestry clerk is a pauper, and not a good character; the two last overseers could neither read nor write."

wickedly opposed the spread of education among the poor.* During the last five or six years, reform has been growing—a more liberal feeling has prevailed, and the opponents to the expansion of intellectual light, and the enlargement of social happiness, unable to stem the flowings of generous benevolence, have deemed it prudent no longer to impede the progress of education, but to aid the march of instruction in those rudiments which accord with the peculiar forms and tenets of the

* Mr. Hume—than whom no man has more ample means of correct information—says, in his pamphlet, “That the establishment of Lancasterian schools was opposed by the rich, and especially by the clergy; and that wherever it was found impossible wholly to suppress them, means, the most disgraceful, were used to prevent their increase. The most effectual of which, was the hypocritical pretence of a willingness to teach the people by the establishment of national schools. In many places, where a national school was opened, and in places where the subscription was unequal to the support of two schools, and was yet divided between two, the Lancasterian school was generally ruined, and no school remained. In other places, no sooner was a subscription opened for a Lancasterian school, than another subscription was commenced for a national school; and the consequence was, that no school of any sort was established.”

It is well known, that this disinclination to encourage the establishment of elementary schools, pervaded the highest orders of the state; and the various reports of the education committee, unfold a lamentable catalogue of the mis-appropriation of funds generously bequeathed for the instruction of the poor. The Pocklington, Mere, Spital, and many other cases, are lasting testimonies of these peculations. We cannot refrain from noticing one case, which stands pre-eminent for injustice. In substance it is as follows:—“Mr. Troutback died without heirs, and bequeathed 2000*l.* for erecting an orphan hospital, and the whole of his property, amounting to upwards of 100,000*l.* to trustees, for erecting an additional wing, or separate building, to the charity school of St. John of Wapping, and for maintaining, clothing, and educating poor children of that parish. The government availed itself of some technical informality in the wording of the will. The testament was *set aside* by the court of Chancery, the property declared *forfeited as a droit of the crown*, and in 1816 appropriated to the discharge of the arrears of the civil list.—See report of the education committee 1816, p. 289. [This plunder ought to be restored].

church establishment. Our note (page 50) evinces the existence of enlarged means for the diffusion of elementary education, and that this good feeling will expand with the very cause which it nurtures, there is every fair reason to conclude.

It is difficult to express the extreme importance of dispensing elementary education to the humbler classes. No society can enjoy the advantages of civilization if each member is not acquainted with reading, writing, and accounts. To be peaceful, united, and happy at home—great, powerful, and influential abroad, we must be both morally and physically strong; our internal peace, the maintenance of our civil and political institutions, our means of support, nay our very existence as a nation, depend as much on the intellectual as on the physical grandeur of the state; to be convinced of this truth, we have but to consider the basis upon which our commercial superiority is founded, and we trace it to the comparative standard of national intelligence—to the cultivation of the arts which favour and perfect labour. Strongly, however, as we would advocate the importance of dispensing education to the humbler classes, we very much doubt the efficacy of any direct interference on the part of the government, tending to the establishment of national institutions for gratuitous instruction. That it is the duty of those in authority to favour the diffusion of moral and religious education, must be generally admitted; but any direct interference on the part of the government would, in our opinion, give rise to so much jealousy among the various sects (an effect so deeply felt in Ireland), and so damp the zeal of private individuals for the diffusion of intelligence, that no good results would be effected. If the British, like the Prussian community were poor, or like the French chiefly ignorant, a state provision would be highly desirable; and whether it cost an annual 10,000*l.*,

100,000*l.*, or 1,000,000*l.*, the property, if honestly applied, would be economically employed; but with an opulent society possessing a high standard of talent, where the spontaneous endeavours of private individuals are so actively and so well conducted, the good policy of such a course is highly problematical; much good may however be done by occasional parliamentary grants, to facilitate the establishment of elementary schools; but in this case, great impartiality should be manifested in the distribution of the property, and no favour should be shewn to any particular sect; for, where all religions are tolerated, it is not just that one portion of the community should be taxed for the education of another. The grant being fairly applied, the government should abstain from any further interference in the rules or management of the establishment, and the whole should be left in the hands of private individuals. From this digression we return, to review the operation of the poor laws.

The operation of the poor laws on the value of landed property.—The effect of the mal-administration of the poor laws in the degradation of labourers, and in the utter extinction of every moral and industrious principle, could not be slow in re-acting on the properties of the landed interest. The report of 1833 on agriculture, and the present poor law committee report, furnish some important illustrations of its destructive influence. Several instances are adduced in these reports of the abandonment of farms, through the operation of the poor's rate, and the whole tenor of the evidence bears testimony to a declining state of agriculture. We extract from these reports, in a condensed form, a few, from among a multitude of cases bearing on this point:—

"In the neighbourhood of Aylesbury there were forty-two farms untenanted at Michaelmas last (1832), most of these are still on the proprietor's hands, and in some no acts of husbandry have been done since, in order to avoid the payment of poor rate. I attribute these circumstances principally to the operation of the poor laws."*

"If some material change does not very soon take place, the time is not far distant when the whole rent will be absorbed in the poor's rate."†

"In the parish of Thornborough, Bucks, there are at this time 600 acres of land unoccupied. The greater part of the other tenants have given notice of their intention to quit their farms owing entirely to the increasing burden of the poor's rate."

"Mr. Majendie states, that in Lenham, Kent, at the time of his visit, some of the land was out of cultivation."

"The owners of untenanted farms, who are not farmers, fear to occupy, and prefer the loss of rent to the unlimited expense in poor's rate."—(Adstock, Bucks).

From Cholesbury, Bucks, there is evidence of the total abandonment of a parish to the poor.

"The population of this parish has been almost stationary since 1801; the rates in the year 1816 (99*l.* 4*s.*), rose in 1831 to 150*l.* 5*s.*; and in 1832, when they were proceeding at the rate of 367*l.* per annum, suddenly ceased, from the impossibility of collecting them; the landlords having given up their rents, the farmers their tenancies, and the clergyman his glebe and his tithes."‡

Respecting the depreciation in the value of land, there are numerous instances cited. The answer from Westfield, Sussex, is—

"The annual value of real property assessed here in 1815, 3390*l.*, became in November 1829, 1959*l.* 5*s.*; it has undoubtedly fallen in value since that time.§——Mr. Pilkington says, on visiting Wigston Magna, Leicestershire, November, 1832, he was informed 'that the value of land had fallen one-half since 1820, and was yet unsaleable.' On his return to that neighbourhood three months after, the statement made to him was, 'that property in land was gone, and that the rates could not be collected without judicial sales.'"||

* Appendix (B. 1.) Sherington, Bucks, p. 43:

† Gillingham, Kent. Report.

‡ Extracts from evidence, p. 86.

§ Appendix (B 1), page 531.

|| Appendix (A), Part II.

These are but a few of the sad catalogue of cases contained in the late report, which evidence the rapid decline of farming capital, and the progressive ruin of agriculture. Such effects were fully predicted in the evidence before the poor law committees of 1817 and 1824, and the agricultural report of 1821.

The report of 1817 says, "that unless some efficacious check is interposed, there is every reason to think that the amount of assessments will continue to increase, until at a period more or less remote, according to the progress the evil has already made in different places, it will have absorbed the whole profits of the properties on which the rate may have been assessed; producing thereby the neglect and ruin of the land, and the waste and removal of other property, to the utter subversion of the happy order of society so long upheld in these realms."

These lugubrious vaticinations, however disregarded at that time, appear on the eve of realization. Already the burden of maintaining a dissolute peasantry, and the system of stifling human industry by offering a boon to inactivity, has, in some instances, absorbed the entire produce of the land; and ignorance and poverty, the offspring of idleness, merging into turbulence and criminality, have changed those whose industry once constituted the great and prolific source of our national prosperity, into destructive instruments of national ruin.

The question of legislative interference in the adoption of energetic measures to arrest the march of destruction, is completely set at rest by the general evidence adduced before the commissioners, and by their able and useful report. Interference on the part of the government can be no longer deferred, and a bold effort must be made to crush the hideous hydra of corruption.

The reforms proposed by the commissioners, we intend to discuss in the following section.

SECTION II.—REMEDIAL MEASURES PROPOSED BY
THE POOR LAW COMMISSIONERS.

Question as to the total abolition of the poor law.—The hostility of modern political economists to the entire fabric of the British poor law, is well known; and the conclusions of Malthus, Ricardo, Senior, M'Culloch, and other writers of deep erudition and acknowledged talent, "that the only effectual means of improving the poor law is to *abolish it in toto*," have long been submitted to the test of public opinion. Indeed, if the evils which the evidence and the report unfold are necessarily incidental to *any system* of compulsory relief, many would accord in this severe, but needful remedy. Experience, however, proves that such evils are not necessary consequents on a system of compulsory aid, when conducted on right principles. During the administrations of Walpole—Chatham—Bute, and indeed from an early period, until the era of the American war, the operation of the poor law was attended with no such results as have been witnessed since the passing of the fatal measure of the 36th Geo. III.; and from the practical effect of reforms lately introduced into the system by various parishes, it is fair to presume that a provision for the indigent may be maintained, without its being made a boon to idleness, and a fruitful source of moral degradation. Indeed, sound as may be the opinion of political economists on this subject, and consistent as it may be with "the greatest happiness principle," in a general sense, yet it is quite impossible that the benevolent, generous, and charitable community of Great Britain, could concur in any measure which would expose the aged and infirm portion of the labouring population to *perish* from the incapacity of earning the means of subsistence, on the plea that

such a measure would amend the condition of others. The question of the *abolition* of the poor law cannot be entertained ; all that can be done is, to adopt the best means of improving its operation.

With this object, the commissioners propose several remedial measures, which we propose consecutively to review.

Remedial measures.—The situation of able bodied paupers, say the commissioners, “ should not be really or apparently so eligible as that of an independent labourer of the lowest class ; every penny which tends to oppose this principle, is a bounty on indolence and vice.”—The object should be, to let the labourer feel that the parish is the hardest taskmaster, and the worst paymaster he can find, and thus induce him to make it his *last* and not his *first* resource. Under the present system, it is found that wherever relief is permitted to remain *eligible*, no barrier depending on the investigation of cases will be strong enough to exclude abuse and fraud ; the only true test is, to make relief *ineligible* except to those who are absolutely destitute. This principle, coupled with the immutable determination of refusing to pay a supplement to wages out of the poor’s fund, has been adopted in various parishes, with the greatest success. The plan of several parishes has been to give those who applied for relief, full employment by piece-work, at wages something below the ordinary rate paid to the independent labourer. In others, provided with suitable workhouses, the regulations have been, to employ the inmates with the object of forming industrious habits in the young, and of deterring the indolent. “ Into such a house none will enter voluntarily ; work, confinement, and discipline, will deter the indolent and vicious, and nothing but extreme necessity will induce any to accept the comfort which must be obtained by the

surrender of their free agency, and the sacrifice of their accustomed habits and gratifications." These methods seem to be the only safe tests as to the necessity of the applicants; and indeed the most effectual means of relief to the labouring poor. We shall give, in a condensed form, a few examples of the effects produced by the adoption of these principles:—

"At Cookham, the effects of this plan were the conversion of able bodied paupers into independent labourers; about sixty-three heads of families at once disappeared from the poor's books, and the wages of the great body of the labourers were improved."

In Swallowfield, "all the able bodied paupers left the workhouse; the claimants diminished in number, wages improved, and the rates fell fifty per cent."

At Leckhamstead, "forty-three able bodied labourers were formerly chargeable to the parish, three only are now chargeable; work is more easily obtained at fair wages: the expenditure, which during the five years preceding the change was 4172*l.*, became in the subsequent five years, 3000*l.*"

At Southwell, "the inmates of the workhouse diminished the first year of the introduction of the system, from eighty to thirty, and in the second year to eleven. The total decennial charge preceding the change, 13,928*l.*, became in the ten years subsequent, 4005*l.*"

At Hatfield, where the marquis of Salisbury has been zealous in bringing into action useful reform, "the saving of expense in ten years, amounts to 14,000*l.*; all the independent labourers find work within the parish, and wages are higher than in any other neighbouring parish where a similar system is not adopted."*

Mr. Osler furnishes some valuable information in an account of the *improved* workhouse system at Falmouth:—

"In 1821 a new workhouse was built, but the discipline was inefficient; subsequently it was regulated upon better principles, and all proper cases were ordered in. The effect was not only to cut off a great number of out paupers, but also *actually to diminish the number* in the house.† The diminution of expense was as follows—

* Evidence of Rev. J. Faithful, rector. Appendix A. pt. ii.

† We have not space to give the report verbatim; all we can do is to give the substance of it.

The last year before the new workhouse.

Year ending	1820	Expenditure. 2321 <i>l.</i> ,
Select vestry and workhouse, but without discipline.		
Average 1821 and 1822		2000 <i>l.</i> , population 4392
1823 — 1824 . . .		1794
1825 — 1826 . . .		1634
1827 — 1828 . . .		1501
	1829 . . .	1938*

Introduction of moderate regularity into the house, with increased strictness in ordering in paupers 1830 . . . 1378

Introduction of efficient discipline, no relief given out of the house except in casual or peculiar cases—

Average 1831 and 1832, 1090*l.*, population 4761

These are a few of the numerous cases cited in the report, illustrating the results of poor law reform both in towns and rural districts; results which lead the commissioners to conclude that where labourers have been rendered independent of partial relief, except in well regulated workhouses, their industry has been restored and improved; frugal habits have been created or strengthened; the permanent demand for labourers increased; and their wages, so far from being depressed by the increased amount of labour in the market, have in general advanced; the number of improvident and wretched marriages diminished; discontent has abated; and their moral and social condition improved. Hence they infer that the poor laws may be retained as a resource against want, and the right principles of civil society upheld, without endangering our national resources.

Institution of a central board of commissioners, and its powers.—The commissioners recommend that

* The excess in this year was owing to a cargo of distressed German emigrants, who remained for several months, their vessel being unseaworthy. The extraordinary charge thus incurred included a rate of 127*l.* 7*s.* raised expressly for contributing to the hire of a vessel to carry them to their destination.

the entire administration of the poor laws shall for the future centre in a central board of control, with powers to regulate workhouses and their general management—incorporate parishes for poor-house management—to enforce a uniform system of accounts—incorporate parishes for the appointment and payment of permanent overseers, and for the payment of public labour—*recommend, and remove officers connected with the relief of the poor*—direct parochial supplies to be by contract and free competition—to act, in case of fraud, as public prosecutors—treat relief as a loan, and recoverable under the 59th George III. c. 12, § 29, and by attachment of wages—regulate relief by apprenticing children, and hereafter to inquire into the operation of the laws of apprenticing children, and of the regulations of the board—regulate relief to vagrants and discharged prisoners—appoint and remove assistant commissioners, subordinate officers, &c., and report annually.

The chief object of centring these extensive powers in a board of commissioners is, effectually to abolish out-door relief, concurrent with a large extension of the workhouse system under more efficient and economical regulations; to do, in fact, what Mr. Gilbert's Act proposed in 1782—put an end to the shameful jobbing system practised by unworthy overseers, and maintain the efficiency of the poor law in its legitimate character.

These recommendations, it appears, are in the main approved by ministers. To give effect to the extension of the workhouse system; the central board, composed of three commissioners, may order workhouses to be built, and borrow money for the purpose on the security of parochial, or rather district rates.—Out-door relief is to cease, except as to medical attendance, and in particular cases subject to the approval of the board; and no relief is to be given except by the board of guardians.

The recommendations as to the dismissal of salaried parochial officers; as to contracts, and also as to settlements and bastardy, are to be confirmed.* All heads of settlement, except birth, parentage, and marriage, are to be abolished. — Children hereafter born, to follow the parents' settlement till the age of 16, and then revert to a birth settlement. Persons to be presumed born where first known to have existed. Bastards to follow their mother's settlement till 16. — The mother of illegitimate children bound to maintain them. The commissioners may summon individuals before them to give evidence and produce accounts; and may commit, *at pleasure*, such persons to the county gaol for one month, who will possess *no right of appeal to the civil courts*, but who may proceed against the commissioners by indictment.† Such, we believe, are the chief provisions of the bill now before parliament.‡ — Immediate perfection in measures purporting to effect so great a transition

* Although various instances are adduced of the beneficial effects resulting from the appointment of salaried officers; yet the question of expense imposes very important objections to the general adoption of the plan. If, for instance, a salaried officer was appointed to superintend the disbursements for every *four* parishes, at a salary of 150*l.* per annum, a stipend by no means excessive where great trust is imposed, risk incurred, security required, and impartial and independent conduct indispensable, the charge would be no less than 401,250*l.* per annum, calculating the number of parishes at 10,700. This expense is so great, that parliament will pause ere they concur in the universal adoption of the plan; although in densely peopled districts it may be economical. In thinly peopled districts, the Scotch plan appears more suitable; and if the necessary authority was vested in residents of confirmed respectability, to *disburse* relief under the restrictions which the Act of 1834 will impose, the anticipated advantages of the new system might be more economically obtained.

† Lord Althorp's exposition.

‡ These sheets are at press while the Bill is in progress; we cannot, of course, state what alterations it will undergo in the committee.

in the accustomed system of administering the poor laws, cannot be expected, and time will be required to shew the efficacy or inefficacy of the proposed reforms; to correct that which works ill, and to confirm that which works well. None of the various plans of poor law reform, which during the last forty years have received legislative sanction, have been found effective; and the evil of the abusive system has been rapidly growing, in spite of every attempt to arrest it. The importance of success is so supreme, and the evils to be overcome so inveterate, that those who feel a deep interest in the conservation of British resources, and the spread of independence and intelligence among the labouring classes, will concur in strong measures to attain the one by eradicating the other. Yet the institution of such a *triumvirate* as a board of three commissioners, clothed with such extensive—we would say, dangerous—powers and patronage as are now proposed to be given, appears little suited to the British character or constitution, and objectionable, both in a political and financial point of view. We cannot but think, that if the Scotch system of administering relief had served as the model for English imitation, a more economical, more constitutional, and equally efficient plan would have been the result.* The power

* In Scotland, the funds collected for the relief of the poor scarcely amount to 100,000*l.* per annum; and are derived from voluntary subscriptions, fines for immoralities, baptismal, marriage, and funeral fees, bequeathed legacies, dowers in land, and occasionally by a moderate levy on the inhabitants. The number of poor, or rather of those receiving parochial relief, scarcely amounts to one-fifth the English proportion to the population.

The main cause of the great excess of pauperism in England, is the corruption of principle; but the difference in the plan of management has effectually retained in Scotland, that which has been long lost in England, viz.—“the original object of the fund.”

In England, the total management of the fund being vested in annually chosen overseers, frequently unacquainted with the

given to the commissioners to commit "at pleasure" any witness they may choose to summon before them, seems to be quite unnecessary, and opposed to the genius of the British constitution; it, in fact, is nearly allied to the resuscitation of the star-chamber, and the practical abolition of habeas corpus, significantly termed the bulwark of British liberties. We are not to consider what this notable board *will* do, but what it *can* do. It *can* summon witnesses before itself, and propose questions; these questions may be answered to the full ability of the party examined; yet, at their caprice, the commissioners may think otherwise, and commit the party to prison, to give him time to revive his memory; at the end of the month, they act in the same way, to the same party; and to what length this power may be extended, or how many people may be immured by these governing commissioners, or for how long, without the power of appeal, it is impossible to say: this kind of legal torture is more likely to lead to false witness than true evidence. We do not suppose that the commissioners *will* exercise this absolute prerogative, but they *can* do so; and laws, we presume, ought to oppose both will and power to do wrong. Indeed it seems probable that this power will very rarely, perhaps never, be exercised; for the public mind is so opposed to it, that should it be brought into action, "the pressure from without" would overturn the whole fabric; it being quite impossible that flagrant injustice could long reign in this country. If it is thought necessary to give such a

circumstances of those applying for relief, and sometimes interested in perpetuating abuse, that due discrimination, which is so essential in the disbursement of a charitable fund, is unpractised; while in Scotland, the execution being vested in such men as landlords, clergymen, or deacons, whose functions are *permanent*, a more intimate acquaintance with the habitual condition of the inhabitants of the district, is acquired; greater discrimination is used, and more salutary effects the consequence.

power to the board, why not give the party committed the right of appeal on giving security for the costs? Such a plan is found effective in various instances against vexatious suits; and under such restrictions, none would appeal who were not conscious of having suffered injustice.

To another part of this Bill, as proposed by the government, there seems firm ground for objection; we allude to that clause which burdens the mother of an illegitimate with its entire support. It certainly, from the numerous instances of false swearing adduced, and the difficulty of fixing the guilt on the putative father, is a difficult question to deal with; but the effect of the measure will be to save the father's income at the expense of the parish, which, in many cases, will be burdened with the support of the illegitimate; and hence the expense of maintaining the poor be proportionably increased.

Economy of maintaining the poor in large or small collective bodies.—Much useful evidence was adduced before the committee, on the comparative economy of maintaining the poor in large or small collective bodies; and the comparative efficiency of large and small work-houses, or more properly, poor-houses.

On this subject, Mr. Mott states, that if the maintenance of 500 persons cost 10*l.* per head, 1000 would cost 9*l.* per head.* In large work-houses, economy is practicable by an appropriate classification of the inmates, and hence varying the nature of the supplies: for instance, in the smaller work-houses, the children receive nearly the same diet as the adults; when, if they were separated, they might receive a diet both cheaper and more wholesome.

The relative economy in maintaining the poor in large and small parishes, is practically and very

* See the Committee Report, page 314.

forcibly illustrated, by returns from seven counties* of the expense of poor rates per head, in the largest, the intermediate, and the least parishes. We have not space to give the whole of this return, but the following will shew the general result:—

In the 67 largest parishes, containing a population of 178,208, or an average of 2660 inhabitants, the contribution per head was				9s.	0 $\frac{3}{4}$ d.
—	66 intermediate ditto	789	—	14	4
—	67 —	333	—	14	11 $\frac{3}{4}$
Of all England the 100 absolutely largest parishes, containing 3,196,064				do.	6 7
—	100 intermediate .	19,841	—	15	0
—	100 least. .	1,708	—	£1 11	11 $\frac{1}{2}$

The economy attendant on the incorporation of rural districts is also proved by a comparison of the expense of the eight unincorporated hundreds of Suffolk, with that of the nine incorporated hundreds of the same county. Making the calculation on the basis of the real property assessment in 1815, it appears that the expense of maintaining the poor, from the years 1824 to 1831, was 53 per cent. in favour of the incorporated hundreds.

Added to the advantages in point of economy, which would attend the plan of incorporating parishes, there are others which claim an equal approval. By this means, numerous capacities will be brought into one centre, providing a greater power of applying labour to useful purposes. The inmates of a district work-house, especially in large establishments, may be variously classed, according to the varied employments they have heretofore followed. The supply of the articles consumed in the work-houses, the necessary repairs, and perhaps the cultivation of the grounds attached, would provide useful sources of employment. All these advantages, which in fact are more important as a check against indolence, than

* Bedfordshire, Berks, Bucks, Cambridge, Chester, Cornwall, and Cumberland.

as a source of profit, are lost in parishes unprovided with work-houses, or possessing them on an inefficient scale. In such parishes where the treatment of the poor has been left to an unpaid overseer, the trouble of superintendence has tended to disconnect utility with employment. The latter has been provided by various useless expedients ; such as sending paupers on fictitious errands with baskets full of stones ; or with blank paper directed as letters, and by other devices of the same nature, obviously intended to *torment* them.* However degraded a man's condition may be, he revolts at such contrivances. Employment, only, is not the one thing needful ; it must be *useful* employment. Every man, with a spark of human feeling in his composition, is conscious that his labour should be beneficial and productive. Even the prisoners at the Brixton House of Correction feel indignant at "grinding the wind;†" and every human being feels a kind of natural satisfaction in the consciousness that he is *usefully* employed : nay, we would say more, he feels the moral obligation of being useful in his generation.

Question as to existence of a surplus of agricultural labourers, and the effect of the poor laws on marriage, bastardy, and population discussed.—The question as to the actual existence of a surplus body of labourers in the agricultural districts, is very problematical ; and although the commissioners seem to recommend measures for facilitating emigration, they produce no evidence to prove, that, under a good system of management, the supply of labour exceeds the actual demand for it. They say, "the present state of the administration of the poor law, does not allow us to ascertain in a great *majority* of the parishes we have referred to, what the demand for labour would be, if work were sought with energy and performed

* Report, 1834. † Address to the Working Classes, 1832.

with diligence ; and further, we have already had to state, amongst the most gratifying results of poor laws, that the dispauperised labourers have found employment to a greater extent than the most sanguine friend of the change could have anticipated."

The commissioners are yet decidedly inclined to the opinion that there is, and while a system of compulsory relief for the poor is maintained that there will continue to be, a surplus quantity of labourers ; founding their reasoning upon the encouragement to marriage held out by the poor laws, and the increase of population in the rural districts. The report says, "that one of the most unquestionable effects of the poor law is the encouragement and increase of improvident marriages ;" an unqualified statement, which we think is satisfactorily confuted by the evidence furnished in the population returns of 1831. The general tenor of the late report leads us to suppose that the great majority of the labouring classes marry with a view of obtaining an enlarged weekly allowance : such may indeed appear to be the natural tendency of the compulsory nature of relief afforded to the poor ; but that such is the practical effect, in a general sense, is disproved by the clearest evidence.

We have already shewn (p. 207) the inferior proportion of marriages in the agricultural, compared with the manufacturing counties. We shall here, however, to obviate the necessity of a reference, give a few more comparisons :

Proportion of marriages to the population.

Manufacturing counties.		Agricultural counties.	
York City and		Essex	1 in 154
Ainsty	1 in 113	Berks	1 in 149
Gloucestershire . .	1 in 117	Wilts	1 in 148
Warwick	1 in 120	Somerset	1 in 147
York (West Riding)	1 in 131		
<hr/> Average . . . 1 in 120 $\frac{1}{4}$		<hr/> Average . . . 1 in 149 $\frac{1}{2}$	

These returns shew, that in the manufacturing counties, where the population is chiefly concentrated in towns, and where the allowance system is comparatively little known, the marriages are one-fourth, or twenty-five per cent. more numerous than in the agricultural counties, where the poor law reigns in all its corrupted sovereignty. Ireland furnishes a proof that the poor law is not the primary cause of improvident marriages. Ireland, in which there is not, nor ever has been any provision for the poor, is the very theatre whereon all the evils of such marriages are exhibited: without a poor law, she has outstripped all other countries in improvident marriages; indeed, the evidence adduced before the commissioners tends to prove that the English poor law, so far from having a *general* tendency to promote marriage, rather imposes obstacles to legal matrimony, and banefully drives the multitude to habits of concubinage. Let us look to the evidence on this point.

Mr. Dodgson, of Cumberland, says "we, at this time, in our parish, are supporting two bastard children, whose mothers have landed property of their own, and would not marry the father of their children. The daughters of some farmers and even land owners, who keep their daughters' bastard children with them, regularly keep back the poor rate, to meet the parish allowance for their daughters' bastards."*

Captain Pringle says, "that the allowance made to the mother for the support of her child is an encouragement to the offence."

Mr. Sewell, of Swaffham, after giving some strong illustrations of inducements held out to concubinage by the poor law, says, "a bastard child is about twenty-five per cent. more valuable to a parent (on the scale of allowance) than a legitimate child. The premium upon want of chastity, perjury, and extortion, is here very obvious, it is considered a good speculation to marry a woman who can bring to her husband a fortune of one or two bastards."†

The evidence throughout is ample in proof of the encouragement given by the poor and bastardy

* This, it will be seen, is not what is meant.—It evidently means, some farmers, and even landlords, whose daughters having bastard children, living with them, regularly keep back, &c.

† See Committee Report, 1834, pp. 169—71.

laws to the crime of concubinage. A reference to the returns of the number of illegitimate children born in the year 1830, will confirm the above testimony. This document shews that the illegitimate births are proportionally much less numerous in the towns than in the country. The total number of illegitimate children born in England and Wales in the above year was 20,039, of whom 10,147 were males and 9892 females, being about as 1 in 19 to the total number of births. In Middlesex (the metropolis county) the proportion was only as 1 in 38, while in Pembrokeshire it was as 1 in 8, and in Radnor 1 in 7. The diminished ratio in Middlesex may be deemed remarkable, considering the opposite result in a neighbouring nation, in the capital of which the illegitimate births are as 1 in 2, while in the provinces they are only as 1 in 14* (see p. 44 *n.*). Notwithstanding this very large excess of illegitimate births in the country compared with the towns, still the ratio of the increase of population is very greatly inferior.

This fact we shall again illustrate, by comparing the actual increase in the manufacturing and the agricultural districts during the decade ending 1831.

Increase of population.

Manufacturing counties.		Agricultural counties	
Chester	24 per cent.	York North Riding	2 per cent.
Warwick	23 ditto	Rutland	5 ditto
York West Riding	22 ditto	Herefordshire . .	7 ditto
Stafford	19 ditto	Wilts	8 ditto
<hr/> Average increase 22		<hr/> Average increase 5½	

* This apparent disparagement may in some degree exist in applying the word illegitimate to all who are deposited in the hospitals for the reception of *les enfans trouvés*, and who are in many cases the children of wedded parents who are too poor to maintain them. In England, this grievous necessity is obviated by the poor laws. The opulence of the British metropolis, as well as its density of population, facilitates the concealment of illegitimate births. The so-called *Foundling Hospital* has long ceased to be so in reality.

Thus the ratio of increase has been four-fold in favour of the manufacturing districts, in the face of a very large inferiority in the proportion of illegitimate births. Where could we find a stronger proof that the poor law does not tend to promote population by offering encouragement to improvident marriages? That the crime of concubinage occasionally leads to matrimony we admit, and we by no means doubt the veracity of the *particular* cases cited in evidence; but that the *general* tendency of the poor law is to promote population by encouraging improvident marriages, is disproved by the general results.

The commissioners' report gives a very different colouring as to the effect of the poor law on population; and while urging the government to the impolitic encouragement of emigration, says,—“not only has an increase of population, which would have been heretofore deemed extraordinary in a long settled country, taken place in the manufacturing counties, but the increase has been *nearly as rapid* in those purely agricultural districts from which we have received such general complaints of a decrease of the capital of the farmers.” To illustrate this allegation, it refers to a few agricultural counties which shew the largest increase; in these it includes Buckinghamshire, which it says has increased in population nineteen per cent. during the decade ending 1831.* We certainly felt some surprise at seeing so large an expansion of numbers in a county which may be termed purely agricultural, and where no excessive growth of towns seems to warrant such a result; but on referring to the population returns, we find the inhabitants of the county to number, in 1821, 134,068; and in 1831, 146,529; shewing an increase of $9\frac{1}{4}$ instead of nineteen per cent.—an error materially effecting the basis on which the

* Report, p. 352.

reasoning and conclusion of the commissioners are founded; and the more unfortunate, and we would say fatal, as it concurs to induce them to recommend, "that the vestry of each parish be empowered to raise money for the purpose of facilitating emigration."* It is much to be regretted, where the public pay so high a price for the talent employed in collecting information and in investigating the causes of abuse, that more accuracy has not been observed in the compilation of this report; and that the government should be induced upon false, or, to use a milder term, erroneous data, blindly to concur in a recommendation decidedly opposed to sound principles of practical economy. Had the commissioners more closely examined the late population returns, they would have found that almost every agricultural county shews an *inferior* ratio of increase in the decade ending 1831, compared with 1821; and on the other hand, that almost every manufacturing county shews a comparative *superior* ratio of increase,—proving that the addition to the number of consumers of farming produce far surpasses that of the producers of it, and implying a growing demand for agricultural labour. The abolition of the out-door allowance system will sufficiently facilitate the equipoise of demand and supply, without the *quack* system of burdening parishes with heavy debts for property expended in transporting the élite of the population.† The existence of these errors in the re-

* Report, p. 357.

† By a reference to our table of the ages of the inhabitants of England and Wales (p. 287), it will be seen, that the number of males between the ages of twenty and thirty-nine does not, even in the present year, much exceed 1,300,000: of these about 1,000,000 may be termed the operative classes; and it is almost entirely on this class that the emigration system will act. When we consider that one man's labour is equal to the maintenance of eight people, we can form some idea of the loss of productive power in sending any material portion of this class out of the country. Every man who emigrates, takes with him the pro-

port is the more unfortunate, as it seems to give an additional hue to that manifest overcolouring which characterises it, tending to bear out the professed and well known *individual* opinions of some of its founders, against *any* system of compulsory relief for the poor. We will not trust ourselves to say more on the subject of emigration; our opinions are freely expressed—pp. 279 to 283.

The poor law has undoubtedly heretofore tended to retard the adaptation of the supply to the demand for agricultural labour;—it has tended to retain an undue proportion of labourers in the country which would have been more profitably employed in the towns;—and we are decidedly of opinion that the *first* effect of a general refusal to “make up” wages will be to throw a large body of agricultural labourers on the parish resources, and be attended with no little degree of suffering. What proportion of this number may constitute a surplus, cannot be determined. However, we shall attempt an estimate.

We shall assume the total number of persons receiving parochial aid, under all the varied forms, to be in round numbers, 1,200,000 (see table, page 309), a calculation formed on the average of the last ten years. This number we class as under (taking as data the tables of 1813, 14 and 15).

Persons permanently relieved in workhouses	100,000
Ditto out of workhouses	500,000
Parishioners occasionally relieved . . .	600,000
	—————1,200,000

This number we divide into three classes:—
 1. Those incapable of labour. 2. Able-bodied paupers receiving a supplement to wages from the parish funds. 3. Those totally dependent on the parish funds from want of employment.

vision for, or what is the same thing, the means of providing for seven people; so that if the government by means of bounties on emigration, send away annually 50,000 men, they destroy the means of subsistence for 350,000 people; but this is not all, they burden the impoverished nation with a debt for effecting this destruction. This reasoning may provoke a smile, but it is true.

	Paupers incapable of labour.	Poor receiving parochial relief as supplement to wages.	Paupers totally dependent from absence of employment.
Of 600,000 persons receiving relief, chiefly as a supplement to wages, we shall assume one-fifteenth to be proper objects of charity, from ill health or casual absence of employment .	40,000	560,000	—
Of those permanently relieved in work-houses (100,000), we assume twelve-fifteenths to be incapable of labour .	80,000	—	20,000
Of those permanently relieved out of work-houses (500,000), we assume also twelve-fifteenths to be incapable of labor, including children	400,000	—	100,000*
Total . . .	520,000	560,000	120,000

The third column gives 120,000 as the estimated body of surplus labourers, The number to whom a supplement to wages is paid, is 560,000, being about seven-eighths of the total number of agricultural labourers.

Question as to the policy of employing the redundant body of labourers in colonising waste lands discussed, and deficiency of agricultural productions.—If the effect of the measures now before parliament, will be to identify a surplus body of labourers numbering 120,000, we cannot but think that some measure for employing them in that branch of productive industry the most suitable to their capacities, would be both politic and necessary. The extension of our agriculture, if the means are at hand, appears, from the investigation of our wants in a national sense, and from the quality of our

* This includes those uselessly employed, and paid by the parish.

surplus productive power in a particular sense, to be that which claims the first consideration.

We shall cursorily refer to the average annual amount of the deficiency of our agricultural produce to meet the consumption.

In computing this deficiency, we pass over the years of war,—when indeed it would appear on a much larger scale,—and revert only to the commencement of the present peaceful period.

The following is the quantity of wheat, barley, oats, peas, and beans, imported and exported (exclusive of Irish produce) for the seven years ending 1830 :—

	Wheat. Qrs.	Barley and Rye. Qrs.	Oats. Qrs.	Peas and Beans. Qrs.
	5,970,000	1,822,000	8,110,000	543,000
Of which were re- exported . .	976,000	268,000	282,000	50,000
Leaving for home consumption .	4,994,000	1,554,000	7,828,000	493,000
Average annual deficiency . .	713,400	222,000	1,118,000	70,000

During the years 1821 to 1823, the British ports were closed against the importation of foreign corn. The following will shew the quantity of foreign grain imported and exported, for the seven years ending 1830 :—

	Wheat. Qrs.	Barley and Rye. Qrs.	Oats. Qrs.	Peas and Beans. Qrs.
Imported . .	4,850,000	1,715,000	4,722,000	450,000
Re-exported .	550,000	120,000	150,000	50,000
Leaving for home consumption .	4,300,000	1,595,000	4,572,000	400,000
Annual average deficiency .	614,000	228,000	653,000	57,000
Annual average deficiency for the two periods.				
	665,000	225,000	880,000	64,000

This importation of corn forms but a portion of our purchases of foreign agricultural productions :

seeds and dairy produce are brought in large quantities from Holland and the Baltic states.

The annual average amount of the importations of these commodities is subjoined.

Linseed. bushels.	Rapeseed. bushels.	Canary-seed. bushels.	Butter. cwts.	Cheese. cwts.
1,250,000	1,500,000	50,000	185,000	95,000

These importations cost the nation annually about three millions and a half sterling, of which the greater part might be saved, and industrious habits encouraged, by the cultivation of a portion of the British waste lands. No complaint is more general than the difficulty of finding profitable investment for money : and while capitalists are found ready to invest property in the frail securities of foreign governments, at low rates of interest, and in any plausible, speculative undertaking of the day;—nay, even in the cultivation of the wilds of Canada, and the more remote regions of Australia, few seem disposed to advance the necessary means for consummating a great national improvement, by the cultivation of lands at home, which, under due protection, would afford more ample remuneration. We shall here attempt an estimate of the quantity of waste land in the various English and Welsh counties.

Tables of the cultivated and uncultivated area of England and Wales.—In the preface to the abstract of the population returns, printed in 1834, we find a table of the superficial area of the English and Welsh counties ; and Mr. Marshall's book contains an estimate of the number of acres of land in tillage and pasture, and the number of acres remaining in waste and wood land. From these and other documents, founded on good authority, we have compiled the following table, where it appears that the quantity of land still uncultivated, is abundantly sufficient for the employment of the entire surplus of agricultural labour.

Table, shewing the area of the several English counties, quantity of land in tillage and in paturage, and the quantity remaining uncultivated, or in wood land, roads, covered with buildings, water, &c.

Counties.	Total area.	In tillage.	In pasture.	Total cultivated.	Waste and wood, or in towns, roads, rivers, &c.
	Acres.	Acres.	Acres.	Acres.	Acres.
Lincolnshire . . .	1,671,040	400,000	1,100,000	1,500,000	171,040
York, West Riding . . . }	1,658,640	350,000	700,000	1,050,000	608,640
Devon . . .	1,654,400	400,000	800,000	1,200,000	454,400
York, North Riding . . . }	1,315,200	273,000	187,000	460,000	855,200
Norfolk . . .	1,295,360	730,000	263,000	993,000	302,360
Northumberland . . .	1,197,440	150,000	650,000	800,000	397,440
Lancashire . . .	1,130,240	450,000	350,000	800,000	330,240
Somerset . . .	1,062,800	330,000	524,000	854,000	208,000
Hampshire . . .	1,040,000	380,000	620,000	1,000,000	40,000
Kent . . .	996,480	400,000	200,000	600,000	396,480
Essex . . .	981,120	380,000	520,000	900,000	81,120
Suffolk . . .	969,600	250,000	500,000	750,000	219,600
Cumberland . . .	974,720	400,000	200,000	600,000	374,720
Sussex . . .	938,240	280,000	345,000	625,000	313,240
Wilts . . .	874,880	150,000	200,000	350,000	524,880
Shropshire . . .	859,520	300,000	500,000	800,000	59,520
Cornwall . . .	851,200	250,000	255,000	505,000	346,200
Gloucester . . .	805,120	300,000	450,000	750,000	55,120
York, East Riding	716,160	150,000	350,000	500,000	216,160
Stafford . . .	757,760	500,000	100,000	600,000	157,760
Durham . . .	702,080	300,000	200,000	500,000	202,080
Chester . . .	673,280	200,000	450,000	650,000	23,280
Derby . . .	652,800	100,000	400,000	500,000	152,800
Northampton . . .	650,240	290,000	235,000	525,000	125,240
Dorset . . .	643,840	250,000	330,000	580,000	63,840
Warwick . . .	574,080	200,000	350,000	550,000	24,080
Hereford . . .	552,320	300,000	250,000	550,000	2,320
Cambridge . . .	548,480	140,000	160,000	300,000	248,480
Nottingham . . .	535,680	200,000	100,000	300,000	235,680
Leicester . . .	515,840	65,000	430,000	495,000	20,840
Westmorland . . .	487,680	30,000	130,000	260,000	227,620
Surry . . .	485,760	80,000	380,000	460,000	25,760
Oxford . . .	483,840	150,000	230,000	380,000	103,840
Berks . . .	481,280	260,000	120,000	380,000	101,280
Bucks . . .	472,320	253,000	170,000	423,000	49,320
Worcester . . .	462,720	200,000	150,000	350,000	112,720
Hertford . . .	403,200	225,000	50,000	275,000	128,200
Monmouth . . .	317,440	100,000	205,000	305,000	12,440
Bedford . . .	296,320	40,000	168,000	208,000	88,320
Huntingdon . . .	234,080	100,000	60,000	160,000	74,080
Middlesex . . .	180,480	43,000	100,000	143,000	37,480
Rutland . . .	95,360	30,000	55,000	85,000	10,360
Total . . .	32,338,000	10,880,000	13,478,000	24,358,000	7,980,000
Wales . . .	4,752,000	820,000	2,300,000	3,120,000	1,632,000
Grand total . . .	37,090,000	11,700,000	15,778,000	27,478,000	9,612,000

The foregoing table differs, in some slight degree, from the table, page 256; but if either deserves any confidence, it is evident that the cure of that particular disease, “the existence of a redundant body of agricultural labourers,” is to be found co-existent with the evil itself, by the possession of so large an area upon which such labourers might be advantageously employed. Of the 9,600,000 acres, of which this area consists, about 4,360,000 are said to be physically unfit for cultivation; and from the remainder we may deduct about 1,500,000 acres for roads, water, buildings, &c.; leaving, after these ample deductions, an area of about 3,800,000 well adapted to general purposes of cultivation. Dividing this area by the total number of parishes in England and Wales, (say, 10,700), gives 355 acres for each parish.

Results of the allotment system.—Different opinions prevail as to the best means of applying the waste lands in aid of the employment and maintenance of the labouring poor. The report from Wells, Somerset, notices the happy success of the allotment system in that neighbourhood. The lord bishop of the diocese granted, in 1826, three pieces of waste, amounting to thirty acres; and in 1831 and 32, other portions, making in the whole fifty acres. This land, of which a small part given in 1832 is not yet under cultivation, is granted to 203 persons, in quantities varying from one-twelfth to one-half of an acre, *at a rent of 12s. 6d. the quarter of an acre, the land being tithe and tax free.* We invite attention to the following results, cited in the report:—

“1. Twenty-nine names were pointed out, of persons who formerly had received relief, but had discontinued it since they got land. 2. There is a general improvement in the character of the occupiers, who are becoming more industrious and diligent. 3. Not a single instance has occurred, in which any one thus holding lands has been taken before a magistrate for any com-

plaint. 4. The land is much improved. 5. The continued increase in the demand for allotments, is the best proof of the advantage derived from them. 6. The success of this plan has induced its extension in the Mendip Hills by the rev. bishop, and it is very extensively adopted in other parts of the country.*

At West Looe, Cornwall, within the last five years, a portion, amounting to twenty-two acres, of a common belonging to the borough, which from time immemorial had been waste, was inclosed, and was let in lots from 15s. to 20s. per acre rent, the money to be applied to the poor rate. The success of this experiment was such as to induce the parish to inclose another portion of about the same extent, which was *all let*."

"Captain Chapman says, 'I went over the land, and found it in excellent condition. The effect on the poor rate has been a *diminution from 10s. in the pound to 3s.*; but the moral effect upon the poor is beyond calculation.'

These gratifying results, which seem to recommend the allotment system, are however clouded by the failure of like experiments in other parishes. At Westbury, Shepton Mallet, Tunbridge, and other places, where the system has been practised by the parish, it has not succeeded; and the general conclusion seems to be, that where unpaid parish officers have the direction of these undertakings, success is rare; while, if conducted by private individuals, the opposite effect is produced. The farmers throughout the country look with jealousy on the introduction of allotments; they *object to the increased independence of labourers*. "The absence of half days and days," says Mr. Power, in his report from Cambridgeshire, "must not only *deduct from the market of labour*, but place the allotment occupier on a better footing as to the terms of the contract with his employers; and unhappily these considerations operate to the exclusion of allotments." The whole tenor of the evidence however shews, that there is a decided feeling in the rural districts among proprietors, in favour of inclosures and allotments for the better employment of the poor; and this feeling proceeds from a decided conviction of its utility. A legis-

* Captain Chapman's Report.

lative provision, abolishing all tithes, taxes, and local rates, for a term of years (say fourteen) on land newly brought into cultivation, and proposing some substantial principle upon which the plan might be acted on extensively, would doubtless facilitate its operation ; while, if left entirely to work its own course against the impediments which fiscal burdens impose, its effect can be but extremely limited.

Every county possesses a considerable area of uncultivated land, although unequal in extent ; and as it is proposed to incorporate the rural parishes, a certain portion of these wastes might be attached to each district, each parish holding its claim on the waste in relative proportion to its inhabitants, or ordinary number of dependent unemployed poor. The central board of control might become the general lessees, with liberty to grant subleases on certain prescribed conditions, with a view to the better employment of the labouring poor. The first source from which these wastes might be obtained, would be the parochial lands, or commonage belonging to parishes ; then the crown lands, or such national domains as are not at present under cultivation ;—of course excluding those planted with timber or otherwise used for national purposes ;—thirdly, manor lands, if suitably situated for the proposed object, might be claimed on lease, subject to a rent assessed by a jury. We think also that exchanges of lands possessing local conveniences might be effected on terms mutually advantageous. The employment of the poor, in the cultivation of waste lands, is becoming a favourite domestic policy with several continental governments. The Dutch have entered on it on a large scale, at Williamstadt. The Prussians are following the same plan ; and in this country it appears to be demi-officially sanctioned by the association of a large and highly patriotic portion of

the British nobility, to forward the object. The co-operation of the legislature is only wanting to render the exertions of the society to which we allude, highly beneficial to the state. What is to be the particular system upon which the super-numerous country labourers are to be employed, is yet to be decided ; but it is certain, that in a great majority of the parishes throughout the kingdom, common lands are to be found at present comparatively useless ; which, by a skilful appropriation now, and good management hereafter, would suffice to give employment and provide maintenance for every unemployed labourer in the kingdom ; and hence expand, in an important degree, the national resources.

Estimate of the increase of the growth of agricultural produce, consequent on the employment of the poor in agriculture.—We shall here attempt an estimate of the extra quantity of agricultural productions which might be supplied, if the entire body of supernumerous labourers were fully employed on the land. Our object, in forming this estimate, is to shew that the extra supply, even supposing the whole of the labourers to be forthwith employed, would not effect any material depreciation of prices. Suppose an area of land equal to the employment of 100,000 hands, at the average of six men to every 100 acres, were brought into cultivation,* it would measure 1,666,000 acres, being about two-fifths of the total quantity of land in England and Wales in an unimproved state, but adapted for general cultivation. The present proportion of tilled to pasture land, appears in our table (p. 350), to be nearly as 70 to 100. We should, therefore, be warranted in calculating that the above area would eventually be cultivated in

* Presuming the allotment system rejected, and the land divided into regular farms.

about the same ratio. Hence we shall presume, that 686,000 acres would be applied to tillage, and 980,000 acres to pasturage, or to the growth of various grasses.

By the table (p. 243), the proportion which the area of land appropriated to the growth of wheat, bears to the total area under *tillage*, is about $\frac{9}{40}$; to oats, beans, and peas, $\frac{9}{40}$; to barley and rye, $\frac{3}{40}$; to roots, potatoes, or other kinds of cultivation by the plough, $\frac{7}{40}$; fallow, $\frac{6}{40}$; hop grounds, pleasure grounds and gardens, $\frac{1}{40}$; buildings, roads, hedges, boundaries, &c. $\frac{3}{40}$; water courses, $\frac{2}{40}$.

Thus the proportion of the 680,000 acres applied to wheat culture, would be 154,000 acres; to oats, &c. 154,000; to barley and rye, 51,000; to roots, seeds, or other cultivation by the plough, 102,000. The remainder would be in fallow, or appropriated to minor objects of culture.

In estimating the probable annual production of this land when brought under tillage, it is necessary to consider, that although the soil may be physically of good quality, yet it would be unlikely, at least until some seasons after its primary location, to produce as abundantly as lands already under cultivation. But, calculating on the average produce of tilled lands as estimated in Mr. Jacob's reports, and deducting four bushels per acre for seed corn, the net increase of wheat would be twenty bushels per acre; of oats, thirty-two; and of barley, thirty-two.*

Presuming that these estimates form a fair approximation to accuracy, the extra annual quantity of wheat produced would be 385,000 quarters; of oats, 616,000; and of barley, &c. 204,000,

* The quantity of corn raised on an acre of ground of course varies with the quality of the soil. Some soils produce on the average of years 40 bushels of wheat per acre, while others do not produce more than sixteen. The general average is supposed to be about 24; the average produce of an acre under barley cultivation is 32, and oats 32.

quarters; a supply of corn very inferior to the quantity annually imported.

We invite the attention of the reader to the following summary, shewing the inferiority of this supply to meet the consumption :—

	Wheat.	QUARTERS OF	
		Oats.	Barley.
Annual average import during the seven years ending 1830	614,000	653,000	228,000
Estimated additional supply from extended cultivation .	385,000	616,000	204,000
Annual deficiency	229,000	37,000	24,000
Total deficiency of wheat			229,000
Ditto oats			37,000
Ditto barley			24,000
Annual deficiency of corn to be supplied by foreign import		Total in quarters	290,000

Had we formed the foregoing calculation from the returns of the quantity of corn imported during the four years ending 1832, the deficiency of wheat would have appeared three-fold. The annual average quantity of that grain which paid the import duty during that period being 1,008,860, would leave a yearly deficiency of 600,000 quarters, after allowing for the above additional supply.

Thus, it appears, the supply of home-grown corn would still be inferior to the consumption, by nearly 300,000 quarters per annum; and when we add the increasing demand of a population, growing in the ratio of 230,000 per annum, the danger of overproduction need not create alarm, while prices are moderate.

Would this excess of production diminish price?—
Now, as the market price of a commodity is regulated by the proportion of the demand to the offer, and as it is reasonable to expect that the offer of corn would still be inferior to the demand for it, the corn laws, should they be continued upon the

present footing, would continue to hold the same degree of influence as heretofore ; hence there appears no reason to anticipate any prejudice to the interest of landed proprietors from the extension of tillage.

Probable advantages from employing the poor in agriculture.—Having thus endeavoured to shew that no depreciation of landed property would be consequent on the measure, we shall briefly remark on the beneficial effects which may be anticipated from its adoption.

The present charge for the support of the poor we have seen to be 6,830,000*l.* per annum ; and the number of these, who form the community of beggars (for beggars we must consider all who receive eleemosynary aid) 1,390,000. We have presumed that about 560,000 individuals are partially supported out of the parish funds, through inadequacy of wages. Now the effect of the increased demand for labour, by opening a field for the additional employment of 120,000 persons, would so completely turn the scale of the demand for, and supply of, labourers, that the rate of wages would no doubt become adequate to the due support of the labourer and his dependents ; and hence one immediate and important advantage would be, the diminution of rates to the extent of the amount distributed to this collective body, and the confining of the charges to the amount necessary for the relief of the aged, infirm, or unfortunate.

There is no official information published of the relative portion of the poor's fund distributed to those actively employed, who receive their weekly stipend from the parish overseers as a counterpoise to the inadequacy of wages, and to those who are supported by the fund through infirmity ; we are, therefore, in some degree left to speculate upon the relative sums. As a medium estimate, we

shall presume the sum distributed as part payment of wages, to be equal to two-fifths of the total sum disbursed, which would make it 2,730,000*l.* per annum. Of this sum the contributors would be entirely relieved, and the charge falling chiefly upon the agriculturists, the diminution in their rates would compensate them for any additional charge to which they might be subject from a moderate increase in the rate of wages;* indeed, it is fair to calculate, that the diminution in poor-rates would very closely approximate to the additional sum paid in the shape of wages.

The augmentation of national income consequent on the full completion of such a system for the employment of the poor, would, upon a moderate calculation, approach eight millions sterling; and as the present amount of state revenue bears a ratio of about sixteen per cent. to the yearly national income, it is fair to presume that an additional 1,200,000*l.* would be paid into the state treasury from that source.

We cannot conclude the present chapter without offering a few observations on the condition of Ireland, and the policy of introducing poor laws into that portion of the kingdom.

* To shew the relative proportion of poor rate paid by the separate interests, we give the following official return of the proportional calculations in 1826; levied on

Lands.	Dwelling-houses.	Mills and Factories.	Manorial profits.
4,795,482	1,814,228	259,565	96,882
being to the total cess, in millesimal parts, as			
·688	·261	··37	··24

The average rate on cultivated lands, taking the number of acres as cultivated at 27,800,000, is 3*s.* 5*d.* per acre.

SECTION III.—THE POLICY OF INTRODUCING POOR LAWS INTO IRELAND.

The evils of Ireland.—Ireland and her evils are daily presented to public view as painful subjects of discussion. In that unfortunate country repeated confiscations, and the hideous provisions of the catholic code, which forbids the accumulation of property to nine-tenths of the people, have caused capital to centre in a few hands, and in various provinces completely severed the natural connection between industry and its reward. All the complicated ills which Ireland has suffered, and must, in some degree, continue to suffer, absenteeism—the defective administration of justice—seditious societies—insecurity to property—religious jealousies—widely spread poverty and many others—are all centred in this fundamental curse,—inequality in the distribution of property, engendered by a long course of mistaken policy. From this cause her manufactures in the south and west have dwindled, and her people been driven, *en masse*, to seek subsistence from the soil, under the most severe exactions of the landlords, the clergy, and the state.

Let us view Ireland as she now is ; placed as a link between the eastern and western continents, and in the centre of the civilised nations of Europe, she possesses a geographical position highly favourable for international commerce. Intersected with deep and spacious bays, and traversed with numerous navigable streams ; gifted by nature with an irrigated soil unequalled in fertility, and a climate so pure, so genial, that no noxious reptile could exist in it ;* inhabited by a highly spirited, and constitutionally industrious, people ; in short,

* It is said that no poisonous animal, not even a toad, exists in Ireland.

possessing all the elements for the superstructure of national wealth, prosperity, and widely diffused happiness, yet exhibiting a picture of dire distress, with the mass of her people goaded by famine and debased to the lowest stage of human misery. This paradox is the result of that Machiavellian policy which, with little interruption, since the junction of the English and Irish crowns in the person of Henry II., the British government has adopted towards Ireland. Seeking by this plan to establish an arbitrary authority, without considering the justice of the means employed, it has brought Ireland to what she is, the poorest of the poor, of European nations.

An improved policy has, however, during the last few years, been observed towards Ireland; and that antiquated and infernal principle, “divide et impera,” no longer characterises the measures of the imperial legislature towards the sister isle. From a recent date, Ireland has entered on a new, and, we trust, prosperous career; progressing, we think, rapidly in that course, which will at no distant period mitigate her evils, and importantly add to the sum of her happiness.

Parliamentary committee reports on the state of Ireland.—Any official information on the evils and remedies, actual state, resources, and prospects of Ireland, are so interesting to every attentive mind, and so useful as a matter of reference, that we shall here quote portions of the evidence adduced before the parliamentary committees on the state of the Irish poor in 1810, 1819, and 1830. We do not remember to have seen a parliamentary report so talented, so useful, and containing so much valuable information as that made in 1819, and reprinted in 1829.

The report commences by noticing the evils attendant on the rapid growth of unemployed

population in Ireland; it says, "that excessive population in proportion to the demand for labour does exist, and is fast growing in Ireland, is a fact which demands the most serious attention of the legislature, and makes it not merely a matter of humanity, but of state policy, that every reasonable encouragement should be given to labour in that portion of the empire." It continues, "the non-residence of a large portion of the proprietors of estates, and the consequent remittance of full 50 per cent. of her rental to be expended in England, operate banefully against the accumulation of Irish capital, and enhance her claim on the generous consideration of the British parliament.*

The area of Ireland was stated in evidence to be about 12,000,000 of acres, Irish, or 19,210,000 acres English admeasurement: "of this area," says the evidence, "5,710,000 acres remain in a state of primitive unproductiveness." Of this there are 2,830,000 of bog land; 1,500,000 of uncultivated mountain; and the remainder, of general qualities. Messrs. Telford, Nimmo, and other able engineers, state, that of the bog land, about 1,580,000 acres, consisting of flat, red bog, might be easily adapted to the general purposes of agriculture; and of the remaining 1,250,000 acres a considerable portion might be improved, at a small expense, for pasture, rearing, or dairy purposes, or perhaps still more beneficially applied to the purposes of plantation, much of the worst of it having formerly been forest land. In the highland districts, different portions are well adapted for the cultivation of grain, pasturage, or plantations; but the whole is at present comparatively unproductive, from the total absence of roads, or other means of communication with the market towns, or landing places.

* The rental of Ireland is about - 12,000,000*l.* per annum.
The amount remitted to England 6,000,000*l.* do.

The committee, referring to several reports made to the Irish House of Commons between the years 1733 and 1799, forcibly notices the highly advantageous position of Ireland as a seat for the fisheries ; “ *an advantage which could alone have been rendered unprofitable by a most perverse and injudicious system of laws.*” It says, “ the actual condition of the fishermen on the coast, appears to be most miserable ; and yet their general habits, character, and qualifications are highly deserving of liberal encouragement.”

From the whole current of evidence, it is conclusive, that not only the northern and western coasts afford very desirable advantages for a bay or cod fishery, but that they are eminently suitable for a deep sea cod fishery of great importance, independent of that for the production of oil from the whale and basking shark, which abound in the contiguous seas. In support of the recommendation of the committee to parliament to multiply the means of communication between the coast and the interior, it particularly notices the precedent by which the government acted in 1802 and 1803 with regard to Scotland, when ministers approved of the principle of applying the public money for the ulterior object of encouraging the Scotch fisheries, and in that view adopted a scheme for opening the bog lands, on a prospective estimate of 150,000*l.*, to be met by an equivalent levy on the districts to be thereby improved. “ Of the signal success of that scheme,” says the report, “ the committee have the most satisfactory evidence.”

The improvements which have already taken place in Ireland upon the suggestion of this committee, and from the extension of steam navigation, have doubtless been very important. Mr. Nimmo, in 1823, represented to the parliamentary committee the deplorable state of the southern

and western districts of Ireland, from the total absence of the means of inland communication. He described the country as being the retreat of smugglers, robbers, and culprits of every description. Extensive lines of road have since been formed; and Mr. Griffiths, in 1829, in speaking of the change which had been produced, says, "A very considerable improvement has already taken place in the vicinity of the roads. At the commencement of the works, the people flocked into them, seeking employment at any price; their looks were haggard; and their clothing wretched. Since the completion of the roads, rapid strides have been made: sixty new lime kilns have been built; new houses of a better class have been erected; new inclosures made, and the country has become perfectly tranquil, and exhibits a scene of industry and exertion, at once pleasing and remarkable." Mr. Kelly, confirming Mr. Nimmo's description of the change produced by opening the country, says, "before the formation of the roads, at Abbeyfeale and Brosna above half the congregation at mass on Sundays were bare-footed and ragged: hundreds, or even thousands of men could be got to work for sixpence a-day, if it had been offered; and many families went to beg in Tipperary and other parts. The condition of the people is now (1829) very different. The congregations at chapels are now as well clad as in other parts; the demand for labour is increased, and *a spirit of industry is getting forward* since the new roads have become available." Mr. Williams, in speaking of the advantages Ireland derives from the intimacy of communication with England by *steam* navigation, says, in his evidence before the committee on the condition of the Irish poor, 1830, "One of the effects has been to give a productive employment to the capital of persons in secondary lines of business, that formerly could not have been

brought into action ;” he adds, “I am a daily witness to the intercourse, by means of the small traders themselves, between England and Ireland. I have known fifty tons, or 880,000 eggs, and ten tons of poultry, collected from the poorest classes, shipped in one day from Dublin to Liverpool.” This is a new creation of property that has a direct tendency to act upon the condition of the poorer classes in Ireland ; for the produce is laid out in purchasing articles of clothing and manufactures, which are retailed out to the families of the peasants who rear the poultry and collect the eggs. This new trade—this mutually beneficial intercourse—this expansion of human happiness—is entirely the result of a rapid and cheap communication by means of the roads and *steam* navigation ;* and when the metropolis, Bristol, and Liverpool, are connected by rail-ways, and communicate by means of *steam* carriages, there is no reason to doubt that this commercial intercourse will receive a very large and beneficial extension ; and that a very happy effect will be produced in multiplying the means of enjoyment to both the English and Irish people.

We have given more copious extracts from these reports than we at first intended ; but from attentively perusing them, we were persuaded that the evidence they furnish of the evils of Ireland, and the convincing proofs they give of the good effect of the partial adoption of the recommendation of the committee, could not be too frequently brought to public view.† From the general tone of the

* The first steam-boat established between Liverpool and Dublin was launched in 1824. In 1830, there were no less than forty-two steam-boats, measuring 8423 tons, engaged in traversing the Channel ; and the capital employed in this shipping trade was reported to be 671,000*l*.

† Various evidences of the rapid extension of Irish commerce, chiefly in consequence of these improvements and the extension of steam navigation, have lately been submitted to parliament.

evidence of the above quoted report, there is fair reason to conclude that a variety of private in-

Mr. Spring Rice, in his place in parliament, April 1834,—debate on the motion of the member for Dublin for a committee to inquire into the expediency of repealing the legislative union,—took that occasion to state the following comparisons and results:

The export trade of Ireland to the

single port of Liverpool was	1831	. .	4,497,708
	1832	. .	4,581,313
	1833	. .	7,456,692

The tonnage which passed on the Grand Canal, the Royal Canal, and the Barrow, was as under:—

	Average of 1821-2-3. Tonnage.	Average of 1831-2-3. Tonnage.
Grand Canal . . .	140,230	227,169
Royal Canal . . .	88,190	141,937
The Barrow . . .	23,770	35,487

The tonnage which entered the ports of Ireland amounted for the average of the three years ending 1810 to . 764,658 tons
Ditto ditto 1820 . . 961,884
Ditto ditto 1830 . . 1,325,079
One year, ending 5th January 1834 . . 1,523,291

The amount of property proved under probate of will and letters of administration for the average of the three years ending . . . 1821 was . . . 2,814,816*l*.
Ditto ditto 1831 . . . 3,623,206

In 1825, a power of transferring stock to receive the interest in Ireland was given, since which time property to the amount of 16,000,000*l*. has been transferred, the dividends on which amount to 562,000*l*.

As some proof of the amelioration of the condition of the Irish people, we give the following returns of the consumption of various commodities at the dates referred to:—

In 1777 the consumption of <i>cotton wool</i> was	429,000 lbs.
1826 ditto ditto . .	4,368,000
1793 ditto <i>sugar</i> . .	184,000 cwts.
1832 ditto ditto . .	342,000
1777 ditto <i>tea</i> . .	808,000 lbs.
1830 ditto ditto . .	3,887,000
1800 ditto <i>coals</i> . .	364,000 tons.
1830 ditto ditto . .	940,000
1800 the import of sheep's <i>wool</i> was	1,800,000 lbs.
1826 ditto ditto . .	6,682,000
1800 the export of <i>linen</i> was	36,000,000 yards.
1826 ditto ditto . .	51,000,000

terests might be reconciled with important public advantages ; and that by the introduction of a plan for the cultivation of the wastes of Ireland, in connexion with other internal improvements, much might be done to convert the redundant population of Ireland from a condition of wretchedness and peril to the state, to an useful means of prosperity and national strength.

Poor laws for Ireland advocated.—The foregoing citations of evidence as to the domestic improvement of Ireland and the expansion of her commerce, seem to prove that she is at the present day in a state of active transition ; that she is merging from a state of poverty, not to prosperity, but to an improved condition ; that she is increasing her income in a ratio superior to her numerical growth, and hence that her community are obtaining, in the aggregate, a greater supply of the necessaries of life.* But this expansion of commerce is not all that is necessary : let it be granted that it offers more general employment and more ample recompense for labour ; yet it gives no security to individuals against want ; it provides

* Some economists maintain that the increase of exports from Ireland is demonstrative of her increasing suffering, and that by sending food out of the country she deprives her own inhabitants of the means of subsistence. Neither Ireland nor any other country *gives* away its produce ; it only exchanges what it has less need of, for that it has more need of, and hence benefits by the intercourse. We by no means intend by this to maintain that Ireland does not suffer by the exports she remits to pay the rental due to her absentees. But even by this she suffers in a far less degree than is generally supposed. If Ireland remits to this country 6,000,000*l.* sterling for this purpose, her inhabitants do not lose 6,000,000*l.* ; and the sum must be paid by the producers to the landlords, whether present or absent, and in either case no return is made : but there is this difference, that if the total sum were spent *in* Ireland instead of *out* of it, her trade would obtain all the profit on its expenditure ; calculating this profit at thirty-three per cent. she may be said to lose 2,000,000*l.* by the absence of her landlords.

no support to the helpless, the destitute, or the infirm; it does not say to the labourer who for fifty years has risen with the sun to till the earth and enrich the world, you shall not in the decline of life be left to perish of hunger in the land of your birth; it does not say to those who from accidental causes may be incapacitated to labour, or who for a season may be without the opportunity of profitable employment, you yet shall be preserved; it does not say to the feeble and aged widow, the state shall be to you a husband; or to the orphan, your country shall be to you a father. All this remains for a poor law to do; and while this is *not* done, and obedience to the laws of society enforced, which they cannot *justly be*, away with all objections as to the policy of a poor law based on principles of state economy. The demand for such a provision is too supreme to be met by any argument; for if it be true that not to feed the hungry in the day of his need is to imbrue our hands in his innocent blood, how can we excuse the obligation attached to property, of contributing for the support of the really necessitous? Valid as may be the objections advanced to a poor law as a cause of privation to many for the safety of a few, yet better it is that *twenty* should suffer a diminution of their gains, than that *one* should perish of hunger.*

* To shew the distress which pervaded Ireland in 1832, and we fear too frequently visits her, we quote a letter written by the Rev. William Baker Storey, rector of Newport, county of Mayo, to the editor of the *Record*, and read to the committee for the relief of the Irish poor in London in that year:—"No tongue can tell, no pen can describe, the state of wretchedness into which thousands are plunged along the sea coast of this country by the almost total destruction of the potatoe crop. Particularly the *aged*, the *infirm*, and multitudes of *little children* are reduced to the utmost extremity; no work, no earnings are to be had; no provisions sold, except at a price far beyond the poor man's reach; he has parted with all, and his family is starving around him. I have seen all this with my own eyes; and unless

All attempts to rule Ireland by terror have failed, and must fail; they have but produced one monotonous course of the most horrible barbarity, which has driven capital from the country, and extended the sphere of privation and distress; and until the government perform their bounden duty, of obliging the rich, or the possessors of property, to contribute to the sustenance of those really necessitous, all coercive measures enacted for the suppression of crime, disaffection, and rebellion, must and *ought* to fail. It is vain to expect internal peace until this be done. Those who ever felt hunger, among whom are but few of our legislators, know well that man devoured by famine is reckless of life and character—moved by the worst passions, ready to listen to any leader who incites him to unlawful acts, or to join in any enterprise against those institutions which he regards as causing his suffering. It is impossible in this state to impress him with the necessity of respecting property, or to inculcate in his mind any virtuous principles. A poor law, which offered security in the day of the utmost need—which afforded a safe protection against the torments of starvation, would, in our opinion, prove a needful remedy for the ills of Ireland; it would act as oil poured on troubled waters; as the sovereign elixir for the complicated evils which afflict the Irish community; or, as the learned and virtuous Dr. Doyle expresses it, “as the dew of heaven;” it would give security to property, encourage its investment in that vast field for improvement which Ireland presents; it would place the Hibernian in that speedy relief be afforded, I expect to see the work of *death* commence in a manner that will render all attempts to check it almost hopeless.”

J. Dunbrain, Esq., inspector general of the coast blockade for Ireland, says, “many are living on sea weed and such shell fish as they can procure.” The visitation of such distress as is here described, calls loudly for protection by a poor law.

position when it would be *possible* that he could receive wholesome and useful instruction, and be taught to uphold the laws and the national institutions as his protectors, instead of denouncing them as his oppressors;—thus he would grow in honesty and virtuous principle; he would acquire a taste for the comforts of life, and learn how to direct his efforts to obtain a small stock of those necessary domestic articles, which attach a man to his home, and check his marauding, predatory inclination. This would revive his anxiety to obtain more, and thus to advance in the career of social existence; for where shall we find a truth more universally illustrated throughout the whole family of man, than that the love of property increases with the possession of it?

These truths, which advocate the introduction of poor laws into Ireland, are rapidly growing into conviction in the minds of our legislators. Even some of the leading political economists of the day, who for a long time were opposed to the measure, now concur in the policy of introducing them under a *modified* form; and it is very evident that the opposition of the Irish landholders, from motives which would bear but little scrutiny, and the objections of those few who view the tranquillising effect to be anticipated from the operation of Irish poor laws as a prelude to the decline of their political ascendancy, *must* yield to the force of public opinion, and the acknowledged equity of the measure.

Estimate of the probable amount of charge on the landed rental by a poor law.—The leading objection to the introduction of poor laws into Ireland, is founded upon the magnitude of the charge which they would entail on the landed rental; and judging from the almost universal poverty which pervades Ireland, there is too much reason to fear that

the charge would be very great. But all calculations on this point, and all objections to Irish poor laws, are based upon the immensity of the sums collected for the relief of the poor, or more properly for the management of labourers, in England, and the vast evils which the corruption of the original principles of the statute have effected. No government in its senses would ever think of extending the English poor laws, with the baneful provisions of the 36th Geo. III., to Ireland; the impolicy of such provisions is clearly demonstrated by the valuable information collected by the late commission, which is as important in guiding the legislature in framing Irish, as in reforming English poor laws. Without entering upon the principles which may be adopted with respect to poor laws for Ireland (without doubt they would be considered in connexion with various local improvements), we will suppose the provisions of the 9th George I. to be extended to that portion of the kingdom: in that case, it is fair to estimate that the expense would not greatly exceed the amount collected in England when that wise statute operated, and the English community numbered about the same as the numerical complement of the Irish population at the present day. To form an estimate of the amount which would be collected upon this data,—which we think fair and reasonable,—we are referred to the year 1782, when we find the population of England and Wales to have been 8,020,000 souls, and the total amount of the cess for the relief of the poor and for other local purposes, 2,132,000*l.* (see page 309); now adding twenty per cent. to this sum for the greater poverty of Ireland compared with England in 1782, the amount required for the support of the Irish poor would be about 2,500,000*l.*; a very large sum we admit, but very far from being such a sum as,—to use the phraseology of the day,—

“ would swallow up the whole of the rental.” The annual landed rental of Ireland may be very moderately computed at 12,000,000*l*. Hence the cess at the foregoing ample computation would only amount to about twenty-two per cent. of it ; but whatever it might amount to, it would occasion an extra expenditure in the country of at least a moiety of the sum collected ; that is, presuming half of the rental of Ireland to be now remitted to England, and even supposing by this means an extra 1,200,000*l*. was retained in Ireland and distributed to the unfortunate peasantry, instead of being remitted to England to support the non-resident Irish landlords, it would greatly exceed any extra expenditure which the most sanguine could reasonably anticipate by the recal of the absentees or by the reintegration of a legislative assembly in that portion of the kingdom. Those who call for “ poor laws, or the repeal of the legislative union,” would do well to bisect the phrase ; to cling to its prior member, and renounce the latter.—Poor laws—would be a more effective and more profitable concession to the Irish people : and had that measure been urged by the member for Dublin with the same zeal as he demanded the repeal of the union, his demand would not have been negatived, as was that motion, by a majority of the Irish and the sum total of the British members ; but would have received that strong demonstration of public feeling in its favour, which must have speedily ensured its triumph. Looking at the question as a subject of economy, it is a matter of nice calculation to determine, whether poor laws for Ireland are not advisable. The Irish poor are, and must be kept alive, and the charge for so doing must necessarily fall on property. In the place of a legal provision, plunder, mendicity, robbery, and such means are made available. Of the amount thus obtained, of course we can form no estimate ;

but doubtless, from the frequency of depredation, and the great number of beggars, it is very large. Add to this the amount annually raised by voluntary subscription; the moneys paid out of the English poor fund for the support of Irish poor in this country; the parliamentary grants, and the sums granted by England to the Irish clergy, from the impossibility of collecting their dues in that country; the expense of tranquillising Ireland by a numerous police and a large military force; the cost of the arms employed, and the *mitraille* expended for this purpose; the amount of these various items might equal or surpass that required under a legal assessment, which would at once sweep away by far the greater proportion of this unhappy catalogue of charges:—but who, with a view of shewing that the amount expended in support of a coercive system is inferior to that which would be demanded under a poor law assess, could uphold, *a fortiori*, the continuance of the present system, when the great work of carrying real reform into the social condition of Ireland is attainable by the introduction of poor laws? It would be a libel against the imperial parliament to portend that any of its members could base their objections to the measure upon such a calculation; and we feel convinced that when the subject is substantially proposed by government—which it must be very speedily—that it will meet all the support which its great importance merits. We deeply regret that ministers have not thought proper to propose during the present session a poor law for Ireland, in the place of a renewal of the obnoxious coercion bill of 1833. Had this been done, the success of the great work of tranquillising that unfortunate country would have been more fully assured, in a manner infinitely more gratifying and salutary. There never can be any union in spirit between England and Ire-

land, until the Irish people enjoy *all* the privileges of British subjects. Politically speaking, we must forget that the deep sea separates Ireland from British ground, and rule her as though she stood in the same position to England as the Isle of Wight.

When the rental of Ireland shall be charged with the support of the Irish poor; individual interest will powerfully urge her nobility, landowners, and political representatives, earnestly to apply themselves to ameliorate the condition of the Irish labourer, so that the least possible deduction may be made in the rent and value of their estates; for in proportion as they depress the condition of the one, so will the charge augment on the other, and hence their income be virtually contracted.

With these remarks we dismiss the present subject. Much remains to be done; much that lies within the reach of the government to do, as applicable to both parts of the kingdom; and it is earnestly to be desired that measures for the better employment of the parochial poor, and for the removal of those obstacles which now impede the progress of instruction,—giving a freer scope to every instrument which may elevate the intellectual and moral condition of the humbler classes,—will continue to engage the attention of the legislature; and that such wholesome reforms will be progressively introduced, as offer a well grounded anticipation of important and felicitous results.

CHAPTER III.

AGRICULTURE, AND THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE CORN LAWS.

SECTION I.—HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE CORN TRADE.

THE state of our agriculture, and the practical operation of the laws which govern our corn trade, will form the succeeding subjects of disquisition.

We propose to divide this inquiry into three separate heads: embracing, I. An historical sketch of the British corn trade: II. Some comments on the present state of our agriculture, and the prospective effect of a free trade in grain, upon vested interests; and III. Remarks on the expediency of the entire abandonment of restrictive regulations.

HISTORICAL SKETCH.

Early statutes relative to commerce in grain.—The interference of the legislature in the free course of the British corn trade, dates from a remote age. All the early statutes referring to the first three centuries immediately succeeding the Norman accession to the English crown, were intended to promote abundance, and low prices; exportation was prohibited, and importation admitted on easy terms. These statutes were framed with what was supposed to be the dictates of common sense, the object being to promote as large a supply of the necessaries of life as possible; but that the contrary effect was produced, is very

evident from the frequent occurrence of direful famine in those days of feudal ignorance. The first Act we meet with authorising the exportation of grain was passed in 1436 (15th of Henry VI.), by which it became lawful to export corn when the home price did not exceed 6s. 8d. per quarter, equal to about 12s. 10d. of our present money; barley was allowed to be exported when the price did not surpass 3s. 4d.; but from the difficulty of determining the home price, it is probable that these limits were little regarded. The 3d Edward IV. (1463) gave birth to an Act of somewhat novel character, *importations* being *prohibited* when corn reached the export limit price; but from the turbulence of the times, and the frequent revolutions in the regal government, parliamentary enactments could command but little respect. This statute, however, continued unrepealed nearly a century, when it was superseded by the Act passed in 1562, (4th Elizabeth) which extended the export limit to 10s. per quarter for wheat, and 6s. 8d. for barley and malt; prices extremely low, when we consider that the currency had been re-adjusted, and was in point of metallic weight and fineness the same as at present. This Act was in a few years repealed; and in 1571, a new enactment permitted the exportation of wheat at a duty of 2s. per quarter when the price did not exceed 20s., and of barley and malt at a duty of 1s. 4d. when the price was under 12s. per quarter. This doubling of price in a few years is very remarkable, and its causes have been a subject of considerable discussion with political economists; they have usually been ascribed as the effect of remittances of specie, which at this time began to flow into Europe from the Americas, and the general expansion of commerce towards the east by the happy discovery of a marine passage to the Indies. These conjunct causes may in some degree have operated; but a more probable solution of the

problem will be found in the general prevalence of war throughout Europe at this period. Without, however, determining the really operative causes of this enhancement of price, we find it to have been progressive, as implied by the Act of 1623 (21st James I.), which raised the export limit to 32s. per quarter for wheat, and 16s. for barley and malt. During the latter part of the reign of the unfortunate Charles I., when the nation, tempest-tost in the waves of civil commotion, was not only deprived of the protection which a firm government affords to the rights of property, but goaded, ravaged, and plundered by the contending factions—the price of corn rapidly increased, and during the early years of the republic, attained the very high rate of 56s. per quarter. The rise was yet in some degree nominal; the debasement of the currency, by clipping and filing, adding considerably to the apparent price of commodities. After the restoration, and the return to a more pacific and orderly system, prices gradually receded. This fall in price, concurrent with greatly increased charges on production, from causes not unlike those which have operated in late years, pressed heavily on vested interests, and induced the legislature to adopt various expedients to counteract it. By the 12th Charles II. cap. 11. (1660), the export limit was increased from 32s. to 40s. per quarter for wheat, and proportionally increased in other grain; but the measure being deemed by the agriculturists insufficient to the desired object, they obtained in 1663 an Act, increasing the export limit to 48s., and commuting the fixed duty for an *ad valorem* tax on exportation.

These Acts, of course, implied an intention to carry prices up to the export limit, the legislature always inferring that foreign consumers would increase their offers in relative proportion to the demands of the British parliament. The opera-

tion of the Act, however, proved the fallacy of such an anticipation, the average prices for the seven years ending 1670, not exceeding 41s. 6d. per quarter. It seems probable that these vexatious restrictions to a free trade in corn tended in some degree to impart a stimulus to agriculture on the European continent, for in the year 1670 we find the agriculturists imploring legislative protection against any interference with their monopoly through foreign importations, and obtaining a new Act, which extended the export limit for wheat to 53s. 4d. per quarter, and for other grain in proportion, at the same time imposing a duty on foreign wheat of 16s. per quarter until the price rose to the export limit, and of 8s. when the price of wheat rated between 53s. 4d. and 80s. ; on barley, the import duty was fixed at 8s. per quarter ; and on oats, 5s. 4d. Little effect, however, emanated from the Act, partly in consequence of the continuance of the duties on export, caused by the necessities of the crown — (see finance chapter, revenues, and expenditure of Charles II.)—but more especially from the adequacy of our own growth of corn to meet the consumption. During the nineteen years, 1671 to 1689, prices continued below the export and import limit, averaging for the ten years ending 1680, 44s. 6d., and for the nine years ending 1689, the unusual depression of 34s. 1d. per quarter.

Laws against engrossing corn.—A material, or rather remarkable alteration occurs in the regulation of the corn trade at this era. There had existed from a remote age severe enactments against engrossing corn, the government always inferring, that the corn factor, dealer, or agent in distribution, had interests opposed to the common weal; viewed the existence of this useful class with great distrust, as tending to raise prices to the consumer, while it depressed the remuneration to the farmer.

Various chronologists bear evidence of the unhappy consequences of the laws which proscribed the operations of the corn dealer or "corn engrosser." Farmers were generally without the means of holding their corn for any considerable time after the harvest; hence, however deficient the harvest might prove, food was always abundant during the autumnal months, and no scarcity was experienced until the ensuing spring or summer. In that part of the year, corn usually rose to four or five times its price in the months of September and October, producing a degree of suffering among the humbler classes which words can but inadequately describe. Thanks to the increase of capital and corn engrossers, we are no longer exposed to these vicissitudes: the speculators in corn, by their more extended sphere of information, are better judges of the state of the harvests than the located agriculturists or the ordinary consumers; and immediately the deficiency of a season is known, capital is employed to buy up the corn, and warn the people of the necessity of being sparing by a rise in the price. Thus the nation is, as it were, immediately the necessity occurs, put on short allowance; and the stock being more equally distributed throughout the year, the degree of suffering inseparable from a deficient season is diminished in intensity in proportion to the length of its endurance; seldom—in these days of corn engrossers and speculators—producing those periodical plagues and mortiferous diseases, which are so frequently mentioned in history, during the middle ages.*

* The improvidence of the unfortunate peasantry in the south and west of Ireland, who exist during the year on the preceding crop of potatoes, usually produces a great degree of suffering towards the latter part of the summer;—this is in some degree attributable to the absence of capital and traders in that part of the country.

As the erroneous conclusions respecting the tendency of the operations of the corn engrosser gradually became more obvious, so the severity of these ridiculous enactments were modified—some relaxation of the restrictions against corn factors was made by the Act of 1624 : and in 1663 (15 Car. II. c. 7), “engrossing corn,” or as we now call it, “holding corn,” was declared legal, so long as the price did not exceed 48s.; a limit almost universally above the market currency. This Act, Dr. Smith justly observes, has, with all its imperfections, done more to promote plenty than any other in the statute book. But it was not until 1773, that the last remnant of legislative enactments, restraining the freedom of the trade of corn dealers, was abolished. “Engrossing corn” has, notwithstanding, since that period been, and we believe is at the present day, held to be an offence at common law ; and it is a remarkable fact, that so lately as the year 1800, a corn dealer was convicted by a judge and jury of this imaginary crime.* The court, however, on reflection, refrained from calling up the supposed delinquent to receive his sentence, and it is to be hoped that this is the last instance that common sense will be so outraged in this country by such a disgraceful proceeding.

But returning from this brief digression, we proceed in our historical sketch. During the five centuries immediately posterior to the Conquest, to the reign of Elizabeth, importation had been substantially free, and exportation discouraged, with a view of ensuring low prices to the consumer. After the reign of James I., but more especially subsequent to the turbulent times of the commonwealth, the opinion began to pervade the legislature that the agriculturists required a more extended sphere for the sale of their produce, and to a certain extent

* See M'Culloch's Dictionary, article Corn.

the monopoly of the home market—hence the increase of the export limit, and the restrictions on imports, by the statutes of 1623, 1660, 1663, and 1670. Little effect emanated from all these enactments, prices being usually under both the export and import limits.

The Bounty Act of 1689.—A new era now opens in the political and commercial history of Britain. The war of the revolution—the conflict in Ireland—the reforms of the currency—in short, an altered position both positive and relative, necessitated pecuniary sacrifices far exceeding those submitted to during the two previous reigns, and hence a large addition to the ordinary rates of taxation

To provide the necessary funds for upholding the new system was, in these times of limited external commerce and deficient internal capital, no easy task. Land was considered as the principal source of income, and higher prices for its produce were encouraged, in order to afford the means of taxation. By the 1st William and Mary, c. 12, not only was the exportation of grain rendered free by the repeal of the duties on export, but encouraged by a bounty of 5s. per quarter on wheat, when the price was under 48s. ; of 3s. 6d. on rye, when under 32s. ; and of 2s. 6d. on barley and malt, when under 24s. ; while the restrictions on the importation of grain remained the same as in 1670. By a subsequent Act, a bounty of 2s. 6d. on the exportation of oats was also granted. These bounties were given in anticipation of the imposition of the land tax, which, bearing directly upon the landed interest, was not likely to meet the assent of the great estate holders without some concomitant measure of indemnity. Restrictions on the importation, and bounties on the exportation of grain, were expected to secure to the agriculturists an increased price for their produce, and to

the landlords an increase of rent in relative proportion ; thus indemnifying the landed interest for the amount of the tax levied, or rather transferring it from the producer to the consumer.

High prices for grain, the never-failing accompaniment of war, followed the passing of this Act : a rise by no means caused by legislative enactments, but by circumstances in a great degree similar to those traceable during the late war period ; such as a curtailment of productive power, arising from the demands of the government for men and money to recruit and maintain the forces ; to which causes may be added the occurrence of an unusual number of deficient seasons during this period. From the passing of the Bounty Act, from which such wonderful advantages were anticipated by the landed interest, to the peace of Ryswick, wheat was usually above the export limit price, or 48s. ; and without admitting that the measure of 1688 in any degree caused this rise (for the law of 1670, forbidding the export of wheat when it rated above 48s. per quarter, effectually negated the Bounty Act during this period) ; yet its imaginary influence, together with the higher prices which followed, in an important degree encouraged the progressive application of capital to tillage, and hence laid the foundation of that excess which, during the following half century, kept prices far below their previous ordinary level.

The prices of corn during the fifty years succeeding the peace of Ryswick, preserved a remarkable steadiness ; wheat averaging 35s. per quarter, or about 13s. per quarter below the export limit ; evidencing the gratifying fact, that the very engine which the selfish landed proprietors had employed to increase prices, and thus starve the community, was turned into a powerful instrument for their own punishment.

Table of the import and export of wheat from the years 1701 to 1764.—We shall here give, in a tabular form, a return of the quantity of wheat exported during the first sixty-four years of the 18th century, illustrating the expansion of British agriculture during that period.

Years, or periods.	Qrs. of Wheat imported.	Qrs. of Wheat exported.	Excess of export over import.	Annual average quantity exported.
1701 to 1720	2,204	2,172,470	2,170,266	108,013
1721 — 1740	120,670	4,095,687	3,975,017	198,750
1741 — 1764	170,636	8,165,931	7,995,395	333,141

Notwithstanding a growth of population of little less than thirty per cent. during this period, the surplus produce increased three-fold ; a fact which seems to bid defiance to the most ingenious devices of the legislature to increase unnaturally the price of corn.

This rapid increase in the quantity of agricultural produce raised, does not appear to have been so much the result of the expansion of the area brought into cultivation, as to improvement in the art of agriculture, and the extra labour and capital employed in farming the lands already under tillage. From the report of a parliamentary committee, it appears that during the reigns of Queen Anne, George I. and George II., the area brought into cultivation was as follows :

Reigns.	Enclosure Acts passed.	No. of acres enclosed.
Anne	2 . .	1,439
George I. . . .	16 . .	17,960
George II. . . .	226 . .	318,778
	<hr/> 244	<hr/> 338,177

Thus it appears that the area brought under cultivation from the accession of queen Anne, 1700, to the demise of George II., or to the termination of the session of 1759, was only 338,177 acres (of

which the greater proportion in a few years became pasture land), being an addition of about one and a half per cent. to the area under cultivation in England and Wales at the demise of William III. ; while the increase of home consumers was fully twenty-six per cent., and the extension in the quantity of grain exported very large. This fact is very important, as illustrating how much more the quantity of subsistence raised depends on the amount of labour bestowed on a given surface, than on the extent over which it is applied ; proving also the very limited acquaintance of our ancestors with the physical capacities of the soil, and unfolding to the contemplation of the reader the probability of our being, even at the present day, very imperfectly informed as to the elementary properties of land, and as to the accuracy of general geological deductions : we may also add, that these premises, based on returns of more recent date, will appear equally well founded.

Rise of prices and cessation of corn export subsequent to 1756.—In the very principle of commerce there is action and reaction, and the low returns made for the capital employed in agriculture during the late forty years, gave a different direction to our productive power.

The war of 1756, conducted at an unprecedented expense, opened new channels for the more profitable employment of capital in manufactures, and caused a large subtraction of labourers from the pursuits of productive industry, to man the fleets and recruit the armies. The low prices for grain had also induced many landed proprietors to convert their tilled lands into pasture grounds ; and hence, towards the latter years of the contest (1760-62), supplies of grain became scanty, and exportation comparatively ceased.

The official returns of the import and export of

wheat during the nine years ending 1773, make it appear that the consumption more than equalled the home production; and this fact receives confirmation by the orders in council, issued 1767, laying an embargo on all grain destined for exportation, and forbidding the use of wheat in the distilleries. Thus vanished all preceding legislative enactments; bounties on export and duties on import being known but in name, and virtually ceasing to operate.

The quantity of wheat imported and exported during the years from 1765 to 1773, was as under:

Qrs. of wheat imported.	Qrs. of wheat exported.	Excess of import.	Annual average import.
1,051 . .	492,595 . .	509,598 . .	56,599

A change so sudden in the accustomed course of trade during a period of uninterrupted peace, when capital became more abundant and the supply of hands adequate, is a remarkable feature in the history of British agriculture; that the cause of this change could not be the mere effect of a numerical increase of consumers to the extent of about seven per cent. is evident, but that there was any decrease in the annual supply of corn of home growth is contrary to evidence. Mr. Comber* says that the annual average quantity of wheat raised at the commencement of the reign of George III. (1760) amounted to about 3,800,000 quarters, of which about 300,000 were sent out of the kingdom, leaving about 3,500,000 for home consumption. In 1773, the annual production of wheat was stated in parliament to be 4,000,000 of quarters, all of which, with the addition of about 100,000 quarters per annum imported, were consumed in Britain. If these statements are to be credited, they infer that while the number of mouths had increased about twelve per cent., the actual consumption of wheat had increased eighteen per cent.,

* Treatise on National Subsistence, p. 180.

a result which appears extremely probable, when we consider the great extension of our commerce, and the growth of manufactures, particularly of cotton, which improved machinery was at this time effecting. By these important mechanical inventions, which *economised* manual labour, the working classes were *more fully employed*, and the expanding demand for workmen augmented the price of work; an extended power of purchase was the consequence, and an enlarged consumption of food, superior in quality to that ordinarily consumed in previous times, the result.*

Corn law of 1773.—This change suggested the corn law of 1773; a law which implied that England was henceforth to be considered rather as an import than an export country of grain. The statute of the above year repealed the Act of 1670, and permitted the import of wheat when the price exceeded 48s., at a nominal duty of sixpence per quarter:—of barley, when the price exceeded 24s. at the rate of twopence per quarter; and of oats, when the price exceeded 16s. at the same rate of duty. The export limit was also reduced to 44s. for wheat.† The Act of 1773, admitting the free importation of grain when the price surpassed the previously mentioned limits, being more moderate in its demands than any preceding enactment, was better calculated to *maintain* a superiority of price over the market price of grain on the continent.

When prices exceeded 40s. per quarter—being perhaps a fair return for the expenses on production,—the English markets were kept in check by

* The above apparent paradox is fully explained, pp. 240-44. After the year 1760, when wages rose rapidly, wheat was generally substituted for rye by the labouring classes.

† Dr. Adam Smith says there seems to be a great deal of impropriety in prohibiting exportation altogether immediately the price of wheat attains the limit; when the bounty, given to force it, is withdrawn.

foreign importations; and no irrational inducement being offered for large investments of capital in bringing new lands into cultivation, the demand and supply were nicely poised, import or export alternately occurring in conformity with the state of the seasons. To what degree import predominated will be seen by the following return :—

Period.	Qrs. of wheat imported.	Qrs. of wheat exported.	Excess of import.	Aver. annual import.
1774 to 91	3,435,721	2,167,799	1,267,922	70,440

State of the corn trade at the commencement of the late wars, and Act of 1791.—We now approach the eventful period of the late wars; a period replete with vicissitude in the commerce of the state, and unfolding the most useful lessons for the due and practical government of transmarine trade. During the two years preceding the ever to be deplored rupture with France, the price of wheat fluctuated between 42s. and 45s. per quarter; which, being insufficient to satisfy the avidity of the landed proprietors, they obtained in 1791 a new act of parliament, by which the bounty on export was extended until the home price of wheat reached 46s. The import limit was raised from 48s. to 54s. per quarter, and a duty of 2s. 6d. per quarter was imposed on wheat, and proportional duties on other imported grain. The Act also enacted that foreign wheat might at any time be imported and warehoused under the king's lock, and re-exported duty free, but if sold for home consumption it became liable to a warehouse duty of 2s. 6d. per quarter, in addition to all other duties. This Act, securing to the British grower a more strict monopoly, became in a great measure eclipsed by circumstances arising from the French war, which unfolded to view a certainty of increasing prices in all essential necessities of life, and hence a co-existent increase of charge on pro-

duction. Yet the policy of the British government towards France tended for a time to retard the rise of prices, which, in ordinary course, must have immediately followed the commencement of hostilities. France, at this time, distracted by the revolutionary tempest which paralysed the springs of her commerce, felt grievously the horrors of famine and the miseries of anarchy, and in order to engender among the French people a dislike to the revolution, and a national demand for the reintegration of the ancient regime, the British government determined to direct its utmost efforts to aggravate, in that country, the existing dearth. With this view, they issued their orders in council, Feb. 1793, prohibiting the exportation of grain to the French ports; which, together with strict measures to prevent supplies reaching that country, and the large importations brought into England, depressed the price of grain in the English markets; the average price for the three years ending 1794 being 46s. 9d.; and this depression would, doubtless, have been more considerable, had not the government, interfering in operations foreign to its office, bought up large quantities of corn, which, in some measure, counteracted the effect of superabundant import.

The partial deficiency of crops which consecutively occurred in the years 1794 and 5, joined to the influence of the war, relieved the market of the redundant quantity, and carried prices in the latter year to 72s. 11d.

Corn Bounty Act of 1795.—The credit of France sinking under the pressure of circumstances, and the nation being disgusted with the sanguinary course of the revolutionary factions, a new attempt was made by the British ministers to *starve* her into subjection, or to increase the expense of maintaining an armed force, so as to place resistance to the

united efforts of Great Britain and Austria beyond her power. With this view Mr. Pitt determined to make a vigorous attempt to raise the price of grain on the continent, and to make Great Britain the storehouse for all the disposable grain of Europe. Hence he obtained the sanction of parliament (1795), allowing a bounty of from 16s. to 20s. per quarter, according to quality, on wheat imported from the north of Europe, until the quantity imported should amount to 900,000 quarters; of from 12s. to 15s. per quarter on wheat from the south of Europe or the Americas, until the quantity imported should amount to 500,000 quarters; and of from 8s. to 10s. per quarter, on such additional quantity as might be imported previous to the 30th September, 1796.

This truly ridiculous measure, so "full of sound and fury," could of course make no impression on the price of grain; for, the bounty being part of the purchase price—the price at which it was purchased was just minus the sum of the bounty in comparison with what it would have been if the trade had been free. That the plan failed in practice is evident from the fact, that the quantity of wheat imported from the north of Europe (430,000 quarters) during the period the Act remained in force, did not amount to a moiety of the limited quantity to which the bounty attached; and the total import from foreign parts upon which the bounty was paid, did not exceed 700,000 quarters, being just half the quantity limited by the Bounty Act—a result which fell very far short of the anticipations of the government.*

Fluctuations in the price of corn, from 1796 to 1800.—The season of 1796 proving abundant, not only in this country, but throughout the greater part of Europe, prices gradually declined; and the

* The amount paid for bounty on corn imported under the Act of 1795, was 573,418*l*.

government, convinced of the futility of their late attempt to starve their enemies into subjection, returned to that policy from which, in our opinion, they ought never to have departed, and determined to admit the import of all grain *free of duty and free of bounty*. The fall of prices, which commenced towards the close of the year 1796, continued progressive during the years 1797 and 1798; the average price of wheat, which in 1796 was 76s. 3d., becoming in 1797, 52s. 2d., and in 1798, 50s. 4d. This fall of prices alarmed the landed interest; and notwithstanding the almost total failure of all former political schemes to raise the price of corn, they again applied for, and obtained the sanction of parliament to an Act imposing a duty of 2s. 6d. per quarter, on all grain imported.

The large amount paid to foreigners for supplies of grain during the years 1795 and 6, turning the balance of commercial payments against England, had a powerful effect on our exchanges, and concurred with other causes to drain us of bullion and to stop the bank. The Exemption Act, which followed this unfortunate, this unhappy occurrence, opened a great facility for raising nominal capital, and hence provided a renewed stimulus to agriculture. The application of these means to farming investments was powerfully encouraged by the distressing seasons of 1799 and 1800, which, with the stoppage of the bank, seemed to occur as penal retributions for our iniquitous attempts to starve Europe into submission.

As soon as the deficiency of the wet season of 1799 was confirmed, prices rose rapidly, carrying the average of the year to 66s. 11d. After the corn harvest of the year 1800, which proved equally unfortunate, the rise in price was still more important, and averaged for that year 110s. 5d. In the spring of 1801, fine wheats attained the extraordinary price of 180s. per quarter, and notwith-

standing the rapid fall during the autumn of that year, wheat maintained the average rate of 115s. 11d. These prices were wholly unprecedented in British history, and caused that severe distress, which in a great degree resembles that mentioned in the latter years of the reign of Elizabeth.

Bounty Act of 1801.—These high prices induced the government (in 1799), to reduce the import duty from 2s. 6d. to 6d. per. quarter—and in 1800 to recur to the plan of granting bounties on the importation of grain. These bounties were regulated on an ascending scale, according to the quality of the grain; and subtracted from the exchequer, for corn imported during the three years ending 1802, no less than 2,156,678*l.*

Fall of prices at the peace of Amiens, and Act of 1804.—The peace which succeeded to this eventful period, restoring free transmarine intercourse with the northern European nations, concurred with the favourable season of 1802 to impose a sudden check to these high rates; and the average price which in the latter year had been 67s. 9d. became in 1803, 57s. 1d. So sudden a fall in the price of agricultural produce, was a subject of no little embarrassment to those who had invested property in agriculture during the late period, and legislative aid was again invoked to restore remunerating prices. The landed interest maintained, that the prices of 1804 would not admit of the cultivation of the poor soils which had been broken up in the dear years being continued, and persuaded ministers to accord in a new enactment which closed the ports against importations of foreign wheat until the home currency should reach 63s.; imposing a middle duty of 2s. 6d. per quarter when prices rated between 63s. and 66s., and a nominal

tax of sixpence per quarter when it surpassed that limit. A new plan was also at this time devised for more accurately determining the home prices of grain. By the Act of 1791, the maritime counties were divided into four maritime districts, and the prices regulated by the particular prices of each; by the Act of 1804, they were regulated by the aggregate averages of the maritime districts: the averages were taken four times a year, so that the ports continued either opened or closed for three months; during the following session, an Act passed by which importations and exportations of grain were regulated by the average prices of the twelve maritime districts.

Inutility of the Act of 1804; permanent rise of price subsequent to that year.—The abrupt renewal of the war with France in 1803, was, however, in itself quite sufficient to have spared the legislature the trouble of statuting on the corn trade; all the nice resolves of the parliamentary councils of 1804, being of about as much avail as the resolution of Xerxes to command obedience from the sea by chastising it with stripes.

The years 1803 and 1804 had passed over without any pecuniary pressure; but the formation of a new coalition with Austria and Russia, and the drain of hands and capital for the war, produced in the summer of 1805 a sudden revolution in our exchanges, depressing the value of Bank paper about four per cent., and causing a relative rise in the price of merchandise. The season of 1804 unhappily proved deficient, and the advance of the prices of grain was a natural consequence. Wheat attaining for the entire year of 1805 the average price of 87s. 1d. or about 22s. per quarter above the import limit in bullion. During the years 1806-7 and 8, the nation was in a measure independent of foreign supplies; but the prices for three consecutive years being 76s. 9d.; 73s. 1d.; 78s. 11d.,

—rates considerably above the import limit,—our ports remained open. In 1809, prices were enhanced from various causes. Our remittances to the Peninsula and Austria depressed, in an important degree, the relative value of Bank paper to gold.* The harvest of 1808 was unfavourable; and the season of 1809 proving wet, discovered a more calamitous deficiency. The expenditure of the government increased, and the operation of the war taking a wider range, the demand on our manufactures became proportionally enlarged. Foreign commerce in the year 1809 was especially extensive,† which tended greatly to augment the wages of labour, and thus to expand the power of purchase; hence the prices of wheat rose to the annual average of 94s. 5d., or about 23s. above the import limit in bullion.

From this time, the depression in the exchanges powerfully operated to increase the nominal price of corn; this cause, and the deficient harvest of 1809, carried the average for the year 1810 to 103s. 3d. The season of 1810 was unusually abundant; but causes of a permanent nature, “the effect of the war,” continuing to operate with increasing vigour, the currency of the markets did not average for the year 1811 less than 92s. 5d.

Extreme prices in 1812-13.—This was the year in which the resources of the British empire were put to the severest test: a deficient harvest,—a currency depreciated to the extent of from fifteen to twenty per cent.—extensive remittances of specie for the maintenance of the forces in the Peninsula,—the necessity of extending powerful pecuniary aid to the leviathan Muscovite,—all tended to press heavily on resources already dilapidated by un-

* Mr. Baring says, that gold remitted to Hambro' in 1809, returned a profit of $8\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. on the mint price.

† The amount of marine insurances in this year, was 162,538,900l.

precedented sacrifices. The prices of provisions soon sympathised with the extended demand and the deficient supply; wheat averaging, for the year 1812, 122s. 8d.; and for 1813,—despite of the abundant season of 1812,—106s. 6d.

At no period during the past century, were the profits of the agriculturists more remunerating than from the year 1811, to the peace of 1814. It was the heyday of prosperity to farming interests. Rents and charges being paid in a currency, depreciated from twenty-five to thirty per cent., the agriculturists felt in no degree the pressure of high rents, while prices afforded an indemnity far exceeding their original calculations. Thus, investments in land and farming stock, became a favourite channel for the employment of capital; rents and tithe received a rapid increase, and profits augmented to a degree which far surpassed any previous anticipation.

Such were the prospects of the agriculturists, and the laws which governed the importation of foreign grain, at the termination of the war; prospects doomed to undergo a bitter disappointment on the return of a pacific era.

Transition from war to peace.—The cessation of so many causes which had produced the enormous rise of prices during the war, together with the diminution of the charges on foreign importations, naturally caused a rapid fall in the prices of agricultural productions. Bread corn, which averaged in 1812, 122s., at one part of the year rose to 125s. per quarter: subsequent to the harvest of 1812, prices began to recede, and in the following year fell to an average of 106s. 6d.

Parliamentary resolutions, and committee reports on the corn trade, between 1813 and 15; and corn bill of the latter year.—Previous to the fall of

prices in 1813, a parliamentary committee had been appointed, to inquire into the state of the corn trade;—"which, actuated by a mixture of ignorance and selfishness, hardly to be credited in men of their station in society," agreed in the wise resolve of recommending to parliament, prohibition of import, until our home currency reached 105s. per quarter for wheat, and other grain in proportion.* Ministers, however inclined to favour the landed interests, were yet not so completely stultified as to propose to parliament the adoption of such a recommendation, and hence it was treated with the contempt it merited. In the early part of the session of 1814, the House of Commons came to certain resolutions. 1st. That it was expedient to permit the free exportation of wheat, whatever might be the home price. 2dly. To impose a graduated scale of duties on the importation of foreign grain, as follows—"when the price of wheat should be at, or under 64s. per quarter, the import duty should be 24s. per quarter, decreasing one shilling with every shilling rise in the price; until the home currency should reach 86s., when foreign wheat should be admitted for home consumption, at a duty of one shilling per quarter." These resolutions were at the time but little in favour with the great majority of the people; and the attempt to maintain a high price on the necessaries of life, at a time when our manufacturers were entering on a new field of competition with foreigners, was popularly stigmatized as a most injudicious and nefarious policy. These opinions being well grounded, reached the cabinet, where the conflicting views of its members prevented the adoption of a decisive measure. The landed interest yielded to the opposition, perhaps under the vain expectation, that prices would rise without legislative interference; hence the bill

* Committee Report on Agriculture, May, 1813.

imposing prohibitory duties miscarried, while the enactment permitting the free exportation of grain with the bounties granted in 1689, passed into law.

In 1814, another committee was appointed, to inquire into the operation of the laws affecting the corn trade. The witnesses examined were unanimously of opinion that the corn law of 1804 was insufficient to enable farmers to perform their engagements, or to retain in cultivation the poorer soils which had been broken up during the time of high prices. Some of the country gentlemen, who came to enlighten the committee by their vast fund of practical knowledge, thought that the very moderate peace price of 120s. per quarter should be the *lowest* limit at which foreign wheat should be allowed to be imported; others varied in their estimates at from 90s. to 100s., 80s. to 90s., and a few so low, as 80s. The committee were, however, contented with the lowest estimate, and recommended that 80s. per quarter for wheat should be the future import limit.

Upon this report, ministers prepared the corn bill of 1815, and Mr. Robinson (now Lord Ripon) was deputed to propose the measure to parliament. Neither ministers nor the advocates for high rates seemed to be aware of the effect on prices of a rise in the value of the currency to the extent of about 20 per cent.; and despite of all opposition, and the wise warning of the public voice, succeeded in obtaining the sanction of parliament to a measure which prohibited wheat when the home price should be under 80s.; rye, peas, and beans, 53s.; barley, beir or bigg, 40s.; and oats, 26s. Importations from the colonies were also prohibited, when our current prices were under 67s. for wheat; 44s. for rye and beans; 32s. for barley &c.; and 22s. for oats. By this Act all foreign grain might be imported and warehoused for exportation, duty free;

but the bounty on British grain exported was abolished. Immediately that peace opened the unrestricted navigation of the ocean, the importations of foreign grain became extremely large, and even the reduced prices of 1814 offered ample remuneration to the importers, whose operations during that year were conducted on an extensive scale. The immediate effect of the bill of 1815—which is perhaps the most unfortunate statute passed during the last 100 years—was to close the ports against any further supplies, and to cause demands for higher prices; these demands were freely answered, partly from the anticipated effect of the statute, but more particularly from the distressing deficiency of the crop of 1816; the effect of which was to carry prices far beyond the import limit, and to occasion during the years 1817 and 18, supplies of corn from the European and American continents, which have seldom been surpassed in quantity at any similar interval of time. Notwithstanding these immense supplies,—surpassing 5,300,000 quarters of grain—(see table, p. 432) prices rose rapidly, reaching from 63s. 8d., the average of the year 1815, to 90s. in the autumn of 1816, and 94s. 9d. for the average of the year 1817: after the harvest of the latter year, they began to shew a tendency to decline, and the season of 1818 proving abundant, they fell to an average of 83s. 8d. for that year.

Effects of the Corn Bill of 1815.—The Act of 1815 remained inoperative, except during the early part of the year 1816. That the subsequent rise in price proceeded from causes almost entirely independent of legislative enactment, is evident from the inefficiency of foreign importations, although conducted on an immense scale, to reduce prices below the import limit, ere the abundance of the season of 1818 was confirmed. But the high prices which followed the passing of the Act,

revived the drooping spirits of the farmer; and this confidence in the vain security which the statute pretended to offer, that the permanent minimum price for wheat should be 80s., caused a renewed extension of tillage. The country had been so long fed by foreign importations, that the idea of its being able to produce a sufficiency of food for its rapidly increasing numbers, was considered chimerical; and thus new investments of capital in agriculture were deemed quite safe, under the firm protection afforded by a legislative enactment. No sooner, however, did this extension of tillage begin to operate in increasing the supplies, than that which had so lately appeared a mere chimera, was abundantly proved to be an indubitable fact. The growth of 1819, 1820, and 21, decidedly surpassed the home consumption. The ports were closed against foreign importation, yet the prices of wheat receded, falling in 1819 to 72s. 3d., and in 1820 to 65s. 10d.; the agriculturists were confounded, yet despite all their calculations, prices fell in 1821 to 54s. 5d., and in the autumn of 1822 to the extreme depression of 38s. 2d., averaging for the whole year 43s. 3d.

Thus, the unfortunate corn law of 1815, had the very contrary effect to that intended, and had not the innocent suffered with the guilty, selfish monopolists, the punishment would have been happily commensurate with the deserts of those who demanded the statute. In vain did the landed interest in 1821, appeal to parliament for relief. The legislature, having abused its functions, ceased to possess the power of raising prices. Rents, though lowered, remained unpaid—farming stock sold at ruinous rates, and the agriculturists throughout the kingdom experienced in no slight degree, the beggary and ruin they intended for others.

Re-action of prices after 1822.—That extreme depression in the prices of merchandise always carries its own antidote, is a maxim too evident to

require any comment; and the prices of 1821-2 having so depressed the profits and wages of the agriculturists, as to induce a rapid transfer of labour and capital from husbandry to trade and manufactures, prices in 1823 began to recover, averaging for that year 51s. 9d. The rise continued slowly progressive, and reached, in 1824, an average of 62s.—1825 was the famous prosperity year for all classes, and the agriculturists obtained their full proportion, prices averaging 66s. 6d.

The spring and summer of 1826 proving prematurely arid, and the crops indicating a general deficiency, the government determined to check a further advance. This became the more necessary, from the extreme embarrassment into which the commerce of the country had been plunged by the events of the early part of the year; hence Orders in Council were issued, “admitting for home consumption, a quantity not exceeding 500,000 quarters of wheat, at such rates as should be thought advisable under circumstances.” This measure, which is characteristic of the promptitude of Mr. Canning, had the effect of preventing any further rise in the price of grain ere the harvest of the year was gathered; and the crop proving more abundant than was anticipated, the averaged currency of the year did not exceed 58s. 9d.*

This measure was but the prelude to a revision of the laws which governed the importation of grain. Mr. Canning, in 1827, proposed to parliament certain resolutions, to the effect that foreign corn might be always imported in order to be warehoused, and always admitted for home consumption on payment of certain duties. It was resolved, that in the instance of the average current price of wheat being 70s., the duty charged

* The standard, or imperial measure, which came into operation in 1826, being somewhat more than the Winchester measure, 58s. 9d. is only equivalent to 57s. computed by the old measure.

should be one shilling per quarter; the duty increasing one shilling with every shilling decrease in the market price of wheat: the scale was also extended to other corn. These resolutions were embodied in a Bill, which passed the House of Commons with a large majority, and which was considered by the public as a great improvement on previous corn laws; but in the House of Lords, the Duke of Wellington having succeeded in carrying an amendment interdicting the admission of foreign wheat until the home price reached 66s., ministers abandoned the Bill, considering such an amendment incompatible with its general principles.

Corn Bill of 1828.—Upon the accession of the Duke of Wellington to office, during the year 1828, a Bill, very similar to that which he had formerly opposed, was introduced by his government, the chief provisions of which were to admit the importation of grain, upon a scale of duties calculated in relation to the usual comparison of prices in the British and foreign markets. By this enactment, it was intended to secure to the home grower a monopoly, when prices might be under 60s. per quarter. The practical operation of this law we shall hereafter notice; and shall here give a copy of the ascending scale of duties which it enforces.

				Duty.	
If the average price of wheat				s.	s. d.
during six weeks is at or above				73, the import duty is	1 0
If under 73s. and not less than				72	2 8
—	72	—	71	—	6 8
—	71	—	70	—	10 8
—	70	—	69	—	13 8
—	69	—	68	—	16 8
—	68	—	67	—	18 8
—	67	—	66	—	1 0 8
—	66	—	65	—	1 1 8
—	65	—	64	—	1 2 8
—	64	—	63	—	1 3 8
—	63	—	62	—	1 4 8
—	62	—	61	—	1 5 8

By the above scale, it appears that the decrease of duty is co-equal with the increase of price, when the latter ranges between 61s. and 67s. per quarter; after the price reaches 67s., the duty decreases 2s. for every shilling rise in the price of wheat, until the latter reaches 69s. When the prices range between 69s. and 71s., the duty decreases three shillings per quarter for every shilling rise; and when between 71s. and 73s., four shillings upon the same ratio; when at or above 73s., the duty is one shilling per quarter.

Barley, when rating under 33s. and not under 32s. per quarter, is subject to a duty of 13s. 10d.; the rate of duty from this point diminishes 1s. 6d. for every shilling rise in the price, until it reaches 41s., when it is fixed at 1s. per quarter.

Oats, if under 25s. and not under 24s., pay 10s. 9d. per quarter duty, which decreases 1s. 6d. per quarter, until the price reaches 31s. when the duty is fixed at 1s. per quarter.

Such is the law which at the present day governs the importation of foreign grain. In the succeeding section we purpose discussing the practical operation of our corn laws, and the expediency of their repeal.

SECTION II. PRACTICAL OPERATION OF OUR CORN LAWS.

Question as to the efficacy of corn laws discussed.—

It is no difficult task to prove the utter impolicy of any legislative enactments tending to restrict the free ingress and egress of bread. A retrospect of the results of the various statutes which have been framed by our legislators, will convince the most sceptical, of the inability of our law makers to effect any permanent benefit either to the community generally, or to any particular interest, by the perversion of the natural laws which govern our productive power or international commerce, while the injury done by the attempt is frequently of the most baneful description. That the effects of the various enactments passed to regulate the trade and govern the prices of corn have ordinarily been in direct variance to the object sought, is proved in almost every instance to which we can refer. The object of all the early statutes was to ensure low prices and abundance; their effects were high prices and scarcity. The object of the bounty granted on the exportation, and the restrictions on the importation of grain by the Act of 1688, was to ensure high prices and to stimulate tillage; its effect during forty years was to depress prices far below their previous limit, and to cause that torpid state of agriculture so remarkable during the half century previous to the American war. All the Acts passed and resolutions adopted respecting the corn trade during the last war were inoperative; but in no instance was the triumph of justice and reason over malevolence and ignorance more forcibly evinced, than in the results which followed the enactment of 1815. From the stimulus given to tillage by the high prices following 1808, our

supplies so much increased, that in 1812 and 1813 our home growth of corn was quite equal to our consumption ; it was therefore evident, that had our ports been hermetically sealed against importations, the first abundant harvest would occasion a rapid fall of prices : the operative effect of that ill advised statute was to favour an erroneous notion, both in England and on the continent, that prices would always bear a tendency to rise above the import limit, and that they could only be kept in check by foreign supplies, from reaching a greater elevation. This opinion was calculated to create a temporary rise of price, and to favour the accumulation of large stocks of grain on the continent, in anticipation of a demand from this country, which, when realised, caused the stock of the whole of the granaries of Europe to be poured, at one fell swoop, into the English markets ;—thus unnaturally depressing prices, and causing those sudden jerks in our agricultural, commercial, and financial concerns, which could but be attended with the most distressing effects. These effects indeed were too severely felt during the four or five years following 1818. But such consequences, however disastrous, are very inferior to those which would follow, if the legislature *could* give full effect to its intentions. . It is impossible to estimate the extent of the evil consequent on the Corn Bill of 1815, had it continued permanently operative. This Bill, which was trumpeted forth by Parliament as necessary to maintain the prosperity of British agriculture and commerce, would, if its operation had been commensurate with its ideal character, have been attended with the most ruinous effects to both. If indeed effect could be given to such laws, the nation might starve amidst surrounding plenty ; or at any rate the dearth would be proportional to the magnitude of the prohibition. It would

have compelled us to have had recourse to such expensive means of raising food, and of employing so large a proportion of our productive power in unprofitable agriculture, that the means of supporting the national burdens would have been wholly inadequate to their pressure. Emigration of capital and talent to less taxed countries would have been carried on extensively, and our power of permanently competing with foreigners, except at a most distressing reduction of wages, quite out of the question. Had the Corn Bill of 1815 been rejected, and no inducement held out by the government to extend tillage in the anticipation of permanently high prices, the conversion of tilled lands into pasture,—which had begun in 1814, would have progressed,—all the unfortunate investments made in 1815, 16 and 17, been avoided,—supply and demand been more equally poised,—the transition from high to moderate prices more gradual, and less severely felt; and the agricultural ruin which distinguished the years 1821, 22, and 23, caused by over-production, in a great degree prevented. The Act of 1804 was in itself quite sufficient, because its provisions would, for a season, have been chiefly inoperative, and in subsequent years have counteracted any extreme depression; hence a more steady and permanent advantage in price would have been maintained over the continental markets.

EFFECT OF THE CORN BILL OF 1828.

THE Act of 1828, by reducing the import limit, and gradually increasing the facility of foreign supplies with the need for them, has been more effective than any previous statute; its demands, although too large, being comparatively more moderate. By diminishing the probability of extreme prices, investments in agriculture have, in a degree, been discouraged; and in spite of partial

deficiencies of crop during the first two years, and more abundant seasons in the two latter years of its operation, a more than usual steadiness of price has been maintained. To what extent this Act taxes the consumer for the benefit of the producer, or rather, of the landlord and other co-partners in the produce, is a question which involves much inquiry, and to the elucidation of which we shall here offer some data.

Estimate of the annual production and consumption of grain in Great Britain.—As a prelude to the elucidation of the question as to the tax imposed on the consumer by the present corn laws, it is first necessary to form some approximate estimate of the quantity of corn raised and consumed in Britain. Several calculations have from time to time appeared on this subject, founded chiefly on the number of acres under tillage, and the average quantity yielded by an acre of ground.

Mr. Charles Smith, author of *Tracts on Corn*, made some curious calculations on the consumption of grain, referring to the year 1765; and by reducing it to the standard of wheat, he found it to be equal to about one quarter to every inhabitant. The magistrates of the county of Suffolk, in the year 1795-6, investigated this subject for the purpose of ascertaining the consumption of bread by each family, and found Mr. Smith's calculations very accurate.

The calculation of Mr. Smith, referring to 1765, is as under; he takes the population of England and Wales at 6,000,000 souls.

People.				Total consumption.
3,750,000	consume	1 qr. of wheat	per head . . .	3,750,000
888,000	—	$1\frac{1}{8}$ rye	ditto . . .	999,000
739,000	—	$1\frac{3}{8}$ barley	ditto . . .	1,016,000
623,000	—	$2\frac{1}{8}$ oats	ditto . . .	1,791,000
<hr/>				<hr/>
6,000,000		Total bread corn consumed by man	.	7,556,000

Brought forward—quantity consumed	7,556,000
Wheat used for distillation and in starch making .	90,000
Barley ditto and for malting . .	3,417,000
Rye for hogs, &c.	31,000
Oats for horses, &c.	2,461,000
<hr/>	
Total home consumption	13,555,000
Excess of exports over imports	398,624
Add for seed (one tenth)	1,395,447
<hr/>	
Total production of all corn	15,349,071

This table has, we believe, formed the foundation for various subsequent calculations; but the time elapsed since 1765 has, undoubtedly, worked a material change in the accustomed diet of the labouring classes, and consequently a variation in the relative consumption of the different sorts of grain.

We have already noticed the estimate of Sir F. M. Eden, of the relative consumption of wheat, barley, and rye, as food for man, referring to the year 1760. The two latter descriptions of grain are now, as regards England and Wales, rarely consumed as bread corn. Barley, but more especially oats, are yet still consumed to some extent in Scotland in the shape of bread. The general improvement in the condition of the British people has, doubtless, enlarged the consumption of meat, and probably, in some degree, diminished the relative consumption of bread.

In 1823, Mr. Lowe estimated the corn produce of the soil of England and Wales to be, of Wheat . 12,000,000 qrs.

Barley . 7,000,000

Oats . . 10,000,000

Total . 29,000,000

The produce of the soil during the four or five years previous to 1823, having been about equal to the quantity consumed, the above calculation bears reference to both production and consumption. Since that year, the increased consumption

of wheat has perhaps not surpassed the relative increase of mouths. The quantity of barley and oats consumed has doubtless increased in a greater ratio, from the great excess in the quantity used in the breweries and distilleries; but as Mr. Lowe's calculation of the consumption of barley is decidedly too large, our estimate for the present year will still be more moderate.*

Upon the foregoing premises, and the data furnished in various official documents, we may hazard an estimate of the consumption of grain at the present date, with reference to Great Britain. We compute the population at the end of 1833 to be 16,800,000 souls.

People.	Quarters.	Total consumed.
15,600,000 consume	$\frac{16}{15}$ of wheat per head	. . 14,625,000
650,000 —	$2\frac{7}{8}$ — oats —	. . 1,869,000*
550,000 —	$1\frac{5}{8}$ — barley and rye	. . 894,000
		<hr/>
Total corn consumed in bread		. 17,388,000
Wheat used in the distilleries, 100,000, and in starch, 3100 quarters	 103,100
Barley used for malting, 4,650,000; in the distilleries, 880,000; for pigs, and other purposes 200,000 quarters	 5,730,000
Oats for horses and other cattle, 11,200,000; for other purposes, 100,000 quarters, (partly used in the distilleries)	 11,300,000
Peas, beans, and other sorts of grain	 2,000,000
		<hr/>
Total consumption of grain in Britain		. 36,521,100

From the defective returns of the state of cultivation in Ireland, a detailed estimate of the production and consumption of grain in that country would be subject to great inaccuracy—it is, however, usually computed, that the Irish consume about one-fourth the quantity of grain consumed in Britain, while the quantity produced, amounts

* Present State of England (Appendix, p. 94).

† This is intended to include the oatmeal consumed otherwise than in bread.

to fully one-third. Upon this estimate the production of grain in the United Kingdom, in the average of two years, ending 1833, stands thus :

	Quarters.
Total consumption of grain in Great Britain . . .	36,500,000
Add for Ireland, one-fourth	9,100,000
	<hr/>
Total quantity of grain consumed	45,600,000
Add for seed, one-tenth	4,560,000
	<hr/>
Total grain produced in Great Britain and Ireland*	50,160,000

Having thus completed our estimate of the consumption and production of corn in the United Kingdom, which, when compared with the estimates of various other writers, must be deemed moderate; our next subject is to determine, in what degree the operation of the present corn law influences the price of grain in the English markets, and hence to what extent it taxes the British community.

Superiority in the price of grain in Great Britain, over the Continent, deduced from the Consuls' returns—The comparison of the prices of grain in the principal shipping ports of continental Europe, compared with the prices in the British markets, furnishes the best, or perhaps only data, for computation on this point. We hence note in a tabular form, the consuls' returns of the prices of wheat in the north of Europe, at various intervening dates, from 1829 to 1833 ; also an estimate of the expense of transport, the prices of wheat in the British markets, and the superiority of price maintained.

* During the two past years, the production of grain in the United Kingdom, has very nearly equalled the consumption. Thus the estimate of the quantity consumed, will also refer to the quantity produced.

Wheaten bread is seldom found in the cabin of the Irish peasant in the south and west, hence the consumption of wheat is not comparatively so large as in England. The quantity of barley used in the distilleries is immense.

Shipping Ports.	Average prices of wheat for year 1829.	Consuls estimate of the expense of transport to London, per quarter.	Total price at which wheat could be imported free of legislative restriction.	Average price of wheat in 1829 in Britain, according to inspectors' returns.	Superiority of price by the operation of corn laws per qr.
	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>
Dantzic	43 5	7 6	50 11	66 3	15 4
St. Petersburg . .	34 9	8 3*	43 0	—	23 3
Riga	32 3	9 1	41 4	—	25 11
Memel	35 11	2 6	43 5	—	22 10
Hamburgh	39 6	5 6	45 0	—	21 3

Another return of this description was presented to parliament during the session of 1833. Noting the prices at various shipping ports in Europe and America, between October 1829, and July 1832, the subjoined table, deduced from the above-named document, will refer to the latter year only.

Ports.	Average prices in January, April, and July, 1832.	Estimated shipping charges to London.†	Price free on board in the Port of London.	Average price in England and Wales.	Superiority of prices.
	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i> <i>d.</i>
Dantzic	41 0	7 6	48 6	60 7	12 1
Hamburgh	38 3	5 6	43 9	—	16 10
Amsterdam	42 1	5 0	51 6	—	13 6
Leghorn	42 2	9 4	51 6	—	9 1
Philadelphia	36 2	9 6	45 1i	—	14 8

Taking the average of the two periods referred to, the superiority of the price of wheat in the British markets over the average price in the continental ports, is about 25s. per quarter; but allowing for the

* This includes shipping charges, and lighterage from St. Petersburg to Cronstadt.

† There is no official estimate of the expenses of transport in this return, but we have calculated them rather above the actual sum.

expenses of transport, the corn law seems, through this period of four years, to have imposed a duty on wheat of 17s. 6d. per quarter; being without doubt a greater tax than was ever imposed by any act of parliament on record, and by far too oppressive to remain in operation. Our table (page 432), will shew what proportion of this tax was paid to the government—and what remained for the landed interest. We are, however, disposed to make some reduction from this large superiority in price, on account of the difference in the *quality* of corn on which the average prices are calculated in the foreign and British ports. The usual description of foreign wheats shipped to England, furnishes but a very imperfect sample of the quality on which the average prices are calculated abroad; for the British law subjecting foreign wheat of every quality to the same rate of duty, it is fair to presume that the best descriptions, only, are brought to the English markets; it being evidently to the interest of the importer, to pay the duty on that description which sells for the highest price, the proportion of duty diminishing with the increasing price obtained. Hence we may reasonably infer, that there is a difference of ten per cent., or about 4s. per quarter, on account of difference of quality in the wheat on which the average prices are computed in the British and foreign markets; to which sum, if we add 1s. 6d. per quarter for landing charges, storing, merchants' commission, &c., we shall reduce the excess of price maintained in wheat, through the operation of the Act, to about 12s. per quarter; which is still a very important superiority.

Sixty shillings may be taken as the medium price in the English market for a quarter of wheat between the years 1829 and 1833, therefore this 12s. extra price may be computed at twenty per

cent., which is perhaps about the ratio of the excess of price on all grain, through the operation of the corn law.

Now taking the medium price of all corn, at 40s. per quarter, and the consumption of grain in Great Britain, at 36,000,000 of quarters, the money expended for grain amounts to 72,000,000*l*.* twenty per cent. on which, amounts to 14,500,000*l*. being the apparent direct tax levied on the consumers by the corn law; but as a large proportion of the consumers (the agriculturists) are both receivers and payers of this tax, its direct pressure on the community cannot be computed at so large an amount; allowing one third on this account, the tax on corn paid by the consumer, amounts to the annual average sum of about 9,700,000*l*.; but if we were to extend our view to the influence which the price of bread has on all the prime necessities of life, our estimate would be at least double.

Such we find to be the present operation of the British corn laws; and it now remains to be considered, whether, duly weighing all the several interests demanding and condemning the system of restriction to a free trade in corn, they work to the advantage or disadvantage of the British community.

The policy of restrictions to a free trade in corn discussed.—The rent of land, it is evident, is the surplus which remains, after every charge incurred in cultivation. Rent may be substantively divided into three portions: viz. landlord's profit; tithes; and such portion of the charge for the support of the poor, as is applied to the maintenance of the aged, impotent, and infirm. The foregoing returns

* Ireland perhaps receives as much as she pays, by the operation of the corn law, we therefore leave her out of the calculation.

seem to warrant the opinion, that the total abolition of all restrictions on the import of corn, would bring prices in the British market to within about 10s. per quarter of those of the continent;* that sum being about equivalent to the expense of transport; and if, as a fair average, we take the standard or ordinary price of wheat in the corn exporting countries laved by the Baltic at the very probable currency of 38s. per quarter, the standard price in the English market would be 48s. per quarter. This may be considered equivalent to a reduction of about 12s. per quarter on wheat, taking the average price of the last three years at 60s. per quarter; and if we admit that this 20 per cent. depreciation on wheat is a fair estimate of the fall on all agricultural produce, consequent on the removal of all restrictions to a free trade in corn, we may infer that the *money rent* of land would depreciate in the same ratio.

Question: Is the landlord benefited by corn laws?
 —To the landlord the question arises, whether, in placing this depreciation of income on one side of the account, and the various advantages consequent on the return to a “*natural state of things*,” by the abolition of the corn law, on the other, it is to his interest to advocate or oppose such a measure? Let it be granted, as a postulate, that by the repeal of the corn laws the landlord’s income would diminish 20 per cent.,—where would he find the counterpoise? First, it is clear that the fall of income would be concomitant with a similar depreciation in the prime necessities of life, but it would not, in a general sense, be equivalent to a rise in the value of money *pari passu*, when viewing the usual roll of the items which usually constitute the disbursements of those expending large incomes.

* We suppose 12s. per quarter to be the difference of price, from which we deduct 2s. per quarter for the importer’s profit.

Such items of expenditure as servants' wages,* salaries, professional fees, education at the public schools or universities, the cost of articles of luxury, and the productions of the fine arts, which absorb a material portion of the expenditure of the higher orders, being scarcely susceptible of an immediate practical reduction ;—that an equivalent, or nearly equivalent, reduction in these items of expenditure would eventually follow a fall in the prime necessities of life, is very probable, but the operation would be slow, and the full accomplishment remote. Yet a fall of prices in articles of prime necessity would give a *tendency* to a general rise in the value of money, even in disbursements of a superficial character ; and, as no inconsiderable portion of the expenditure of the higher, or rather richer, classes, is disbursed directly and indirectly in commodities of prime necessity, in which the fall would be 20 per cent., we may

* There are, perhaps, no services which, in England, are more amply remunerated than those of domestic servants. While all other classes have suffered a great depreciation during the last twenty years, the wages paid to domestic servants have undoubtedly increased. The ordinary items of the expenditure of this class have also very considerably diminished ; the cost of clothing, which, we presume, constitutes the chief disbursement of female domestic servants, has diminished since the peace, at least 80 per cent. Hence the 15*l.* now paid as yearly wages, is equivalent to 27*l.* twenty years since. The number of female servants in Britain is upwards of 700,000 ; and if their ages were calculated, we do not doubt it would be found that two-thirds of all the British damsels, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five, are domestic servants ; yet, notwithstanding this immense supply of female labourers, the demand is superior to it ; their wages rise, and their prosperity is strikingly evinced by their elegant garments, and costly decorations. Male servants are not so numerous, yet the demand is superior to the supply ; and the services of a footman, gratuitously educated at the parish school, already command an equal remuneration, and promise to command a higher price, than the services of a curate who has expended large sums in the acquirement of classic lore at the universities. *This proves that the useful are beginning to be appreciated.*

fairly estimate that they would meet a counterpoise amounting to half, or ten per cent., from this source; leaving still a deficiency of income to a like amount. If our landlords would refer to the interesting report of the parliamentary committee on agriculture, in 1821, they would there find most useful, and we think sound, advice, as to the course to be pursued at the present time. The report was calculated to awaken the landed interest to the folly of high restrictive duties on the importation of foreign corn, and to the injurious tendency of that discouragement to foreign competition which has so remarkably distinguished their policy since the late war. The report especially notices that the bounty system of 1689, whatever might be its early operations, was accompanied by a *torpid* state of agriculture for the half century previous to 1773; and that one cause (we presume, by their noticing it, that they considered it a material cause) of the prosperity of our agriculture from 1773 to 1814, was *its comparative exemption from legislative interference*. The advice of the committee was, to return, by cautious steps, *to an unrestricted state of intercourse*. This valuable advice, coming from those who were the professed, and undoubtedly the best, friends to the landed interest, has been suffered to pass by unheeded, and has unhappily been forgotten in the current of events. The charges on cultivation have been in a great measure retained; and the British growers of corn, who, from limited information, are unable to judge of the natural effect of unnatural causes, trusting to the maintenance of the monopoly, have become the innocent victims to their credulity. The evidence adduced before the agricultural committee of 1810,* which, indeed, would apply at the present day—and in

* Our readers are well aware, this was a time of great deficiency of home-grown corn to meet the consumption.

our opinion will apply fifty years hence—should have warned the landed interest of the impossibility of retaining high prices on agricultural produce. Mr. Beecher, of Suffolk, being asked by the committee whether he considered the import limit of this time (63s.) as too low, answered in substance—

“ If the import limit was raised 20s. a quarter, or to 84s. instead of 63s., the effect would be, on a notice given that that would be the import price after the 30th of September in *any* year, the consumption of the country would be fully provided for at home, even the first year after such a notice.”

Q.—“ Could it be provided for in the first year, without cross cropping ?”

A.—“ I believe that the lands now sown with wheat are not in the high state generally they might be ; and this I am aware of, that every additional hoeing of the wheat crop will give, upon an average, at least two bushels an acre. I have tried the experiment more than once *in the same fields*. By not hoeing, hoeing once, and hoeing twice, the difference has been—with one hoeing, two bushels more, and upwards ; and in that hoed twice, four bushels more.”

Here we have the opinion of a gentleman of practical science as an agriculturist, of the ability of farmers to increase to a large extent, and almost spontaneously, the supply of wheat on a given surface, by the employment of additional labour ; so that when prices rise, so as to pay a profit on the labour employed, all the protection of a corn law vanishes, by the excess of home-grown corn produced : but it is from the effect of the growing imports of corn from Ireland, that landlords must expect the most decided opposition to any corn law which purposes to maintain high prices. Those who are acquainted with the wretched state of agriculture in that country, and its amazing fertility, must be aware that the least improvement must occasion a very large and rapid addition to her ordinary produce. Since the opening of the western districts, and cheap *steam* communication with England her trade has rapidly increased ;

and in comparing the imports of Irish corn at the present day, with her import 25 to 30 years ago, we find them to have increased seven-fold. (See table, page 365, *n.*) No corn law can be imposed against the trade of Ireland; all such measures must, from the very nature of our relative position, be for ever banished from the English councils; and with such a power of supply, Ireland is fast growing into that productive state, when she will teach the British manufacturers to *mock* any effort of a statesman to raise the price of grain, by imposing corn laws.

All this only shews our *power*, after a few seasons, of eradicating the operation of a corn law; but it is in the interval that the greatest wrong is inflicted on society by restrictive measures. However extraordinary, yet it is an undoubted fact, that small capitalists are induced to occupy under the expectation that the prices of grain will be permanently maintained at the import limit imposed by law; and this idea pervading the agricultural classes, they exert every effort, while the law is *young*, to withhold supplies, under the impression that they will improve; in fact, a general idea usually prevails, that prices will advance; and this temporary stimulus to markets succeeds, for a season, in augmenting price. As illustrative of this proposition, we could refer to the state of the markets in 1805, 1816, 1823, and 1829, all years immediately succeeding a new corn law; *—now the effect of this is, that the tenant engages to rent a farm upon an erroneous calculation of the value of the produce; the landlord makes his contract for a term of years; the clergyman triennially

*Years of a new Corn Bill.	s.	d.	Succeeding years.	s	d.
In 1804	60	5	1805	87	1
1815	63	8	1816	76	2
1822	43	3	1823	51	9
1828	60	5	1830	66	3

commutes the tithe, and other contracts are blindly entered into by the credulous tenant. After the first effect of the new corn law has passed, the tenant finds all his calculations erroneous;—his monopoly of the home market but ideal, and having no means of export, except at the most ruinous prices:—his capital sinks—lands become neglected—the estate is depreciated in value, and at the end of a few years, the tenant abandons the farm; and the landlord finds, that although the corn law has transferred some portion of the tenant's capital into his hands, yet that the sum is very inadequate to repair the injury done to his estate by the inefficiency of the tenant to do justice to the ground.

We could refer to a multitude of instances where this effect has been produced. The late agricultural report abounds with instances of the defective management of farms; and the late poor law report quotes numerous cases evincing the loss of farming capital, and the reversion of farms to the landlord (see page 328). Mr. Power's report from Cambridgeshire would, too, generally serve as a report from various parts of England: he says, "several farms of considerable extent have changed hands *twice* within the last *five* years, from insolvency of the tenants in some cases, in others from the terror of that prospect."

Would any landlord in his senses, admitting these effects to be true and general, maintain that it would not be his interest to abandon his claims for rent to the extent of twenty or even thirty per cent., if the remainder were secured by placing agriculture on a firmer and fairer foundation? It never can be to the interest of the landlord to prey upon the scanty capitals of occupiers, by pretending to secure to them a boon which, in reality, it is *beyond his power* to bestow: a heavy loss must, and does eventually fall on him;

while the injury done to other classes is incalculable.

Question: Is the corn law beneficial to the farmer or husbandman?—To the practical farmer, who weighs in his scale of calculation, all charges which appertain to the expense of production, against the income arising from his land, a corn law securing a high price, can be of little avail; the charges, of course sympathising with the price of the produce, and the surplus, whatever it may be, being what may fairly be termed the *natural rent*, or the usually claimed share of the landlord, we shall here refer to the expenses on tillage, by which we shall be enabled to shew how far the agriculturist is interested in high prices.

Estimate of the expense of cultivating 100 acres of land.—The board of Agriculture published, about fifteen years since, an estimate of the expense of cultivating 100 acres of arable land in England, on an average of the returns made to circular letters to farmers in different parts of the kingdom; from this estimate, it will be immediately seen, how intimate the reduction in the expense of tillage would be with the fall in the price of agricultural produce.

The estimate was made for three distinct periods, viz. 1790, 1803, and 1813: the proportion which the various items of charge bears to the total sum, is nearly equal in each of the periods; but as the calculation for 1803, is more suitable for the present day, we here note the estimate for that year:

	£.	s.	d.		£.	s.	d.
Rent	121	2	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	Brought forward	319	10	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
Tithes	26	8	0 $\frac{1}{4}$	Seeds	49	2	7
Rates	31	7	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	Manure	68	6	2
Wear and tear . .	22	11	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	Team	80	8	0 $\frac{1}{4}$
Labour	118	0	4	Interest	30	3	8 $\frac{3}{4}$
	<hr/>				<hr/>		
	319	10	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	Total	£ 547	10	11 $\frac{1}{2}$

With the exception of rent and interest, every item of charge would almost spontaneously diminish, *pari passu*, with the decline in the price of produce. A diminution in the already depressed wages of the labourer may appear wanting in humanity, and indeed from political reasons unadvisable. That the loss, however, to the peasant, by a depression of twenty per cent. in the amount of wages, concomitant with a corresponding fall in the prime necessities of life, would be very trifling, will be seen by the following table of the disbursement of the weekly wages of a labourer. This table first appeared in a small pamphlet, written by Mr. Hewitt Davis, a Surrey farmer, who says, “during the winter of 1829-30, I made every agricultural labourer in my employ give me a weekly account of how he spent his wages, and from the average of the accounts I computed the following table ;”—the wages are taken at fifteen shillings per week.

Articles of expenditure.	Decimal parts in 1000 of fifteen shill- ings.	Proportion in money. s. d.
Bread and flour	375 5 7½
Meat	120 1 9½
Butter and cheese	80 1 2½
Firing, candles, and soap . . .	100 1 6
Potatoes	50 0 9
Beer and spirits	70 1 0½
Tea coffee and sugar	100 1 6
Clothes	105 1 7
	<hr/> 1000 . . .	<hr/> 15 0*

Thus, if we exclude the portions expended for beer and spirits, clothes and grocery, amounting to .275, or nearly twenty-eight per cent., the labourer would virtually lose nothing by wages diminished in proportion to the reduced price of

* A copy of the above pamphlet was sent to the present Earl Fitzwilliam, who, from investigations of a similar description, approves of the accuracy of Mr. Davis's estimate.

agricultural produce; and presuming that no fall in the articles demanding the outlay of .275, as annexed, would occur, his total deficiencies of wages, although nominally amounting to twenty per cent., or three shillings per week, would be only six and a half per cent., or $11\frac{3}{4}d$. But we have no idea that even this reduction of wages would be necessary; the arrangements, progressively making by parliament to reduce other items of charges, being calculated to afford an increase in the share of the labourer.

To the farmer, the advantage of a reduction of the price of produce, coequal with a fall in the expenses of husbandry, would, in many respects, be beneficial. For instance, the capital required would be diminished, together with the risk arising from bad seasons, or epidemic disorders in cattle; and what perhaps is of greater importance, he would not be exposed to any extensive depreciation of price by the competition of foreign agriculturists. At present, surrounded with markets which offer supplies at a lower rate, he stands exposed to all the disadvantages of depreciation, without any corresponding reduction in charges. Always enduring great fluctuations, and obtaining no countervailing profits—the relief to the farmer must come from diminished charges on production; not from an increased price for the produce.

The only valid impediment to a free trade in corn, arises from the difficulty of meeting the claims of tenants on lease; but in looking to the roll of the charges on cultivation, it does not appear that the extra proportion of rent, calculated upon prices twenty per cent. in advance of returns actually made, would be so immoderately increased as to preclude the policy of a return to free trade. The rent, calculated at about one-fifth the value of the produce, would certainly, by a fall of prices equivalent to twenty per cent., be

raised to one-fourth ; but the anticipated boon to the tenant, "*the abolition of tithe*," coupled with the gradual relinquishment of those taxes which especially press on agriculture, would fully indemnify him for the extra rent to which he would be subject until the expiration of his lease ; and from the general repugnance to contracts for long leases, which of late years has been usually manifested by both landlord and tenant, it is fair to presume that no long interval of time would elapse, ere the proportion of rent would become justly poised with the value of the crop.

But the most important of the benefits to be derived from a free trade in corn—is, the advantages it would secure to the manufacturer and general trader.

Advantages of a free trade in corn to the manufacturer and trader.—Countries which do not, in an especial degree, possess the physical aptitude for producing rare or particular productions of the soil, which secure to them a kind of natural national monopoly in certain branches of commerce, must, in order to support a foreign trade, and obtain the productions of other climes, direct their productive power to the manufacture of the raw materials furnished by other countries. Portugal possesses in a high degree the physical capacity of producing wine and fruit ; Italy, of silk ; Germany, fine wool ; the Brazils, gold and cotton ; through which capacity, they are enabled to maintain a foreign trade. Great Britain produces naturally, few commodities indigenous and peculiar to her soil, by which she could maintain a foreign trade of consumption ; but she possesses in a high degree the elements for the manufacture of raw productions—convenient geographical position—an immense commercial marine—intimate means of internal communication—large capital, and above all other advantages, an intelligent

and highly industrious community : hence, the natural current of her commerce is, to manufacture for those countries who supply her with raw materials. In this commerce, however, she possesses no monopoly ; but is exposed to the competition of every state, where manufactures are established, and her superiority can be maintained only by a more economical, and more scientific management of her resources. Now as the exchangeable value of British manufactures must depend on the competition of foreigners, the limit of this competition be controlled by the price of labour, and the price of labour governed by the price of the necessaries of life ; or, as Dr. Smith—the father of the science—says, “ by the price of corn,” it is evident that a high price of provisions, peculiar to either of the countries engaged in the competition, must be disadvantageous in proportion to the excess ; since the price obtained for their manufactures possesses an inferior power in procuring provisions, and thus virtually depresses the wages of labour below the established minimum.

If we measure the relative price of provisions in Britain, and in the manufacturing states on the continent of Europe, by the price of wheat, it will appear that the difference against Great Britain is usually about thirty-five per cent.* Hence it appears that manufactures made on the continent of Europe, and there sold or exported to other countries, would afford the foreign mechanic thirty-five per cent. more in wages than the English mechanic could obtain for the same labour. But if the wages of the foreign mechanic are reduced to the minimum reasonably necessary for subsistence, then the wages of the British mechanic would be thirty-five per cent. below that minimum, and his distress consequently proportional.

* We exclude France, and allude more particularly to Germany, Switzerland, and the Austrian dominions.

That such a calculation is not sanctioned by practical fact, we are fully aware; and that the wages of the British mechanic are, even calculated upon the comparative value of money, superior to those of any European mechanic, we are inclined to admit; but this proceeds from the especial economy which the possession of coal and iron, and other advantages, both natural and acquired, has introduced in the application of our productive force, exhibiting a *combination* of physical and *scientific* power, which has enabled the British manufacturer, not only successfully to repel foreign competition, but even to meet his rivals in their own markets. This is, however, no argument why native industry should be unnecessarily clogged by taxes to support the rental of a class which, although adding nothing to the wealth of the state, actually receives an income from land exceeding that of the total collective body of agricultural labourers;* or why the sphere of our international commerce should be limited by partial laws;—and that the corn laws do limit it, none will deny. Large as the amount of British exports may appear, when compared with what it was forty or fifty years since, yet when it is considered that the quantity of British manufactures consumed at home exceeds *four-fold* the quantity purchased by the *whole world*, whose inhabitants number forty-fold the British population, and who for the most part are little advanced in the art of manufacture, it sinks into mere insignificance.

Mr. Lowe, in 1823, valued the *home consumption* of woollens, cottons, linen, silk, leather, and hardware, at 89,000,000*l.*; to which may be added earthenware, porcelain, hats, shoes, furniture, jewellery, and various other articles, including minerals and other demi-manufactured commodities of British production, valuing at least an

* By a reference to the estimate (page 417), the rent-charge is $\frac{1}{5}\frac{2}{4}\frac{1}{7}$; and the labour-charge, $\frac{1}{3}\frac{1}{4}\frac{8}{7}$.

additional 60,000,000*l.* ; and to this total of 150,000,000*l.* we may safely add 20,000,000*l.* for increased consumption since the date of Mr. Lowe's calculation. The importance of this view will justify us in repeating, that when against this total of 170,000,000*l.* expended by the British people on British manufactures, in the inadequate supply of their *wants*, we place the 40,000,000*l.* representing the value of British manufactures exported to supply the *wants* of hundreds of millions of people, possessing but limited means of manufacture, how trifling it appears, and what a field is not open for the almost boundless extension of our foreign commerce.

But let us look more particularly to some especial branches of British manufacture, and contrast their insignificance with what they would be under a different system of commercial policy. For the manufacture of glass, earthenware, porcelain, cutlery, iron and hard ware, our physical advantages, joined to an advanced stage in the art of fabric, offer the most ample means of attaining inimitable perfection ; yet our exportation of these commodities does not amount to *one-fifth* the quantity consumed at home. In the finer sorts of porcelain, Britain yields her export trade to France ; and we allow the superb manufactory at Sévres to offer us models for imitation. In the article of plate glass, we are in every degree unequal to meet the French manufacturers in foreign markets. In heavy machinery, iron, and hardware, the manufacturers of Dusseldoff compete successfully with those of Birmingham and Sheffield, although the physical advantages at the command of the latter are eminently superior. To what shall we ascribe these results ?—To those restrictions which fetter our domestic and international commerce, and unnecessarily increase the relative expenses of subsistence.

An unrestricted state of international commerce in alimentary productions—not less important in facilitating the interchange of food and clothing, than in tending to equalise the prices of provisions in the various manufacturing continental states—would open so wide a field for British trade with nations emerging from a state of barbarism, advancing in the career of civilization, and acquiring a taste for the more refined comforts and luxuries of life, that it would be difficult to imagine a limit to our growth in power, security, and wealth.

Tendency of the measures of government to freedom of trade.—Since the famed memorial of the merchants of London to parliament in 1820, the commercial policy of the government has uniformly tended to free-trade principles; and the maxim that a free and unfettered intercourse with the nations of the earth, is as productive of general and local advantage as with provinces of the same kingdom, seems to be admitted by our rulers. The repeal of those taxes which press more particularly on agriculture; such as the beer tax, the leather tax, the assessed taxes on horses and vehicles used in husbandry labour, the fire insurance duty on farming stock, and various other imposts, seems to indicate that a free trade in corn is the ulterior object of ministers. The great obstacle to its accomplishment was, and is, the difficulty of relieving the land from the burden of poor's rate and tithe. Ministers have made a bold effort to limit the pressure of the first; and their poor law reform,—after being revised and corrected in a second or third edition,—will, we doubt not, be effectual in diminishing the pressure of the present burden. The tithing system, which is unknown in any protestant country except the British Isles, must yield in its turn to wholesome reform; for all who look to the march of improvement in this

country, must feel convinced that the continuance of the levy of tithe is *impossible*. A due provision must, with that justice which in modern times has, and it is to be hoped will, characterise the British legislature, be made for the clergy; but the levy of tithe cannot be allowed to oppose the accomplishment of that great national benefit—the gradual abolition of corn laws. Referring to the table (page 417), the charge under the head of tithe appears to be rather a vicissimal than a decimal part; being about five per cent.; and if this charge were *national*—that is, levied on the *total* income of the nation instead of on the land, its burden on the agriculturist would scarcely surpass one-third of its present ratio, or about one and a half per cent. Even such an arrangement would powerfully tend to clear the way for the full development of the plans of government on this important subject.

Suitableness of the present time for a change in the corn laws.—There has seldom occurred a time more favourable for the reform of the corn laws than the present. Lord Althorp, in the early part of the present session, took occasion to express a contrary opinion, assigning as his reason the present very moderate price of grain: this, we think, is the very ground upon which the policy of such a measure should be based. At the present time the prices are so low, that no evils of transition could be felt; a partial repeal of the corn laws could scarcely effect any reduction of prices in our markets; it would work quietly and smoothly, while it would tend to prevent any extensive fluctuations following a partial deficiency of crop. All new tenants would enter on their farms on moderate terms, under a full persuasion that steady prices would be more firmly secured than in former periods: thus their capitals and means of doing

justice to the ground would be preserved, and the security of the landlord's claim substantially improved.

The reform of the corn laws should be gradual.—When the much desired arrangement with the episcopal clergy shall be made, the principal impediment to a free trade in corn will vanish, and a gradual relaxation of the present restrictions on import must speedily succeed. We have no expectation that parliament will concur in measures purporting to abolish at once *all* present restrictions. The duties now payable on the importation of foreign corn will probably be diminished annually, until they expire in natural course. If, for instance, the present duties are calculated to maintain the monopoly of the home grower when prices are at or under 60s. per quarter for wheat, this limit might be progressively reduced five per cent. per annum : reducing the limit in the first year to 57s. ; in the second, to 54s. 2d. ; the third, 51s. 6d. ; the fourth, 49s., &c. : thus gradually diminishing all restrictions to a free trade. If such a reduction should, on investigation, appear too rapid, its principle might be limited to four, three, or two and a half per cent. ; but viewing the case of vested rights, it is but reasonable that the return to sound principles should be progressive.

When the restrictions are entirely removed, the protection to the home growers will be limited to the expense of transit from foreign to British ports—an expense, including the charges of landing, storing, sale, &c., amounting to little less than 10s. per quarter. By the evidence adduced before the agricultural committee of 1821, it appears (page 364) that the cost of raising a quarter of wheat in Prussia or Poland, including conveyance to Dantzic, was about 36s. per quarter ; and if we may judge by the consul's returns of the price of

wheat in that port during the three past years, it is about the same at the present day.* We may, therefore, infer that it could not, in fair average seasons, be brought into the British ports, adding 10s. for transit, under 46s. per quarter. A reference to other countries would, perhaps, furnish

* Dantzic is by far the most important shipping port for grain in the north of Europe; and, allowing for the superiority in the quality of wheat usually shipped there, it is found that it is generally cheaper at Dantzic than in any other continental port. The market price of grain at Hamburgh is usually very much under the price at Dantzic; but it frequently happens that large supplies of Dantzic wheat find their way into Hamburgh, which could not be the case if the superiority of quality were not more than equal to the difference of the price. We need scarcely observe, that Dantzic being situated at the *debouché* of the Vistula, which river traverses the finest districts of Poland, is the shipping port of all the fine wheat exported from that unhappy and oppressed country. The neighbourhood of Warsaw and the districts traversed by the Vistula produce the finest corn in Europe, and it is from thence that the wheat shipped at Dantzic is derived.

Mr. Jacob says, that in the corn growing provinces in the vicinity of Warsaw, 28s. to 30s. is the lowest price at which wheat can be permanently raised. Upon this statement he makes the following calculation of the cost at which Polish wheat could be brought to the London market:—

	Per Quarter.	
	s.	d.
Cost of raising the wheat	28	0
Conveyance by boats, warehousing, storing, and other charges	0	6
Freight to Dantzic	5	0
Loss on passage, by pilfering, and rain causing it to grow	3	0
Expenses at Dantzic, in turning, drying, and screening .	2	0
Profit, or commission to merchant or agent	1	6
Freight and shipping charges to London	8	0

Total cost of a quarter of Dantzic wheat, free on board in the port of London 48 0

A paper was presented to parliament, session 1827-8, estimating the cost of 100 quarters of wheat shipped from Dantzic to London, which gives the following results:—

Total Cost.	Quarters.	Per Quarter.
£ 221 13s. 4d.	÷ 100	= 44s. 2d.

The mean of these estimates is 46s. 1d. per quarter.

nearly the same results. The cost of raising a quarter of wheat in France, exclusive of rent, cannot be very much less than in England, owing to the large amount of direct taxes levied on the land—such as *Le Foncier*, a large portion of *les droits sur les portes and fenêtres*, *mobilier*, *taxe-personnelle*, etc., levying about 10,000,000*l.* per annum on agriculture; and, calculating the vast superiority which the British agriculturist possesses in the transport of his grain to shipping ports, no *continued* competition can be expected from that quarter. Thus the British grower would be secure against the evils of great fluctuations, while he might calculate upon returns advancing upon the minimum price of 46*s.* per quarter.*

Probable demands of the landed interest, and the means of meeting them suggested.—All great authorities were in favour of a free trade in corn, until Mr. Malthus demanded the same protection for the home growers of corn, as for the home manufac-

* Nothing is more clearly indicative of the backward state of France, and the defective communication between her various districts, than the regulations which her government impose on the foreign corn trade. Until a very late date, the French laws forbade the exportation of grain, except when home prices were below a certain limit; and prohibited importation, until prices were above a certain limit. The prices regulating importation and exportation differed materially in different districts; and it has not unfrequently happened, that corn warehoused in a particular port, where it was not allowed to be consumed, except upon payment of a very high duty, has been carried to another port, situated in a district where it has been admissible duty free. During the last two years, importation has been allowed under a graduated scale of duties, which however, like those of our own country, become prohibitory when prices sink to a certain level. The division of the kingdom into separate districts is still kept up; and in June, 1833, while the duties on wheat imported into some of the departments was 4*f.* 75*c.*, in others it was 12*f.* 25*c.* An official announcement is issued the last day in each month, of what the duties are to be in each district during the succeeding month. These depend, with certain modifications, on the average price in the district.—(See M'Culloch's Dictionary, article Corn).

turers of particular commodities. At the time Mr. Malthus wrote—about twenty years since—our restrictive system against the competition of foreign manufacturers was carried to great lengths. Since that period, however, many fiscal regulations against the introduction of foreign manufactures into Britain have been effaced from our Statute-book, and at the present day the protection afforded is rather *nominal* than real. Presuming, however, that our tariff, on an average, levies ten per cent. on the importation of foreign manufactures, our agriculturists would perhaps contend, with some fairness, that they are entitled to the same protection. If such a claim can be substantiated, we think the following plan for its levy would be the most conducive to the general interest:—“That an *ad valorem* duty of ten per cent. should be levied on the importation of foreign grain, on an ascending and descending scale, calculated in an inverted ratio—that is, supposing the price of wheat on which ten per cent. is to be charged were fixed at 50s., then, if the price rose to 51s., the duty to diminish, say $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.; if it rose to 52s., the duty to still further diminish; but if the price fell to 49s. or under, then the duty to increase in the same proportion, being thus calculated to levy, on the average, about ten per cent. on import.”

Mr. Ricardo,* justly celebrated for the soundness of his views, contends that the taxes levied on British agriculture ought not to be allowed to impede the export of farming produce. He says, in substance, that these taxes levy from 5s. to 6s. per quarter on wheat, and that we ought not, by adding this amount of tax to the natural expense of production, to induce the foreigner to purchase corn of another country, and deprive ourselves of a trade we might, in free competition, enjoy. He

* On Protection to Agriculture, page 28.

therefore recommends that a bounty, or, as he terms it, a *drawback*, equivalent to the amount of the taxes levied, should be granted on British corn exported. We are no friends to bounties on export, or duties on import; but if it can be admitted that a sum paid on the export of a quarter of wheat, equivalent to the tax levied on its production, would be essentially drawback, and not bounty, a scale just equivalent to the duties on imported corn should be that adopted. Hence, if the market price of wheat was 50s., the drawback should be ten per cent.; if under that price, the drawback to increase; if above it, to diminish; so as to make the average or mean rate of drawback ten per cent. We can see many cogent reasons for the plan, some of which we shall here notice. It will be admitted, that the quantity of grain produced on an extended area (say Europe and America) is just about equivalent to the consumption of its inhabitants, but that great inequality exists in the productiveness of seasons, a deficiency of crop in one country or climate being ordinarily counterbalanced by an abundant harvest in another: thus, while import is required in one country to prevent dearth, export is required elsewhere to counteract the ruinous effect on prices of superabundance. Now, such state regulations as we have mentioned, while enlarging the area from which subsistence might be drawn, and favouring export when seasons were abundant, and import when deficient, would, by enabling us, as it were, to borrow supplies in a time of dearth, and return them in a time of plenty, not only very materially tend to equalise prices at home and diminish the suffering inseparable from a deficient harvest, but would operate, we think, more effectually than any other plan, in maintaining a moderate but steady superiority of price to our landed proprietors. The Act, if the scale were sufficiently

extensive, would rarely be inoperative. When prices were low, the inducement to export would increase in a kind of geometrical proportion; while, perhaps, on the average, imports would predominate, and, on the balance of payments, the Exchequer would be the gainer. Under this regulation, prices would, in general, oscillate about the rate at which the mean or standard duty was charged and drawback paid. Our objections to such a plan are—first, that foreign governments might be induced to increase their duties on import equivalent to our bounty, or *drawback* on export, and thus transfer the money paid from the British exchequer to their own. And secondly, that collecting revenue as *duties* on the one hand, and distributing it as *bounties* on the other, is attended, in a general sense, with useless expenditure. As we have before stated, we cannot, on its merits, advocate such a system in preference to a gradual repeal of all restrictions to a free trade, and we have merely thrown out the foregoing suggestion as a preferable *alternative* to the retention of the laws which govern, or pretend to govern, our foreign corn trade.—In conclusion, it is seriously to be desired that the question as to the relaxation of restrictions to a free trade in commodities of prime necessity, will, at this *very convenient season*, speedily engage the attention of parliament, and that the dark and shallow policy of monopoly will yield to that liberal commercial spirit which permanently secures the happiness of states.

TABLE shewing the quantity of Foreign and Colonial Wheat, Flour, and other kinds of Grain, entered for home consumption in Great Britain, in each year, from 1815 to 1832, both inclusive. The total amount of Duty received, and the rates of Duty charged per quarter—given in the Agricultural Committee Report of 1833, Appendix B. p. 620.

Years.	Quarters of corn entered for home consumption.						Duty received.	Average rates of duty charged per quarter.					
	Wheat and flour.	Barley and meal.	Rye and meal.	Oats and oatmeal.	Indian corn.	Beans and peas.	Total corn.	Wheat.	Barley.	Rye.	Oats.	Indian corn.	Beans and peas.
1815	—	160	148	214	—	1	523						
16	225,263	14,918	10,259	76,294	—	—	326,734						
17	1,020,949	133,438	132,237	473,813	157	17,122	1,777,706						
18	1,593,518	695,621	79,221	990,947	1,411	177,850	3,538,568						
19	122,133	364,012	17,293	523,515	26,738	199,716	1,253,407						
20	34,274	—	—	726,848	—	3	761,125						
21	2	—	—	—	—	—	2						
22	12,137	—	—	—	—	—	—						
23	15,777	39,263	—	—	—	—	12,137						
24	525,231	270,679	3,442	619,340	1,249	—	675,629						
25	315,892	332,641	67,241	1,185,214	6,222	30,767	830,225						
26	572,733	236,991	21,887	1,851,248	145,842	189,894	2,097,104						
27	842,050	217,345	489	14,374	22,747	157,854	2,986,555						
28	1,364,220	202,406	65,331	192,890	22,688	119,782	1,216,987						
29	1,701,885	52,107	19,121	900,319	4,100	96,514	1,944,049						
30	1,491,631	522,709	56,868	355,120	65,428	63,644	2,741,176						
31	325,435	72,665	61	2,863	1,024	83,444	2,568,963						
32						21,181	423,229						
Annual average.	564,607	175,289	26,310	439,609	17,094	64,322	1,286,339						
								10 10	5 11 $\frac{3}{4}$	6 7 $\frac{3}{4}$	5 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	6 10 $\frac{1}{4}$
								s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
								16 11 $\frac{3}{4}$	8 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	—	4 9 $\frac{3}{4}$	9 1	—
								11 11 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 6	4 0	4 10	6 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
								8 6 $\frac{3}{4}$	5 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 3	3 11	3 5
								11 3 $\frac{1}{4}$	1 0	6 2	1 3 $\frac{3}{4}$	2 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 6 $\frac{1}{4}$
								21 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 1	3 6	8 0 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	8 2 $\frac{1}{4}$
								1 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	9 0 $\frac{1}{4}$	2 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	9 7 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 8 $\frac{1}{4}$
								9 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	9 5 $\frac{1}{4}$	12 6	4 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	12 7 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 8 $\frac{1}{4}$
								6 4 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 7	2 7 $\frac{1}{4}$	7 3 $\frac{1}{4}$	1 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 10 $\frac{1}{2}$
								4 8	9 6 $\frac{1}{4}$	17 0 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 6 $\frac{1}{4}$	9 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 4
								16 2	9 6 $\frac{1}{4}$	17 0 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 6 $\frac{1}{4}$	9 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	10 4
								309,676	309,676	309,676	309,676	309,676	309,676
								555,158	555,158	555,158	555,158	555,158	555,158
								900,208	900,208	900,208	900,208	900,208	900,208
								188,412	188,412	188,412	188,412	188,412	188,412
								792,934	792,934	792,934	792,934	792,934	792,934
								442,595	442,595	442,595	442,595	442,595	442,595
								296,121	296,121	296,121	296,121	296,121	296,121
								176,363	176,363	176,363	176,363	176,363	176,363
								10,310	10,310	10,310	10,310	10,310	10,310
								£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.

Account of the Annual Importation of Corn and Meal from Ireland to Great Britain, from the years 1807 to 1832, inclusive.

QUARTERS.

Average of years.	Wheat and flour.	Barley and meal.	Rye.	Oats and oatmeal.	Indian corn.	Beans and peas.	Total Qrs.
1807-9	52,244	23,418	476	403,135	—	3,338	482,611
1810-12	145,307	18,095	73	389,971	3	4,315	557,764
1813-15	210,939	32,482	210	614,348	—	5,836	863,815
1816-18	96,295	38,138	216	788,072	—	4,451	927,172
1819-21	376,159	63,430	228	956,037	—	7,077	1,402,931
1822-24	406,493	29,229	218	965,603	—	7,174	1,408,717
1825-27	372,041	99,252	183	1,458,919	598	10,945	1,941,938
1828-30	567,264	127,029	802	1,740,170	112	16,177	2,451,554
1831-32	565,063	154,238	404	1,773,127	1800	18,015	2,512,647

In 1806, the British ports were opened to the free importation of Irish grain; previous to that year, the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland was limited by fiscal restrictions.

The following is a list of the Annual Average prices of Wheat in the British ports, from 1790, to 1832 inclusive, according to the corn inspectors' returns.

	s.	d.		s.	d.		s.	d.		s.	d.
1790	53	2	1801	115	11	1812	122	8	1823	51	9
1791	47	2	1802	67	5	1813	106	6	1824	62	0
1792	41	9	1803	57	1	1814	72	1	1825	66	6
1793	47	10	1804	60	5	1815	63	8	1826*	58	9
1794	50	8	1805	87	1	1816	76	2	1827	56	9
1795	72	11	1806	76	9	1817	94	0	1828	60	5
1796	76	3	1807	73	1	1818	83	8	1829	66	3
1797	52	2	1808	78	11	1819	72	3	1830	64	3
1798	50	4	1809	94	5	1820	65	10	1831	66	4
1799	66	11	1810	103	3	1821	54	5	1832	58	8
1800	110	5	1811	92	5	1822	43	3			

* Imperial measure from this time.

CHAPTER IV.

CURRENCY—COIN—AND OUR MONETARY SYSTEM.

SECTION I.—HISTORICAL SKETCH OF OUR EXCHANGES.

THIS and the succeeding chapter, which will complete our work, will be directed to discuss the financial condition of Great Britain. The first will apply to the state of the currency and the monetary system ; the second to our revenue, plan of taxation, and general finances.

We propose in the chapter before us—first, to give an historical sketch of the currency, or rather a succinct chronicle of the fluctuations of the relative value of our paper currency against gold, since the commencement of the late wars, and the causes which effected these fluctuations. Secondly, to elucidate the effect of the Bank Restriction Act on the finances of the country. And thirdly, to suggest some changes, which may be introduced into our system with present advantage and prospective security.

State of the exchanges at the commencement of the late wars.—The years immediately preceding our unhappy rupture with France, in 1793, were marked by general commercial prosperity, and the rapid growth of our productive power and foreign commerce. Our exportation of British staple commodities was large, and the balance of payments being favourable, the exchanges, that

true barometer of the state of foreign trade, rated usually above par. The stock of our gold coinage (about 43,900,000*l.*) was equal to the due support of our banking and commercial credit,* and the supply of the precious metals fully adequate to the maintenance of our monetary system.

Our coalition, in 1793, with the powers which had already taken up arms against France, but little influenced the state of our exchanges during the first two years of the war. The effect of the payments on account of subsidies to our allies, was counterbalanced by the magnitude of our exports; and our remittances to the continent for the expense of the war being chiefly in military munitions, the drain on the circulating medium was but little felt.

Fall in the exchanges during the latter months of 1795.—The year 1795 produced different results: the vacillating policy of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the weakness of our Prussian and Dutch allies, viewed in comparison with the bold display of the military force of our enemy (see p. 59), and the expulsion of our troops from the continent, boding distrust in the hitherto anticipated speedy success of our arms, favoured a rise in the current rates of interest, and tended to foment commercial embarrassment. Added to this, we were called on to remit, chiefly in specie, a large subsidy to Austria,† and, from the peculiar policy of our government, to import large quantities of foreign corn.‡ Hence the demand for British gold, and its rise in price, equivalent to about seven per cent., implying an equivalent depression in the continental exchanges. The operation of this fall forms a striking feature in our commercial annals. It evidently became the

* Evidence of Mr. George Rose, before the Bullion Committee of 1810.—This estimate is generally considered too large.

† See Table of Subsidies, p. 450. ‡ See page .

interest of the merchant to remit bullion to the continent, causing a drain of specie which seriously affected our banking establishments; and hence a contraction of paper issues equivalent to the coin subtracted from circulation. The effect of this double contraction of the circulating medium, was to limit the means of the Bank to afford the customary aids to commerce, and to diminish the *rests* in the hands of private bankers. Hence the difficulty of obtaining discounts, the stoppage of the provincial banks, and the commercial embarrassments of 1796, which led, in the early part of the following year, to the suspension of cash payments.

Financial difficulties of 1797, and suspension of cash payments.—The unfavourable state of the war, the subjugation of our Austrian ally by the French in the Italian and German campaigns, and the growing military preponderance of France, occasioned renewed distrust in the measures of government, and created a timorous withholding of capital from commerce. The Bank issues were counteracted by the eagerness to obtain gold, and circumstances seemed in full progress towards the accomplishment of the total annihilation of banking credit. Yet an interval of suspended hope occurred. The termination of the war on the continent, by the peace of *Campo Formio*, having rendered further remittances of specie on account of the Austrian subsidy unnecessary, favoured a rise in the continental exchanges. This change, though occurring on the eve of the decision of ministers to legalize the tender of Bank notes, had no influence on their determination, and on the 25th of February, 1797, they issued orders in council for the *temporary* suspension of cash payments. It is a circumstance little known beyond the circle of those who have given

their attention to Bank affairs, that the anxious correspondence at this date, between Mr. Pitt and the Bank directors, gave the latter no reason to expect this extraordinary mandate. With the cessation of subsidies and corn imports, the balance of payments had become favourable, and gold began to flow into the country. Hence the immediate necessity for such a measure had ceased to exist, and, on the reception of the order, it was a matter of discussion in the Bank parlour whether it should be complied with.*

The measure, apparently so pregnant with fatal consequences to public credit, could only be justified on the plea of a *temporary* expedient; and it being adopted in this view, the injunction was at first limited to a few weeks. At the termination of that limit, ministers finding that the Bank were still strong in public confidence, prolonged it to the end of the session of parliament, and subsequently to the opening of the succeeding session.

In the interval, our financial position became more favourable. France, by the enlargement of her continental authority, had relieved us from the pressure of subsidies, and our efforts being chiefly maritime, the nation developed her mighty power on her *natural* element, without internal embarrassment or pecuniary pressure. The balance of trade continued favourable; and the Bank increasing their stock of bullion, now prepared to resume payments in cash. But the opinion of ministers being favourable to "the system," they determined on obtaining the sanction of parliament to its continuance during the war.

Severe trial of the system in 1799 and 1800.—No severe trial of the new monetary system occurred

* See Mr. Tooke's evidence before the Secret Committee on Bank affairs.

until towards the end of the year 1799, when Austria, encouraged by the dissensions in the Gallic councils and the absence of a large portion of the French army from Europe, concurred with Russia in a new coalition with Great Britain. A double subsidy was promised by our government; and no sooner was this treaty publicly known, than our exchanges began to shew a tendency to decline. The depreciation was unfortunately accelerated by the necessity of importing large quantities of foreign corn; and hence, ere the termination of the year, Bank paper was depreciated in relation to gold about three per cent. The opening of the next year was even more unpropitious: remittances of bullion in payment of the Austrian and Russian subsidies, amounting in this and the following year to nearly three millions sterling, had begun; and an immense import of foreign corn created a large balance of payments against us. The drain of specie augmenting its value, Bank paper evinced a relative depreciation of about six per cent.—adding so much to the amount of the government expenditure. Towards the latter end of the year 1800, the successes of Buonaparte in Italy, and Moreau in Germany, brought the continental war to a close, and with it the speedy suspension of subsidiary remittances. Relieved from this pressure, our exchanges would soon have recovered from their depreciation, but the immense imports of foreign aliment in this season of dearth still pressed heavily on our pecuniary resources, and prolonged the inferiority of the value of our Bank paper in relation to coin.

The sacrifice consequent on this depreciation, although at the time not generally understood by the public, and which will be more fully developed in our future pages, could not escape the discerning mind of Mr. Pitt; he well knew that the only remedy was the pacification of Europe. The

aspect of the times, although unfavourable to the attainment of advantageous conditions of peace, seemed, nevertheless, to recommend this course. Our best exertions to reduce France by famine and sword had failed; our allies were every where beaten; our gold remitted to the continent to be dissipated in war, had brought to the verge of ruin those who had received it. The preponderating influence of France was apparently equal to the formation of a maritime confederacy against our commerce and even our independence, and no attainable object presented itself by the continuation of the contest. Thus, prompted by circumstances, Mr. Pitt determined to prepare the way for pacific negotiations; and fully aware of the unpopularity attached to his name in France, and hence his inefficiency for a negotiation with the French government, retired from office, being succeeded by Lord Sidmouth, who terminated the war by the peace of Amiens, in March 1802.

Recovery of the exchanges, after the peace of Amiens.—This “made up peace,” or short respite from war, proved of the greatest advantage in reinstating the value of our paper currency. The preceding harvest had been favourable, and the free vent for our manufactures increased the amount of exports, bringing bullion into the country, and effecting an important rise in the value of Bank paper. On this return to peace, the Restriction Act became open to repeal, hence the arrangements necessary to the resumption of cash payments were in progress; but before they were completed, the nation was roused to new alarms. War was renewed, and all idea of a speedy return to a metallic currency vanished.

During the years 1803 and 1804, the contest was chiefly maritime, and our efforts were limited to defensive operations. No remittances for con-

tinental subsidies being made, our foreign commerce was equal to support the equilibrium of the exchanges, and Bank paper harmonised with the value it represented.

Slight depression of exchanges in 1805.—The year 1805 produced a return to our accustomed plan, of rousing the continental states to arms by alluring subsidies. Austria and Russia were to be supplied with British treasure, on condition of their declaring war against France. On this renewed coalition being publicly known, our exchanges tended to decline, and depreciated about four per cent. ; but ere this fall assumed the character of permanency, the days of Ulm and Austerlitz foretold the suspension of our subsidies, and with it, relief to our finances (see page 150). In the year 1806, Prussia, thwarted in her designs on Hanover, and deceived by Napoleon, joined her forces to those of Russia against France ; but the vacillating policy of her cabinet, and her unstable conduct in 1794, had, in the opinion of our ministers—the Grenvilles and the immortal Fox—sullied her character as a *zealous ally*, and rendered her less worthy of pecuniary aid. The military achievements of Napoleon at Jena and Pultusk, abruptly disposed of the question of a Prussian subsidy ; and after the forlorn condition in which the treaty of Tilsit left Prussia, our remittances to that country were merely limited to a sort of *cleemosynary grant* for the support of his Prussian majesty and household (see page 188). From the re-commencement of the war in 1803 to this time, we had experienced but little depreciation in Bank paper—the exception being in the latter months of 1805, when gold was relatively depreciated about four per cent.

Orders in Council in 1807, and their effect.—It is

evident that the value of non-convertible Bank paper, in relation to gold, could only be supported by such a stock or supply of the precious metals as would be adequate to meet the demands of ultra-marine creditors; and that this supply could only be obtained by the adequacy of our exportation of merchandize: hence the policy of encouraging, by every fair means, the transport of our wares to the continent, whether to friends or foes. A state of war, which limits the direct commercial intercourse of belligerent nations, imposes the necessity of employing *neutrals* as agents in the conducting of international commerce. During the previous years of the war to this time, the Americans had shared largely in this trade;—they became, in fact, what the Dutch had formerly been, the principal carriers of the imports and exports of Great Britain and her enemies. The capitalists and principals of commercial houses in Europe took the guise of sale brokers and commission agents; and these important branches of commerce were carried on between subjects of belligerent states, without any relation to the political hostility of their respective governments. The Americans carried their cotton, timber, grain, and other native staple productions, to our enemies, and sought investment for the proceeds in European fabrics. The continent, at this time deficient in capital, and imperfect in the means of manufacture, produced scarcely sufficient to meet the consumption of her inhabitants, and hence rather sought supplies through neutrals, than possessed the means of supplying them.* The consequence

* The principal manufactured commodity exported from Europe is cotton. The comparative meanness of the cotton manufactures of France to those of England, even in 1808, will be seen by reference to the following particulars. The cotton manufactories of France before the revolution, consisted of two spinning mills, on Arkwright's plan, at Louviers. The French

was, that the proceeds were brought to England, and invested in the purchase of British manufactures, which were partly consumed in the United States and the Spanish colonies, and partly re-exported to continental Europe. The extent of this intercourse will be seen by reference to the subjoined returns of the exports of British manufactures to the United States during the three years preceding 1808.

Years.	British produce.	Foreign and Colonial.	Total.
1805 . . .	11,011,409 <i>l</i> .	435,530 <i>l</i> .	11,446,939 <i>l</i> .
1806 . . .	12,389,488	476,063	12,865,551
1807 . . .	11,846,513	251,429	12,097,492

Annual average . . £ 12,136,660

It is well known that this large trade was not maintained by American consumption; the Ameri-

government assisted this establishment with 15,000*l*. During the short peace of Amiens, Buonaparte, through the advice of Mr. Holkar of Rouen, procured some persons from England to superintend cotton works of every description; but the hands procured were incapable of imparting, in any important degree, their knowledge to the French; and the work done was consequently inferior. Since that period to 1808, several machines were established at Rouen (the Manchester of France), and the number of factories established amounted to forty-two; of which only three were worked by *steam*, for which *turf* was used. The whole quantity of cotton annually spun in France, to answer the demand of 30,000,000 of consumers, was, according to the best information, only 3,600,000 lbs; while Great Britain, with about one-third the population, at the same period manufactured 62,000,000 lbs. In France, 200,000 hands were employed to manufacture less than 4,000,000 lbs. of cotton; while in England, about the same number of hands manufactured 62,000,000 lbs. The inferiority of skill and the excess of cost is evident. France might, indeed, at this time surpass us in the beauty of her fabrics; her manufacturers use better raw cotton than our's do; even the coarse goods are made of fine materials; but their price is consequently higher, and hence her manufactures are not adapted to the means of purchase possessed by ordinary consumers. England calculates on the extent of consumption, and adapts her manufacturing power to produce goods of all descriptions at a great range of prices; but her principal aim is to produce a *cheap* commodity, which is demanded by the *bulk* of consumers.

cans acted chiefly as carriers and agents to capitalists in great Britain and the continent.

To what extent the returns were made in merchandize, will be seen by the following account of the imports from America during this period :

1805	4,641,468 <i>l</i> .
1806	5,153,098
1807	7,515,963

Annual average £ 5,733,509

Thus a large balance remained to be remitted to us, either in bills on the continent, which cancelled foreign claims, or in specie, when the state of our exchanges permitted it. Such resources furnished us with important means of prosecuting the war with vigour, and of paying for any excess of imports in times of dearth, without deranging the relative value of gold and Bank paper. Our ministers, imperfectly informed as to principles of commerce, felt that the continent were enjoying those means of trade which fed the exchequer of hostile states ; and that the superiority of the British marine could not be better employed than in securing the monopoly of the foreign trade of Europe to Great Britain. The shipping interest viewing the carrying trade enjoyed by the Americans as an infringement on their privileges, had little difficulty in persuading the government that if neutral commerce were checked, the continent would be obliged to draw their needful supplies of transmarine commerce through England ; and that British would supersede American shipping in the transport of merchandize.

This unfortunate and shallow advice had great influence with ministers, who, in November, 1807, regardless of the intimation of Buonaparte to the American ambassador at Paris, of his intention to prohibit neutral commerce, declaring, at the same time, that “ all maritime commerce,” whether

through the Americans or others, must turn to the advantage of England,—issued orders in council, declaring the ports of hostile nations in a state of blockade, and prohibiting the ships of neutral or friendly powers from entering, on pain of confiscation of ship and cargo.

Thus the ground work of our currency system was swept from under it; and by destroying the American trade, thereby depriving ourselves of the supplies of bullion from the continent which the Americans had brought us, our Bank paper became exposed to great depreciation.

Serious depression of the exchanges following the year 1808.—The effect of this impolitic measure was immediately and distinctly visible in our exchanges. Our exports of manufactures to the American States, which, on the average of the three preceding years, had been 12,136,000*l.*, sunk in the year 1808 to 5,241,739*l.*, which being met by the imports of merchandize, supplies of bullion ceased; concurrent with a new and extensive demand for specie for the military expeditions to Spain and Portugal.* The effect was, an appreciation of gold to the extent of eight per cent., 4*l.* 3*s.* 9*d.* in Bank paper being required to purchase an ounce of bullion.

Next year (1809) the pressure on our exchanges became still more severe. The harvest proved deficient, and, in addition to our ordinary imports, supplies of foreign grain were required. Austria, encouraged by the success of our arms in the Peninsula, and allured by the promise of a British subsidy, again consented to measure her strength against France. The drain of specie to maintain our troops in Spain, and those of Austria in Germany, increased the price of gold to 4*l.* 6*s.* 6*d.*

* Nearly 3,000,000*l.* sterling was sent in 1808 to the Peninsula.—Appendix to Report of the Bullion Committee.

per ounce, shewing a relative depreciation of Bank paper. The depression would doubtless have been more severe, had not the rigour of our orders in council been relaxed, and our commercial intercourse extended.

The rapid success of the French arms in Germany and Italy relieved our exchequer from the necessity of continued remittances on account of the Austrian subsidy; but a new demand on the state resources was made by ministers, for power to subsidise the king of Sweden. The season was, moreover, concurrent, with a vast outlay for the equipment and maintenance of the forces comprising the unfortunate expedition against Antwerp, and large remittances of bullion to the Peninsula. These causes were in themselves sufficient to continue the depression of our exchanges; but unhappily another equally powerful cause—the deficient harvest of 1809—operated, adding the necessity of importing corn to the other causes of depression. It is said, that on these various accounts, no less than 7,000,000*l.* in specie was remitted to the continent during 1810—a degree of pecuniary pressure hitherto unknown. Gold, purchased with bank notes, commanded 4*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.* per ounce, shewing a depreciation of the currency to the extent of twenty per cent.

Opinions of the Bullion Committee, and continued depression.—This measure of depreciation created alarm in the governing councils, and ministers instituted a parliamentary committee to inquire into the *causes* affecting our currency. The withdrawal of the precious metals from circulation, to subsidise foreign powers and support the continental war, were evidently the causes sought; but this truth, though clear and simple, was but imperfectly understood either by the public generally,

the banking interest, or even the government itself.

The over-issue of bank paper—the deficiency in the produce of the mines of America—the decline of national capital—were all stated as fundamental reasons for the depreciation of the paper currency.* The committee were little acquainted with the limited power of the Bank to extend its issues beyond the amount demanded by trade, or of the influence of remittances of bullion to the continent; in fact, the general conclusions of the bullion committee were erroneous, as proved by the re-establishment of our exchanges following the peace.

The harvest of the preceding year proved favourable, and international commercial payments were more nearly poised. Yet the drain of bullion continued for the furtherance of our military operations in the Peninsula, and our exchanges remained at the extreme depression of the former year.

In 1812 our war expenditure was considerably increased: the arming of Russia to repel the French invasion requiring extensive pecuniary aid from our government. This diversion provided an opportunity, such as had not before occurred, of rendering effective a system of vigour in the conducting of the war: hence the redoubled exertions to increase our military forces in the Peninsula, and to free Spain from French domination; exertions which required large remittances of treasure. This year is distinguished by the unfortunate termination of our differences with the American Congress, as to the right of search and our system of blockade, by a declaration of war against Great Britain; an event which entirely suspended our

* See the Report of the evidence given before the Bullion Committee of 1810.

trade with that quarter of the globe, and deprived us of the feeble resource it had afforded since the memorable edict of 1807. These combined events accelerated the depreciation of our currency, and sunk the value of Bank paper to twenty-five per cent. discount.*

* It was in the war of 1756, that the French were, for the first time, driven to the necessity of getting neutrals to bring the produce of their several colonies to a home market. The object was to supply the colonies with provisions, and to obtain their produce through the means of a neutral, who brought enemies' property across the seas under cover of his own pacific flag, though he had no other interest in it than his freight. The records of the British prize courts could prove that this commerce was considered illegal, and that enemies' property was considered seizable wherever it could be got at, and in these cases neutrals were captured. During the American war, as in that of 1793, France resorted to the same system; England was opposed to it, and even attempted—in Mr. Jay's treaty, which made so much noise in America—to stipulate, that French colonial produce, carried to the United States, should not be re-exported to Europe during the continuance of the war. From this sprung those other points of dispute which eventually led to the rupture with the United States in 1812. The ingenuity displayed by the neutral agents, and the means resorted to in order to avoid capture, are too long for minute detail; they were practised with great success by the Danes, Swedes, and Prussians, as well as Americans; and through these, France enjoyed facilities of commerce which she could not otherwise have possessed. Through neutrals, continental nations carried on their commerce with the foreign West Indies, Spanish Islands and Main, Dutch Guiana, Batavia, etc.; and by such means Spain received its stagnated revenue from Vera Cruz, which was always so readily at the disposal of Buonaparte. The complaints and remonstrances of England against these practices were of no avail, and she determined to exercise that power of repressing them which Providence had placed in her hands; hence her orders in council, declaring the ports of hostile nations in a state of blockade, the exercise of her right of search, and practice of taking seamen belonging to one of the belligerent parties from the vessels of neutrals. Mr. Walton, from whose excellent edition of De Beaujour's "Sketch of the United States" this note is abridged, says, "If the question (of the right exercised), had only been presented in its proper point of view, and manifested with simplicity and clearness, it would not be difficult to prove that the rights exercised by England at sea are in strict accord with the law of nations;

The year 1813 was that in which our greatest efforts were made for the complete subjugation of our enemies. Our sacrifices, both of men and treasure, were carried to an extent never before known in the annals of our history. Treaties were concluded to afford pecuniary aid to our allies, who demanded subsidies of treasure to an immense amount, (see table, p. 450); a demand which the finances of the country were ill calculated to afford; yet the opportunity, in a military sense, was highly favourable to renewed exertions: the retreat of the French army from Spain,—the total overthrow of the French forces directed against Russia,—the rapid advance of the allied troops in Germany, and, indeed, the general aspect of affairs, predicted great and important changes in the political state of Europe, and opened renewed claims on our support. Gold was bought up for remittance to our allies, regardless of the state of our currency, or of the commercial embarrassment its withdrawal would occasion; and the value of our Bank paper, sinking in relative proportion to the nominal rise in the price of gold, reached the alarming depression of thirty per cent. below par.

these rights are certainly common to all maritime states; but the English have made use of an expression, that has caused the other powers to believe that they pretended to hold the *exclusive* exercise of these rights. Whenever this subject has been discussed in parliament, all have uniformly used the expression '*our maritime rights*.' The principle maintained by maritime states, whose naval power cannot contend with that of England, that *the flag covers property*, cannot be conformable to the laws of war, because it would admit neutrals as auxiliaries in the contest. By a fiction of the law, the sea-coast of a maritime state has been extended to a certain distance into the sea, and thereby becomes a part of its territory; from this it necessarily results, that in time of war the sea ceases to be the common dominion of all, and becomes the territory of him who holds it in military possession. The right of taking away from neutral vessels, seamen belonging to the belligerent powers, is evident, for no one can deny a state the right of calling its subjects to the defence of their country."

The same causes operated in the early part of the year 1814: ministers felt the embarrassment, in the enormous increase of our expenditure; but it was no time to ponder; the hour was at hand, when the cause of Europe should achieve a complete and honourable triumph. The physical force of France was paralyzed, and her means of effectual resistance destroyed; while the strength and resources of Britain were evinced to an astonished world, in accomplishing, after an unparalleled sacrifice, a triumphant peace.

Ere this event, our stock of bullion was nearly exhausted; the government had been, for the last two years, buying up our gold coin with bank notes at a premium of nearly thirty per cent; with such customers for gold, little could be left in the shape of circulating medium, and the sight of a guinea became something rare and curious.

Recovery of the exchanges after the peace of 1814.—Such was the critical state of our finances when peace came to our relief. The vigour of our efforts towards the close of the contest, were of a character to blind the public mind as to the exhausted state of our resources. Peace, however, opened an effective means of reclaiming the lost guineas, which were freely returned in exchange for British manufactures, transmitted in large shipments to every part of the civilized world. Hence Bank paper began to redeem its costly character, and gradually recovered before the end of the year 1814, from a depression of thirty, to eight per cent. below bullion.

Sudden fall in the value of Bank paper at the re-commencement of hostilities in 1815.—This promising aspect of affairs, it is well known, did not long continue. The return of Napoleon from the place of his exile, to repossess himself of the imperial diadem of France, caused the war-cry to be resounded throughout Europe, and ignited

that mortiferous combustion, which spread its terrific glare over the plains of Waterloo. The necessity of rendering our treasury tributary to foreign governments, was held by the public as a certain consequence of this new appeal to arms. Our exchanges immediately sympathised with the unexpected political transition, and in a few weeks declined to twenty-five per cent. below par. A speedy termination of hostilities seemed the only means of relieving us from this prospective irretrievable embarrassment; happily, relief was at hand, and the cloud, which so seriously threatened destruction to our finances, was dispelled on the entry of the British forces into the enemy's country. Peace, that Gilead for the evils which affect civilized states, offered the renewed opportunity of reinstating the currency. Our exports of merchandise were immense, while our imports were more limited, from the abundance of the two or three preceding seasons—large importations of bullion were the consequence, and ere the end of the year, the current value of Bank paper was within five per cent. of gold.

Account of the remittances in specie, on account of subsidies, etc. during the war.—The disappearance of our gold during the war, will be sufficiently accounted for, by the subjoined notice of the amount of the actual remittances on account of subsidies to foreign powers, when viewed in connexion with the large importations of foreign corn during the years of scarcity.

Account of moneys remitted as subsidies, loans, or advances to foreign countries during the war, computed from documents presented to parliament from the year 1794 to 1816.

Years.	£.	Years.	£.
1794	2,198,200	1809	1,400,000
1795	4000	1810	2,050,000
1796	810,500	1811	2,060,103
1797	99,500	1812	2,977,747
1799	120,012	1813	5,315,828
1800	325,000	1814	11,294,416
1801	2,613,178	1815	10,024,624
1802	200,000	1816	11,035,248

The total amount of these subsidies exceeds 52,500,000*l.*, which greatly surpasses the amount of the gold coin in circulation, as estimated by Mr. George Rose, which estimate has usually been considered too large;—when to this amount of subsidies, we add the amount of specie sent to Holland, the Peninsula, and other parts, to pay the British forces employed, and the vast sums paid as the balance of commercial payments in the years of dearth, we shall be at no loss to account for the disappearance of our guineas, and the absorption of bullion remittances which came into the country in prosperous years.

The state of exchanges since the peace.—The cessation, through peace, of so many causes which had produced the extensive depreciation of our currency during the war, materially changed our financial condition. Our ports were closed, from causes both commercial and political, against imports of grain; remittances were continued on account of subsidies granted during the previous years; but the effect of these was more than counterbalanced by the magnitude of our export trade, thus Bank paper reached par* in the early months of the year 1816.

The state of the foreign exchanges now enabled the bank to prepare for the resumption of cash payments, and the attention of parliament would doubtless have been called to this subject, had the balance of foreign trade continued favourable; but various circumstances combined to render this period unsuitable to the contraction of the circulating medium—commercial embarrassments, and a general absence of employment prevailing throughout the kingdom. The harvest of 1816, proved

* The word par in this sense, means that three one pound bank of England notes (17*s.* 10½*d.*), would purchase an ounce of gold.

unfavourable throughout the greater part of Europe, importations could only be obtained at high prices, and our market rates for grain surpassing the legal import limit, immense importations flowed into British ports; other causes also contributed to affect the value of bullion. The Bank, expecting to be called on by the government, to resume cash payments, were buying large quantities of gold, and contracting their usual accommodation to traders;* foreign governments were also preparing for the reinstatement of their debased currency; in fact there was a general competition throughout Europe to obtain supplies: the effect was a rise in the price of gold, to the extent of about six per cent., and the resumption of cash payments was necessarily postponed.†

The only peculiar feature in the state of the currency during the year 1818, was a prompt and extensive issue of Bank paper, to relieve the commercial embarrassments which had distinguished the preceding year. The amount of Bank issues reached the unprecedented sum of 31,000,000*l.*, and imparted a stimulus to manufacturing and commercial industry; our exchanges improved, and in the early months of 1819 reached nearly par.

Measures for the prospective resumption of cash payments.—In 1819, ministers determined on proposing to parliament measures for the prospective resumption of cash payments, and Mr. Peel was deputed to move certain resolutions to that effect, which were, in course, embodied in a Bill which allowed the Bank three years to prepare for that event. Hence the policy of contracting the issues,

* The amount of gold held by the bank on the 28th February, 1816, was 1,900,000*l.*; in 1817, 9,600,000*l.*

† In February 1817, the price of standard gold, was 4*l.* 3*s.* per ounce.

with a view of lowering prices and discouraging imports. The due effect on the exchanges was by this means produced, and gold flowed in, as the balance of commercial payments. Bank paper representing 6,000,000*l.* was suddenly withdrawn from circulation, and the amount of reserved bullion in the Bank proportionally increased;* a contraction which, in the same ratio, influenced the issues of the provincial banks, causing a contraction of the general circulating medium of not less than 20,000,000*l.* This withdrawal of capital from commerce could not fail in its embarrassing consequences; and the torpid state of trade which resulted from it, together with its subsequent evils, form a prominent example of the direful consequences resulting from an unsteady management of the currency.

During the years 1820, 21, and 22, the Bank, expecting that the determination of ministers in 1819 was inviolable, pursued the same policy, diminishing the amount of their issues in 1821 to 21,500,000*l.*, and in 1822, to 17,800,000*l.* Their stock of bullion continued to increase; and such was the effect on trade, that large capitals were withdrawn from it, and being invested in government annuities, virtually ceased to exist. The rise in the price of the British funds was in a ratio to the withdrawal of capital from, and the consequent decline of, commerce. The rates of interest on these investments diminished with the increasing price of stock; and thus the inducement to invest property in British funds becoming weaker, capital sought employment in the frail securities of foreign governments. Hence it was the contraction of our currency, and its effect on trade during these years, which prepared that embarrassment which characterized our com-

* The amount of bank notes in circulation in February, 1820, was 23,900,000*l.*—See Bank Committee Report.

merce in 1825. Towards the latter part of the year 1822, large remittances of specie were made to the continent, in virtue of loan contracts entered into at London and Paris. The effect on the exchanges was not immediate; and the Bank, at no inconsiderable sacrifice, managed to retain, and rather increase, its stock of bullion.*

Vacillating financial policy of the government.—Towards the latter part of the year 1823, the Bank had amassed the immense sum of 14,000,000*l.* in gold, aggravating commercial distress in relative proportion to the immense contraction of the circulating medium. This was in full anticipation of being obliged to furnish gold for the notes of the provincial banks, the Act of 1819 cancelling the privilege hitherto held by the country bankers, of paying their notes with those of the Bank of England, subsequent to the year 1823. In the previous session, the measure of 1819 was reconsidered, and its provisions modified, by enlarging the time for the payment of the country notes to 1833; thus, in a great measure, rendering the contraction of the circulating medium during the two preceding years, which had occasioned so great a sacrifice to all parties, unnecessary. This vacillating policy—this indecision on the part of government—was ill suited to promote public confidence in the measures of ministers respecting the regulation of the currency; and it is some proof that those at the helm of affairs possessed but limited information on the subject. The Act of 1819 had imposed a certain present sacrifice as a price for, and prelude to, a prospective but lasting security; and when the sacrifice had been made, and the benefit on the eve of attainment, we were told—Your sacrifice is of no avail, but its repe-

* The surplus capital of the bank during these years experienced a large diminution.—Bank Committee Report.

tion will be required ten years hence, when the promised benefit shall be secured. This new determination left the Bank large means of increasing the circulating medium; money became suddenly plentiful; the rates of interest fell; fictitious bills were freely discounted; merchandise rose, and importations received a great extension; gold was sent out of the country to be invested in foreign securities; or rather, as it proved, to be given away to the democratic governments of South America, and expended in furnishing rival chiefs with means of contending for power;—in kindling the flames of civil war in the infant states of that continent. Thus a large amount of British capital was sacrificed, and the embarrassments of 1825 and 26 were prepared.

After the month of July, 1824, the effect of these extensive remittances was distinctly visible in the state of our exchanges; yet the tendency of a rise in the price of commodities encouraged immense imports of foreign produce from every quarter of the globe. Our exports of British manufactures were large, but dangerously inadequate to provide remittances for the importation of merchandise, coupled with the demands of foreign governments for money, in virtue of the loan contracts entered into with the British merchants.

The mania for speculation ranged far and wide. The opening of the Spanish Americas to British intercourse offered fatal allurements to capitalists to enter into contract with the Mexican and other American governments for the mines of precious metals, described by travellers as having enriched so many families. All appeared to promise the most advantageous results. This period was pompously announced as the hey-day of commercial prosperity, and the sanguine calculations of the government were set forth in the speech from the throne, in the following words:—"There never

was a period in the history of the nation, in which all the great interests of the state were in so thriving a condition." But, with the progress of the year the delusion vanished, and proved to have been the result of the great extension of paper issues succeeding the postponement of the time for the withdrawal of the small notes of the country banks.

From August, 1824, to December, 1825, upwards of 6,000,000*l.* in gold left the country, and the exchanges rapidly declined during the latter months of 1825.* The Bank found themselves obliged to contract their issues; and the continued calls on the shareholders of various undertakings, created no small embarrassment, and contributed to raise doubts as to the merits of the various schemes in operation. Thus the speculative mania gave way to rational discussion; a general absence of confidence succeeded, and a rapid depreciation of the capital invested was soon apparent. The loss of property and contraction of issues began seriously to affect the amount of deposits in the hands of bankers, which continued to diminish; and, in the latter part of the year, the failure of one of the provincial banks in the north excited a general want of confidence throughout the trading community: the demand for gold became extensive, all public securities were depreciated, and immense losses incurred by the banks in realizing the funds necessary to meet the demands of their creditors. In the month of December came the "crisis;" that is, the breaking up of commercial and banking credit. The situation of the Bank, and of the state finances, was most critical. Every corner of Europe was searched for gold, yet the stock of bullion rapidly diminished; exchequer bills fell to an alarming

* See table (page 495), founded on Mr. Horsley Palmer's statement to Mr. McCulloch.

discount, and found their way into the treasury as payment for import duties and taxes. We had reached the very verge of national bankruptcy: the bank held but a few hundred thousand pounds in gold—being scarcely sufficient to meet the average demand of the public for twenty-four hours, and no relief was at hand. As a matter of history, it may be interesting to refer, briefly, to the anxious correspondence between the government and the Bank at this period. A renewed order in council for a temporary suspension of cash payments was discussed, but finally rejected. Mr. Huskisson proposed that a notice should be affixed to the walls of the Bank, stating the inability of that establishment to continue payments in specie, and acquainting the public of the anticipated speedy arrival of supplies of gold—advice which was too irrational to meet approval. Happily, the directors discovered that they possessed a box of small notes; and with the advice, or rather the concurrence, of the government, they decided on issuing them. This expedient was attended with the most beneficial results. The notes were readily received by the public in exchange for those of provincial bankers; the demand for bullion from the country was suspended. In the meantime the exchanges began to turn, and the anticipated supplies of gold to arrive. The depreciation of the currency throughout this period did not exceed three per cent., which, although less than might have been expected, yet caused great embarrassments to our merchants, and, according to the evidence of Mr. Ward, a loss of about 100,000*l.* to the Bank of England, in the re-purchase of bullion out of its usual channel.*

Measures adopted by parliament to limit the paper issues of the provincial banks.—The severe shock to commercial credit experienced during the latter

* Bank Committee Report, 1832.

months of 1825, and the commencement of the year 1826, seem to have paralyzed the springs of trade; thus rendering our financial position insecure. At no period of our history did our prospects, as to the progress of the nation in wealth, experience so sudden a revolution. The beginning of the year 1825 was the hey-day of commercial prosperity; that of 1826 the abyss of misfortune and ruin. However, prices during 1826 continued to fall. Hence imports were discouraged, and bullion began to come in as the balance of commercial payments. Public confidence, although not re-established, was, if we may use the expression, convalescent, and progressed so as to enable the Bank to furnish fair issues of its currency, upon the stable foundation of an increasing stock of bullion.

The measures adopted by parliament in the session of 1826, limiting prospectively the paper issues of provincial banks, by cancelling notes under 5*l.*, with the reasonable impression that such restriction was essential to public credit,—were viewed not without anxiety by the trading portion of the community. As the time approached for the adoption of the provisions of this Act, a general opinion prevailed, that the inability of many of the country banks to redeem this large portion of their issues, would occasion a return of the embarrassments of 1825-6. This opinion was happily disproved by results. The establishment of branch banks was instrumental in aiding the measure, by offering assistance to those parts of the country where the circulation of provincial paper was the most extensive. This, and the length of time given to provincial bankers to withdraw their paper, and the ready issues of the Bank of England, combined towards the accomplishment of the measure, and protected commercial credit from the effect of this contraction of provincial issues.

During these years, our foreign exchanges, notwithstanding the extensive imports of grain, experienced but little depreciation; and the gold which left the country from April 1828, to February 1829, did not exceed 500,000*l.*, the extensive exportation of British manufactures counterpoising any further effect.

Influence of the French and Belgic revolutions on the foreign exchanges.—1830-31. At the commencement of the year 1830, the political horizon was calm, and the state of Europe seemed to promise a long continuance of peaceful government. Confidence in the stability of the political institutions of Europe, was evidenced by the very high price maintained by foreign securities.* Our trade was free from embarrassment, and the exchanges steady.

This aspect of affairs, it is well known, was doomed soon to undergo a sudden and most important transition, by the occurrence of the French and Belgic revolutions in the summer of the same year. Such events could not fail to produce a timidity among the moneyed and commercial classes, as to their effects on the pacific relations of Europe. The holy alliance was viewed as the great breakwater to the spread of liberal opinions; and although, perhaps, none of the leading powers entertained any intention of opposing, by force of arms, the establishment of the new governments of France and Belgium, yet the question of war was raised into importance by the strenuous means of defence organizing in every part of Europe, but especially in France. The political horizon of Europe thus appearing clouded with combustible matter, the securities of every government experienced a rapid fall in value, and the

* The French Four per Cent. Loan was negotiated in the month of March, 1830, at the very high price of 102.

low premium which the bonds of our unfunded debt supported, placed the British exchequer in a position of insecurity. Several causes concurred to extend the demand for bullion on the continent; among which, the principal perhaps was, the hoarding of large sums by foreigners, particularly by those of the French, who considered recent events as but the prelude to such confiscations of property and *bouleversement* of affairs as succeeded the memorable era of 1789 to 92.* This state of affairs continued throughout the whole of the year 1831; and about two millions sterling of British gold were sent out of the country, partly to pay for our immense imports of grain, partly to pay instalments on foreign loans, and partly to feed the avarice of distrustful capitalists. Our exchanges were consequently influenced, and remained at a slight depression.

The effect of the political discredit in 1832.—The commencement of the year 1832 was a time of great public excitement, occasioned by the important proceedings in the British senate, and the strenuous exertions of political parties—the one to impose, and the other to oppose, the ever memorable Bill for reforming the representation of the people.

Public credit was not, however, influenced until the efforts of the opposition were for the second time on the eve of proving effective. This leading to the resignation of a ministry more disposed to the public good, and more steadfast in advocating popular rights, than any that ever

* This opinion, although well founded, will perhaps be doubted by those who are unacquainted with the state of parties in France at this era; but on reference to the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies, on the financial report (budget) of M. Thiers for 1832, they will find that the practice of hoarding money was seriously complained of.

graced the British senate, roused the nation to acts of decision, when the prerogative of the people was to be weighed in the balance against the prerogative of the king. Such a state of affairs could not fail to foment political discredit. The call for gold was immediate and extensive, and would certainly have outrun the means of answering it, had not his Majesty, by the timely re-call of the popular ministry, assured the triumph of the great measure in agitation. About 1,800,000*l.* in gold were withdrawn from circulation during the month of May, 1832. Fortunately, this demand for specie was co-existent with a very high rate of exchange,* which enabled the Bank speedily to replenish its stock of the precious metals.

We have now brought our historical sketch of the fluctuations in the currency to a close, and our next object is to elucidate the sacrifice made, and the consequent addition to our public debt, by the operation of the Bank Restriction Act, and the system pursued during the war with respect to loan contracts. These subjects will be discussed in the following section.

* The exchange on Paris, June 6, 1832, was 25*f.* 95*c.*

SECTION II.—EFFECTS OF THE BANK RESTRICTION ACT.

Remarks on the issues of paper money.—Since the era of the establishment of the Bank, England has enjoyed, in a more or less degree, the convenience and economy of paper money. Public confidence in the stability of that establishment favoured the progressive extension of its notes; and, up to the period of the late wars, no default in the engagements of the Bank with the public having occurred, the standard of value had not been violated, and the credit system proved sound and beneficial.

At the commencement of the last war, our stock of bullion was equal, or nearly equal, to the amount of paper money in circulation;* and thus the full means existed of freely exchanging the notes for bullion. But with the war, the interruption to our export trade concurred with various other causes, such as subsidies and large importations of food, &c., to effect a disproportion in the relative amounts of specie and paper in circulation. Now, it is clear that, as paper issues must be regulated by the amount of bullion in circulation, any withdrawal of it must necessitate a relative contraction of the circulation of its representative—"paper;" for, if the *market price* of bullion be greater than its coined value, the holders of paper will immediately demand coin, and obtain the proffered premium for it in bullion; and hence paper will be thrown back upon the issuers. Thus, unless the standard is preserved, there is a moral impossibility of maintaining a paper currency in circulation. A bank-note is only retained in circulation on the principle that

* Including bills and provincial notes.

it will command specie on presentation ; and any delay or default in its payment must depreciate its value, the extent of that depreciation depending on the degree of credit attached to the establishment promising to accomplish its ultimate payment, and the fluctuation in the demand for bullion.*

These axioms being admitted, it is evident that the Bank, following the Restriction Act, having defaulted in the payment of their notes, depreciation in the value of paper money against gold became an *open consequence*, the degree of that depreciation depending on the public feeling as to the solvency of the debtors, and the foreign demand for bullion. At the period of the Bank's suspension of payments, circumstances were favourable to the due support of the value of paper money. The public judged the directors of the Bank to whom the new privileges were granted, to be men of prudence, talent, and honour ; the exchanges also were daily improving, and gold became more plentiful. Hence the temporary success of the new plan.

The day of trial arrived during the season 1799-1800, when the pressure of war subsidies and corn importations, depreciated the value of the bank-note, in relation to gold, to the extent of about four per cent., a one pound note and 2s. nearly, being required to purchase a guinea. Depreciation to various degrees, depending on the foreign demand for gold, in payment of subsidies, for excess of imports over exports, or the maintenance of military expeditions to the continent, occurred in 1805, 1808, and 1815—the bank-note sinking in the latter years of the war, to about 13s. 6d. when purchased with gold ; or what is the same thing, 6s. 6d. and a pound note being required to

* The issues of the Bank are, and must always, as a principle of currency, be regulated by the state of the foreign exchanges.—Evidence of Mr. Ward before the Secret Committee.

purchase a golden guinea.—Before we proceed to our estimate of the excess of government expenditure, consequent on the Exemption Act, it will be necessary to remark, that the depression of Bank paper implies a relative fall in its exchangeable value against commodities; and that the public effective expenditure being principally regulated by the price of commodities, would be increased, in years of the depression of the currency, *pari passu* with the degree of that depression; and further, that as the government expenditure in these years always surpassed the amount derived from taxation, the excess consequent on the depression of the currency would be added to the amount of the loans, and hence, proportionally swell the sum of the debt.

Estimate of the loss to the public by the Exemption Act.—In estimating the excess of government expenditure, consequent on the operation of the Exemption Act, we shall, in accordance with the foregoing remarks, consider it relative to the depreciation of Bank paper.

The first period of depreciation was, as we have already observed, the three years ending 1801.

Our expenditure during these years was 171,500 <i>l.</i> ,	£.
and the average depreciation about 3½ per cent. . .	6,002,000

As the fall in the exchanges did not occur until an advanced period of the year 1805, we shall calculate the loss on a moiety of that year's expenditure:—

The expenditure of the year 1805, was 77,600,000	
—the moiety 38,800,000 <i>l.</i> at three per cent.. . .	1,164,000

With 1808 commenced the great losses.—

During the years 1808-9, the expenditure reached 168,700,000 <i>l.</i> , and the average depreciation about nine per cent.	15,183,000
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The expenditure of the years 1810-11, was 181,300,000 <i>l.</i> , and the average depreciation about fourteen per cent.	25,382,000
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The expenditure of the years 1812-13, was 244,400,000 <i>l.</i> , and the average depreciation about twenty-two per cent.	49,360,000
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Brought forward . . . £ 97,091,000

In 1814 and 15 the exchanges greatly fluctuated ; in the early part of 1814, they were extremely depressed, reaching a depreciation of nearly thirty per cent., while in the latter part of the year, the depreciation was barely ten per cent. ; after March 1815, they again drooped and depreciated to the extent of twenty-five per cent. ; but ere the termination of that year—recovered to about eight per cent. ; we shall therefore take the average depreciation at fifteen per cent. The expenditure of the years 1814-15 was 233,300,000*l.*, which at fifteen per cent. is

34,000,000

Total extra expenditure, or amount added to the public debt on account of the depreciation of Bank paper £ 131,091,000

The foregoing sketch is illustrative of the proximate excess of government expenditure, resulting from the relative depreciation of Bank paper against coin ; and as our war expenditure always surpassed the income arising from taxation, it represents the extra sum borrowed, and consequently the addition made to the debt from the same cause.

There are, however, deductions which ought to be made from this large sum, on account of the dividends paid during the depreciation of the currency.

The total amount paid on account of dividends during the twelve years of depreciation, was about 290,000,000*l.* The average depreciation for this time was about eleven per cent ; which gives a deduction of about £ 32,000,000

Besides which, we may suppose that a depreciation of one per cent. might have occurred, had Bank paper continued convertible :—admitting such a depreciation, although by no means certain, it will add to the sum to be deducted about . . . 10,000,000

Making a total deduction of . . . £ 42,000,000

This offset reduces the actual loss, on account of the depreciation of Bank paper, to nearly 90,000,000*l.* ; but if our inquiry extended to the excess of government expenditure consequent on the facility of raising funds by the suspension of the Bank

demand for bullion during this period, we might add a very considerable sum to this enormous loss. For instance, is it probable that after the example which the commercial embarrassments of 1796 unfolded, as the result of the remittances of coin to support the continental war, our government would have formed the coalition of 1799?—a confederacy demanding subsidies to the extent of 6,000,000*l.*; implying at that period, when the balance of commercial payments was against us, a certain addition to the export of metallic currency—Is it probable that, after experiencing the difficulties resulting from the diminution of our circulating medium, the mere quibble concerning the guardianship of the Island of Malta, even when coincident with the aggression of France on the Swiss frontier, would have induced the government to resume the war in 1803?—Or is it probable, without the financial abundance afforded by the Suspension Act, Mr. Pitt would have formed, with so much ardour, the expensive and fruitless coalition of 1805? Or would the Grenville administration, more inclined to peace than their predecessors in office, have blindly rejected the terms offered by France in 1806? Would the government, without a full assurance in their financial resources, have dared to brave combined Europe, and extend the war by the piratical seizure of the Danish navy, and the bombardment of Copenhagen? Or would the affairs of Spain and Germany have commanded so many millions of British treasure during the latter years of the war?

Each of these queries must be answered in the negative; for, had not the whole stock of gold been placed at the disposal of the government by the Suspension Act, it would have been *impossible* to have found the pecuniary means of supporting the immense expenditure which our system of vigour necessitated. Neither trade nor extensive revenue

could have been maintained without a large circulating medium; and by the export of gold, and the consequent contraction of paper money, the whole circulating medium would have ceased to appear.

Addition of public burden consequent on depreciation of the currency, and the system on which loans were contracted during the war.—We shall now shew the combined effect on the public debt, of the depreciation of the currency, and the loan system practised by the government during the war.

Previous to the war, state loans were usually raised by giving stock for the same amount as the sums borrowed, allowing a bonus or commission to the contractors. Mr. Pitt, however, changed this plan, and adopted the system of borrowing in a nominal capital, bearing a low rate of interest; the three per cent. annuities being those in which the greater portion of the loans were contracted. This plan may have afforded some temporary facilities; but when viewed in conjunction with the depreciation of the currency, it has been attended with the most baneful consequences: first, by preventing since the peace the reduction of the rate of interest on the loans contracted during the war; and secondly, by limiting the power of our present surplus revenue to cancel stock, in consequence of the increased price.

To illustrate the effect of “the system,” we refer to the financial contracts of the government during the latter five years of the war. In these years, 1811 to 1815, the amount of stock created was 214,500,000*l*. These loans were contracted in a currency depreciated on the average of the five years about twenty-two per cent; the mean price of gold being about 4*l*. 16*s*. 3*d*. per oz., and the mean contract price of the loans a fraction more than 61*l*. for every 100*l*. stock created. Hence, every 100*l*. of debt incurred during this

period yielded the government in *money*—that is, in *gold*—47*l.* 12*s.*; and the sum actually raised commanded, and does command, an annuity, not of 3*l.* per cent. as the stock implies, but of 6*l.* 6*s.*; while the present market rate of interest is less than 3*l.* 10*s.* per cent.*

Now let us elucidate the extent of loss, to which the present generation is subject, in the repurchase of stock; suppose for instance, an individual possessed of 150 *guineas*, subscribed to a loan, contracted at 6*l.*, during these years of depreciated currency, he would first sell his *guineas*, which, weighing precisely *forty ounces*, at 4*l.* 16*s.* 3*d.* per ounce, would yield him in bank notes 192*l.* 10*s.* This sum he invests in stock at sixty-one per cent., and becomes a state creditor for 315*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.* In 1834, he sells this stock to the commissioners for the reduction of the debt, at ninety per cent., and receives in *gold* 284*l.* 0*s.* 5*d.*, equal to 268 *guineas* 11*s.* 5*d.* So that for 150 *guineas* lent in these years of depreciation, for which loan he has received from the produce of the taxes an annuity of 6*l.* 6*s.* per cent., he receives in liquidation of his claim 268 *guineas*, or 118 *guineas* more than his contract entitled him to demand, and for which the public have received *no value*.

This illustration places in a clear point of view the ruinous financial system followed during the war, and the evils consequent on the non-convertibility of Bank paper. We do not maintain that the Restriction Act is the sole cause of these losses; but, that by placing the whole stock of bullion at the disposal of government, it induced that system of lavish expenditure, of sending specie out of the country for subsidising our allies, and supporting continental war, which could never have been followed, had the Bank been liable to pay their notes in cash.

* Mr. Baring, in his speech in parliament, April, 1833, says 2*l.* 10*s.*

Some advantages resulting from the non-convertibility of Bank paper.—Against the evils resulting from the non-convertibility of Bank paper, it had, however, some redeeming qualities which ought in fairness to be noticed. The contraction of the currency in seasons of depreciation, such as 1799 and 1800, was no longer a necessary precaution as in 1796, when it caused so much embarrassment to commercial men. The non-liability of the Bank to pay in gold, left its directors at liberty to make unlimited advances on bills or securities, possessing the necessary qualifications, and to meet demands with a liberality which they would never have dared to exercise, had they been liable to pay in cash. This supply of nominal capital, which served the purposes of metallic currency, was, doubtless for the time being, beneficial.—It assisted those branches of commerce which required heavy advances at a moderate rate of interest; and employed productive power,—so necessary to answer the increasing demands of the state in a time of war,—which could not have been brought into activity without such means; it was also of advantage, in supplying any deficiency of the circulating medium, which probably would have been felt in such years of scarcity as 1800 and 1801, a crisis, in a great measure foreign to political events. In this, as in subsequent periods of the war, when the balance of trade was against us, the issues of Bank paper acted as a counterpoise to the deficiency of metallic currency, and hence in a great degree prevented those breaks in the revenue, which must have occurred had Bank paper been negotiable. Yet these redeeming advantages were by no means equal to the ultimate loss which the Restriction Act has entailed. We now approach the third section of our chapter—an inquiry into our present monetary system.

SECTION III.—OUR MONETARY SYSTEM.

THE losses incurred by our inability to maintain the standard of value during the late wars, have been elucidated at some length in the preceding section, and form a subject of sufficient importance to authorise the discussion of the question, whether, *under the pressure of war expenditure*, our present system is calculated to afford security against their recurrence, or whether we possess any means of strengthening our financial position.

The advantages of the banking system.—The advantages of a sound system of banking are obvious. Banks collect the small inactive sums of individuals into centres, from which they are re-issued, in aid of those employments which could not be conducted without capital. By emitting also, more bills than they hold coin, they multiply money, and consequently the means of circulating commodities, which is called, “trade;” the activity of trade, therefore, is in a great measure governed by the amount of money in circulation. If banks enjoy a sufficient degree of public confidence, to cause their bills to circulate freely, in lieu of money, they not only economise the use of the precious metals, but operate strongly in augmenting trade, by facilitating the means of interchanging commodities. But, as it is clear, that the Bank, or any other confidential paper, payable at sight, can only do the *entire* office of money while possessing the means of commanding it at any hour, the first object in supporting the banking system, is to guard against any violation of the standard of value; for any variation in the relative value, or price of gold and paper money, must necessarily expel one or the other from circulation.

Does the Bank possess an effective power to influence the foreign exchanges?—The power which regulates the standard of value, and the supply of the circulating medium, has during modern times centred in the Bank of England. This power must always be limited by the stock of bullion held, or the means of acquiring it; and as the ability of every private bank, to extend its issues, must depend on the amount of the circulating medium, it follows, that the whole currency of the country sympathises with the actual ability, or condition of the Bank of England, and that the state of our commerce is in a material degree dependent on that establishment. To regulate the foreign exchanges, or rather to influence them in such a degree as should counteract any sudden demand for gold, requires resources so large that corporate associations can alone command them. In what manner, it may be asked, could the resources of a corporate association regulate or influence the foreign exchanges, when the balance of trade was against the country, and the drain on the precious metals *a certain* consequence?

Suppose, for instance, 2,000,000*l.* sterling were required to pay the balance of an adverse trade, it is certain that 2,000,000*l.* sterling in specie must leave the country; but it does not follow that this 2,000,000*l.* sterling must be paid in *gold*. The standard metal of almost all the continental states is *silver*; and consequently if the offer of bills on England in foreign markets exceeded the ordinary demand of merchants for them for regular remittance, the export of silver from England to purchase the surplus amount of bills would bring the exchange to par, and prevent any demand for *gold* in England; thus obviating the necessity of contracting the issues in consequence of an adverse trade. Hence we see the importance of the application of *capital* or *power* in regulating, at least

pro tempore, the foreign exchanges. The question whether the Bank does possess this power on an efficient scale, was minutely investigated by the Secret Committee; and upon the evidence presented to parliament on Bank affairs, ministers decided that it *does not*, and resolved to increase the active capital of the Bank by a reduction of the government debt to that establishment. The question whether the proposed reduction of twenty-five per cent., or 3,600,000*l.*, is sufficient, is very problematical; and we may perhaps be allowed to offer some data on the subject, from which the reader may draw just conclusions.

From the era of the institution of the Bank, its entire capital has always been employed in facilitating the loans of the government; it has, in fact, been exchanged for stock warrants. The real capital has been expended by the government, and has thus *virtually* ceased to exist. The Bank has, therefore, never held any power in *capital*, but has retained a power in *credit*. Its entire means consist in the deposits of its customers; some in exchange for its notes, and others for secure keeping. These means also it has invested chiefly in government securities, retaining only about a third proportion as deposited specie to answer all demands. Hence whenever the demand on deposits surpasses, or even approaches, the amount of specie held by the Bank, a violation of the principles of the currency must ensue, which must be *legalized by the state*, or the Bank would be *annihilated*, and the country, without a circulating medium, reduced to barter.

The Bank was just in this position in 1796-7;—all its capital and the greater portion of the deposits of individuals were invested in non-convertible government securities, possessing a *prospective*, but not a *present* value. The demands of depositors outran the means of the Bank to meet

them—a violation of the principles of currency ensued, and the arm of the law interposed to legalize the refusal of payments, and oblige the creditor to receive, in lieu of payment, a note promising to pay the debt at an undefined future time. In 1825-6, the same case was at hand; the government had expended the Bank capital, and the major part of the deposits of individuals had been employed in purchasing an *annuity*: other resources were invested in various securities, and the amount of the assets was reduced to a few hundred thousand pounds; while the claims, demandable at pleasure, exceeded 32,000,000*l.* On the subject of the critical state of the Bank at this time, Mr. Jeremiah Harman was asked by the Secret Committee—

Q.—“Do you recollect the lowest amount of gold which the Bank possessed during any part of 1825?”

A.—“No, I do not; but it was miserably low.”

Q.—“Was it below the 1,300,000*l.* you have mentioned?”

A.—“Unquestionably.”

Such was the power and position of this establishment at the period referred to; and the only *fundamental* increase of power since that time is the reduction of the debt due from the government to the Bank to the extent of 3,600,000*l.*

The Bank official balance sheet.—The usual or ordinary means of the Bank, ere the late Act for repaying the Bank twenty-five per cent. of its capital, will be seen on perusal of the subjoined official balance sheet, struck on the 29th of February, 1832.

BANK.

<i>Dr.</i>	.	.	.	£
Bank notes and post bills outstanding				18,051,710
Public deposits—				
Drawing accounts				£ 2,034,790
Balance of audit bills				550,550
Life annuities unpaid				85,030
Annuities for terms of years				38,360
Exchequer bills deposited				490,000
				<hr/> 3,198,730 <hr/>
Private deposits—				
Drawing accounts				5,683,870
Various other debts				54,560
To the holders of Bank Stock				14,553,000
Balance in favour of the Bank				2,637,760
				<hr/> <hr/>
Total debts				£ 44,179,630 <hr/>

* The discrepancy between the amount due from the government to the Bank for capital, and the amount due to the holders of Bank Stock, arises out of an old settlement between the government and the Bank ; but of what nature did not transpire in evidence.

From the foregoing statement it appears that the debts due from the Bank to the public, exclusive of the capital stock, amount to 27,000,000*l.*, every shilling of which they are liable to be immediately called on to pay in gold. The available amount they possessed, including commercial bills under discount, amounted to about 8,200,000*l.*, or less than one third of the debts. The amount advanced to the government, or on government securities, exceeds the surplus or capital by 15,000,000*l.*—absorbing so much of the public and private deposits.* No portion of the sum advanced to the government, or of that advanced to public companies, or on mortgage, &c., could be made immediately available in cancelling notes or in obtaining bullion. The capital held by the government, it is well known, exists but in name; the receipts given for it, such as exchequer bills, stock warrants, annuity deeds, &c., being but the *record* of so much real capital previously *consumed*—spent. The capital has *vanished*—the *acknowledgment* alone remains, and the annuity which the receipt commands, can but be paid out of the forth-coming incomes of individuals: or in other words, a real capital has been subscribed or obtained from the public—paid over to the government, and by it spent; and thus the debt due from the government to the Bank is dependent for payment on the means of a debtor, who can only pay it by contracting a new debt with the public, and thus effecting a transfer of creditors.

Insecurity of the financial position of the Bank.—We shall endeavour to explain the danger to which the Bank is exposed by this position. Suppose the nation were, by any circumstances, obliged to take part in a continental war; as a

* The money raised on the issue of notes is of course a part of the deposits.

natural consequence, our international commerce would meet with interruption; and our workmen being drafted for the service of the government, our productive power would be impaired. The balance of commercial payments would be against us, which, being probably coincident with remittances for the support of armaments abroad, would depress the exchanges, the advantage of remitting gold would arise at a time when the price of the public funds would tend to decline. Such being our situation, suppose a large capitalist, or what may be termed a mercantile stockholder, whose only country is *higher interest*, desires to profit by the premium which the export of gold, purchaseable here at 3*l.* 17*s.* 10½*d.*, bears on the continent. He sells his stock for gold, transmits it to Paris, Hamburg, or Amsterdam, there purchases bills on England, with which he renews his demand for gold. What would be the effect of any considerable trade of this kind?—Certainly and speedily to drain every sovereign from the Bank, and ensure a recurrence of the measure of 1797, with all its attendant sacrifices. With a premium in the market over the Mint-price of gold, it would be impossible for the Bank, on the present system, to maintain the standard of value during many successive months. As to the resources which the Bank holds, of contracting the issues by the sale of exchequer bills, they could, in such times, avail nothing. The government, deficient in pecuniary means, could not submit to the embarrassment which such sales would cause; for, the effect being to depress the bills to a discount, they would be paid into the national treasury in lieu of taxes, not only to the amount of the bills held by the Bank, but to a sum proximating to the sum total of the unfunded debt; and thus, by increasing the demands of the government for loans, cause a double withdrawal of capital from the

ordinary channels of commerce, and seriously embitter that embarrassment always attendant on great political transition.

But presuming that the government, by orders in council, or other more constitutional means, raising the interest on exchequer bills, averts the necessity of cancelling any large portion of the unfunded debt, and that the Bank are enabled to reduce the amount of their liabilities equivalent to the amount of the exchequer bills it holds—even this reduction, if we refer to the precedent of 1797, when the Bank issues were reduced below 9,000,000*l.*, would be totally inadequate to avert the necessity of a suspension. The demand for gold by the continental powers would continue to reduce the stock of bullion to a point which the Bank could in no degree contend with; for, as Mr. Rothschild quaintly remarked to the committee—“*Should foreign powers want gold, if five per cent. will not command it, ten will do so.*”

Indeed, when we look to the whole extent of our present monetary system, we cannot but consider it replete with danger; not so much in time of peace, as on the very possible recurrence of war; and as leading to those sudden “*jerks*” in our commercial course, which create the most direful embarrassment. From these conclusions, we are led to infer that the re-payment of the 3,600,000*l.* is inadequate to the due security of the Bank, and hence to the maintenance of public credit. Against such an inference it may be contended, that the Bank directors are the best judges of their means to afford financial aid to the government, and that the measure of that aid is always regulated with a due regard to financial security. Let it be remembered, that this was the thesis of the Bank in 1797, and that the system pursued at the present time is essentially the same as it was before that era; it led to

the Suspension Act, which cost the country—not the Bank proprietors—100,000,000*l.*, which, being added to the public debt, imposes to this day upwards of 4,000,000*l.* of taxes on the people, while the Bank proprietors built their prosperity upon the ruin. Let it be considered, that the Bank hold their privileges at the *public cost*, and that their interest is, in some points, opposed to the common weal; and then let it be asked, whether the affairs of the Bank are not a proper subject for public scrutiny? The system hitherto pursued has been highly profitable to the Bank, although in many points disastrous to the public. The Bank has, for many consecutive years, received from the public treasury something like an annual million sterling for loans of money collected from the public in exchange for notes, promising re-payment on demand, while they *know*, that should value be demanded when it did not suit them to redeem the pledge, an order in council, or some such ordinance, would relieve them from the present discharge of the obligation. This is, in fact, taxing the people for the loan of their own property. The system, as we have before observed, may work securely in time of peace; but, as Voltaire says, history is but the recital of similar events under different forms: and being warned by the past, we ought to guard against errors for the future.

It would be of little service to note our objections to the present system of currency, and to point out the insecurity which it unquestionably presents, did we not suggest some remedial measures that seem calculated to meet the evil.—The great object is to strengthen, or rather to enlarge, the means of maintaining the standard of value. The suggestions on this point will form the subject of the following section.

SECTION IV.—POLICY OF A CHANGE IN THE
STANDARD OF VALUE.

THIS subject will necessarily embrace, 1st, The fluctuations in the relative value of gold and silver money, and present state of our coinage. 2d, An inquiry as to the policy of continuing the standard value in gold only; and 3d, Whether an alteration of the standard would conduce to the maintenance of steady rates of exchange.

Fluctuations in the relative value of gold and silver.—As the balance of trade determines the ingress and egress of the precious metals, so the relative value of gold and silver, as bullion, will regulate the exportation or importation of each; for purchasers will always remit in that kind of money which is the most valuable. From a remote period to the year 1664, gold and silver were both legal tenders, and it being obvious that they should bear an exact relative value to each other, the value of the former to the latter was regulated by *proclamation*, or what is the same thing, it was ordered that gold should be taken as equivalent to a certain specified sum.* From 1664 to 1717, this practice was discontinued; silver became the only legal tender, and the price of gold fluctuating according to the relative value of the two metals in the market, it was fixed in the latter year that the guinea should be taken at 21s. The authority at foot says, “the guinea was at this period over-valued in comparison with silver, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ l.”—During the greater part of the last century, the relative value of silver coin was superior to that of gold; or, to explain, twenty-one perfect shillings would remit for a greater value than a golden guinea. The purchase

* Liverpool on Coins, p. 128.

of the silver coin with gold, for the purpose of export or melting, together with the practice of clipping and debasing the silver coin, were the effect of this inequality of value. These evils gave rise to the statute of 1775, limiting payments in silver to 25*l.*; but the enactment which purported to protect the silver coin came too late, and was in a great degree unnecessary, owing to almost concurrent alteration in the relative value of gold and silver. Soon after the passing of this Act the scale began to turn, and the preponderance of value was reversed; hence, the guineas, which had been of less value than twenty-one perfect shillings, and were from that cause retained in circulation, became now of more value than twenty-one perfect shillings, and were consequently purchased with silver, and being melted down or exported, disappeared; leaving in circulation the imperfect silver coin. In this state our currency continued until 1816, when, by 56 Geo. III., it was enacted, that gold should be the only legal tender for all debts amounting to more than 40*s.*, and that the old debased silver coinage should be called in, and a re-issue of silver money made, at the rate of 5*s.* 6*d.* per ounce. The pound troy of silver being coined into 66*s.* instead of 62*s.* as formerly—yielding the government a kind of seignorage on the issue of silver of $6\frac{1}{3}\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. The government retaining the monopoly of coining silver, and issuing it as tokens, counters, or change for gold.

It will be perhaps necessary to explain more clearly the relative intrinsic value of gold and silver money in 1817, when the gold currency re-appeared, we hence invite attention to the following calculation :—

Ounces of Gold.		The Mint or Standard price.	
1440	+	3 <i>l.</i> 17 <i>s.</i> 10½ <i>d.</i>	= 5607 <i>l.</i>

This quantity is coined into 5608 sovereigns. So

that the gold coin is within $\frac{1}{5}$ per cent. of its value in bullion,—a merely nominal difference, which is perhaps equivalent to the value of the alloy; while the pound troy of silver, which, at that date, cost in gold 3*l.* 2*s.*, was coined into 66*s.*, being a difference of 6*l.* 1*s.* 1½*d.* in every 100*l.*

By the fall in the value of silver since this date, to 4s. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per ounce, the premium on the issue of silver money has risen to about 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.;* allowing, however, 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for the expenses of coining, the net profit is about 11 per cent.

Danger arising from the present depreciation of the silver money.—The depression before noted infers the possibility of purchasing the gold sovereign intrinsically valued at twenty perfect shillings, or 22s 5d. of the present silver money, with silver valuing as bullion 17s. 7d., and we cannot but think that we are exposed to great loss (however strong the laws, to counteract illicit coining)—from the temptation here offered to circulate spurious coin. Imitative British silver money, possessing all the qualities and value of our silver coin, may be remitted from foreign parts, and exchanged for gold at a profit of 11 or 12 per cent.—or, what is the same thing, merchandise may be exported to the value of 100*l.*, and paid for in silver money, valuing in bullion 89*l.* 10s. The rapid exportation or disappearance of our sovereigns, and the overstock of silver money, usually ascribed to its return from the colonies, which led to the melting of upwards of half a million sterling by the Bank in 1831, are at least fair reasons for surmising that the temptation offered has encouraged the operations of the

* 48 ounces troy of silver $\frac{1}{12}$ fine, at 4s. 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per oz. 235s.

Do. coined into - - - 264

Profit - - - 29 in 235, or
12 $\frac{1}{3}$ p. cent.

private coiner.* It has been officially stated that no prejudicial effects have arisen, or are likely to arise from this depreciation of the silver money—but such opinions, although clothed with *official sanctity*, are, to say the least, very problematical.

We now come to the point which involves the policy of an alteration of the standard.

POLICY OF CHANGING THE STANDARD OF VALUE.

WE shall not enter into any lengthened discussion as to the aptitudes of various metals to serve as money, or standards of value. The Lacedemonians, or rather the disciples of Lysurgus, preferred iron. Some modern people use lead, others shells, but most of the polished nations of ancient and modern times have selected gold and silver. The claims of these metals to priority are briefly enumerated :—they are perfectly homogeneous, so that their value is determined by the quantity ; they are less liable to waste than other metals ; they are more ductile, capable of the minutest divisibility, and possess other properties which make them valuable as articles of universal merchandise.

The monetary system adopted in England since 1816, which excludes the use of silver as current money, we cannot but view as imposing an undue restriction on Bank issues, and depriving commerce, conducted through the medium of paper money, of a fair means of activity and

* An account of the amount of silver coin melted in 1831, also the loss sustained thereby :—

Amount of silver coin melted into bars	- -	£ 565,000
Ditto melted and re coined	- - - - -	35,000

Total	- - -	£ 600,000
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Loss on sixpenny pieces	- - - - -	4,601 1 3
Ditto on other denominations	- - - - -	62,982 19 2

Total loss	- - -	£ 67,584 0 5
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source of security. It is evident that as gold is the only metal by which, according to law, paper issues can be advanced or cancelled, the extent of these issues must be regulated by the quantity of gold in circulation ; hence it follows that any subtraction of this metal must be concomitant with at least an equal subtraction of paper money, which double contraction of the circulating medium causes a diminution in the circulation of commodities in exact proportion to the amount of the circulating medium subtracted ; we need scarce add, as the circulation of commodities is only another term for commerce, that the decline of trade, both foreign and domestic, is sensibly affected by a contraction of the circulating medium.

Now, as in a season of scarcity, a rich country will always part with its gold for aliment ; an adverse season in England is always concurrent with an export of the precious metals—hence a double contraction of the circulating medium, and decline of domestic commerce. It seldom occurs in Great Britain that large importations of food are paid for by increased exports of manufactures : perhaps, from this reason, that an adverse season in England being concurrent with the same visitation in those countries in the north of Europe, from which we usually draw supplies of corn, England possessing capital employs it to purchase food, and increases her importations, while poor countries, possessing less abundant means, are obliged to curtail their purchases of our manufactures ; thus we are always exposed to lose a portion of our gold in times of scarcity or great political transition.

The Bank issues are, and in the present system must continue to be, regulated by the stock of gold commandable or in hand. The usual calculation adopted in practice being, that the amount of gold held must be in the proportion of one-third to the

amount of the Bank paper in circulation ;* hence, supposing 5,000,000 of sovereigns would circulate 15,000,000*l.* in paper ; if both silver and gold were current, 5,000,000*l.* in gold, and a like sum in silver, would circulate 30,000,000*l.* in paper ; or, if the issues were still regulated by the amount of gold held, a double security would manifestly arise by enabling the Bank to redeem their issues in whichever of the two metals best suited their convenience. There can be no doubt of the extra facilities of payment which would be afforded by the adoption of a double standard, and thus legalising the discharge of debts in either silver or gold, in preference to the present system of enforcing payment in gold only.

Estimate of the amount of the precious metals received from the Americas, and of the relative proportion of silver to gold.—An estimate of the amount of specie received from the mines, is inseparable from every question touching the policy of maintaining or changing the standard of value. On this subject our estimate is liable to great inaccuracy ; the laws permitting the importation and exportation of the precious metals free, or without any entry of the amount being made at the Custom-house.† The only means of approximating to a fair estimate of the quantity of bullion received by Great Britain from the Americas, is by determining the balance of trade with them ; and by ascertaining, upon the most approved authorities, the produce of the mines.

First we shall note the amount of our imports and exports with the gold and silver producing countries of America.

* Evidence before the Bank Committee.

† By the 56th Geo. III. c. 49 (1819), the exportation of coin, which had been previously prohibited, was legalised, and no export duty is charged.

Official value of British imports from, and the declared value of exports to, the under-mentioned states, for the year ending 5th January, 1830—

	Total imports.	Total exports.
Brazils	1,530,558 <i>l.</i>	2,497,561 <i>l.</i>
Mexico	169,223 . . .	1,298,848
Foreign West Indies .	432,421 . . .	976,080
States of the Rio de la Plata	583,947 . . .	644,852
Columbia	52,870 . . .	222,605
Chili and Peru . . .	111,330 . . .	947,759
	<hr/> £ 2,880,349	<hr/> £ 6,587,705
Deduct for difference between the official and real value 10 per cent. -	288,000	

Deduct value of the imports of merchandise 2,592,349

Excess of exports, and presumed balance of
commercial payments remitted in specie £ 3,995,356

This, we admit, is far from an accurate mode of determining the balance of trade, but we believe it is the only means of forming an estimate; and with all the imperfections to which it is susceptible, it will warrant us in presuming that the specie remitted to England from this part of the world is very large—perhaps 3,000,000*l.* per annum.

How far is this estimate warranted by the quantity of the precious metals produced?—The work of the illustrious Baron de Humboldt is the ordinary text book referred to on this subject;* our limited

* There are perhaps few works which exhibit a greater fund of practical information on metallurgical and geological science than the writings of De Humboldt; and yet few that have given rise to more erroneous calculations, and led to more fatal results. Many combined circumstances, such as the abundance of capital, low rates of interest, &c., occurred in the year 1824, to induce our moneyed men to look to distant objects for the investment of capital. The opening of commercial intercourse with the Spanish colonies about this date, seemed to offer alluring encouragements for the investment of capital and the application of British talent

space will not permit us to follow this profound author in his comments on the estimates of Ustariz,* Solorzano,† Navarete,‡ Raynal,§ Ro- in working the gold and silver mines of that part of the world. The statements of De Humboldt were appealed to, as to the success which might be anticipated from the schemes; companies were formed,—contracts entered into for mines,—shares issued,—and the frame-work of the necessary means speedily completed. A great portion of those who possessed disposable capital, and many who did not, became candidates for shares: shopkeepers, merchants, lawyers, the clergy, even the nobles of the land, became associated in these worthless undertakings; the price of shares rose to five, and, in some instances, to seven or eight times the nominal value at which they were issued. Engineers and managers,—in some instances very incompetent parties,—were dispatched to commence operations, and the greatest expectations of success were raised. Want of correct information led to severe disappointments. Of the old Spaniards and proprietors of the mines, some of whom had derived immense fortunes from mining speculations, and who had been driven out of the country by the civil wars, few found their way to England; the island of Cuba, the South of France, and Old Spain, being their more ordinary locations. From our non-intercourse with Spanish America during the time that Spain maintained her supremacy over these countries, our countrymen were little prepared to meet the difficulties which presented themselves, and no accurate idea had been formed of the immense injury done to the mines from their having been abandoned during the period of the civil wars. Many of the mines required a large outlay of capital to bring them into a workable state; and the means of draining were limited, not only by the natural impediments which the country presents in transporting heavy machinery, but by the opposition imposed by a set of ignorant and faithless Mexicans to the employment of the steam engine in preference to the horse wheel. The native Mexicans, unacquainted with modern European improvements, recommended the process of amalgamation to extract the silver; and our countrymen, scarcely better informed, allowed themselves to be duped by these unworthy counsellors. At first, the wretched governments encouraged our speculations; and when, at an immense expense, the mines had been brought into a workable state, disputes about title have arisen, which seem destined to absorb the remnant of the immense capitals subscribed.

* Treatise on Commerce and Navigation.

† De Justinian Jure.

‡ De la Conservation de las Monarquias.

§ Hist. Philosophique, Geneva edit. 1780.

bertson,* Neckar,† Gerboux,‡ Smith,§ Garnier,|| and other celebrated authorities. We must, therefore, referring our readers to the works of this phalanx of literati, pass on to notice De Humboldt's estimates of the produce of the American mines, from the first discovery of the Western Hemisphere, to the year 1803.

General summary and estimate of the amount of gold and silver imported into Europe from Spanish and Portuguese America, from the year 1600 to 1803—

Periods.	Annual average importation of gold and silver from America.
1492 to 1500	250,000 piastres
1500 to 1545	3,600,000
1545 to 1600	11,000,000
1600 to 1700	16,000,000¶
1700 to 1750	22,500,000**
1750 to 1803	35,300,000††

Thus, according to the calculations of De Humboldt, Europe annually received from the American colonies, between the years 1750 and 1803, 35,300,000 dollars, or about 7,501,200*l*. These calculations are doubtless founded on the best authority; but since this date, especially during the last twenty years, it is generally admitted that

* History of Commerce.

† De l'Administration des Finances.

‡ French edit. Smith's Wealth of Nations.

§ Wealth of Nations.

|| Demonétisation de l'or.

¶ The mines of Potosi begin to get exhausted, especially after the middle of the 17th century; but the mines of Yauricocha are discovered. The mining produce of new Spain rises from two to five millions of piastres per annum.

** The alluvial mines of Brazil wrought; Mexican mines of la Biscaina Xacal, Tlapujahua, Sombrerete, and Botopilas; the importation of gold and silver into Spain, from 1748 to 1753, was at an average of 18,000,000 of piastres annually.

†† Last period of the splendour of Tasco;—mine of Valenciana wrought; discovery of the mines of Catorce and the Cerro de Gualgayoc; importation of gold and silver into Spain towards the commencement of the 19th century, was 43½ millions of piastres.

the produce of the American mines has very considerably diminished.* Mr. Jacobs estimates the total annual produce of the mines of America, during the twenty years ending 1829, at 80,736,760*l.* or 4,036,838*l.* per annum, and of all the mines in the world 110,000,000*l.* or 5,500,000*l.* per annum. Since the publication of Mr. Jacob's estimate, some further information as to the produce of the mines has been received from the resident British consuls, from whose returns the following estimate is founded: the produce of the Brazilian and Columbian mines, &c. is not included:—

1790 to 1809,				1810—1829.		
	Gold.	Silver.	Total.	Gold.	Silver.	Total.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
Mexico	4,523,378	94,929,303	98,952,681	1,913,175	45,388,729	47,301,804
Panama	223,518	—	223,518	23,603		23,603
Chili	863,974	944,736	1,808,710	1,904,514	878,188	2,782,702
Buenos Ayres	1,862,955	19,286,831	21,149,786	2,161,940	7,895,842	10,057,782
	7,473,825	115,160,870	122,134,695	6,003,232	54,162,759	60,165,891
		Russia		3,703,743	1,502,981	5,206,724
		Total		9,706,975	55,665,740	65,372,615
		Annual Average				

The annual amount produced from the Mexican mines, which rapidly diminished during the fifteen years following 1810, has, however, according to documents recently published, been progressively

* Account of the number of *dollars* coined at all the legal mints of Mexico, and the amount exported to Europe from the years 1817 to 1829 inclusive:—

Years.	Dollars coined.	Dollars exported.	Years.	Dollars coined.	Dollars exported.
1817	9,937,981	7,659,890	1824	9,680,583	6,503,648
18	12,099,917	4,264,450	25	9,193,586	3,714,354
19	13,301,890	6,002,737	26	8,608,278	5,925,367
20	11,586,656	10,104,645	27	10,619,217	9,669,428
21	8,067,560	10,623,020	28	9,982,908	12,367,766
22	11,066,950	9,338,357	29	11,787,133	13,010,020
23	9,458,536	3,391,924			

increasing since 1826,* while the mines of the United States are beginning to become productive.† Adding therefore a million to Mr. Jacob's estimate, we may presume that the specie annually remitted to Europe from America is not less than 5,000,000*l.*, and if to this we add 1,300,000*l.* for the produce of the European and Asiatic mines, and the auriferous sands of Africa, the total annual produce

* For a more general account of the produce of the American mines, see Mr. Black's interesting translation of De Humboldt's Mexico, or the original *Essai politique sur la Nouvelle Espagne*.

† A writer in the New York Journal says,—“Gold is much more extensive in the United States than is generally supposed. It commences in Virginia, and extends south west through North Carolina, nearly in the middle of the state, as regards its length; along the northern part of South Carolina into Georgia, and thence north westerly into Alabama and ends in Tennessee. These mines have during the last five or six years, or probably less, been worked extensively; mills for grinding the ore propelled by water, or by steam, are erected in vast numbers. The company of Messrs. Bissells, one of the most considerable, employs about 600 hands, and the total number of men employed at the mines exceeds 20,000. The weekly produce of these mines is estimated at 100,000 dollars, or more than 1,000,000*l.* sterling per annum. A small portion of the gold is sent to the United States' mint, but by far the greater part is exported to Europe, particularly to Paris. The rapidly increasing village of Charlotta, in Mecklenburg county, is in the immediate vicinity of several of the largest mines. It is a fact not generally known, that the miners who have come from the mines in South America, and in Europe, pronounce this region to be *more abundant in gold than any other* that has been found on the globe. There is no telling the extent of these mines, but sufficient is known to prove they are of vast extent.”—This account we believe to be in accordance with the ordinary mendacious character of American tales, and the last accounts from the British Consuls give the following results:—

Provinces.	1829.	1830.	1831.	1832.
	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.
Virginia - - - - -	2,500	24,000	26,000	34,000
North Carolina - - - -	134,000	204,000	294,000	458,000
South Carolina - - - -	3,500	26,000	22,000	45,000
Georgia - - - - -		212,000	176,000	140,000
Alabama - - - - -			1,000	
Tennessee - - - - -			1,000	1,000
Dollars - - - - -	140,000	466,000	520,000	678,000

is about 6,300,000*l.*, being about three-fourths of the sum produced in the most favourable times.

But the most important point in the prosecution of our inquiry is the *proportional* quantity of silver to gold produced. “Till 1525 Europe had received from the new world little else than gold, but from that date to the discovery of the mines of Brazil, towards the close of the 17th century, the silver imported exceeded the gold in the proportion of sixty or sixty-five to one. During the first half of the last century, Brazil, Choco, Antioquia, Popayan, and Chili furnished so considerable a quantity of gold, that Europe probably did not draw from America thirty marks of silver to one of gold.” From 1750 to 1800, (says Humboldt,) “the quantity of gold imported into Europe was to the quantity of silver imported, in the proportion of one to forty,” *which proportion*, according to the calculations of M. Heron de Villefosse, will also apply to the produce of the European mines; recent accounts, however, make the proportion of gold considerably more. Now the general inferences we draw from these researches are—that the mines of America remit to Europe 5,000,000*l.* per annum—Great Britain receives three-fifths of the total amount—these remittances are in silver, in the proportion of fifteen or twenty to one in relation to gold—and that the relative quantities produced are liable to great variation.

It is impossible to form any correct estimate of the stock of the precious metals in Europe, much less of the relative quantities of gold and silver. Messrs. Jacob, Neckar, Humboldt, Forbonnais, Gerboux, and several other writers on pecuniary legislation have severally furnished data upon which approximate estimates may be founded ;*

* Mr. Jacob calculates the stock of coined money in the world at 380,000,000*l.* De Humboldt estimates it at 325,000,000*l.*, and the annual accumulation of the stock of specie in Europe, in 1802, at 840,000*l.*

but without entering on this subject, it may reasonably be supposed that the stock of silver exceeds the stock of gold in the ratio of at least fifteen to one. If this is admitted, the increased facility of commanding silver in preference to gold is a natural inference ; hence, how immense the extension of power that the Bank would acquire in preserving the standard of value, in maintaining steadiness in the amount of their issues, and in preventing any depreciation in the value of their paper, were it at liberty to pay its notes in silver *or* gold. It is a well known fact that when, in 1825 and 1826, the Bank were searching every corner of Europe for gold, and were on the very brink of ruin from the difficulty of procuring that metal, the state of the bullion market offered unlimited supplies of silver, which, had it been current, would have averted in a very great degree the pecuniary embarrassments which distinguished that period.

Objections to the adoption of a double currency in silver and gold.—From a perusal of the foregoing matter, our readers will be little prepared for the following proposition—*that a double standard is not advisable*—because it is impossible to prevent fluctuation in the relative value of the two metals, and the least difference would occasion the disappearance of one of them ; we have already shewn (page 479), the fluctuations in the relative value of silver and gold during the last century, proceeding from various causes, of which perhaps the most fundamental is the uncertainty and variableness in the produce of the mines : at some periods the proportion of silver produced to gold being as fifteen to one, at another sixty-five to one,—forty to one, ten to one, six to one,—an absence of uniformity in production, which must, *in naturâ rerum*, effect a difference in the relative value of the two metals. This being admitted, we shall note in a simple form the consequences of even a slight variation of the

relative value of silver and gold, both being current. —Supposing a double standard adopted, that is to say, a separate standard for silver and gold. The standard price of silver being fixed at 5s. and that of gold at 80s. per ounce; four ounce, or crown pieces of silver, being intrinsically worth the golden sovereign. Now, supposing that gold should bear an agio or profit in foreign markets of three or four per cent. while silver remained at its standard value; such a variation would cause our gold to disappear; for silver would be imported to purchase gold, or conversely, if silver bore a profit, gold would be imported to purchase the silver.*

Such an effect, which may be termed certain, would be extremely inconvenient, and attended with considerable losses. A seignorage on each description of money could not be sufficiently large to counteract this effect without producing evils of perhaps greater magnitude; private coiners would soon circulate their gold at a certain profit, and comparatively little risk of detection. These objections would, in our opinion, entirely negative the adoption of a double standard of silver and gold, unless some solid plan could be devised for protecting the currency against fluctuation.

Policy of fixing the standard in metal, compounded of silver and gold, discussed.—Fully impressed with the advantages derivable from employing silver, as a joint current medium in value; we are, as it were, forced by our course of reasoning to suggest a plan, which we do not recollect to have seen advocated, or even mentioned by any writer or debater on currency legislation. It appears to us,—perhaps from erroneous

* This was the case in France. Previous to 1785, the louis d'or was rated at only 24 *livres*, while it was worth as bullion 25*f.* 50*c.* Those who paid in gold therefore lost 1*f.* 50*c.* The consequence was, few payments were made in gold. The louis d'ors disappeared, being melted or exported, and the silver only was left in circulation.

conclusions,—that the only means of securing the advantages of the use of both silver and gold, as *current media of value*—is by adopting a single *standard in an amalgamated metal, being compounded of silver and gold*, of equal value, but, of course, of different quantity. In this case the value of the metallic currency could *never vary* in consequence of a variation in what may be termed the market price of either metal; the appreciation in the one always inferring an exact relative depreciation in the other, those who demand the appreciated *gold* contained in the coin, must also with it purchase the relatively depreciated *silver*. We need not recapitulate the manifest *advantages* of this plan in point of security, and the enlarged means it would provide to extend securely the issues of paper money; but we ought perhaps to speak of its *disadvantages*. The chief, is the extra bulk of the current money; an inconvenience of some consequence, we admit. This, however, might in some degree be remedied by ceasing to coin pieces of greater value than 10s., the current money valuing 10s. would in this case about equal in bulk the present crown piece, and other money would be smaller in proportion to the diminution of value. Those who consider the inconvenience of extra bulk, as a fatal objection to the plan, should consider that our currency, even thus remodelled, would be only half the size of French money, and scarcely one third that of the currency of the major part of Europe; and that nowhere is the use of paper substitutes, which this plan would materially encourage, enjoyed to so great an extent as in Britain. Small money, such as shillings and sixpenny pieces, might still circulate in alloyed silver as tokens, not current coin: gold would not be necessarily excluded from circulation; gold might be issued at a moderate *agio*, as is done in France; but, of course, it would form no part of the currency.

Question of charging a seignorage discussed.—The question as to the policy and justice of charging a seignorage on the current coin, has been subject to much discussion: it is generally viewed as prejudicing the claim of creditors while relieving the obligation of debtors. The extent of income or vested property affected by a depreciation in the currency, is very large: it consists of all money contracts entered into between parties for terms of years, such as rents arising from lands; money invested in the public funds, or on mortgage, &c., producing an income amounting to perhaps 60 to 65 millions sterling per annum, and representing a capital of not less than 1,200,000,000*l.* About 400,000,000*l.* of the national debt, and large sums in the formation of docks, roads, canals, &c., as well as in the improvement of lands, were invested during a period when the currency was depreciated from 10 to 30 per cent.; hence, no injustice would be done to holders of this property, by paying them in coin depreciated even to the same extent, which much exceeds any seignorage which could now be charged. For other reasons, a moderate seignorage on the current coin seems advisable; it would counteract the melting and debasement of the coin at home, and would also induce foreign merchants to remit in its perfect state in times of favourable exchange, such portion of British coin as had found its way abroad, while it would diminish the annual charge, on account of the dead weight, to the extent of about 900,000 per ann. “It is to the want of an adequate seignorage,” says Mr. Mushet, “that England owes the disappearance of the great silver coinage of King Wm. III.” The disappearance of our guineas during the war, but more particularly the continued absorption of our gold currency since the peace, is in some degree attributable to the same cause. By contrasting the amount of the gold coined at the Mint, from 1817 to 1831 (43,943,280*l.*), with the esti-

mate of Mr. Horsley Palmer, of the amount of gold in circulation in 1833 (30,000,000*l.*), it appears that 14,000,000 sovereigns have been lost or melted during this period;* or, perhaps, we shall better explain the matter, by saying that 14,000,000 of sovereigns have been melted either at home or abroad, returned to the Mint in bullion and recoinied into money, occasioning all the losses of the expenses of recoining, of the interest during the period it has remained inactive, as well as of those consequent on its subtraction from circulation; what these heads of loss may amount to, it is impossible even to guess with any pretension to accuracy, but it is much more considerable than is generally supposed.

A seignorage of two and a half per cent., which, deducting the expense of coining, say, one per cent., would leave the government a profit of one and a half per cent., would, while insufficient to encourage illicit coining, materially counteract the losses above referred to.

The amount of pecuniary sacrifice consequent on this change in our currency system.—A temporary inconvenience and some immediate loss, would however arise from the adoption of these reforms in our currency. Gold now issued at 3*l.* 17*s.* 10½*d.* per oz. would, supposing the exchanges at par, be worth 3*l.* 19*s.* 9¾*d.* in current money; hence, in order to collect the gold currency, it would be necessary to give an apparent bonus, equivalent or nearly equivalent to the seignorage charged; while in silver money, the depreciation being at present about twelve per cent., its exchange for current money would occasion a loss of nine and a half per cent. : and supposing that three-fourths of the silver money at present in circulation, say 9,000,000*l.* were thus exchanged, the loss would amount to about 610,000*l.*; a sacrifice to which

* See table, page 499.

sooner or later the state must submit, independently of an alteration in the standard of value; to this we may add 90,000*l.* for the expenses of the re-coinage, carrying the total sacrifice to 700,000*l.*

The danger to which our finances are exposed in case of war.—The re-modelling of the coinage may appear unnecessary to some of our readers, who merely look to the present state of affairs; but we are convinced, that should the peace of Europe be interrupted, the greatest embarrassments would occur, and it is the opinion of one of our most distinguished authorities on financial legislation (Mr. Baring) that should Great Britain be unhappily reengaged in hostilities, she could not carry on an expensive contest during two years without a recurrence to the Bank Exemption Act,* and this opinion induced him to recommend the adoption of a *double standard*, legalizing the tender of silver or gold, *ad libitum*. For the reasons before stated, we cannot agree in the propriety of adopting a *double standard* on the principles recommended by Mr. Baring, but we perfectly concur in his view of the insecurity of our present financial position.

The Currency Bill of 1819, and its effects.—The security which the reform of our coinage would provide in every stage of our monetary and commercial system, would doubtless operate in extending the issue of paper, and would in a great degree negative the demand of the anti-bullionists for a repeal of the Currency Bill of 1819. That this bill was at the time impolitic, is, we believe, very generally admitted; all the embarrassments attendant on the transition from war to peace were severely felt, and hence the stimulus which capital affords to commerce more than ordinarily needful: taxation pressed heavily, and the policy of keeping

* Mr. Baring's Evidence before the Committee on Coin, 1829.

the value of money at a low ebb was dictated by circumstances—various European states were at that time buying up gold ; the effect of which, together with the extensive demand of the Bank of England, could not fail to raise its price in relation to commodities, to limit the resources of our continental customers, and depress commerce. These were doubtless the results of the progressive working of that measure ; but although admitting that a great depreciation in the prices of merchandise was consequent on the enactment, yet we do not concur in the extent ascribed to it by the anti-bullionists. Other causes contributed largely to depress the prices of merchandise. The cessation of the waste of war ; the change so general throughout Europe, from the destructive soldier to the productive labourer ; the progressive invention and application of machinery, and the growth of commercial relations between civilised nations, were all auxiliary causes of the depreciation of the price of commodities against gold. During the last twelve years, the prices of merchandise have uniformly tended to adapt themselves to the alteration in the currency, and at the present time, as the productiveness of the mines is increasing, a rise, rather than a fall, in the price of commodities against gold is to be expected ; hence, however impolitic the Currency Bill of 1819 might have been at that time, yet as great interests have adapted themselves to the measure, the return to a system of insecurity by its repeal, with the *avowed object* of depreciating the value of money, cannot be fairly advocated.

Concluding remarks.—None will deny the great advantages attendant on Bank issues, if based on firm security ; they enable individuals to apply productive power to employ labour, and thus raise a real property by means of an imaginary capital.

Neither will any deny the great advantages attendant on a sound system of banking, and the establishment of joint-stock banks. How many small sums, which now lie dormant in the hands of individuals, from want of confidence in the provincial establishments, would be deposited in the hands of banking companies, and by them productively applied: the history and success of the Scotch banks are too well known to require any comment in proof of the advantages of such establishments. Security against the depreciation of Bank paper, and steadiness in the standard of value, are all that is required to command or enlarge these advantages. The nearest attainable approach to which appear to us to be—by fixing the standard in a currency of amalgamated gold and silver; a further reduction of the debt due from the state to the Bank of England; a steady perseverance in a pacific course; and a firm resolution *never to grant a subsidy to foreign powers*, except on the most pressing occasions.

TABLE shewing the value of Gold and Silver coined at the Mint in each Year, from 1793 to 1831 inclusive; [Extracted from Parl. Papers, No. 138. Sess. 1833.] also an estimate of the amount of Gold Coin in circulation in June 1833, as furnished by Mr. Horsley Palmer to Mr. McCulloch.

Years.	Gold coined.		Silver coined.		Dates.	Amount issued.	Remarks.
1793-97	£. 8,264,717	s. 0	£. 293	s. 0	From January 1821 to July 1824 . .	17,370,000	{ Exchanges favorable. Gold imported.
1798-02	4,494,662	0	115	0			{ Exchanges against this country.
1803-07	1,774,613	0	331	0	August 1824 to December 1825 .	8,660,000	{ Gold exported.
1808-12	1,299,598	0	234	0			{ Exchanges favorable.
1813-16	519,772	0	1,805,543	0	January 1826 to April 1828 . .	2,370,000	{ Gold imported.
1816	Nil.		1,805,251	16			{ Exchanges unfavorable, from Nov. 1828, to Feb. 1829.
1817	4,275,337	10	2,436,297	12			
1818	2,862,373	10	576,279	0		9,600,000	
1819	3,574	10	1,267,272	12	May 1828 to May 1832		
1820	942,516	0	847,717	4			
1821	9,520,758	13	433,686	0	Coin	£. 38,000,000	
1822	5,356,787	11	31,430	7	Deduct exported in years		
1823	759,748	10	285,271	16	1824 & 1825	6,000,000	
1824	4,065,075	0	282,070	16	1828 & 1829	500,000	
1825	4,580,919	0	417,335	16	1830 to 1832	2,000,000	
1826	5,896,461	7	608,605	16		8,500,000	
1827	2,512,636	17	33,019	16	Add	29,500,000	
1828	1,008,559	2	16,288	3	Issued from February 15, 1832, to		
1829	2,446,754	12	108,259	16	February 15, 1833	1,600,000	
1830	2,387,881	2	151	16		31,300,000	{ Sums taken out during the political discredit of May 1831, and not yet returned.
1831	587,949	14	33,696	5	Deduct Stock of Branch Banks, taken as part Issues from Lon- don	1,300,000	
					Gold in circulation	£. 30,000,000	

* This table, which is taken from Mr. McCulloch's Dictionary, is of course intended only as an approximate estimate. As nearly the whole of the gold coined at the Mint, is on the Bank of England's account, the amount issued is determinable with tolerable accuracy; but as the law allows the egress of gold from this country free, the estimate of the amount exported is liable to greater error; it being impossible to determine the amount which is taken out of the country in the pockets of private individuals.

CHAPTER V.

REVENUE, DEBT, TAXES, AND FINANCES.

SECTION I.—HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE BRITISH
REVENUE, DEBT, AND SINKING FUND.

WE propose, in the first part of this chapter, to trace the progress of the British state revenue, expenditure, public debt, and sinking fund; to note the reductions effected since the peace of 1815, and our present financial condition. We shall then examine, in detail, the present mode of taxation; and discuss the policy of a commutation of various taxes which especially interrupt the free course of productive industry, for others of a less pernicious tendency.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE STATE REVENUE.

Little credit can be attached to the statements of the revenues of the crown previous to the accession of Henry VII.—the bigotry, ignorance, and general turbulence of the times, precluding the possibility of maintaining any regular system of taxation. Previous to this period, history unfolds but a dull monotony of extortion and rapine; and evidences, that however small may have been the revenues of the crown, they were not raised without the greatest difficulty, and the frequent exercise of the presumed prerogatives of the court in their most offensive shape.* A variety of circumstances con-

* See Strype's Annals, Parliamentary History, &c.

cur to mark the accession of the house of Tudor to regal power, as one of the most propitious eras in the British annals. It was distinguished by the discovery of the great western hemisphere, and the no less important marine passage to the East Indies—discoveries which have largely tended to revolutionise the political system of Europe, and to found the basis of the greatness of the British empire. It is also remarkable as terminating those intestine commotions, between the adherents of the houses of York and Lancaster, which had so long infested our wretched country, and caused it to bleed at every pore.

A detailed account of the various sources from which kings of England derived their revenues could little interest our readers, and would fill that space in our volume designed for subjects of more present importance. We shall, therefore, referring our readers to the well-known and excellent work of Sir John Sinclair,* for enlarged information on the revenues of the early reigns, confine ourselves to a brief epitome of the subject.

Revenues of Henry VII.—The extortions of Henry VII., so famed for his pecuniary avidity, were of the most nefarious description. His exactions were known under the titles of benevolence, feudal aids, sales of titles, patents, &c. These, beside dues on tonnage, poundage, parliamentary subsidies, compensation from the French king, Charles VIII., in lieu of his pretended claims on Brittany, &c. &c. constituted his revenues, which are moderately estimated at 400,000*l.* per annum. Bacon says “he received more and spent less than any preceding monarch.”† His wealth at his decease is said to have amounted to four millions of our present money.‡

* History of the Revenue. † Bacon's History of Henry VII.

‡ Fabian Phillips.

Revenues of Henry VIII.—Henry VIII., the libertine son of the first of the Tudors, soon expended the immense treasures amassed by his avaricious parent. Every species of plunder and extortion was practised on his subjects by this prince: the abhorred poll-tax was revived—the coin debased—compulsory loans raised by royal proclamation—which, as Noy, the attorney-general in the reign of Charles I., says, has equal authority with laws, and as such ought to be obeyed.* The seizure of the church lands, of the lands of the two universities, and of all the chantries, free schools, and hospitals, as well as of the monasteries and convents, added 150,000*l.*—or, as some say, 272,000*l.*—to his annual revenues. Notwithstanding that he possessed himself of these funds, he disdained to pay his creditors, and obtained from his venal parliament an Act cancelling all his debts. Sinclair estimates the annual revenues of the crown in this reign at 800,000*l.*

————— *of Edward VI.*—The peculation and fraud of courtiers greatly impaired the revenues of Edward VI. Paget, Beauchamp, Whalley, and Warwick are named in history, as a few among the host of those who possessed themselves of the revenues of the church and state. Boulogne was sold by “the Protector”—Seymour—to the French king, for 400,000 crowns, and the money applied to the purchase of political support; but

Auferre trucidere rapere falsis nominibus imperium.

It is supposed the annual revenues of the crown during this reign amounted to about 400,000*l.*

Mary's reign presents nothing but the records of acts of horror. Her extortions and treasures, by embargoes, seizures, compulsory loans, &c. are of the most barbarous character. She raised a revenue of about 300,000*l.* per annum.†

* Noy's Rights of the Crown. † Hume's History of England.

Revenues of Elizabeth.—A more propitious era dawned with the accession of Elizabeth. The revival of letters, which the novel art of printing had introduced, was working its mighty influence over the public mind. The papal church, by the prodigal exercise of her subtleties, roused the advocates of civil and religious liberty to unfurl the standard of concerted resistance to her exactions and oppressions. England stood in the van of the Liberals; and directed her power, in defence of her institutions, against the spiritual thunders of the pontiff, and the powerful arms of the bigoted champions of the Romish church. The expenses of the struggle were great beyond precedent. The Flemings received 800,000*l.* as a loan, to aid them in resistance to the forces of the ferocious Alva—450,000*l.* were lent to the French king, Henry IV., in aid of the cause of Hugonots.* The war against Philip II. cost 1,200,000*l.*†; and the rebellion of Tyrone, excited by the tyranny and extortions of Protestant zealots, cost, according to Sir Robert Cecil, 3,400,000*l.* The permanent income of Elizabeth, including the revenues of the duchy of Lancaster, is stated to have been about 350,000*l.*;‡ and the total receipts, including thirty-eight subsidies and vast sums raised by crown monopolies, patents, &c., amounted to upwards of 500,000*l.* per annum.§

* Camden's History of Elizabeth.

† Parliamentary History, vol. 4, p. 364.

‡ Stevens, p. 247.

§ The little respect paid to the rights of property in these times will be seen by the following instance:—Some Genoese merchants had contracted to transport 400,000 crowns for the use of the Spanish forces in Flanders; the ships on board of which the money was embarked being attacked by some French privateers, took shelter in the English ports—the money was seized by Elizabeth, under the pretence that it was the property of the Genoese merchants, from whom she would borrow it herself, *having occasion for money.*—Hume, vol. iv, p. 194.

Revenues of James I.—Several circumstances concurred to swell the revenues of James I. ; such as the extension of commerce—especially to the East Indies—the cessation of war—the junction of the crowns of England and Scotland—the sale of crown lands—and the partial repayment of the funds advanced to the Dutch and French during the previous reign. Yet the most unworthy means were practised to raise the royal income: the favours of the crown were publicly sold; and a certain price was, by the advice of Cotton, or, as some say, Salisbury;—fixed on the dignities of baron, earl, and viscount—the prices varying at from ten to twenty thousand pounds. The dignity of baronet was purchaseable at a thousand pounds, and ninety-three of these titles were actually sold. Arbitrary and excessive fines, imposed on those who unhappily fell under the displeasure of the court, also greatly conduced to swell the revenues of the crown; * the total annual amount of which was about 600,000*l.*

————— *Charles I.*—Charles I. came to the throne with all the high prerogative principles of his father, strengthened by those notions of *right divine* which he had acquired by his visits to the Spanish court. His wars against Ferdinand VI., the most powerful prince that ever wore the imperial diadem, together with his wars against France, weighed heavily on the state resources; the attempts to relieve Rochelle consumed the produce of five subsidies. The ordinary revenues constitutionally obtained were quite inadequate to meet the heavy expenses of the government. Monopolies and fines were largely resorted to,†

* Bennet paid 20,000*l.*, Suffolk 30,000*l.*, and Middlesex 50,000*l.* The Lord Chancellor Bacon was also fined 40,000*l.*, which was afterwards remitted.

† Commons' Journal, vol. viii.

and 800,000*l.* were, during four years, raised by the unconstitutional imposition of ship money, by royal proclamation. These large exactions, which swelled the revenues of Charles I. to an annual average of 895,819*l.*,* roused the people to resistance, and kindled the flames of intestine commotion.

Revenues of the Commonwealth.—The revenues of Charles I., greatly exceeding those of his predecessors, were small comparatively with the sacrifices made by the people during the civil wars which succeeded the rupture between the king and his parliament. Never was the cause of popular resistance to the regal power more energetically supported. The citizens of London sent even their plate to be coined; no article, however mean, no ornament however valuable, was spared; the very thimbles and bodkins of the women were not withheld; “every one was anxious to maintain the cause of the Godly against the Malignants.” Immense sums were raised by the confiscation of the estates of the Church, and the sequestration of tithes; the people even retrenched their meals, and paid the saving of their domestic expenditure into the hands of the worthless parliament. The greatest efforts were also made to support the royal cause. The Earl of Worcester lent the king no less than 100,000*l.*, and the Universities sent their plate as an offering to the voracious idol of legitimacy. According to Sir John Sinclair’s tables, the amount collected by the parliament during the period of the Commonwealth, amounted to no less than 83,331,489*l.*; and Chalmers says that the total sacrifices during the civil wars surpassed 100,000,000*l.* The foreign wars of Cromwell were a heavy drain on the resources of the country; but at no period of history was the honour or independence of the

* See Macauley, vol. ii, p. 248.

nation more nobly vindicated. The gallant Blake carried the thunders of the republican cannon to every hostile shore ; he obliged the Dutch to recoil from their vaunted naval superiority, and took signal vengeance on them for the barbarities practised on British subjects at Amboyna ; Spain yielded to Great Britain the island of Jamaica ; Portugal was humbled ; and the European powers, which had disdained an alliance with England under James I. or Charles I., sought it when under Cromwell.* These expenses were, however, severely felt by a suffering people ; a heavy debt had accumulated ; and Milton's assertion, "that the trappings of monarchy would defray all the charges of a republic," was completely negatived by results. The people were ripe for a change ; Monk gave impulse to the latent popular inclination, and the old dynasty was restored in the person of Charles II.

Revenues of Charles II.—The revenues of this libertine prince were fixed by parliament at 1,200,000*l.* per annum ; he obtained also 250,000*l.*, and Bombay, as the marriage portion of his wife Catherine, daughter of the King of Portugal. He received as subsidies from Louis XIV. 950,000*l.* to make war upon Holland ; and 800,000 patatoes, about 300,000*l.*, from the Dutch, to make peace. The crown's share of the plunder taken in the Dutch war, was 340,000*l.*† ; and 400,000*l.* was received from France for the sale of Dunkirk. The total sums received by Charles, during his twenty-four years' reign, amounted to no less than

* Mazarin et Don Louis de Haro (the Spanish minister), prodiguèrent à l'envie leurs politiques pour s'unir avec le Protecteur. Il goûta quelque temps la satisfaction de se voir courtoisé par les deux plus puissans royaumes de la Chrétienté.—*Voltaire siècle de Louis XIV.*

† D'Estrade.

53,824,492*l.*, being about 2,242,500*l.* per annum.* This immense revenue was, however, found unequal to meet the expenditure. The Dutch war cost 5,483,000*l.*; the body guard, varying at different periods from four to eight thousand men, was maintained at an expense of 212,000*l.* per annum;† the navy at 300,000*l.*; and the ordnance at 40,000*l.*; while the rapacity of the famed mistresses of this lascivious prince demanded immense sums. So great were the pecuniary embarrassments of Charles II., that it was publicly advertised “whoever could discover a mode of supplying his necessities should be rewarded with the place of treasurer,” when Clifford closed the Exchequer against the claims of the king’s creditors, amounting to 2,800,000*l.*, and obliged them to receive as compensation long annuities of the value of 19,927*l.* Charles, before his decease, is said to have begun a system of rigid economy, but ere he had made great retrenchments he was called by that all-conquering hero Death, and all disputes of debtor and creditor were arranged “in the grand reconciliation of the grave.”

Revenues of James II.—At the demise of Charles II. his brother James came to the throne. By menaces and intimidation he obtained a larger revenue than his predecessors. Parliament voted the rash bigot 2,000,000*l.* per annum for life. After the barbarous massacre which succeeded the rebellion of the unfortunate Monmouth, James obtained a special grant of 400,000*l.* The extension of our trade, especially with the East, had placed enlarged resources at the disposal of the government; Davenport remarks that the customs and excise had greatly increased, and that commerce had made

* Carte, vol. vi.

† This is the first mention in English history of the household troops.

rapid strides during late years. The maintenance of the fleet and army is reported to have cost about 1,100,000*l.* per annum.*

Reforms in the British Constitution.—It is the peculiar felicity of Britain, that every encroachment of the court on the constitutional privileges of the people has always been the prelude to an extension of popular rights, and that the prolonged attacks of the court with the *small arms* of regal prerogative and influence have, immediately they assumed a dangerous aspect, been suddenly repulsed by the *cannon* of public opinion. Thus the barbarities of John gave rise to *Magna Charta*. The extortions of Edward I. occasioned the famous statute of *De Tallagio Condecendo*. The measures of Charles I. roused the nation to arms; and in the subsequent reign the rights of parliament were maintained,† and the liberties of the subject secured, by the institution of *habeas corpus*. The fanaticism and treason of James II. led the people to depose the king, and re-enact the constitution by the *Bill of Rights*; and at the present day, courtly influence over the popular councils has again received its wholesome check, by the *irrevocable* statute of *parliamentary reform*. Thus the fundamental principles of the constitution have been preserved and strengthened; and a system of mild government, justice, and rational liberty, raised upon them, which, while the reign of Henry VIII. remains unexpunged from the annals of English history, it is impossible for the British people to over value.

William and Mary.—During the late reigns, all the plans of government seem to have been conducted with disorder and embarrassment; financial science had made little progress, and the limits of

* Encyclopædia Britannica.

† The Bill of Rights.

the royal prerogative were in a manner undefined. With the accession of William III., a more precise compact was established between the crown and the subject. A civil list of 700,000*l.* was provided, out of the produce of special taxes, and parliament exercised full control over the other branches of state expenditure. The times were, however, pregnant with difficulty. The war against France, and the intestine commotions in Ireland, were subjects of great political anxiety, and necessitated heavy expenditure. France was at this time in the zenith of her power: her military forces were more numerous and better disciplined than those of any modern state, or even than those of the Roman empire under Augustus or Claudius;* Vauban, Condé, Luxemburgh, and other generals who headed her armies, were esteemed the military champions of the age; while her fleet, commanded by the famed Tourville, rode triumphant in the European seas. Her annual revenues, about 7,000,000*l.*, were threefold those of Great Britain, while her financial credit was more firmly based. Thus, as Sir James Stuart observes, the reduction of the French power was no easy achievement; and it was very generally considered as an enterprise far beyond the strength of Great Britain to carry through, though assisted by the greater part of Europe. This difficulty was much increased by the jealousy with which a large portion of the people viewed the advancement of a foreign prince to the British throne, rendering heavy impositions dangerous to the stability of existing institutions. A few taxes were, however, imposed; some of which were truly ridiculous, such as taxes on marriages, births, and bachelors above forty years of age. Better management was intro-

* Gibbon says that Augustus maintained 240,000 men for the empire of the world. Louis' forces, according to Voltaire, numbered 400,000 men.

duced into the excise and customs' departments, and these two branches yielded nearly 2,000,000*l.* per annum. The land-tax also contributed largely to swell the revenues, which on the annual average amounted to 3,550,000*l.*

Revenues of Anne.—It would be vain to enter into details of the various sources of the revenue of queen Anne. Her expensive wars gave rise to every expedient to raise money; the excise was increased to 2,000,000*l.* by various new taxes, and the land-tax, maintained at four shillings in the pound, produced a like sum, swelling the annual average revenues to 5,691,803*l.* The wars, prolonged to gratify the ambition of Marlborough and Eugene, cost 43,270,000*l.*, which far surpassed the revenues arising from taxation.

————— *George I.*—At the accession of the House of Hanover, circumstances seemed to portend a long interval of peace. The period at which George I. came to the throne was nearly concurrent with the demise of Louis XIV., who had so long distracted Europe with his sanguinary wars. The British king, and the duke of Orleans, regent of France, were both deeply impressed with the necessity of preserving peace, and seem to have adopted a course of policy in some degree resembling that which characterises the cabinets of London and Paris at the present day. From this wise course, peace was preserved; and notwithstanding a large increase of charge for the public debt contracted during the two previous reigns, some reduction of taxation was effected, yet the revenues increased, averaging for the whole period of this reign, 6,039,000*l.*

————— *George II.*—During the first twelve

years of the reign of George II. the pacific policy adopted by George I. was maintained—never were the good effects of peace more fully illustrated. The credit of the government was firmly supported,* commerce increased, and the national resources received great extension.

The war with Spain in 1739, the coalition with Austria in 1741, however, completely changed the face of affairs; taxes and national debt seemed to vie with each other in their increase; the taxes which, at the commencement of this reign, produced about 6,700,000*l.* per annum, were raised in the latter years of it to 8,500,000*l.*, while the expenditure exceeded the income by 59,132,000*l.*

Revenues of George III. (previous to the late wars). No period of history affords such an example of the expansion of state revenue as the reign of George III. At his accession it amounted to about 8,800,000*l.*, and progressively expanded in every succeeding year: in 1770 attaining 9,510,000*l.*, and in 1783, the first year of the peace, 12,000,000*l.* The wonderful inventions of Arkwright, Hargrave, Wedgwood and others, about this time, began to shew their results in expanding the national income, and with it the state revenue. In 1785 the receipt of the exchequer had increased to 14,871,000*l.*, and ere the outburst of the war with France (1792) it reached 17,382,000*l.* The progress of the revenue, from the commencement of the war to the present time, will be developed in this chapter, and we shall now trace the progress of our national debt and charge.

SKETCH OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL DEBT.

The system of raising money for the service of the crown, on the security of transferable annuities, payable out of the forthcoming revenues of

* The three per cents., in 1738, were 107.

the state, dates its origin from a remote period, and seems to have been first practised in Florence, A.D. 1344,* but it was not until the reign of Charles-II. that the plan was adopted in England. English history frequently speaks of debts contracted by kings with their subjects. Edward I. borrowed money to pay the debts of his father, in order, as the record states, to get his soul out of purgatory,—

Ad exonerationem animæ Henrici patris nostri.

Henry IV. obliged the rich men of the kingdom to lend him money upon the security of the growing taxes.† Henry VIII. mulcted his subjects of all the money he could borrow of them. Elizabeth left at her demise a debt of 400,000*l.*, which was repaid during the succeeding reign. At the death of Cromwell, the republican government were indebted in no less a sum than 2,474,000*l.*, and it does not appear that this was ever discharged. Charles II. compromised debts to the amount of 2,800,000*l.* by granting annuities amounting to 19,927*l.*, and this debt being acknowledged in subsequent reigns, is the foundation of the British *national* debt as at present understood.

William III. had already been familiarized with the plan of raising a national debt, the Dutch considering it as a necessary appendage to government; and when the exigency of circumstances in this country required extended resources, the Dutch plan was freely introduced. The bad faith observed by preceding English monarchs in their pecuniary contracts, rendered subjects extremely disinclined to entrust their property to the new king. Hence, during the first two or three years of his reign, William III. experienced great difficulty in raising loans. He

* Encyclopædia Britannica.

† Macpherson's History of Commerce.

borrowed small sums of his private friends, which were soon dissipated in Ireland. Subsequently six per cent. was publicly offered by the state without avail. By 4 & 5 Wm. & Mary, 881,000*l.* were raised on annuities for ninety-nine years, at ten per cent. until 1700, and seven per cent. after that date. In 1793, 1,000,000*l.* were raised on annuities for sixteen years, at fourteen per cent. interest; these sums were, however, found inadequate: hence the unfortunate Patterson, to aid the government, conceived and contrived the Bank scheme, and formed a company, which purchased its privileges of the government with a loan of 1,200,000*l.*, at eight per cent. per annum. The new East India Company also bought its charter by the loan of 2,000,000*l.* at the same rate of interest, on condition that the money should be refunded ere the expiration of their charter, in 1711. Montague also invented the scheme of issuing exchequer bills, which were made more convertible by being made so low as 5*l.* and 10*l.*, and by which considerable sums were raised.* The total sums borrowed during this reign were 44,930,000*l.*, of which about 29,000,000*l.* were repaid, leaving, at the demise of William III., a total debt of 16,394,702*l.*, bearing an annual interest, including the annuities granted by Charles II., of 1,310,942*l.* At the accession of queen Anne, the credit of the government had improved, the current rates of interest were lower, and the debt was in a fair prospect of reduction; but the war of 1702 completely changed the face of affairs: annuities and tontines were granted on the most extravagant terms, and deficiency bills called "tallies," were sold at forty per cent. discount. The government obtained from the Bank 400,000*l.*, without interest, on the renewal of its charter. The East India Company lent

* Life of Lord Halifax, p. 43.

1,200,000*l.* on the same terms. The South Sea Company increased its capital to 10,000,000*l.* : every species of gambling, fraud, and speculation was practised, and the public, at the demise of the queen, was burdened with a debt of 54,145,363*l.*, bearing an annual interest of 6*l.* 6*s.* 2*d.* per cent., or 3,351,358*l.*

George I. and his wise counsellors pursued a more salutary course, and applied themselves to remedy the evils done by their predecessors. The establishment of the sinking fund, and its inviolable application to its legitimate purposes during about ten years, had some effect in the reduction of the debt ; but a more powerful diminution of charge was effected through the growth of public confidence in the measures and integrity of the government, and the consequent fall in the rates of interest ; thus various stocks were reduced from six to five per cent., which economised the annual charge by 328,560*l.* Further reductions of interest were effected, which, ere the demise of George I., carried the total saving to 1,133,807*l.* Such were the beneficial results of a pacific policy, that the charge for the debt was reduced during this reign to 2,217,551*l.* and the capital to 52,092,235*l.*

During the early years of the reign of George II. the reductions continued ;—the debt in 1739, —the first year of war—being reduced to 46,954,623*l.* and the annual interest to 1,964,025*l.* The Spanish war, and the war of 1741, added 31,338,000*l.* to the debt, and about 1,760,000*l.* to the annual charge. During the eight years of peace which succeeded the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, some reduction was made in the capital stock ; but more important economy resulted from the well known operation of Mr. Pelham, 1752, by which 57,703,000*l.* four per cent. annuities were converted into a three per cent. stock : these measures effected an annual saving of charge to

the amount of 664,287*l.* In 1752 various stocks, amounting to 9,137,812*l.* were consolidated into a new stock, which forms the original capital of the three per cent. consolidated annuities. Retrenchment was, however, suspended by the operation of the seven years' war, which added 72,111,000*l.* to the national obligations, and carried the amount of debt at the peace of Paris, 1763, to 146,682,844*l.* and the annual charge to 4,840,821*l.* During twelve years of peace, which followed the treaty of Paris, the sinking fund effected some considerable reductions of debt. In 1766 and 1768 a large portion of the four per cents. and navy bonds were cancelled; in 1770 the three and a half per cents. were redeemed; and from 1772 to 1775, 2,500,000*l.* were paid off. These several reductions amounted in the latter years to 10,739,000*l.*, economising the annual charge by 364,000*l.* The rupture with America, and the wars against France, Spain, and Holland, brought with them a recurrence to the funding system; the credit of the government sunk, and the loans were contracted on ruinous terms for the public. The debt was increased between the years 1776 and 1783, by no less than 102,541,819*l.*, and the annual charge by 3,843,094*l.* The total capital at the peace of Versailles, 1783, being 238,484,870*l.*, and the annual charge 8,319,905*l.* Great as had been the increase of debt during this short period, its magnitude sinks into insignificance when compared with the increase which took place during the late wars.

Large increase of revenue, expenditure, and debt during the late wars.—At the commencement of the contest, the opinion prevailed that France, goaded by famine,—bereft of public credit,—distracted by revolution, and deficient in resources, could not effectually contend against the formida-

ble powers allied against her; and hence that the contest would be short and success complete. The events of the years 1794 and 1795, however, completely dispelled these illusive hopes, and left us in a war the most expensive on record.

The prosecution of the contest at its commencement being shaped upon this ill-judged estimate of the power of France, our efforts, during the first two years, were comparatively limited, the expenditure absorbing only a few extra millions, raised, not by taxes, but by loans. Subsequently, however, when the war assumed a more formidable aspect, taxes and loans immensely increased.

The following is an account of the money annually raised by taxes and loans, from 1793 to the peace of Amiens, 1802:—

Years.	Money raised		Total.
	By Taxes.	By Loans.	
	£	£	£
1793	17,170,400	4,500,000	21,670,400
1794	17,308,411	11,000,000	28,308,811
1795	17,858,454	18,000,000	35,858,454
1796	18,737,760	25,500,000	44,237,760
1797	20,654,650	32,500,000	53,154,650
1798	30,202,915	17,000,000	47,202,915
1799	35,229,968	18,500,000	53,729,968
1800	33,896,464	20,500,000	54,396,464
1801	35,415,096	28,000,000	63,415,096
1802	37,240,213	25,000,000	62,240,213
	263,714,331	200,500,000	464,214,731*

Thus, this ruinous war, besides doubling the amount of taxes, added two hundred and ninety-five millions to the national debt, although only about two hundred millions were paid into the Exchequer: on such unfavourable terms were the loans contracted. The total debt at the peace of Amiens, is estimated by Sinclair at 561,203,234*l.*, and the annual interest at 20,428,488*l.*; being an

* Hamilton's History of the National Debt, p. 157 to 259.

increase of about 250 per cent. during nine years of war.

Such was the growth of debt, revenue, and expenditure, during the ten years ending in 1802 : shewing a surprising expansion of income and disbursement, particularly after the year 1796, and surpassing in a very great degree the sacrifice in any previous contest. Yet this sacrifice, however large, was greatly exceeded during the war period of 1803 ; when our expenditure far outstripped all previous calculation, and augmented the debt to a sum which seriously threatens public credit.

The sums raised during the war of 1803, are as under :—

Years.	Money raised		Total.
	By Taxes.	By Loan.	
	£.	£.	£.
1803	37,677,063	15,202,931	52,879,994
1804	45,359,442	20,104,221	65,463,663
1805	49,659,281	27,931,482	77,590,763
1806	53,304,254	20,486,155	73,790,409
1807	58,390,225	23,889,257	82,279,985
1808	61,538,207	20,476,765	82,014,972
1809	63,405,294	23,304,691	86,709,985
1810	66,681,366	22,428,788	89,110,154
1811	64,763,870	27,416,829	92,180,699
1812	93,169,854	40,251,684	103,421,538
1813	66,925,835	54,026,822	120,952,657
1814	69,684,192	47,159,697	116,843,889
1815	70,403,448	46,087,603	116,491,051
	<u>770,962,331</u>	<u>388,766,925</u>	<u>1,159,729,256*</u>

The average annual revenue derived from taxes, during the first period of the war, appears, by the preceding accounts, to have been about 26,300,000*l.* and the expenditure 46,200,000*l.* The average annual income arising from taxation, during the thirteen years ending 1815, was about 59,300,000*l.*, and the expenditure something more than 89,000,000*l.*; adding 335,900,000*l.* to the debt, and carrying its total sum at the close of the war

* Hamilton's History of National Debt.

in 1815, to 864,822,441*l*.* A portion of the loan of 1815, not being required for the war, was appropriated to the repurchase of stock; hence, the amount of debt at the wind-up of the war expenditure in 1817, we find it to be 846,155,106*l*.†

Such is the maximum, to which the national debt, revenue, and expenditure of Great Britain have ever yet attained: what they may reach in future wars can only be known by results; but the present aspect of political affairs, joined to the extensive liquidation of debt since the peace, gives fair reason to hope, that they will not be surpassed in the present age.

Cost of the war.—The foregoing tables shew, that the total sums raised during the war period of twenty-three years, was about 1,624,000,000*l*.: to form an approximate estimate of the cost of the war, it is necessary to calculate what the expenditure of a peace establishment would have been, had the war been happily averted. The disbursements of the year 1792 amounted, in round numbers, to 16,000,000*l*.; hence, if in accordance with the subsequent increase of population, the union with Ireland, and the state of affairs in continental Europe, we carry the average annual expenditure to 19,000,000*l*., the excess of expenditure during the years 1793 to 1815, to be carried to the war account, will stand thus:—

Sums raised by loans and taxes during the period 1793 to 1815	£. 1,624,000,000
Deduct expenditure for twenty-three years, estimated at 19,000,000 per cent.	437,000,000
Excess of expenditure consequent on the war	<u>1,187,000,000</u>

This balance, however, by no means represents the sum expended in the increase of our naval and military establishments during the war period. From

* Debt of Ireland included.

† Parliamentary Papers.

the first year of the contest, but particularly after 1796, the annual disbursements were greatly swelled by the accumulation of the charge for the debt, and during several years the depreciation of the currency added largely to the nominal amount of the sacrifice. Hence, deducting on account of the accumulated interest of debt, an

Annual excess of about 14,000,000 <i>l.</i> per ann.	£.322,000,000
And for the depreciation of the currency	100,000,000

There remains to be deducted from the gross amount of the apparent sacrifice £.422,000,000

Deducting the amount *ut supra* from the total sum, the pecuniary sacrifice on account of the war stands thus :—

Excess of expenditure consequent on the war,	£.
as annexed	1,167,000,000
Deduct, as explained above	422,000,000

Being a clear sacrifice on account of the war £.745,000,000

It is difficult to reconcile the account of such sacrifices with the ability of the people to bear them. No people on the face of the globe, except the British, could have borne them; and even they must have sunk under such stupendous burdens, had they not been assisted and supported by the miraculous and Herculean power of *steam*!

We have already shewn the progressive growth of our debt and expenditure during the war; we now propose to notice the origin and operation of the sinking fund.

ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE SINKING FUND.

The loans raised for William III. were chiefly for a specific period; a large portion of them were in the shape of terminable annuities, and hence required no reserved fund for the extinction of the capitals. At the accession of the house of Hanover, the debt was considered so enormous, that its re-

duction was made a special object of parliamentary legislation. During the session of 1716, Sir Robert Walpole, by the advice of the Earl of Stanhope, proposed the institution of the sinking fund, and parliament passed certain resolutions, to the effect that the produce of certain taxes, after paying the interest on loans contracted on its security, should be inviolably applied to the redemption of the capitals; and that when the fund arising from the surplus had cancelled certain loans, it was to be applied to the liquidation of other debts; the resolutions were embodied in a Bill, 3 Geo. I. The energy displayed, and the unanimity with which this Act was passed, coupled with the pacific aspect of the times, augured its provisions inviolable.

In its infancy the fund was watched over with great care, and the necessity of the maintenance of its provisions was recommended in most of the speeches from the throne, and echoed in the addresses of the House of Commons. We have already noticed its effect, from 1716 to 1727. After the demise of the crown in 1727, the zeal of ministers for its inviolable application abated. In that year the rampart of the principle was broken down by Walpole, when, to insure the support of the landed interest, he reduced the land-tax; and, indeed, he seems at this time to have completely changed his views as to the merits of a public debt, and to have considered it a useful means of engaging the moneyed interest in support of the throne, against the attacks of the malcontents. Hence, in 1727, new loans were charged on the produce of the funds, and in 1734, 1,200,000*l.* were taken from it; in 1735 and 1736 it was anticipated and mortgaged; but in 1737 and 1738, it redeemed 3,000,000*l.* of stock. From 1739 to 1748 it was eclipsed by the operation of the war, but reappeared with greater force on the return to peace. In the year 1749 it received an

annual addition of 300,000*l.*, which was subsequently increased by the financial operations of Mr. Pelham to 600,000*l.*; and during the eight years of peace (1748 to 1756), it cancelled 3,700,000*l.* From 1756 to 1762 — years of war—it was inoperative; but on the return to peace effected some important reductions. (See table, page 530). From 1775 to 1783, the wars consumed *all funds*: in 1785, Mr. Pitt came to the helm of affairs, with the avowed determination of carrying *reform* into every department of the state, and to conform his policy to a *pacific* course. The reduction of the national debt was one of the first objects which engaged his philosophical meditations. The finance committee of 1786 reported that the clear surplus of the annual revenue over the expenditure was 900,000*l.*, which it was proposed to increase to 1,000,000*l.* by additional taxes. Mr. Pitt, charmed with the surprising discoveries of Dr. Price, that money, at compound interest, would increase at a more rapid ratio in the hands of the government than in the possession of subjects, determined that this annual million accumulating at compound interest should form a new sinking fund, to be applied to the reduction of the debt. Thus Parliament passed certain resolutions, to the effect that the surplus revenues should be invested in the names of certain commissioners, of whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the time being should be one; that the fund should be transferred to them by quarterly payments of 250,000*l.*, besides such other excess as might arise from the cessation of interest on redeemed stock, to be applied to the liquidation of debt. These resolutions were embodied in a Bill, which, amended by a few suggestions proposed by Mr. Fox and Mr. Pulteney, received the unanimous sanction of parliament. The operation of this enactment was to cancel stock during the six

years, 1787 to 1792, amounting to 9,279,460*l.* The operation of the fund to this extent was, however, only apparent—the expenses of preparing the armament against Spain, in 1788, limiting the actual reduction of the debt to 4,751,261*l.* All further reduction of debt was completely precluded, by the determination of Mr. Pitt, “to crush the hideous hydra of revolution in its birth:” the mockery of a sinking fund was, however, still retained during the wars, and the people were constantly *amused* with statements of millions annually redeemed on the *miraculous system* of Dr. Price. All delusion, however, as to the effect of the redemption of the debt vanishes before the startling fact, that between 1793 and 1815 upwards of 600,000,000*l.* were added to the sum of the national obligations.

Financial measures of the government since the peace.—The change in our financial and commercial condition at the peace was no less important than the transition in the political state of Europe. The war expenditure of the government, which had so long maintained in activity various branches of manufactures, ceased, and new channels of consumption were to be sought in the theatre of the wide world. The sea became the common property of nations, and “*our maritime rights*” no longer secured to us the monopoly of foreign markets. The competition of less taxed countries could only be met by a large reduction of prices, necessitating a corresponding fall in the rate of wages, and a depreciation of commercial profits. Taxation, which, during the era of high prices and depreciated currency, was little felt, now pressed with extreme rigour; and the people, to use Lord Castlereagh’s words, became “impatient of taxation,” energetically demanding an immediate adaptation of our burdens to our means.

This demand was promptly met by the relinquishment of the property and income tax, yielding an annual revenue of about 15,000,000*l*.^{*} Such a reduction was yet far from meeting the national demands, and ministers found all their endeavours ineffectual to give operation to the sinking fund. The rise in the price of the funds yet portended, that with a surplus revenue ministers would be enabled to effect their favourite project of redeeming the higher stocks. The sanction of a parliamentary committee seemed expedient for the imposition of new taxes: hence, the finance committee appointed in 1817 reported, in the following year, that the deficiency of revenue over expenditure amounted to 1,500,000*l*.; and resolved “that the finances of the country could not be established on a solid basis, until the annual income should exceed the expenditure by 5,000,000*l*.† The income of the following year produced a surplus of 2,000,000*l*. This, in conformity with the recommendation of the committee, parliament determined to increase by the imposition of new taxes on malt, spirits, tobacco, tea, and wool, to the amount of three millions, which were paid with great reluctance during the years of embarrassment which succeeded. The anticipated results were not fully attained until the year 1822, when the sinking fund became operative to the extent of nearly 5,000,000*l*. (See table, page 528). In the interval, the political aspect of Europe had been unfavourable to the rise of stocks; the troubles in Spain, Italy, and Greece creating alarm in the councils of established governments; but, in 1821 and 1822, circumstances, of which the most operative were large purchases of stock by the commissioners, and the reduction of the rate of interest

* The proposed partial continuance of this tax was rejected by a majority against ministers, 18th March, 1816.

† Finance Committee Report, 1818.

by the Bank, concurred to raise the price of the three per cents. to eighty; when the long sought opportunity of transferring the five per cents. into a stock of lower denomination was promptly seized by the government,—140,250,828*l.* five per cent. stock being cancelled by a new stock, amounting to 147,263,328*l.*, bearing an annual interest of four per cent. Thus the capital of the debt was increased 7,000,000*l.*, while the annual charge was diminished by 1,222,000*l.* This beneficial measure was nearly concurrent with a no less important financial operation—the commutation of a portion of the military and naval pensions, with the Bank, for an annuity for forty-four years; placing about 2,200,000*l.* at the disposal of the government during five consecutive years.

It is, perhaps, necessary to explain, that the half-pay and pensions, amounting in 1823 to about 6,000,000*l.*, had been, in 1818, calculated by Lord Castlereagh to diminish at the ratio of seven per cent. per annum. The actual diminution was, however, far less rapid, and relief appeared remote. The Bank agreed to pay 2,800,000*l.* per annum to the government, on account of these pensions, during five years, making a total payment of 14,000,000*l.*, on receiving an annuity of 585,740*l.* during forty-four years, from the 5th of April, 1823. Thus the annual relief during five years amounted to 2,215,000*l.* After that period, which terminated in 1828, the increase of burden became 585,740*l.* per annum over what it would have been had no contract been entered on; while, in comparison with the period of five years, the increase of burden is 2,800,000*l.**

The consequence of these combined operations was a reduction of taxes during the years 1822 and

* This, perhaps, is not strictly correct; a part of the funds received from the Bank were applied in cancelling stock, and in that case effected a change, of a permanent, for a terminable annuity.

1823, amounting to 6,000,000*l.* The beneficial effect on public credit was for a season deferred, by the threatening aspect of affairs in the Peninsula, and the doubt which prevailed as to the policy our government would adopt on the entrance of the French army into Spain. The three per cents., on the apprehension of war, fell to seventy-two; but, on the fixed determination of ministers not to interfere being known, they recovered, advancing in the spring of 1824 to ninety-three; and, in the summer of that year, attaining the very high rate of ninety-seven. Such an opportunity for financial operations was not suffered to escape; and the four per cents., amounting to 76,806,882*l.*, were converted into a three and a half per cent. stock of nearly the same amount, effecting an annual saving of 381,034*l.* The large remission of duties provided for in the session of 1825, came into operation with the commencement of the following year, concurring with commercial embarrassments to reduce the surplus income of 1826 below 1,000,000*l.*; thus essentially departing from the resolutions of parliament in 1819. After the embarrassments of 1825 and 1826, ministers seem to have felt the danger to which the finances of the state were exposed by the magnitude of the unfunded debt, and determined on creating a new four per cent. stock of ten millions, not redeemable until 1833, in lieu of a similar amount in exchequer bills. To this period the shadow of a sinking fund had been maintained, together with all the sophism of diminishing and increasing the debt at one and the same time. It is evident, that the only real sinking fund is the surplus of revenue over expenditure; and this simple truth becoming too well known for the continuance of the old system, the finance committee of 1828 recommended that the payments to the commissioners should in future be limited to the actual surplus of revenue

over expenditure, which they suggested should be maintained at 3,000,000*l.* per annum; parliament concurring with this recommendation, condemned this boasted monument of Mr. Pitt's genius, and in 1829 consigned it to oblivion. The year 1830 is distinguished as the period of the first financial operation under the new system—ministers succeeding in transferring the four per cents. of 1822 into a new stock, bearing three and a half per cent. interest, not redeemable for ten years; holders having the option of receiving 70*l.* per cent. of a new five per cent. stock, not redeemable until the 5th of January, 1869. This operation effected an annual saving of about 730,000*l.* and a small diminution of capital. The threatening aspect of the political state of Europe, during 1831 and 1832, prevented any further financial operations until the early part of the year 1833, when a saving of about 60,000*l.* was effected by a reduction of interest on exchequer bills.

The total saving by these various operations, and the reduction of the capital of the debt, from 5th January 1817, to 5th January 1832, will be seen by reference to the following statement of the comparative amount of, and charge for, the public debt, as it stood on the 5th January 1817 and 1832, as under:—

1817.	Debt of Great Britain and Ireland.	Total Debt.	Charge, including ter- minable Ann ^s .	Total Charge.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
Funded Debt . .	796,200,191	29,870,852	
Unfunded do. . .	49,954,913	2,051,242	
		846,155,104		31,922,094
1832.				
Funded Debt . .	755,543,884	27,647,452	
Unfunded do. . .	27,123,350	782,667,234	655,329	28,302,781
Total reduct ⁿ		63,487,870		3,619,313

We shall close this Section, by noting the particulars of the debt as it stood on the 5th January 1832, and a table of the fluctuations in the amount of the debt, and its charge from its origin to the present time.

PARTICULARS OF THE DEBT, AS IT STOOD ON THE
5TH JANUARY, 1832.

	£.	£.
3 per cent. Consolidated Ann.	348,017,532	
— Reduced ditto	123,604,712	
— Debt due to the Bank of Eng.	14,686,800	
— Debt to the S. S. Company	3,662,784	
— Old South Sea Annuities	3,497,870	
— New ditto	2,460,830	
— South Sea Annuities	523,100	
— Bank Annuities	876,049	
	<hr/>	497,329,677
3½ per cent. New 3½ per cent. Ann.	138,078,982	
— Reduced Annuities	63,386,707	
— 3½ per cents. 1818	12,553,755	
	<hr/>	214,019,444
4 per cent. Annuities 1826	10,804,595
5 per cent. ditto 1830	462,736
		<hr/>
Total Funded Debt of Great Britain		722,616,452

FUNDED DEBT OF IRELAND.

3 per cent. Consolidated Annuities	2,673,545	£.
— Reduced ditto	145,078	
	<hr/>	2,818,623
3½ per cent. Debentures Stock	14,520,904	
— New Annuities	11,672,700	
— Reduced ditto	1,277,768	27,471,372
4 per cent. Debt due to the Bank of Ireland		1,615,384
5 per cent. ditto ditto		1,015,384
— New Annuities 1830		6,661
		<hr/>
Total Funded Debt of Great Britain and Ireland		755,543,876
Exchequer Bills outstanding on 5 January, 1832		27,123,350
		<hr/>
Total Funded and Unfunded Debt of Great Britain and Ireland		£ 782,667,426

The particulars of the charge for interest and

management of the public debt, for the years ending 5th January, 1832, are as follows:—

	£.
Interest of Permanent Debt	24,027,666
Actual Payment for Terminable Annuities . .	1,844,498
Ditto for Life Annuities, and Annuities for terms of years	1,501,991*
Interest of Exchequer Bills	655,329
Management	273,296

Total Charge £ 28,302,780

The actual amount of money applied to the reduction of the national debt, since the peace, may be simply seen by the following table of the state revenue and expenditure in each year, from 1817 to 1832, after deducting allowances, discounts, bounties, drawbacks, &c. The years end on the 5th of January in the succeeding year:—

Years.	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficiency.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1817	57,560,589	58,559,036		998,447
18	59,667,941	57,903,559	1,764,342	
19	58,680,252	57,507,008	1,173,244	
20	59,769,680	57,618,891	2,150,789	
21	60,675,075	57,783,727	2,981,348	
22	60,102,741	55,187,222	4,915,119	
23	63,415,592	56,704,607	6,710,984	
24	64,775,865	58,188,062	6,587,802	
25	62,871,300	57,217,459	5,653,841	
26	60,282,374	59,272,925	1,009,448	
27	60,201,005	59,068,778	1,132,226	
28	60,473,738	54,623,565	5,850,169	
29	55,934,963	54,223,414	1,711,548	
30	54,932,290	52,018,217	2,913,673	
31	50,990,315	52,575,308		1,584,993
32	51,686,822	50,385,118	1,290,604	
			45,845,137	2,583,440
Deduct deficiency . . .			2,583,440	
Actual surplus in 16 years .			43,261,697	
Average annual surplus } since the peace . . . }			2,703,856	

* These annuities are terminable at various periods, and are classed as long annuities, life annuities, and annuities for terms of years; as a general average they may be calculated at about twenty-three years' purchase; nearly a moiety, or 1,331,339*l.*, expire A. D. 1860.

It is necessary to remark that the revenues of the years 1823, 1824, 1825, 1826, and 1827, were increased by the arrangement of the government with the Bank in 1822, by which the latter agreed to advance fourteen millions, in annual payments of 2,800,000*l.*, towards payment of the half-pay and pensions, on receiving an annuity of 585,740*l.* for forty-four years. As the account stands in 1834, this transaction is equivalent to a loan of nearly ten millions sterling; to which we must add the composition of about 1*s.* 4½*d.* in the pound, which the Austrians entered into with the British government, on claims of the latter, amounting to nearly thirty millions—this produced also two millions. Hence, deducting these twelve millions, the total surplus of revenue arising from taxes, applied since 1817 to the reduction of the debt, amounts to but 31,261,697*l.*, or an annual average of 1,953,856*l.*

On the other side is given a table, shewing at one view the fluctuations in the amount of the national debt, from its commencement to the present date.

TABLE, shewing the comparative increase and decrease of the National Debt, and the interest payable from the commencement to the present time :—

	Principal.	Interest.
National Debt at the Revolution	£. 664,263	39,855
Increase during king William's reign	15,730,439	1,271,087
	<hr/> 16,394,702	<hr/> 1,310,942
At the accession of queen Anne		
Increase during her reign	37,750,661	2,040,416
	<hr/> 54,145,363	<hr/> 3,351,358
At the accession of George I.		
Decrease during his reign	2,053,128	1,133,807
	<hr/> 52,092,235	<hr/> 2,217,551
Debt at the accession of George II.		
Decrease during twelve years' peace	5,137,612	253,526
	<hr/> 46,954,623	<hr/> 1,964,025
Debt at commencement of Spanish war, 1739		
Increase during the war	31,338,689	1,096,979
	<hr/> 78,293,312	<hr/> 3,061,004
At the end of Spanish war, 1748		
Decrease during eight years' peace	3,721,472	664,287
	<hr/> 74,571,840	<hr/> 2,396,717
Debt at commencement of seven years' war, 1756		
Increase during the war	72,111,004	2,444,104
	<hr/> 146,682,844	<hr/> 4,840,821
Debt at the peace of 1762		
Decrease during peace	10,739,793	364,000
	<hr/> 135,943,051	<hr/> 4,476,821
Debt at commencement of American war, 1775		
Increase during the war	102,541,819	3,843,084
	<hr/> 238,484,870	<hr/> 8,319,905
Debt at conclusion of American war, 1783		
Decrease during the ten years' peace	4,751,261	143,569
	<hr/> 233,733,609	<hr/> 8,176,336
Debt at commencement of war, 1793		
Increase during the war	295,105,668	12,252,152
	<hr/> 528,839,277	<hr/> 20,428,488
At peace of Amiens		
Increase during war of 1803	335,983,164	20,796,796
	<hr/> 864,822,441	<hr/> 41,225,284
Debt at peace of Paris		
Decrease since the peace	82,155,207	12,883,841
	<hr/> 782,667,234	<hr/> 28,341,443
Debt on 5 Jan. 1832		

* The amount of debt at the peace of Paris included the loan of 1815, part of which was applied to cancel stock. Moreau makes the debt on the 1st of February, 1817—848,282,479*l*. The interest also included nearly nine millions applied to the sinking fund.

SECTION II.—TAXATION.

Pressure of our public burdens.—The pressure of our public burdens, and a general review of British taxation, will form the subjects of the second section of this Chapter. The elucidation of the pernicious effects of taxation, especially when *peculiar* to a country, is found in the writings of every political economist: our remarks on this subject will be therefore brief. It is evident that, as the public revenues can only be drawn from the incomes of individuals, the greater the amount subtracted from them for state purposes, the greater must be the privation endured. During the war, high prices were supported by the monopoly of foreign trade, and the immense expenditure of the government; and as this expenditure was largely provided for, out of moneys raised by loans, the pressure of taxation was less burdensome. At the peace, however, this auxiliary ceased, and the prices of our manufactures were to be regulated by foreign competition.

As the value of a manufactured article represents the price paid for the labour in producing it, the value would naturally sink to the price of labour in that country where labour was the lowest; hence, since our manufacturers have been exposed to the competition of foreign manufacturing states. Wages in England have gradually tended to fall to the continental rates. The question, therefore, as to the pressure of our public burdens, naturally involves a comparison of the financial condition of England with that of the continental nations.

During the war, the pressure of pecuniary sacrifice was felt by every European state, but in no country was the sacrifice so great as in Britain; France, from deficient credit, possessed but little

facility of raising loans, or of carrying her expenditure greatly beyond her annual revenues; hence, her losses were immediate, and her sacrifices limited to the time being. Austria, Russia, Prussia, and the federal states of Germany,—felt, although in an unequal degree, the pressure of pecuniary sacrifice; but their want of credit precluded them from pledging their future resources: hence, the ulterior effect was less considerable. Not so, however, with Great Britain: by the miracle of her financial credit, and the wonderful success of the “system,” she was enabled “to raise fleets and armies by the stamp of her foot,” or the mere expression of her will, and to maintain them at an expense of 600 millions sterling, beyond her ordinary revenues, entailing an annual charge of 20,000,000*l.* on posterity; and proportionally augmenting the charges on production. The effect is seen in the comparative rise of prices. From 1793 to 1815, the average rise in the prices of provisions in Great Britain was about 60*l.* per cent. In France, says Mr. Lowe, the rise was scarcely 15*l.* per cent.,* and in the other states of Europe less.

The effect was naturally to create a disproportion in the charges on production, to diminish wages, depreciate commercial profits, discourage the investment of capital in commerce, restrict the means of employment, and encourage the emigration of talent and capital to other states, where the charges on production, and the price of the produce were more nearly poised. Such are naturally the effects of high taxation peculiar to a country—evils which were so severely felt in England during the first few years after the peace, and which must continue to be felt while the cause operates.

To moderate these consequences, no course is so suitable as to diminish by every possible means the charges on production, and to reduce the prices

* Present state of England.

of the necessities of life as near the level of continental markets as our circumstances will admit of. Such considerations lead us to review our present plan of taxation, which we preface with a few general principles.

Principles of Taxation.—We know of no plan of taxation which could with advantage be *universally* adopted. Financial systems, to be sound, must be adapted to the physical attributes of each particular country, which unerringly point out the most advantageous application of labour and capital; and as the private income of individuals is the only source from which the national exchequer can be *permanently* supplied, it is important to guard against the imposition of *any tax* which may impede the direction of labour and capital to the fittest and most advantageous branches of commerce and manufacture. For instance, in Portugal it would be contrary to principle to tax the cultivation of the vine, because in that country it is the most prolific source of income. In Italy, for the same reason, the cultivation of the olive should be free from tax; and in Mexico, taxes on the production of the precious metals should be avoided.* These productions, peculiar to states, form the most prolific sources of that national income which alone can feed the government exchequer, and hence, to impede or impair these sources is to diminish the *power* of contribution. Great Britain possesses especial attributes, which seem to characterise her as peculiarly adapted to manufacture raw materials into useful commodities. Hence it is contrary to principle to impose taxes on any materials used in manufacture, or to levy

* In this instance usage is against theory. Portugal taxes even the exportation of wine, and the Mexican and South American governments require twenty per cent. on all precious metals produced.

any tax which may impede the application of labour and capital to enlarge that fecund source of income. Taxes on land are impolitic, on the principle that they discourage the investment of capital in the cultivation and improvement of the soil. Taxes on property gradually diminish capital, and tend to drive from the nation, particularly in times of peace, capitals which would be productively employed at home. Possession, however, has frequently been held forth as a fair land-mark to direct a minister in his demands—and in the present day, the British minister seems to be a convert to the prevalent opinion of the propriety of imposing a modified tax on funded property, but the late failure of the attempt to tax the transfer of property, will at least defer the renewal of the proposal. The mere act of transferring property to another by sale or barter, in no degree increases the existing capital—there is no *new creation* of income, which only could serve as a *legitimate* source of revenue. It is true, by substituting this tax for others opposing the freedom of commerce, the capital may be replaced through another channel; but it is not the province of a statesman to use a *real* capital under the speculative hypothesis that the nation *may* replace it by other means.* Yet a property tax, at proper seasons, presents many recommendations, and is not to be universally rejected; for if means could be found of taxing large incomes, without the risks attaching to a general property tax, no impost would be more popular or less injurious in its various bearings. We defer discussing the policy of such a tax, and the means by which, in our opinion, it might be the most advantageously levied, for a future part of this chapter. In concluding these remarks, we may observe that in the collection of

* See Boileau on this subject—"Introduction to the study of Political Economy," pages 254-56.

revenue, the means of *acquiring* individual income should be unrestrained, and the national exchequer supplied by taxes on the expenditure of that income.—At the end of the volume we have placed tables of the British revenue and expenditure for the year ending 5th of January 1833, and shall now proceed to review the practical operation of the various taxes by which the British revenue is collected.

TAXES ON RAW MATERIALS.

Duties on cotton, sheeps' wool, hides, skins, &c.—These duties are in every sense opposed to sound principles of finance. The cotton manufacture, despite of all restrictions, produces an income of no less than 40,000,000*l.* per annum, from the expenditure of which the exchequer derives an annual revenue of about 7,000,000*l.* Exposed to powerful foreign competition, the prosperity of the cotton manufacture can only be maintained by our manufacturers continuing to produce a cheaper commodity than other countries. The levy of a paltry duty of 280,000*l.* per annum on the raw material, is to impair this prolific source of income. Much interesting evidence was adduced before the parliamentary committee on manufactures, commerce, and shipping, as to the effect of competition by the American, Austrian, French, and Swiss manufactures, and although it mainly tended to illustrate the great present superiority of the British cotton manufacture, it was no less conclusive as to the rapid advance of cotton manufactures elsewhere. The quantity of cotton spun in France, is 310 per cent. more in 1832 than in 1812. The quantity of the raw material consumed in 1833, is about equal to the quantity consumed in Britain in 1810. Austria and Switzerland have progressed in nearly a similar degree, and have become rather exporting than importing

nations of cotton manufactures; but it is from America that successful rivalry *may* be anticipated. During the year 1831, the quantity of cotton spun in the United States was no less than 67,000,000lbs.* and in the year ending 30th September, 1832, her exports of cotton goods amounted to 1,229,574 dollars. When we consider that this progress has been made during a period of about twenty years, we cannot be indifferent to such a power of competition: from the advantage of possessing the raw material at hand, and her contiguity to the South American states, it is probable that, at no very distant period, when, by the increase of population, the supply of labour shall become more abundant in the United States, that she will compete successfully in that part of the world with our manufacturers.

The importance of the woollen manufacture was so justly appreciated by our ancestors, that up to the year 1802, the importation of foreign wool was free of duty; and in order to insure our manufacturers a due supply of wool of home growth, and deprive the foreigner of its use, from a notion of its superior quality, the exportation was, in 1660, prohibited by a law which continued in force to the year 1825, when, from various reasons, of which perhaps the most fundamental are the admitted degeneracy of the quality of British wool, its inadaptation for the manufacture of cloth to suit the increased affluence of consumers, and by improved machinery, the prohibition has been removed, and considerable quantities of British wool have been exported, particularly to Belgium and France.†

* Mr. Ewart's speech in parliament, session 1833, on the cotton trade.

† The quality of wool is distinguished under two general terms—long and short wool. Softness of texture is also a quality of great importance. This, Mr. Bakewell has shewn, depends on the nature of the soil on which the sheep are fed: sheep pastured in chalky districts or light calcareous soils usually produce

The scarcity of the supply of fine wool was severely felt by our manufacturers during the latter years of the war, when, from the troubled state of Spain, hard wool; those pastured on loamy argillaceous soils produce on the contrary, soft wool. Hard wool is defective in felting properties. The evidence given before the Lords' Committee of 1828, is conclusive as to the deterioration of the quality of British wool during the last thirty years. During this period, the farmer has disregarded the *quality* of wool in his attempt to increase its *quantity*, and improve the size of sheep. Sheep that are kept lean usually produce the finest wool; and Mr. Fison, in speaking of the progress made in improving the size of the sheep and quality of the carcass, says, "twenty-five years ago Norfolk sheep produced two and a half pounds to the fleece; now they produce three to three and a half pounds. In 1790, out of fifteen tods of wool, weighing 420 pounds, 200 pounds were prime; now the same quantity gives but fourteen pounds prime." Mr. Luccock, in his Treatise on British Wool, says, "that in 1800, 26,148,000 sheep (the estimated number in England and Wales) produced 384,000 packs of wool, of 240 pounds each:" and Mr. Hubbard, of Leeds, says, "supposing Mr. Luccock's estimate of the number of sheep to be correct, they produce, at the present day, 463,169 packs." The increased weight of the fleece is evident, and it seems to be admitted, that the deterioration of quality is in the same proportion. The Herefordshire sheep, which are kept lean, produce finer wool than any other breed in England, and their fleece did not in 1800 exceed one and a half pound in weight. Different modes prevail as to scouring and washing the sheep: the Spanish comes to the manufacturer more pure and clean than the English wool. The former loses in the manufacture about forty-eight pounds in 240, while the loss in the latter is seventy pounds. Within the last year or two, various English farmers have discontinued the practice of washing the sheep before shearing, and the impurity of the wool is much increased. It is, however, considered that the grease remaining in the wool preserves its indigenous quality. Since the restrictions on the exportation of British wool have been removed, the quantity exported has been rapidly increasing. During the year 1833, the quantity exported was as under:—

	lbs.
To Germany	8,428
Holland	173,172
Belgium	3,273,498
France	1,424,208
Portugal, the Azores, and Madeira .	144
British American Colonies . . .	884
The United States	105,214
Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, and Man	6,562

Total 4,992,110 lbs.

imports from that country became difficult: concurrent with the decline of importations from the Peninsula, a new source of supply sprung up in Saxony and the Austrian states.* Circumstances seemed to dictate to every manufacturing state the policy of encouraging by every means the produc-

* In the early part of the present century, the King of Spain, Charles IV., presented to the late king (then elector of Saxony) a small flock of merino sheep. These were husbanded with great care, and every effort made to nationalize the breed in Germany, and improve the quality of the fleece. The first attempts made were not propitious as to the entire preservation of the quality of the wool, and but little attention was paid to the subject in the neighbouring states. By the great injury done to the Spanish flocks during the Peninsular war, the price of fine wool greatly increased, and it was found that a slight improvement in the quality of German wool would add very considerably to its value. Thus the practice of housing the sheep was adopted, together with a change in the food—corn being given to them during the greater portion of the year. In 1812, a small parcel of German wool, weighing twenty-eight pounds, was imported into this country; and the quality being approved, larger supplies were sought at high prices, when the peace of 1814 opened a more intimate international communication. On the continent, the growth of fine wool, which rapidly progressed in Saxony, began to excite the emulation of the landholders in the neighbouring states, and the merino breed of sheep spread rapidly in Silesia, Bohemia, and other parts of the Austrian dominions, where the same care was manifested in improving, or rather preserving, the quality of the fleece. In 1814, the supplies of wool from Germany became large, being no less than 3,432,456 pounds. Every year brought an accession of supply, and in 1825 no less than 28,799,661 pounds were imported into British ports. The mania for speculation in that year had, however, induced a larger import than the quantity annually produced warranted, and in the years 1826-7-8, the quantity brought from Germany was less. In 1833, the imports amounted to 25,370,106 pounds; which, being the fair proportion of the clip exported, seems to offer a rational presumption that the supplies in future years will expand. This extension of the growth of fine wool in Germany seems concurrent with the diminution of its growth in the Peninsula, on which we were formerly dependent. The British imports of Spanish wool in 1800 amounted to 7,794,748 pounds, and in 1814, to 9,234,991 pounds. Since this, the dawning year of the import of German wool, the quantity imported from Spain has rapidly declined; being in 1827, 4,349,643 pounds; and in 1833, 3,339,150 pounds. Thus German and Australian wool (of which latter description we shall presently speak), has, to a great extent, superseded the use of

tion of wool in these countries, but so completely destitute of commercial intelligence were our government, even at this late period, that in 1819 it authorised Mr. Vansittart (Lord Bexley) to pro-

Spanish wool. The German is *softer* than the Spanish wool, and superior to it in felting qualities. New competitors, in the persons of the Australian wool growers, have lately acquired, or rather are rapidly acquiring, power to dispute the monopoly of the Germans in the British market. In 1795, a small flock of sheep, not exceeding a dozen, was brought to the colony from the Cape of Good Hope, by Captain Waterhouse. This was the nucleus from which the large flocks of Australian sheep have spread over that country. A part of the first flocks fell into the hands of Captain Mc Arthur, who also purchased some of his Majesty's flock of merino sheep, which were sold at Windsor in 1804. These, at a great cost, were conveyed to Australia, and planted that source of wealth in the colony which begins, in the present day, to be so happily manifested. In 1806, the first importation of wool from that quarter of the world reached England: the quantity was 245 pounds. For several years little progress was made in the supplies, and in 1821 the quantity imported was only 74,284 pounds; in 1825 it was 325,995 pounds; in 1828, 1,603,512 pounds; and in 1833, no less than 3,516,869 pounds; surpassing the quantity received from Spain in the same year by about 200,000 pounds. Great progress has also been made in the *quality* of Australian wool: until within the last three or four years it came extremely *foul*—we doubt whether this term applies to wool—and the loss of weight in the process of scouring was very large. The wool was also unsightly, and discouraged manufacturers in experimenting on its use; but we are assured, that those manufacturers who used it were very generally agreeably surprised by results. A gentleman in the foreign wool trade assures us, that the woollen manufacturers have frequently admitted to him that they had, on their first purchases of Australian wool, totally misjudged its quality, and that in use it proved infinitely superior to their estimate of it in the rough state. Lately the quality has been better known, and the best judges now admit that the first qualities of Australian wool are superior to any that Germany can produce. By recent improvements in machinery, manufacturers are enabled to use *short* wool for those purposes which formerly required long or combing wool; and the short being of finer texture than the long wool, they have been enabled to substitute foreign for British wool, and thus greatly improve the quality of the manufactured article. Some supplies of wool have lately arrived from the Barbary coast and Egypt, but the quality is so inferior, and hence the price obtained so low, that in its present state no encouragement is offered to the extension of its cultivation.

pose to parliament, as a boon to the landed interest, the increase of the duty on foreign wool to sixpence per lb. Our manufacturers felt severely this increased tax ; but so necessary was the use of foreign wool, that the imports, despite of this restriction, did not diminish, while the stock of British wool continued largely to increase. The importance of the use of foreign wool to our manufactures is seen by reference to the evidence adduced before the Lords' Committee of 1828-9 :—

Mr. Gott, a cloth manufacturer of Leeds, being asked, could you carry on the export trade to the same extent as at present, if you manufactured cloth entirely of English wool ?

Ans.—In certain descriptions of cloth I could not make an article, that would be merchantable, either in the home or foreign market, *except from foreign wool*. The same gentleman further remarked, if two pieces of cloth which cost 10s. per yard were made, one of British and the other of foreign wool, the former would remain on hand, while the latter would find a purchaser.

Mr. Francis, of Haytesbury, says, there is *no demand* for cloth made of *British wool*, it is principally applicable to the manufacture of blankets, baize, &c.

On the strength of this and other evidence, parliament reduced the import duty on foreign wool to *one penny* per lb., at which it remains at the present day. According to Mr. Stevenson's calculations, which are usually considered more accurate than those of most statistical writers, the number of persons employed in the woollen manufacture approximates 500,000, and the annual value of the manufacture to 18,000,000*l.* ; if we calculate the average rate of tax on the expenditure of the income at sixteen per cent., the exchequer derives an annual revenue from the woollen manufacture of about 2,800,000*l.* Now to restrict the growth of this prolific *source* of revenue by a duty of one penny per lb., or about 120,000*l.* per annum on the import of the raw material, is as *impolitic* as it is *paltry*. Our superiority in woollen manufacture is by no means confirmed ; and the advantage which the French, Belgian, and German manufacturers possess in having the raw

material more nearly at hand, enables them to maintain a successful competition with the British manufacturer. We are aware that this duty is defended on the ground of encouraging the growth of fine wools in the Australian colonies, such an argument however should find no weight with the legislators of a manufacturing country ; but, if such a demand could be maintained, it would be far better to pay the Australian wool growers a bonus of one penny per lb. on wool imported, payable out of the state revenues, than continue to charge the tax on the British manufacturer.

The annual revenue collected on foreign hides and skins, although small, (26,000*l.*), is extremely pernicious in operation. The increase in the price of British hides is just commensurate with the duty charged on foreign, so that the tax on consumers is at least ten times the sum paid into the exchequer ; hence the repeal of the leather duty has but little benefited the consumers. This tax is a link in that system of what is called *protection* to agriculture, taxing one part of the community to give to another ; the gradual abolition of which ought long since to have commenced.

Timber duties.—Of the impolicy of these duties, as they at present appear in the British tariff, none are more convinced than the present members of his Majesty's government. Subject to the competition of other countries possessing large tracts of forest land in the vicinity of commercial shipping ports, our merchants, from great insufficiency of timber of home growth, are obliged to obtain supplies from their very opponents in navigation, while heavy charges on transport concur to impose a serious obstacle to successful rivalry. To aggravate this disadvantage by a tax of 1,300,000*l.* per annum on the importation of timber, is to place us on a footing of inferiority, quite incompatible with that due encouragement to Bri-

tish shipping, which principles both commercial and political so strongly recommend. But, independent of general objections to the timber duties, the mode in which they are levied is highly objectionable.*

Previous to 1810 our supplies of timber were usually drawn from Norway, Sweden, and the Baltic ports. In the year 1809, no less than 428,000 tons of British shipping were employed in bringing timber from the north of Europe, and in exporting British merchandise in return, the value of which amounted on an average of three years, to 900,000*l.* per annum.† The increase of the British demand for timber, and the little progress made by the northern nations in manufacturing means, promised a large extension of this mutually beneficially intercourse. Instead, however, of this trade being left to its course of improvement, the government, at the instigation of the shipping interest and the Canadian merchants, determined to destroy it. These gentry represented to ministers the possibility of impediments to the Baltic trade, through the operation of Buonaparte's continental system, and the great advantages of encouraging the application of British capital and labour, in gathering and preparing the timber of the Canadas; they did not fail to impress on

* The entire list of the comparative scale of duties payable on foreign and colonial timber, is too long to be given at length.—A short comparison will shew the advantage given to Canadian timber:—

	Baltic. £.	British American. £.
Deals, per 120.		
Not exceeding 16 feet long and 3¼ inches thick }	19	2
Battens.		
Exceeding 21, and not 45 feet long, or exceeding 2¾ inches thick }	20	2
Not exceeding 16 feet long, and 2¾ inches thick . . . }	10	1

† Edinburgh Review, No. LXVI.

ministers, that Canada being more distant than Norway and Sweden, a greater amount of shipping, and a larger number of sailors would be employed, if the competition of Norway and Sweden were restricted by a large increase of duty, and supplies of timber thus encouraged from the Canadas. Upon these sagacious recommendations, ministers, who had already shewn their utter ignorance of commercial principles, by enacting the blockade system, determined (sess. 1809-10) on repealing the import duties on Canadian timber, and doubling those on Baltic timber. In 1813, a time when our trade to the north of Europe was beyond the probability of interruption, the Canadian merchants prevailed on ministers to enlarge their monopoly, by the imposition of a new duty of 25 per cent. on the importation of Baltic timber. This new Act completely annihilated the British trade with Norway and Sweden, and condemned the British people to pay for timber of the very worst quality, more than double the price at which they could have imported the finest timber of Europe, had no restrictions been imposed : thus, our exports of manufactures to these countries has almost entirely ceased, amounting in 1830 to no more than 104,400*l*.

It is no less sound in theory, than true in practice, that legislative enactments, purporting to force certain branches of trade into particular channels, are either inoperative or detrimental. Trade, *when free*, never fails to attach itself to those places where it can be conducted with the best advantage, and did Canada possess superior attractions for the employment of capital in the timber trade, the influx and reflux of the commercial tide would naturally operate between the shores of Britain and the steeps of the St. Laurence, without any British statutes vainly attempting to direct it. But, the capacity of America, for the successful prosecution of the timber trade, is infinitely

inferior to that of the Baltic countries. The memorial of the Canadian merchants to parliament in 1830, expressive of their fears as to any interference with their monopoly, contended that the yellow deals of Canada were of unrivalled quality; but, against this assertion, is opposed the experience of the best judges of timber, proving that the American timber perishes in about one-third the time that Norwegian and Baltic timber does. On this point, we refer to the evidence of Sir Robert Seppings, before the parliamentary committee of 1829, on the timber trade :—

Q. Can you state to the committee the result of any observations, you or other persons in his majesty's employ have made, on the comparative durability of the timber of North America, and of timber of the north of Europe?

A. About 1796 there were a considerable number of frigates built of fir from the Baltic, their average durability was about eight years. About 1812 there were a considerable number of frigates built of fir, the growth of North America, their average durability was not half that time.

Q. You have stated American timber to be particularly subject to the dry rot, and dry rot is known to have prevailed to a great extent in the navy?

A. I believe the navy has suffered very considerably, from the introduction of the use of Canadian timber, or timber the growth of North America; and, in consequence *from experience*, we have entirely discontinued the use of it, except for deals, (decks) and masts.

It would be useless to multiply the citations of evidence as to the inferiority of Canadian, compared with Baltic timber; every builder and practical carpenter will bear evidence of the great inferiority of modern buildings in consequence of the use of it. But, in the face of the inferiority in the quality of the Canadian timber, the cost of the importations actually exceed by about 1,200,000*l.* per annum the sum which would procure the same quantity from the Baltic, operating as so much additional tax on the British people, chargeable to the debit account of the American colony. Well might Mr. Powlett Thomson observe, with reference to this trade, that it would be better to pay the freightage of the ships employed,

though they but cruised about the Atlantic in ballast, than continue subject to the disadvantage of employing them in the conveyance of timber from Canada to Britain.*

The argument of those who resisted in 1831 the proposal of ministers, progressively to assimilate the duties on American and European timber, on the principle, that Canada purchases annually British manufactures to the amount of 2,000,000*l.*, which she is only enabled to pay for by her exports of timber,—ceases to hold good, when the merits of the American trade are fairly developed.

Our Custom-house returns shew a favourable balance of trade between Great Britain and the colony, amounting to about 1,000,000*l.* per annum; but all who know any thing of the American commerce, are fully aware that this trade is very little else than an indirect trade with the United States, and, in some instances, with continental Europe. Our importations of timber are in a great degree supplied by the United States, although professing to be the production of the Canadas.

The large premium which our tariff offers to the clandestine trader, has not only caused the timber of the Union, destined for the English market, to be floated to the Canadian side of the St. Laurence, but has also caused large shipments of European timber, intended for English ports, to be first sent round about Cape Breton. This may be discredited by our readers, but by a return lately made to parliament, it appears that, in 1831, 1832, and 1833, no less than twenty-eight vessels, measuring 7172 tons, from the north of Europe, entered the ports of British America with cargoes of timber, (chiefly fir). The success which attends this trade led last year to its rapid increase; in 1831 and 1832, the number of ships was only five,

* Speech in parliament, session 1830.

but in 1833, the number increased to twenty-three. To suppose that this importation of timber from Europe is for the use of the colony is absurd ; the whole is imported into England at the low scale of duties. The British manufactures exported to the Canadas are by no means consumed in the colony, or paid for by colonial produce. The immense extent of the northern frontier of the United States, measuring with its inflections about 2800 miles, stretching across the peninsula of Arcadia, along the St. Laurence and the great lakes, to the Lake of the Woods and the Red River, in latitude about 104 west—renders the prevention of contraband trade impossible, and the high duties imposed by the Congress on the importation of foreign manufactures, cause a large portion of the trade between this country and the United States to be carried on through Canada and New Brunswick ; thus this valuable export trade, instead of being remunerated by the timber of the Canadas, is actually supported by those of its rival, the shipments being paid for by the cotton, rice, tobacco, &c., of the United States, and would continue of nearly the same extent were the monopoly of the timber trade abolished. Thus the British people are taxed 1,200,000*l.* per annum, to secure the colony—an imaginary benefit, which is chiefly enjoyed by a foreign state.

The Act which instituted the prohibitory system in 1810, expired in the year 1820, when, with a few modifications, it was renewed. During the session of 1831, ministers attempted to relax the prohibitions to our trade with the Baltic, and were unhappily left in a minority on the plea of the necessity of protecting vested interests. Surely the people cannot permit themselves to be taxed 1,200,000*l.* per annum, *ad infinitum*, and obliged to purchase inferior timber, for the sole benefit of the Canadian monopolists. The time cannot be

distant when the people will see the extent of the evil, and urge the legislature to meet the interests of all parties, by a fair adjustment of the duties on timber the produce of all countries.

American alkali.—We should not notice this tax, which yields a paltry revenue of about 6000*l.* per annum, were it not in a great measure connected with the foregoing subject. Pot, or pearl ashes, the produce of the United States, Russia, or other foreign parts, are charged with an import duty of 5*l.* per ton, while the same commodity imported from the Canadas is admitted duty free; thus the Canadian merchant obtains 5*l.* per ton more for his produce than the United States merchant, being the difference of the import duty. The quantity of this article annually imported from the Canadas amounts to about 14,000 tons, and for which the British people pay 70,000*l.* in advance of what they would do if the trade were placed on terms of equality. It is clear that to collect 6000*l.* occasions an annual waste of property to the extent of 70,000*l.*, a sum which might be rendered available to the British exchequer by placing Canadian alkali, which is inferior to that of the United States, on the same scale of duty; or if a duty on the article is deemed impolitic, then the abolition of the paltry tax of 6000*l.* in American ashes would be a relief of taxation to the extent of 76,000*l.* Surely the alternative ought to be adopted. Our space is too limited to discuss in detail the various duties charged on raw materials, the principles upon which we should advocate their repeal, will be fully understood by the tenor of the foregoing remarks.

EXCISE DUTIES.

Malt.—The first head of revenue collected by the excise is the duty on malt. In reference to

this duty, we shall merely express a hope that, while large revenues are indispensable, the government will concur in no reduction of the tax, unless accompanied with the abandonment of all restriction to the free importation of foreign grain.*

British spirits.—Spirituous liquors have by all governments, and at all times, been held to be fair objects for taxation, their consumption being viewed as tending to demoralize the people and to induce the expenditure of income in a course replete with vicious indulgence. These consequences admitted, there is no sterling objection to the imposition of such a rate of tax which, while yielding a fair revenue to the state, offers no alluring boon to the clandestine trader to brave the laws and defy their authority. Such a tax has, however, usually been inadequate to meet the avidity of state financiers; and upon the plea of improving the revenue of the nation, and the morality of the people, those high rates of duty have been levied, which in operation have *invariably* depressed both.

The appetite for fermented spirits is nearly as universal as the appetite for bread. The civilized European, and the barbarous Hottentot; the hunter tribes at the sources of the Missouri and the torpid Indians on the banks of the Irawaddy, alike manifest their inclination for ardent spirits; all efforts of governments to diminish this appetite have invariably proved abortive; and when high duties have been imposed with this view, the effect has been to transfer a large portion of the trade from the legal distiller to the clandestine trader, and thus to superadd the atrocities of the smuggler to the idle-

* Up to a late period the acts relative to malting were extremely vexatious and complex, and the penalties they imposed numbered no less than 106: by a recent act of parliament, the laws relative to malting have been greatly simplified; but the methods they still prescribe are a great hindrance to improvement in the process.

ness and dissipation of the drunkard ; we could cite various instances where such effects have been produced in this country, but shall confine ourselves to one forcible illustration. About a century since, drunkenness and dissipation had alarmingly increased, and the higher orders, particularly the clergy, demanded with great earnestness legislative measures to restrain the vicious appetite of the people. In 1736, Sir Robert Walpole's ministry determined to make a vigorous effort to check the evil, or rather to root out the consumption of spirituous liquors : with this view, parliament imposed a duty of 20s. per gallon on British spirits, a large increase of the duty on licenses, an extension of the penalties against those who should vend any spirits that had not paid the high duty, and offered alluring rewards to informers. The Act gave great satisfaction to the moralists, and was hailed as a certain prelude to the elevation of the national character ; yet the results proved quite different. The energies of the smuggler were immediately roused, and the respectable part of the spirit trade, unable to meet the competition of the clandestine operators, withdrew from the trade ; leaving it in the hands of a class, who, having little to lose and much to gain, were not deterred by the dread of penalties from prosecuting their illegal commerce. Informations loaded the tables of the revenue boards, fines, convictions, and committals to prison exceeded all bounds, and stirred up that indignation in the public mind which totally negatived all the efforts of the government.* The cause of the smuggler became that of the people, informers were cruelly treated by the populace ; and the revenue officers, openly assaulted in London and other great towns, became afraid to do their duty ; drunkenness continued to progress, and the moral

* Upwards of 12,000 persons were in less than two years convicted of offences connected with the sale of spirits.

condition of the people to sink—within two years after the passing of the law it became a dead letter, and Lord Cholmondeley stated in the House of Lords that 7,000,000 gallons of spirits were consumed in London and the parts adjacent, of which scarcely a gallon came to the charge.* At length the government were obliged to retrace their steps, and in 1742, in the face of great opposition from the bishops, the high duties were abolished, and moderate imposts levied.† The greatest success followed this enactment; the trade returned into its accustomed channel; the illicit distiller curtailed his operations, and turbulence and inebriety were no longer subjects of complaint. High duties on spirits from this time formed no part of the financial plans of the government until after the commencement of the late wars, when from the necessity of raising large revenues, the duties were progressively increased to 11s. 4½*d.* per gallon; the quantity charged with duty decreased *pari passu* with the increase of the rate of duty; but in 1819, Mr. Vansittart, disregarding all former results, raised the duty to 13s. 2¼*d.* per gallon. Clandestine distillation increased to a great extent, and every effort of the government to repress the trade of the smuggler proving ineffective, a return to a moderate scale of duties seemed the only course open. The Parliamentary Committee of 1824 stated that the high duty enabled the distiller to fix the price of spirits, and to raise it to the consumer much above the rate sufficient to make a fair return for the expenses of manufacture. This opinion of the Committee was, however, founded on no sufficient evidence, and we believe the latter section of it to be erroneous; it estimated the consumption of British spirits in England and Wales at 5,000,000 gallons, of which only 3,700,000 paid

* Timberland's Debates, vol. viii. p. 146.

† See Rapin's History of England, vol. viii. p. 258.

the legal duties, and recommended a reduction of the tax as the only effectual means of protecting the revenue. Thus, in 1825, ministers decided on reducing the duties on spirits consumed in England, from thirteen shillings and twopence farthing to seven shillings per gallon; and, in March, 1825, Mr. Robinson (Lord Ripon), in his brilliant exposé of the financial condition of the state, fully justified the course which the government had thought proper to adopt.

The result of the various alterations of duty in the productiveness of the tax, will be seen by reference to the subjoined table of the quantity of English spirits charged with duty, and the number of gallons of Irish and Scotch imported into England, and charged with the English rate of duty, from 1818 to 1834.

Average of years ending 5th January.	English made spirits charged with duty.	Imported into England from Scotland. Ireland.		Total spirits charged with duty.	RATES OF DUTY.	
					English and Scotch.	Irish.
	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.	Gallons.	s. d. Gns.	s. d. Gns.
1818 to 19	3,542,616	1,496,086	6,029	5,034,741	11 0 $\frac{1}{4}$	11 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{2}{3}$
1820—21	2,630,741	1,035,506	237,134	3,903,381	From June 8, 1819.	
1822—23	2,705,498	1,041,388	386,295	4,133,181	12 7 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 2 $\frac{1}{2}$
1824—25	2,323,343	880,229	585,837	3,789,409	.	.
1826	1,910,822	953,252	279,439	2,436,513	.	.
1827—28	3,330,332	2,957,044	756,899	7,044,275	From Jan. 5, 1826.	
1829—30	3,917,613	3,119,096	693,966	7,730,275	7 0	7 0
1831—32	4,050,617	.	.	7,583,074	.	.
1833	3,797,084	2,359,618	1,062,198	7,218,900	From Mar. 15, 1830.	
1834	.	.	.	7,717,304	7 6	7 6

Nothing can more fully justify the reduction of duty made in 1826 than the foregoing statement. The number of gallons of spirits charged with duty, during the four years ending 1830, is more than double the quantity charged during the four years ending 1826; and, notwithstanding a re-

duction of duty of forty-eight per cent., the actual revenue collected is about 250,000*l.* per annum in favour of the latter period. Doubtless the quantity of spirits brought to the charge would have continued to increase, from 1830 to the present time, but the injudicious augmentation of duty in that year, although small, roused the slumbering energies of the smuggler, and invited him to participate in the profits of the government. Thus, during the latter three years, the quantity charged with duty has diminished, while the quantity consumed has so largely increased, that parliament thought proper, during the present session, to appoint a special committee to inquire into the causes of the prevailing drunkenness.

The impolicy of attempting to collect high rates of duty on spirits is, if possible, more strongly illustrated in reference to Ireland and Scotland. Up to 1811, the local duty on home-made spirits in Ireland and Scotland was two shillings and sixpence per gallon, being the utmost limit that the article could bear: subsequently it was increased to five shillings and sixpence, when it became impossible to give effect to the law—the quantity charged with duty in Ireland, which in 1811 was 6,500,361 gallons, becoming in 1822 2,950,647 gallons, while the consumption was estimated by the parliamentary committee of that year at ten millions of gallons.*

The strongest measures were resorted to by the government to suppress the illicit trade, and collect the high rates of duty; the severest penalties attached to the detected smuggler; and, in order to interest proprietors in the suppression of contraband trade, a heavy fine was imposed on any district or parish wherein an illicit still should be discovered; but, instead of the laws effecting the intended object, they filled the country with blood-

* See Fifth Report of the Revenue Commissioners.

shed and anarchy, and raised open defiance to the officers who attempted to do their duty. The Reverend Mr. Chichester, in his pamphlet on the Irish Distillery Laws, says, "the Irish system seems formed for perfecting smuggling and anarchy; it has culled the evils of both savage and civilized life, and rejected all the advantages they contain." Sir Hussey Vivian, lately commander of the cavalry in Ireland, bears evidence to the harassing services imposed on the troops in the ineffectual endeavours to suppress smuggling.* Mr. Hay Forbes, deputy sheriff of Perthshire, in his letter to the revenue commissioners (1822), speaks forcibly of the incalculable evils resulting from a high rate of duty on spirits: he says—"The Irish system is progressing rapidly in Scotland; the excise officers dare not do their duty, and smuggled whiskey is carried off by armed bands, in open defiance of the revenue officers." In proof of the prevalence of smuggling, Captain Munro, of Teainnich, in a letter to the committee, says, that at Tain, where there are twenty licensed public houses, not *one* gallon of spirits has been received within the last twelve months, with a regular permit from a licensed distillery. Upon the whole current of evidence, the committee, in 1822, recommended that the local duties on Irish and Scotch spirits should be reduced from five shillings and sixpence to two shillings; or, calculated by the imperial measure, from 6*s.* 7*d.* to 2*s.* 4*d.*; which recommendation was adopted by parliament in the Bill of 1823. The result of the alteration of the duty, in enlarging the quantity taxed, is shewn in the subjoined table.

* See speech in Parliament, Session 1829.

	Scotland.		Ireland.	Scotland and Ireland.
Average of Qrs. 5th Jan.	Spirits charged with duty for local consump.	Rate of Duty.	Spirits charged with duty for local consumption.	Total quantity charged in Scotland and Ireland.
	Imp. Gallons.	Imp. Gallon.	Imp. Gallons.	
1819—20	1,931,765	6s. 7d. $\frac{20}{23}$	3,184,345	5,126,110
1821—22	1,985,739	—	2,642,445	4,638,184
1823	2,970,556	—	2,328,387	4,407,943
		From Oct. 10, 1823.		
1824—25	3,283,470	2s. 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ d.	4,569,409	7,852,879
		July 5, 1826.		
1826—27	4,989,864	2s. 10d.	8,048,804	13,037,668
1828—29	5,223,989	—	9,099,148	14,323,137
		March 15, 1830.		
1830—31	5,874,686	3s. 4d.	9,146,908	15,021,694
1832—33	5,596,378	—	8,619,706	14,216,084
* 1834	5,982,920	—	8,136,281	14,129,201

Thus, after the alteration of the duties in 1823, the quantity of spirits charged with duty in Ireland was about double that of the preceding year, the low profit afforded to the illicit trader being insufficient to remunerate him for the great expense of hiring bandittos, to oppose the civil power, &c.—receded from the contest; and, in the year 1828, the quantity of spirits brought under the excise charge increased to 9,937,633 gallons, being nearly adequate to the consumption, as estimated by the revenue commissioners; Ireland became comparatively tranquil, and rapidly progressed in her course of improvement. Unhappily, in 1830—Mr. Goulburn resolving to renew the experiment of increasing the duties on spirits—an additional sixpence per gallon was charged. The effect was almost immediate, not merely as regards the

* By the 6th Geo. IV., a drawback of 1s. 2d. per gal. was allowed on all spirits made entirely from malt in Scotland or Ireland: this drawback is claimed on nearly five-sixths of the total quantity of spirits made and consumed in Scotland; but in Ireland the drawback is seldom claimed. During the year 1833 about 54,000 gallons of potatoe spirits were imported from Guernsey and Jersey. It is admitted on the same terms as Irish and Scotch spirits, and excites a great deal of jealousy on the part of the British distillers; upon the plea that it is made from grain and malt, which latter commodity is free of duty in these islands.

revenue, but as applying to the moral condition of the country. The smuggler with his destructive hirelings again appeared in array against the civil power, the quantity of spirits charged with duty gradually diminished, being in 1831, 8,635,081 gallons; 1832, 8,594,331 gallons; and, in 1833, 8,136,281 gallons; and it is supposed by those who are well acquainted with the positive condition of Ireland, that the smuggler is supplying about one-third of the consumption. This diminished revenue arising from Irish spirits is yet of very inconsiderable importance, compared with the lawless turbulence which the increase of contraband distillation has so greatly tended to foment; but compare the state of Ireland in 1829-30, with its state in 1833, when parliament found themselves under the reluctant necessity of doing violence to their professions of free government and political liberty, by sanctioning the noxious Bill for the suppression of the villanies of the predatory Irish; but consider, even in a financial view, the heavy expense entailed on the British exchequer, to give effect to a system of coercion, and then ask whether it was wise to foment disorders by increasing the premium on illicit distillation. We have no hesitation in saying, that the government must at least repeal the duties imposed in 1830, and since new forces have been set in action by the operation of that Act, it is very questionable whether such a reduction will suffice to eradicate the growing evil. In Scotland, the same effects have not followed in the same degree: — a diminution of the quantity charged with duty is yet remarkable in the two years following the advance of duty, the quantity charged in 1830, 5,992,420, becoming in 1831, 5,691,096, and in 1832, 5,401,651: during the year 1833, it has nearly attained its former sum, being 5,982,920 gallons; this seems to imply that the smuggler is still operating—the quantity

charged, however, compared with the population, is immense, and the clandestine operations of the Highlander cannot be so extensive as those of his Irish neighbour; but here another evil seems to occur, arising from the *inequality* of the duties on English and Scotch spirits, offering a large premium on the transmission of whiskey into the English counties. *In limine*, we shall shew the relative consumption of home-made spirits in England, Scotland, and Ireland; calculated on the official returns for the year ending January 1830—

ENGLAND AND WALES.			IRELAND.		
Population.	Consumption in gallons.	Average consumption per head in pints.	Population.	Consumption in gallons.	Average consumption per head in pints.
13,700,000	7,700,766	$4\frac{3}{7}$	7,650,000	9,212,222	$9\frac{3}{5}$

SCOTLAND.		
Population.	Consumption in gallons.	Average Consumption per head in pints.
2,300,000	5,777,280	$20\frac{1}{11}$

The results shewn by this table appear scarcely credible. Allowing for the total exclusion of foreign spirits from Scotch consumption, Scotland consumes in proportion to her population four-fold the quantity of spirits consumed by the English, and inebriation is by no means more prevalent in the northern than in the southern division of Britain. It seems to offer a collateral proof, with the further evidence that we shall presently note, that a very large portion of the spirits charged with the local duty in Scotland are passed over the borders into the northern counties of England. We note in a tabular form, the number of seizures of Scotch spirits, effected in the counties of Northumberland and Cumberland, for illicit introduction into England, between 5th January 1828,

and December 31st 1829; also the number of informations, convictions for smuggling, and committals to prison, during the same period.

Number of seizures.	Informations laid before magistrates.	Convictions for smuggling.	Committals to prison.
226	163	156	110

We believe a more recent return has been furnished, which shews a very large increase in the contraband spirit trade on the Scotch borders. Added to this a very extensive illicit importation of both Scotch and Irish spirits, is well known to exist on the neighbouring coasts. This is purely the effect of the injudicious and unjust plan of imposing varied rates of duty in different parts of the kingdom. The difference of duty between English and Scotch spirits, amounting to 4s. 6d. per gallon, will, while it exists, always ensure the continuance of this contraband trade, which is as pernicious in a moral as in a financial view; it is in vain that the government endeavour to restrain this illicit trade, by increasing the force of *le corps d'observation* on the borders, which in its present state is extremely expensive. The only remedy for an evil, which it is the bounden duty of the government to eradicate, is a nearer assimilation of the duties throughout the kingdom, and as experience is against the policy of increasing the ratio of duty in Scotland, no alternative presents itself but a reduction of duty on English spirits. Let those who demand high duties on fermented spirits, as a check to drunkenness, consult the practical authorities we have quoted, heeding past *results* as a guide for future policy, and they will no longer waste their rhetoric in the attempt to urge the government to a measure so pernicious to society, and so destructive to the sovereignty of the laws. Let them rather, adopting the advice of the profound Dr. Smith, who, in speaking of the inclination of people for tippling, says, "the only way

to eradicate this disposition is by giving a better education to the poor, and thus inspire them with a taste for less grovelling enjoyments.”*—accelerate the progress of instruction, and elevate the intellectual condition of the lower orders; if those of the richer class, who seem so desirous of a recurrence to the prohibitory system to the consumption of spirits, were to economize in their more expensive luxuries, and apply the sum of that economy to promote the education of the humbler classes, their endeavours would be far more effectual than in attempting by any other means to eradicate the evil they so justly deplore. Referring to the estimate of Lord Cholmondeley during the last century, the consumption of spirits in England has immensely decreased in the face of a duplication of numbers, and a reduction of duty from 20s. to 7s. 6d. per gallon; this results from the great improvement in the intellectual condition of society; but progress in this course and the abhorrence of drunkenness will become so general, that sobriety will require no fiscal regulations to enforce it.

Before concluding the review of the British spirit duties, we shall notice one point which at no distant period must come under the consideration of parliament. As the law at present stands, exportation of compounded British spirits is prohibited; or what is nearly the same case, spirits are charged with the same duty, whether exported or consumed at home. Through the growth of our colonial population in Canada, but more particularly in Australia and the East Indies, supplies of British spirits have been demanded in those portions of the empire. The adult population of Australia, for instance, having chiefly emigrated from this country with their confirmed tastes and habits, seeks the same superfluities there, as it found in

* Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 146.

the parent state ; but the law which permits the free exportation of the brandy of the French distiller, the geneva of the Dutch distiller, and the rum of the West India distiller, imposes a high duty on the exportation of the Geneva of the English distiller. In this regulation there is neither justice nor policy : spirits the colonists will have, and it is difficult to understand the principle upon which the government oblige them to consume the spirits of *foreign*, in preference to those of *British* production. Objections to grant the drawback on British compounded spirits, based on the plea of insecurity to the revenue, are absurd. The drawback to which any spirits *not dulcified* would be entitled to, is immediately determinable by their specific gravity, measured by the hydrometer ; and, if the exporters required to dulcify the spirits, previous to exportation, the process which is extremely simple, might be conducted in the shipping warehouses, under the special surveillance of the customs' searcher ; no fraud could ensue, and no opposition can be sustained by fair reasoning against the measure, which would be a valuable boon to all parties.

Tea Duties.—From the year 1819 to 1834, tea was subject to an *ad valorem* duty of 100 per cent. on all sold at the company's sale, at or above the rate of 2s. per pound ; of 96 per cent. on all sold under that price.* With the opening of the trade, a large reduction of the price in bond must in common course ensue ; and if the duties were conti-

* The proportions of the tea sold by the company in 1833, subject to the respective duties, is as under :—

Under 2s. duty. 96 per cent.	Above 2s. duty. 100 per cent.	Total.
7,663,333	21,829,620	29,493,953 lbs.

During the last two or three years, the price of tea has considerably fallen ; from the year 1819 to 1830, the proportion of tea sold by the company under 2s. was very small.

nued to be charged on their present principle, a similar reduction of tax would be the certain consequence; but the government, unwilling to diminish its share of the profits on the China trade, has decided, that in April 1834, the *ad valorem* duty shall cease, and that teas imported under the provisions of the Act of 1833, shall be classed according to their qualities, and charged with the following scale of duties :—

	Duty per lb.
Green tea—1st class, Hyson	3s.
2nd do. Twankay, Hyson, Skin, &c.	2s. 2d.
Black tea—1st do. Souchong, Pekoe, with flower, } and numerous other descriptions of black tea }	3s.
2nd do. Congous, Pekoe, without } flower, &c. }	2s. 2d.
3rd do. Bohea	1s. 6d.

A great deal of evidence was adduced before the late committee on East India affairs, as to the various qualities of tea, by gentlemen of great practical knowledge and high commercial character, partly with a view of informing the committee as to the fittest mode of regulating the duties chargeable on tea imported under the new system. It is extremely difficult to determine, how, with such a means of reference, ministers have been led to propose, and parliament to sanction, such a scale of duties as that which at present figures in the tariff. It is quite impossible that such a system can work honestly, — and extremely improbable that the government or the trade can practically act upon it. The similarity in the appearance, and in some instances in the real quality of teas is so close, that the question as to which class they belong, must give rise to those incessant disputes between the revenue and the trade, which can but be productive of injury to both. In green teas, the difference of quality is more easily determinable than in the black teas; but some descriptions of Twankay (those called Hyson kind of leaf—or Hyson kind),

are so similar to hyson, that even in that class disputes would arise respecting the duty. The low weak souchongs are inferior to and of less value than any descriptions of congou, and the similarity in the *real* and *apparent* quality of the great proportion of the souchongs and those congou teas called by the trade *fresh*, *middling*, or, in some instances, little souchong flavour, is so great, that many practical judges would, on examination of the sample, doubt to which class they belong, and where a difference of ten pence per pound exists in the duty, few merchants would import souchong tea under any other name than congou. The same, or nearly the same similarity of quality is to be remarked between the best descriptions of bohea, and the lower descriptions of congou; consequently, large portions of the latter-named tea would be imported under the title of the former. Pekoe without flower, is charged at 2s. 2d. per pound, while flowery pekoe is to pay 3s. per pound; all pekoe *proprement dit* has more or less flower, and thus the revenue board and the importer are to dispute as to the *proportional* or standard quantity of flower which would subject the tea to the high duty; some descriptions of congou are a kind of pekoe, which is, in fact, the congou leaf, gathered at a different stage of florification. The trade would not permit the revenue officers to dictate as to the *nominal* classes of tea, and to whom could an appeal be made with a view to a fair and just decision? the plan cannot act beneficially, and we have no hesitation in saying, that it must be speedily altered.*

* The tea plant is found wild in various parts of Asia, but is only exclusively cultivated in China and Japan, principally between the 28th and 36th degrees of north latitude, and between the 112th and 125th degrees of east longitude. There is only *one species* of the plant cultivated in China, *thea* of botanists; *tcha* *tha* or *sah* of the Chinese: it is propagated from seeds deposited in rows four or five feet asunder, and the vegetation is so uncertain, that it is necessary to plant seven or eight seeds in each dib-

Before the new Act came into operation, its impracticability was so apparent, that parliament, in April last, appointed a committee to inquire into, and collect evidence on the subject; few particulars of the evidence have as yet transpired, and the conclusions to which it will arrive, are hence matters of speculation.* A recurrence to the old plan of charging *ad valorem* duties, possesses in an eminent degree the advantages appertaining to *ad valorem* duties in general; but the difficulty of rendering such a system effective, now that the trade is in the hands of private merchants, would be very great, and the restriction which such a system would impose to private contract sales, would operate to the injury of commerce. In London, where from old standing connexions, the tea trade will, despite of all enactments, for a considerable period, chiefly centre,—*ad valorem* duties might be ren-

ble; the first crop of leaves is not collected until the second or third year after sowing, and after seven or eight years the trees are removed and succeeded by new plants; three crops of leaves are yielded—one in April, Midsummer, and September. The earliest gathered leaves are of the most delicate colour, and the finest aromatic flavour; the second are of a dull green colour, and the last of a dark green and of an inferior quality. The age of plants also influences the quality of the produce. *Pekoe* is the young leaves picked early in the spring before they expand, and is sometimes mixed with a species of olive flower to give it a fragrance. Congou, souchong, campoi, bohea, &c.; like various wines, take their names from the districts in which they are grown, and the modes in which they are prepared. Green tea principally grown in the provinces of Kian-si and Che-Kiang, differs from the black tea, from being torrifed in iron pots on vases over a fire, while the black tea is dried in the wind under shade, and subsequently in a heated warehouse. The green tea does not improve by keeping, while black tea is considered by the Chinese best when ten years old, or more. To preserve the quality of either, it should be kept dry and free from the action of the atmosphere. The green tea is a more quickly stimulant narcotic than the black; but the bitter of the latter is far more tonic.

* A treasury order has lately been issued to charge the congou rate of duty on low souchongs, caper tea, and some other sorts; it is supposed the duty on bohea tea will be reduced to 1s. per lb.

dered operative, and the trade, following the example of the indigo importers, might accord in conducting their operations through the medium of public sales; but, in the outports, great inconvenience would be felt by the system, and thus there appears no plan open but that of levying fixed rates of duties on black and green teas. A duty of 1s. 10*d.* on the former, and of 2s. per lb. on the latter description, seems well calculated to meet the interest of the revenue, and perhaps would not be objected to by the trade and the consumer. The rates being fixed, would encourage the importation of the *best* descriptions of tea. The plan of charging the duties on valuation we deem too dangerous to admit of adoption; the difficulty of finding competent persons to fix the value, would negative all attempts of the kind.

A large diminution of the tax on tea, must necessarily follow the abolition of the monopoly so long held by the East India Company. We shall endeavour, by reference to the evidence adduced before the East India Committee of 1831-3, to shew the probable extent of this reduction of tax. The tea shipped from Canton to England in 1828-9, consisted of the quantities and qualities expressed in the subjoined table, in which are also inserted the cost prices of each description.

Description of Tea.	Quantity.	Cost Price per lb.
<i>Black Teas.</i>	lbs.	s. d.
Bohea	4,198,964	9—512
Congou	16,951,171	1 2—587
Campoi	507,881	1 7—461
Souchong	183,489	1 10—870
Pekoe	Nil.	
<i>Green Teas.</i>		
Twankay	5,471,633	1 3—810
Hyson Skin	154,767	1 4—238
Young Hyson	Nil.	
Hyson	1,149,371	2 2—263
Gunpowder Tea	Nil.	
Total . . . lbs.	28,617,276	

This quantity imported, is rather under the average annual consumption. During the years 1828-30, the quantity actually delivered to the trade in each year being, in round numbers, 30,000,000 lbs. The average prime cost of all teas imported in 1827-8, was reported in evidence to have been 1s. 3½d. per pound, and the average sale price of teas sold in 1828-9, 2s. 8¼d., leaving about 1s. 5d. per lb. or 115 per cent. to cover import charges, sale charges, &c. Much evidence was adduced, to shew the great economy which private merchants would possess over the company, in the expenses of purchase, shipment, &c. from Canton. Besides the economy of ceasing to maintain the vastly expensive factory of the company at Canton, the reduction of the charge for freight is calculated at from 12l. to 13l. per ton.* The small charges on landing and housing tea, the property of private merchants, compared with the great expense attendant on the present mode of managing the tea importations, added to the obligation incurred by the company of keeping a large stock, are all advantages which will diminish the price; favouring the opinion, that after the first difficulties are surmounted, private merchants will supply the demand, at even less than the company's cost price. Mr. Rickards considers that 35 per cent. on the prime cost of tea would suffice to cover all import charges, and leave a net profit of ten per cent. to the importer; and Mr. Betts is of opinion that 29,500,000 pounds of tea may be brought to the British market at a difference of 1,492,208l. below the company's sale price, and leave a *suitable profit* to the importing merchants. This opinion of Mr. Betts is not sanctioned to the full extent, by the account of the annual profits made

* The company estimate the charge for freight from Canton to London, at 21l. 10s. per ton; the evidence warrants the anticipation, that private merchants would obtain the same at from 8l. to 10l. per ton.

by the East India Company in the China trade. The returns presented to the committee on this subject shew, that the average annual profit made by the company during the quinquennial period ending 1819, was 1,525,799*l.* From the year 1819 to 1824, 875,432*l.*; and from 1824 to 1829, 625,910*l.*; shewing a total profit or tax on the British consumer during the fifteen years ending 1829, of 15,414,412*l.*; being on the average of the whole period, 1,045,000*l.* per annum. If we divide the annual average profit by the quantity annually consumed, during the fifteen years ending 1829,—say 26,500,000 pounds,—the profit obtained on the average rather exceeds 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ *d.* per pound; while, according to the calculation of Mr. Betts, the profit obtained by the company on their sales in 1829-30, when the price was below the average of previous years, is 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* per pound; the mean of these ratio of profits is 10 $\frac{1}{4}$:50*d.* per pound, which may be taken as a fair estimate of the prospective depreciation in the price of tea; and as the new scale of duties reduces the tax about 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ *d.* per pound, the diminished cost to the consumer will be about 1*s.* per pound, which, moderately estimating the consumption of tea at 30,000,000 pounds, is equivalent to a reduction of taxation to the extent of 1,500,000*l.* per annum. It is too much to expect, that this reduction to the full extent will be immediate, as the immense capital required to supply the British market with tea cannot immediately be transferred to that particular branch of commerce.*

* In Dr. Morrison's work, there is some curious and interesting information respecting the antiquity of the intercourse of China with foreign nations. Long before the opening of Indian commerce to the Portuguese, Dutch, French, &c., there existed considerable commercial intercourse between China, Egypt, Arabia, Persia, and other Asiatic countries; and the general tenor of the information given by Dr. Morrison shews, that the Chinese are not so indifferent to foreign commerce, as the government professes to be. A vessel on its arrival off the coast, is generally

Duties on glass.—Few articles of British manufacture possess stronger claims for the abolition of

boarded by a pilot, who conducts her into the Macao roads. The acting pilot, who is generally a fisherman, is the deputy of the licensed pilot, a government officer, who pays a large sum for his license. On the arrival of the ship in the Macao roads, the pilot reports her at the proper office, and, after answering all necessary interrogatories respecting her cargo, nation, crew, &c., receives a permit to pass the ship through the Bogue (the mouth of the Canton river) to Whampoa. Every ship that arrives is obliged to have a Hong merchant as security for the payment of duties, he is also answerable for the good conduct of the ship's company, that she shall not be engaged in any smuggling transactions, and that she has brought no opium. All commanders of ships, except those of the East India Company, are required to give a written declaration that they have no opium on board, which is countersigned by the security merchants, who make an asseveration, that they believe the truth of the matter declared. If any smuggling transaction is afterwards discovered, a heavy fine is imposed, which is extorted by the government from the security merchants, and all communication is suspended until the fine is paid. The Hong, or security merchants, are the only individuals allowed to trade with foreigners; a heavy tax is required for this privilege, and when once they become merchants, they are seldom allowed to retire: the linguists are government interpreters, who procure permits for the delivery of the cargo, and the reloading of the vessel. They transact the Custom-house business, and keep accounts of the duties, for which they receive a fee of about 173 dollars.

All foreign vessels arriving at Canton, pay port charges, according to their measurement; the ratio of duty increases with the size of the vessels, which are divided into three classes, as under:

	Tael per Covid Duty.
1st class—Vessels of 160 covids and upwards . . .	7.874,758
2nd do. . . . 120 ditto, and under 160 . . .	7.221,091
3rd do. . . . 120 and under	5.062,341

The covid is about $14\frac{1}{2}$ inches; the dimensions are taken from the mizen to the foremast for the length, and between the gangways for the breadth; these two numbers multiplied together and divided by 10, give the measurement in covids; the tael is about 6s. 4d. English.

The total charges, including presents, or imperial dues, purser's fees, pilotage, &c. on a vessel of 867 tons, is about 4,959 dollars, which, at 4s. 3d. the dollar, is 1,060*l*. French, Austrian, and Prussian vessels pay about 80 taels extra. For enlarged information on this subject, see Martin's Colonial Statistics, 1st vol.; or the Companion to the Anglo-Chinese Calendar, pp. 101-103.

duty than glass. We need not enumerate the various trades which suffer from the impolitic restrictions on its manufacture. Notwithstanding the advantages we nationally possess for the attainment of unrivalled superiority, yet our manufacture of glass dwindles; shewing a comparative decrease in the quantity made at the present time, in comparison with what it was forty years since, leaving us under the necessity of importing large quantities of glass from nations possessing no physical attributes for the success of the manufacture.

In the common descriptions of glass, we possess a small share of export trade, not so much through any superiority in the manufacture, as from the possession of colonies, where the importations of foreign manufactures are restricted by duties; but even this trade is gradually diminishing. In 1828, the declared value of glass exported, was 527,110*l.*; in 1829, 492,072*l.*; and in 1830, 467,155*l.*; being a reduction of about 12 per cent. in three years. The returns of the quantity reserved for home consumption, shew a more important decrease.

Quantities of glass charged with duty, deducting that on which the drawback was paid in the three years ending 1831.

DESCRIPTION OF GLASS.						
Years. ending 5 th August	Flint.	Plate.	Broad.	Crown.	Bottle.	Total. Revenue.
	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	Cwt.	£.
1830	49,004	14,299	6,864	97,134	209,862	610,307
1831	48,063	13,057	4,845	84,178	165,549	526,507
1832	48,887	14,796	5,915	83,527	143,989	516,518

Thus, the diminished consumption of glass during these three years, a period in which the demand for every other staple article of British manufacture is rapidly extending, has been nearly 16 per cent. The French plate glass is admitted

to be of better quality than the British : its *colour* is superior ; and it is said to be more free from what are technically called “*seeds*” (small globules). We are assured also, that in the article of stained glass, the French is very superior in point of *colour* ; and that during the last thirty years, some improved methods of striking the *blue colour* into glass metal, previously practised with great success in England, have been *lost*.* These are the results of the absence of *experiments* ; for, until a late regulation, no glass manufacturer could attempt improvements without being subject to the full duty charged on the metal, whether he were successful or otherwise ; hence, attempts at improvement have been discouraged, and the manufacturer excelled by foreign artists, has yielded to the force of competition. The machinery employed in collecting the duties on glass, is most expensive to the state, and inconvenient to the trade. Of 900,000*l.* per annum collected from the manufacturers, about 370,000*l.* is re-paid in shape of draw-back : so that besides the injury done by subtracting this capital from active employment, and depositing it in the treasury, or the hands of the Bank Directors, in the interval which elapses between the time of its collection and repayment, the public are charged not only for the expenses of collecting 370,000*l.*, which does not reach the exchequer, but also for its re-distribution to its rightful owners. This system is quite at variance with those principles of political economy, which teach, that a sound plan of taxation subtracts as little capital as possible from the subject, and leaves it as long as possible in his hands. Surely these truths offer a powerful appeal to the

* It seems almost incredible, that during a period so distinguished for the expansion of science, such a misfortune could occur ; but we are assured, from practical men, that the fact is as we state it.

state financier, to consider the expediency of abolishing this pernicious impost.

Duties on paper.—The vexatious excise restrictions imposed against the manufacture of paper, if necessary to the collection of the revenue, are in themselves sufficient to denounce the policy of this tax. Paper, under the excise laws, is divided into two classes: the first class paper is subject to a duty of 28s. per cwt., and the second class of 14s. per cwt.; millboards and scaleboards made of the same material as the second class paper, are charged with 21s. per cwt. duty. That quality, subject to 14s. per cwt. must be made of no other material than *tarred ropes*, without the *tar* being previously extracted; if the tar is washed out, and the ropes prepared for the manufacture of paper, the manufacturer is subject to an additional duty of 14s. per cwt.; while the Acts of Parliament, which pretend to teach the manufacturer the art of manufacturing paper, are so numerous and complex, that it requires an almost supernatural extent of legislative knowledge to escape the heavy penalties they impose. To prohibit the paper manufacturer from using any other material for making second class paper than *tarred ropes*, is just as reasonable as to prohibit the cloth manufacturer from making second class cloth from any other material than sheep *pitch marks*. Since rope cables have been so generally superseded by those made of iron, old tarred rope is difficult to obtain; and when a scarcity arises, hemp must be manufactured into ropes, and then tarred before it can be used for paper-making, although the hemp would be double the value for paper-making, if it were allowed to be used without passing through the expensive process of spinning and tarring. Rags and old sacking, which are too inferior to be used for first-class paper, cannot be manufactured into any other

description, and are hence rendered of little or no value. The heavy duty charged on licenses to manufacture paper, is levied in the most unfair manner. A small capitalist who works one vat, pays as much for his license as a large capitalist who works ten. Surely, there can be no necessity for so burdening the small manufacturer. The government, which professes to be greatly impressed with the importance of encouraging British manufactures, cannot with any consistency defend the system upon which these duties are levied, and must concur in the propriety of a speedy alteration, even at the sacrifice of the entire revenue raised on paper. A fixed moderate rate of duty on all classes of paper might perhaps be raised; but, if effect could be given to *ad valorem* duties, to which, we fear, it could not, they would be decidedly preferable.

Duties on bricks and building materials.—These duties discourage the investment of capital in improving the habitations of the people, and in the erection and improvement of manufacturing establishments; they likewise tend to depress many other branches of trade, which are dependent on the extension of buildings. The policy which dictated the late repeal of the duties on tiles and slates, recommends also the repeal of the duty on bricks.

Duty on hops.—Our objections to this duty rest chiefly on the mode by which it is collected; the duty, as at present levied, increases with the quantity produced, and thus weakens or discourages efforts to obtain the greatest possible produce from the land. If the duty were levied on the ground instead of on the crop, it would be much less objectionable. Free scope would be given to the desire of rendering the land as productive as

possible; the door would be effectually closed against fraud; the annual amount of revenue, instead of fluctuating in the extreme degree it does on the present system, would be comparatively steady, and the expense of its collection considerably economised.

Duty on starch.—The tax on starch, (29s. per cwt.) although high, yields but very little revenue to the state. The importance of the use of starch in the linen, cotton, and lace manufactories,—its being essential to health and cleanliness, and the utility of the manufacture in profitably consuming the damp or injured wheats unsuitable for human food, are strong reasons why this article should be freed from tax. The diminished cost of the article, when duty free, would greatly economise the expenditure of families, who now use a more economical, but, in a national sense, more expensive substitute. By the abolition of this duty, those wasteful and ridiculous excise restrictions, which now prohibit the disposal of the bran or refuse in any other shape than in feeding swine or cattle on the premises, would cease to divert the attention and capital of the starch manufacturers from their proper object.

CUSTOMS' DUTIES ON ARTICLES OF LUXURY.

Sugar duties.—The full and liberal indemnity which the West India planter has been awarded out of the public exchequer, for the late depreciation of his property, under various circumstances, has completely annulled all his pretensions to the exclusive monopoly of the British market against other colonial interests. The present duty on West India sugar is, while large revenues are indispensable, by no means too great; but the extra duty of 8s. per cwt. on East India

sugar, is full of injustice and impolicy. On the opening of the East India trade in 1814, the value of India cotton goods imported was about 2,000,000*l.*; not only has this supply been supplanted by our Lancashire looms, but Great Britain now annually exports to India manufactured goods to the amount of 8,000,000*l.* (according to the official value). The effect of this competition on the Hindoo weaver, who toils many hours for the mere pittance of 1½*d.* or 2*d.* per diem, is evident; and it is no less unfair than impolitic, while driving him from his loom, to seek subsistence on the land, to refuse to admit the produce of his agricultural toil into the British markets, on the terms granted to other subjects of the empire. The policy of increasing the facilities of the import trade of Great Britain with India, is also dictated by the necessity of remitting large amounts from the East to pay claimants in this country. The altered position of our Indian trade has completely changed the ordinary course of remittances. Humboldt estimates the quantity of specie exported to the East Indies and China at the commencement of the present century, at 17,500,000 dollars. In 1829, the total imports of specie from America into Bengal, were 479,388 dollars, while the sum exported to Europe from the three Presidencies in the same year, was 1,119,973 dollars; being a drain of specie amounting to 640,585 dollars. This fact forcibly shews the necessity of encouraging the importation of Indian merchandise.

Duties on tobacco.—The impolicy of the duties at present charged on tobacco, have already been admitted in the highest quarters. It is quite impossible that a duty of 1000 per cent. can, particularly in a season of peace, be effectually levied on an imported article. The Dutch and German habits have been so freely introduced into England

since the peace, that the use of tobacco has become almost as general among the English as among their continental neighbours. The revenue has, it is true, profited, in some degree, from the extension of the intolerant habit of fuming tobacco; but the frequent capture of the property of the smuggler, is an evident proof that the contraband trade in tobacco is extensively carried on.

In Ireland, the increase of tax since the Union, has diminished the quantity of tobacco charged with duty, 60 per cent., in the face of an increase of population to the same extent.

TOBACCO CHARGED WITH DUTY IN IRELAND.

Years.	Tobacco charged with Duty.	Rate of Duty.	Years.	Tobacco charged with Duty.	Rate of Duty.
	lbs.	lb.		lbs.	lb.
1794	9,421,211	6d.	1830	4,125,249	3s.
1795	7,874,409	8d.	1831	4,183,825	3s.
1796	6,045,790		1832	4,342,647	3s.
1797	8,445,555		1833	4,456,647	3s.
Average Annual Quantity charged	} 7,946,741			4,277,091	

To suppose that the consumption of tobacco in Ireland has diminished since 1797, is contrary to evidence, founded on the habits of the people, and it is not unreasonable to estimate, that it has increased in proportion to the growth of population.

At Rotterdam, Helvoet, Antwerp, Ostend, and other minor ports, the machinery which supplies Ireland with tobacco is in continual activity. The official reports of Messrs. Bowring and Villiers, (but a small portion of the contents of which are as yet known to the public) cannot fail to convince the most sceptical of the extensive existence of this contraband trade, and of the impossibility of checking it by any other means than by a considerable reduction of duty. Such a measure is intimately connected with the great task—the pacification of

Ireland. If parliament should decide, as in the case of the spirit duties, that the more orderly conduct of the English, compared with the Irish people, should be recompensed by higher rates of taxation, it cannot fail to concur in the propriety of repealing 50 per cent. of the duty now payable on tobacco imported into Ireland.

Duties on foreign spirits.—In the roll of foreign commodities subject to import duties, there are none which are more properly objects of high taxation than foreign spirits; but here the same impossibility, of rendering high rates of duty effective in ministering to the financial demands of the exchequer while protecting the fair trader from the competition of the clandestine importer, exists, as in the practical operation of the high duties charged on British spirits.

In confirmation of this fact, we, *in limine*, appeal to the returns of the quantity of foreign spirits, charged with import duty at three different periods, shewing the decrease of the quantity charged with duty in proportion to the increased rate of tax charged; the gallons are computed by the *old* standard measure.

Years.	Gallons charged with duty.	Rate of duty per gal.	Years.	Gallons charged with duty.	Rate of duty per gal.	Years.	Gallons charged with duty.	Rate of duty per gal.
		s. d.			s. d.			s. d.
1801	2,631,055	9 5	1806	2,439,794	14 0	1830	1,503,831	
1802	2,806,736	9 2½	1807	2,200,728	16 7	1831	1,552,420	18 9
1803	2,763,575		1808	2,768,678		1832*	1,921,982	
Annual average	2,733,788		Annual average	2,469,733		Annual average	1,659,411	

The present import duty on foreign spirits is 22s. 6d. imperial measure, being equivalent to 18s. 9d. according to the old measure.

* The great excess of the quantity charged with duty in this year, is owing to the unhappy visitation of the cholera; brandy being largely consumed as an antidote to that deadly pestilence. The quantity charged with duty in the years 1833 and 1834 will exhibit a very great deficiency.

These returns shew a considerable decrease in the quantity charged with duty, notwithstanding a very extensive increase of consumers, and doubtless of the means of purchase. It is very improbable that an actual decrease in the consumption has taken place; or that the high price has, to any very considerable degree, limited the demand for brandy; since in 1808 the price to the consumer was quite equal to what it is at the present day.

Smuggling was at that time checked by the war, but the peace has opened to the contraband importer the facility of largely sharing in the amount of the tax paid by the consumer, of which he has not failed to avail himself. Messrs. Bowring and Villiers, who it is well known are at this time actively engaged in arranging those reforms in the commercial relations between Great Britain and France, from which great results are rather to be desired than attained, say, in their reports to the government, that the total amount of duties evaded by fraudulent importation annually amount to at least 800,000*l.*,* of which 500,000*l.* attaches to brandy. The general tenor of the interesting reports of these gentlemen shews the impossibility of effectually stemming the torrent of smuggling except by a large reduction of duty. If we add to this sum a fair proportion of the expense annually incurred in the ineffectual attempt of guarding the coast against the operations of the contraband trader, and of the charge incurred in prosecuting and maintaining the large number of smugglers in the county gaols, the total sum will amount to fully seventy per cent. on the whole revenue collected on foreign spirits. Let the items stand thus—

Amount of duty evaded by the illicit importation of brandy, but charged to the consumer	£ 500,000
Proportion of 400,000 <i>l.</i> , being the annual charge for the maintenance of the Coast Guard, Blockade, &c., 50 per cent.	200,000

* Exclusive of the evasion of duty on tobacco.

Brought forward	£ 700,000
Expenses of prosecuting smugglers or dealers in contraband spirits; also the charge for their maintenance when in prison	*100,000
Gross amount of the revenue collected by the go- vernment on foreign spirits	1,320,000

Total annual amount paid by the public on account
of duties charged on foreign spirits £ 2,120,000

Now let any reasonable financier look to this sketch, which in reality has a great deal of truth in it, and ask himself whether such a sacrifice ought to be required in order to furnish the public exchequer with a net annual revenue of about 1,250,000*l.* Let him likewise consider the moral degradation arising from such a system, and the national loss by immuring a large number of the able population in gaols, who, but for the high premium afforded to illicit trade, would be employed in various branches of honest industry. His conclusions, based on the dictates of ordinary human reason, would prompt him to abandon the contest with the smuggler with such weapons as the Coast Guard, hulks, prisons, &c., and to end the war by withdrawing the *cause* of contest. Any estimate of that judicious rate of duty which would yield the greatest possible revenue and discourage illicit importation, is speculative. But considering the disadvantages which the smuggler encounters in comparison with the fair trader; such as the excess in the prime cost, additional expense and risk in the transit and sale of his contraband merchandise, &c., it is fair to presume that a reduction of duty from the present rate (22*s.* 6*d.*) to 15*s.* 6*d.* per gallon, would meet the desired object.

Duties on wine. — No valid objection can be urged against the principle of collecting a large revenue from the importation of foreign wines;

* By a return made to Parliament, 1833, it appears that there were, in 1832, upwards of 1000 committals to prison for offences against the revenue laws.

but to charge a higher rate of impost on any article of luxury than it is able to bear, merely because its character justifies the tax, is to impair one of the fittest sources of revenue, and to impose the necessity of taxing other articles, the consequent high price of which would be more severely felt. Such an effect has followed the high duties on French wines, particularly as regards Ireland. During the three years ending 1792, when the duty charged on French wines imported into Ireland was 2s. 9d. per gallon, the revenue collected was 60,409*l.*; but in the three years ending 1830, when the duties were 7s. 3d. per gallon, the amount of revenue received was 15,946*l.*, being a reduction of 44,463*l.*, despite of an increase of 4s. 6d. per gallon in the rate of tax charged. Indeed the high duties so long continued on French wines seem to have annihilated the consumption of them in this country. The late judicious effort of the present government to reanimate the commercial intercourse with France, by the abolition of the once highly extolled treaty with Portugal, known as the *Methuen treaty*, has relieved us from the obligation of drawing our supplies of wine from the Peninsula, and by enabling merchants to purchase wines of those countries which offer them on the best terms, will probably in course of time enable France to regain her former share of the trade. Greatly as this Act is to be commended in principle, yet the increase of 8d. per gallon in the duty on Portugal, Spanish, and other wines which accompanied it, was injudicious, as leading to a considerable reduction in the productiveness of the tax. In 1825, the duties on foreign wines, excluding those of France and the Rhenish states, were reduced from 7s. 7d. to 4s. 10d. per gallon; and the consequence was that the annual average quantity charged with duty in the three years ending 1824, 5,060,115 gallons, became, in 1825, 8,121,978 gallons; in 1827, 6,921,639; and in

1828, 7,129,464 gallons. In 1832, the new duty was imposed, and the quantity taxed diminished in that year to 4,995,951 gallons.* This diminished consumption may probably induce the government to repeal the extra duty imposed in 1832; when an opportunity will be afforded of reforming the plan on which the wine duties are collected. The high rate of duty attaching to every quality of foreign wine operates to the exclusion of those wines which form the common beverage of the middle class of people in France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. For instance, the wines of La Gironde, Languedoc, Provence, and other French départements, being in some seasons inferior to the produce of the famed vignobles of Chateaux-Margaux, Lafitte, and other celebrated estates, are, from the high duties imposed, seldom brought to this country. The consequence is, that a few French wine growers enjoy a kind of monopoly in supplying the British market with French wines, and obtain in some instances tenfold the price at which other provincial wines, differing very slightly in quality, would be imported: thus the high cost of French wines renders them unattainable to the great bulk of the British people.

The wines of France being lighter and less *piquant* than those of Spain and Portugal, are, when at the same price, more expensive as an article of consumption; and hence, unless purchasable at a diminished price, are placed beyond the reach of the generality of wine consumers. To give the French wine grower a fair opportunity of selling his produce in this country, the duty

* This deficiency is in some degree attributable to the interruption of the trade with Portugal in 1832.

Quantities of various descriptions of Wine on which duty was paid in the year ending 5th January, 1833.

Cape. Gals.	French. Gals.	Portuguese. Gals.	Madeira. Gals.	Spanish and Canary. Gals.	Rhenish. Gals.	Sicilian. Gals.
514,262	228,627	2,617,405	159,898	2,152,902	38,197	254,251

should be charged on quality rather than quantity, by substituting *ad valorem* duties in the place of fixed rates per gallon. Under this system, wines of various qualities would be imported, and the range of prices would suit the varied means of purchasers. The wines of various southern and western provinces, the quality of many of which is so little inferior to that of the wines of the most famed vineyards, as to be imperceptible to the great body of consumers, would be brought into the British market at from four to five pounds per hogshead (in bond), and if a duty of 100 or 120 per cent. were levied, being about the rate now charged, they would be retailed at about twelve shillings the dozen bottles. A rapid increase of consumption and revenue would be a certain consequence; while not the least important of the benefits of the extension of our commercial intercourse with France, would be to allay that national antipathy which has heretofore so greatly fomented the political quarrels wantonly raised between the two governments, causing the two most powerful nations of Europe to rejoice in each other's respective misfortunes. Such results would follow an alteration of the wine duties; the only difficulty exists in rendering such a change effective—but the validity of the plan can only be determined by experiment.

The great extent to which the practice of mixing the low-taxed wines of the Cape of Good Hope with the highly-taxed wines of Spain, Portugal, and Madeira, induced ministers to propose that colonial wine should (after 1834) be placed on the same footing, with respect to import duties, as foreign wine. This measure, so much at variance with that “tender sympathy” which government usually manifests towards vested interests, and which, according to the present mode of levying the wine duties, would entirely condemn the cultivation of

the vine in southern Africa—would, if the plan of charging *ad valorem* duties were adopted, reach all the objects sought by the minister, without injuring the interest of the Cape wine grower.*

STAMP DUTIES.

Tax on deeds and law instruments.—At the head of these duties appears the impost levied on deeds and law instruments, from which a large but pernicious revenue is raised, amounting annually to 1,500,000*l.* It is evident that a tax levied on a

* It is well known, that the greater proportion of wines improve in quality, and consequently in value, more rapidly in bottles than in casks. A great advantage would hence manifestly arise, if the merchant were allowed to bottle wines *in bond*. At present he is obliged to pay the duty—about 30*l.* per pipe—before he can bottle the wine, and loses all the interest of the money, rent, charges, etc. during the three, four, or five years it remains in his possession—which, while it limits his own active capital, obliges him to enhance the price to the consumers. But the greatest inconsistency arising from this system is in the case of bottled wine exported. Bottled wines are shipped in considerable quantities to the colonies and for ships' use, and are—on being exported—entitled to the drawback of duty. Before this drawback is allowed, the exporter is obliged to certify, not only that the duty has been paid, but to name the day on which it was paid; stating also the ship in which the wine was imported, by whom the wine was bonded, etc. etc. Now it frequently happens, that wine changes hands ten times between the time of paying the duty and the date of its exportation, and therefore it is quite impossible that the exporter can know any thing about such particulars. The consequence is, that exporters seldom trouble themselves to trace the facts, but insert in their certificate, particulars relative to any package of wine being of the same description which has, no matter when, paid the import duty. The customs' board, unable to dispute the allegation, admit the certificate to be true, and the drawback is allowed—although, without any intention of fraud on the part of the exporter, the wine may have been originally smuggled. If the customs' board permitted merchants to bottle their wines in bond, all this system would at once disappear, and wines would be sent, under the eye of the customs' officer, on board the ship, without the payment of either duty or drawback. Such a concession would be an important benefit to the trade, while it would, in some degree, increase the value of property invested in the London and St. Catherine's docks, which has lately become so much depreciated.

deed for the conveyance of property to another, must detract from the value of that property to the extent of the tax paid : hence it is a direct tax on property. But other portions of this head of revenue are yet more objectionable—such as duties on instruments used in legal proceedings, in all actions of *tort*. To tax such instruments is virtually to sell justice, and is consequently repugnant to those fundamental principles of the British constitution, which, in all legislative changes, should never be departed from. But merely viewing these duties in a financial point, they appear fraught with the most baneful effects to the interest of the state. Law proceedings are, in general, cases instituted against those, who, deficient in means, are struggling against the competition of more powerful capitalists ; and who are thus deficient in the power of observing punctuality in their pecuniary engagements. To such, law expenses—exclusive of the tax—are, in the fullest sense, *overwhelming*, and seldom fail to consign the party against whom they are levied to beggary and disgrace. To aggravate the distress resulting from “ the *plundering system*,” by demanding a tax from the unfortunate defendant, is opposed to every sense of justice and policy, and fixes on the government the ignoble character of an accomplice in the robbery, and of a sharer in the booty. It is a tax of the most pernicious description, tending not only to disarrange, but to destroy, the means of both private and public income. Some counterpoise to the loss of revenue, by the abolition of this tax, might be profitably sought in doubling the duty on law certificates : this source of supply is extremely rich, and the high duty would tend to keep the profession more select.*

* The number of lawyers practising in England and Wales is about 8400 : the number, including Scotland and Ireland, cannot be less than 13,000. They are chiefly in the receipt of large incomes : 100,000*l.* per annum might, by an increase of this tax, be added to the revenue without difficulty.

Fire insurances.—It is clear that the sum total paid for insurance against the destruction of property by fire, must surpass the sum of casual losses. The principle of mutual insurance, on its first introduction so wisely encouraged by the government, operates beneficially, by preventing the sudden disarrangement of capital : it enforces, as it were, a small reserve of income, as a counterpoise against sudden loss. A duty of little less than 150 per cent. on insurance, is to tax this reserve of income—to outweigh the fair proportion between the premium and the risk, and thus to discourage a practice so provident and so nationally beneficial. Contrasting the amount of property insured with the value of property requiring that protection, we shall shew how far the duty operates in discouraging insurances against fire.

Referring to Mr. Lowe's book,* we find the value of dwelling-houses, warehouses, manufactories, goods in progress of manufacture or on sale, merchandise, money, household furniture, jewellery, plate, machinery, tools, farming stock, etc., in fact all insurable property in Great Britain, valued, in 1823, at £ 870,000,000

To which add fifteen per cent. for the increase since 1823, in accordance with the increase of population 130,000,000

Value of insurable property in Great Britain in 1833 1,000,000,000

Value of property insured in the United Kingdom, as per papers laid before parliament, session 1831-2 233,000,000

Value of property uninsured in Great Britain £ 767,000,000

This calculation is sufficiently moderate, and shews that the property insured is less than twenty-five per cent. of the insurable property of Great Britain. The fact warrants the anticipation, that a reduction of fifty per cent. of the fire insurance tax would occasion little or no loss to the revenue.

* Present State of England.

Taxes on newspapers, &c.—So much has been urged, both in and out of parliament, against these taxes—significantly termed “taxes on knowledge,” that we can advance nothing which would strengthen the arguments adduced for their repeal. It is now two years since a kind of promise was made by ministers, that the tax on newspapers should be reduced; but as yet nothing has been done, and the government, although admitting that the power of maintenance and the means of enjoyment must be essentially influenced by the state and stock of national intelligence, seem to neglect the means necessary to its growth. Mr. Hume, in his pamphlet previously cited, maintains that a small tax on the transit of newspapers into the country, and the extra consumption of paper consequent on the abolition of these taxes, would fully recompense the exchequer for the loss of revenue. Such an arrangement would, in some degree, act as a counterpoise, but we fear not to the extent anticipated by the member for Middlesex.

ASSESSED TAXES.

House and window tax.—Direct taxes assessed on property in proportion to its value, are levied under the supposition that possessors have a relative means of contributing to the revenues of the state. This, in most cases, may be a fair presumption with regard to freehold estates occupied by freeholders, but, as a general rule, it is by no means reasonable to judge of the competency of a tenant by the size of his dwelling. Large premises are often required for business purposes, but it does not follow that the profits on trade are in proportion to the size of the building in which it is carried on, and thus the principle on which the tax is levied is fallacious. It sometimes occurs in cases of insolvency, where the premises and the

entire stock of the insolvent are surrendered into the hands of creditors, that the tax-gatherer enters with his warrant and sells the property to answer the claim. Is it fair in such a case so to aggravate the loss of commercial capital? It is in this case an arbitrary demand, not on a growing income, but on an already reduced capital. Man likes to part with property only in order to enjoy; he pays his debts from a principle of duty, and the generality of men do not pay them without a degree of repugnance. The debt which is most irksome to pay is a direct tax, because the value received for it is by most people little appreciated; by attaching the impost to an agreeable consumption, confounding it with the price of the commodity, and rendering the payment voluntary, it in some degree escapes observation; it is then paid for an enjoyment, and contributed with pleasure.

Thus the collection of 2,500,000*l.* as a direct tax on dwellings, has, during the last two years, occasioned a kind of revolutionary resistance, while the contribution of four times the amount on wines and spirits has been made without a murmur. During the struggle for the Reform Bill, the liberal party in power were vigorously supported by the middle classes, on whom these taxes chiefly press, and ministers contracted a kind of obligation to repeal these imposts (or so a large body of the people considered): disappointment was consequently strongly manifested when the repeal was refused or deferred. Since the abolition of the house tax, as a sort of compromise with the public, there only remains about 1,300,000*l.* of these taxes to surrender. Some counterpoise to the loss of revenue, by the repeal of the window tax, would be found by a moderate increase of duty on other branches of the assessed taxes, such as on male servants above a certain age, armorial bearings, *race horses*, licenses to kill game, &c.

Protecting duties.—We shall not enter into any lengthened discussion to shew the impolicy of what are termed protecting duties. The advantages of unrestrained international commerce have been already spoken of in our chapter on the corn laws, and the irrationality of imposing any duties on articles of import, with the sole view of protecting any special interest, are admitted by the great majority of our legislators. But although the plan of attempting to bolster up any particular branch of industry, by restrictions against foreign competition, is to be deprecated, yet it is a matter of great practical difficulty to eradicate a deeply rooted protective system. Where large capitals are engaged, and great interests have adapted themselves to certain channels of trade, the cause of vested interest maintains its right and influence in forbidding sudden changes. Political economists, when denouncing a protective system, are too prone to generalize and draw conclusions founded on a kind of universal reasoning, without heeding particular circumstances. In some branches of British manufacture, the sudden repeal of all restrictions on foreign competition would effect so sudden a depreciation of capital, and means of present employment, that a greater national injury would be inflicted than by the temporary continuance of high prices to the consumer.

In the silk trade, throuster mills have been established and extensive capitals invested, under the implied promise that foreign importations would be restricted by a duty of twenty-five per cent. This branch of commerce, perhaps, more naturally belongs to a neighbouring country, and it would have been wiser policy to have allowed the trade to take its own course than offer inducements to capitalists to embark in it; but as that policy has not been adopted, the protection cannot with advantage be abruptly withdrawn. The im-

policy of the prohibition on the importation of manufactures is still more forcibly felt in France, and the impossibility of rendering it effective is shewn by the late information transmitted by Dr. Bowring to the British government. The vigilant efforts of the French government to restrain smuggling have completely failed. Their system of *octroi* (town *grants* or duties), which subjects merchandise passing through towns to a strict search, both at its ingress and egress, is ineffectual. The report of the French *directeur principal des Douans*, to the minister of finance, says "that English bobbin-net to the value of 400,000*l.*, is annually, notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts to prevent it,—smuggled into France; that the quantity of cotton twist, and other British manufactures clandestinely imported is immense, and that the fraudulent introduction of contraband articles into France is, to use his own words, "*vraiment effrayante*." We invite attention to the subjoined note, illustrative of one of the most curious devices to carry on a smuggling trade that ever came to public view.* So convinced are the

* The report of the director of the Custom House, to the minister of finance, on the subject of the fraudulent introduction of contraband articles, says, "That since the suppression of smuggling by horses, in 1825, *dogs* have been extensively employed in the traffic. The first attempts of the kind were made in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes; afterwards they spread to Dunkirk and Charleville; subsequently they extended to Thionville and Strasburg, and in 1828, the system has also been adopted in the neighbourhood of Besançon. The contraband articles are chiefly tobacco and manufactured articles. It is estimated that, in 1823, 180,000 killogrammes of goods were thus introduced into France; in 1825, the quantity reached 187,515; and in 1826, 210,000 killogrammes; this calculation supposes $2\frac{1}{2}$ killogrammes to be carried, *pro rata* per dog, and the number of dogs killed to be in the proportion of one to twenty in some districts, in others one to ten. The dogs, which are of a large size, are conducted over the frontier lines in packs; they are kept without food for many hours, beaten, and tormented, and in the early part of the night laden with contraband articles

French government of the ineffectual character of a prohibitory system, that since the memorable "*petition et memoire d'appui*," from the landlords and merchants of La Gironde, presented to the Chamber of Deputies in 1828, the disposition to rescind it has been rapidly growing, and the laudable efforts of Baron Louis have not failed to interest the government, and especially M. Thiers, whose splendid talents and liberal views shine so conspicuously in that administration of which he forms a part, in the endeavour to reconcile private interests to a change of system. Already has the government commenced this change, by effacing from the statute book the law which so long prohibited the exportation of raw silk. Prussia, in her attempt to retaliate on British interests for the impolitic restrictions against the importation of her corn and timber, has yet to learn the inefficacy of the plans of the new German anti-commercial confederacy to prevent the introduction of contraband merchandise into her territories. The United States of America, by the late alteration of its tariff, retreats from the commercial contest, and invites an extended commerce with Great Britain on terms of reciprocity. Such evidences of the impossibility of levying high duties on the importation of articles

and turned out, when they run with great speed in a direct line to their homes, which are usually situated about three leagues from the frontier lines, seldom failing to bring their masters a valuable load of bobbin-net, twist, tobacco, or other contraband merchandise. On their arrival, they are well fed and kindly treated, and thus encouraged in this ingenious practice. The training is so severe that they frequently go mad through cruel treatment, and the ferocity of the dogs is so great, that they are often known to attack custom house officers, or other persons, who attempt to oppose their progress; they have been frequently captured with loads valuing 600, 800, and sometimes 1,200*lbs.*, 25*l.*, 33*l.*, 62*l.*: great complaints are made of the injury done to the farmers by the dogs passing over the country. —See the Report; or *M'Culloch's Dictionary*, article *Smuggling*.

of foreign manufacture, strongly dictate the policy of returning gradually to that freedom of international commerce, which is so essential to the prosperity of the nation and the expansion of public and private income.

We here close our review of the British taxation ; and proceed in the third section to investigate the means at the disposal of the British minister to effect the diminution or repeal of those taxes which we have endeavoured to shew are opposed to sound principles of taxation.

SECTION III.—PROSPECTIVE MEANS OF FINANCIAL REFORM.

NOTHING could be more fallacious in reasoning than to denounce the present plan of British taxation, unless the means were possessed of substituting a reformed, or in the simple sense of the word, an improved plan. The inviolability of public credit must be preserved, and the government of the state upheld on an efficient scale, however great the pecuniary sacrifice. If it were impossible to provide for the necessary expenses of the state without the retention of those taxes, which in an especial degree impair the national power and resources, we should at once, according with the old proverb, "*necessitas non habet legem*," repudiate any disposition to relinquish them ; but if it can be shewn that we possess the means of even a partial return to a better system, thus improving the condition of the great body of the people, without impairing the means of the government, none would object to their practical application.

No individual, whether he belong to the legislative council or not, nay, whether he be in or out of office, can on any solid grounds determine the propriety of *all* the general and particular items of government expenditure. We shall not, therefore, presume to decipher such a problem ; but in noticing some items of disbursement, which must *in naturá rerum* cease, confine ourselves to the reduction of expenditure consequent on the already adopted measures of the government, and on a change of system in the collection and management of the revenue.

It is unnecessary to enter into a *detailed* estimate of the loss to the exchequer on the abolition or reduction of the duties recommended. From a calculation before us, the total amount of duties to be repealed or reduced in the plan proposed, is about 7,500,000*l.* ; taking the absolute loss to the exchequer at two-thirds, we shall call it in round numbers, 5,000,000*l.* ; such a sum could not be spared, and the difficulty consists in providing a substitute.

We propose to seek a compensation—1st., In the abolition of bounties ; 2nd., reduction of public expenditure, chiefly in the collection of the revenue and the charge for ineffective services ; 3dly, by a subsidiary tax ; and 4thly, the expansion of national income, and the consequent increased productiveness of taxes.

THE ABOLITION OF BOUNTIES.

WE need not enter on a lengthened discussion, to shew the utter impolicy of granting bounties for the importation, exportation, or production of commodities. To suppose that a bounty on the exportation of goods, which could not be produced or exported without it, can be beneficial, is just as reasonable as to suppose that a manufacturer can gain by selling his commodities cheaper than he

can make them. The bounty in this case taxes other branches of industry to raise the price of the article to the home consumer, and to depress it to the foreigner, and thus the nation is doubly a loser. Bounties to encourage any enterprise, such as the Scotch fisheries, diminishes the price to the purchaser, *pari passu*, with the ratio of bounty paid, and are hence a portion of the sale price of the commodity. Bounties on the importation of merchandise have precisely the same effect, and all the expenses of collecting taxes with the one hand, and distributing them on the other, are useless and lost to the nation, while the persons employed to effect the operation are retained as consumers, who would be otherwise producers.

In the year 1831, the bounties formerly paid on the exportation of Scotch linen ceased, and the Parliamentary return of money distributed as bounties in 1833, is much under the sum paid in former years. The account for 1833 stands thus :—

Bounties for promoting fisheries, linen, manufactures, &c.	£.
	79,528
To which may be added—	
Bounties for the growth of hemp in Scotland . .	2,000
Ditto on the exportation of British refined sugar	116,000
<hr/>	
Total	£199,528

Bounties for the encouragement of the Scotch fisheries and the growth of hemp.—In reference to the bounties paid on account of Scotch fisheries, we shall merely remark, that if the produce is more valuable than the sacrifice in procuring the fish, encouragement would be found in the open market, without obliging or forcing the people to pay a portion of the price by a compulsory tax ; if the cost of procuring the produce is superior to the value of it, then it is clearly prejudicial to the common-weal to continue the trade, but as the

price of the article is governed by competition, it is sold to the consumer on terms just *minus* the bounty, and hence the premium can be of no avail to those whom it is intended to benefit. The same reasoning applies to the bounty paid on the growth of hemp: if Scotland can produce better or cheaper hemp than Russia, there is clearly no need of bounty to stimulate its production, the open market offering the premium required; but if hemp can be imported from Russia cheaper than it can be grown in Scotland, then the home cultivation must clearly impoverish the community.

Sugar bounties.—The bounty payable on the exportation of refined sugar does not figure in the finance accounts: it is so interwoven with the drawback of duty, that those who are not *practically* conversant with the subject are quite unable to determine its extent. Various estimates have appeared on the subject; none of which, except those of Dr. Ure, as far as we have seen, appear to be founded on a practical knowledge of the subject. Sir Henry Parnell supposes the bounty to be about 5s. per cwt.* Mr. Powlett Thomson stated in parliament, that a manufacturer had shewn him documents which proved the bounty to be 4s. 10d. per cwt. Some of the calculations of the learned and scientific Dr. Ure make it five and six shillings per cwt.† Thus, as the subject appears to be so little understood, we shall endeavour to elucidate it in its proper form.

First, we shall note the ratio of duty payable on the raw material, and the rates of drawback allowed on the exportation of the manufactured article.

* In the first edition of "Financial Reform," p. 134;—in the fourth edition the Hon. Baronet seems to estimate it at 5s. 6d. per cwt.

† Dr. Ure, in his late experiments, obtained products of 63, 67, 72, and 84lbs. of refined, from 112lbs. of raw sugar; his estimates of the rate of bounty are consequently various.

Import duty payable on West India or Mauritia British plantation sugar, per cwt. 24s. 0d.		Drawback allowed on the ex- portation of British refined sugar, per cwt.	
			s. d.
		*Double refined sugar	43 2 $\frac{2}{5}$
		Single ditto ditto .	36 9 $\frac{3}{5}$
		Bastard ditto .	24 0
		Molasses . . .	nil.

The bounty is included in these rates of *drawback*, which are calculated on the presumed quantity of refined sugar yielded by a cwt. or given quantity of the raw material. Now as there never were, nor ever will be, any two objects produced *precisely* similar to each other, so there never can be any two samples of raw sugar *precisely* similar in quality; and as the *quantity* of *refined sugar* made from a given *quantity* of *raw material* strictly depends on the *quality* of both, so the *quantity* yielded incessantly varies. This variation is very considerable—the low soft sugars of the Mauritius, Berbice, of some parts of Demerara, and Trinidad, do not produce above fifty-six pounds of the lowest quality of refined sugar to 112 pounds of the raw material, or fifty per cent. ; while the best descrip-

* The quality of single-refined sugar is not regulated by any certain standard: on its exportation it is declared by the exporters to be *duly refined*, and if the revenue objects to allow the drawback on the score of inferiority of quality, samples are referred to a committee of the trade, on whose award the commissioners of the customs abide. Double-refined sugar is determined by a certain standard, and as a claim for the drawback is accompanied by a certificate that it has twice passed through the process of refining, it is fair to presume that the small quantities of double-refined sugar exported have been in reality twice refined; but as regards the home trade, the term double refined does not mean that the sugar so called is actually so. Manufacturers differ in their mode of work: some use the hydraulic press, by which the impure syrup is expelled from the sugar; others prepare the sugar intended for the manufacture of a fine article by a process called melting, by which process the low syrups are separated from the more saccharine parts. Sugar thus prepared and worked with single-refined sugar, or the syrup of single-refined sugar, will generally suffice to make double-refined sugar equal to the standard. Bastard sugar is made from the low syrup, which drains from single-refined sugar during the process of manufacture.

tions of Jamaica, St. Vincent's, Montserrat, and Dominica sugars produce seventy-four to seventy-six pounds, and in some instances even eighty pounds to the hundred weight, the quality of the *refined* material being the same, or nearly so.

We may likewise remark that other causes—such as a deficiency of skill in the process of ebullition, or even in tempering the floors—will cause the quantity *pro rata* to vary: if the ebullition of the syrup is carried too high, the *quantity* will increase and the quality deteriorate: if, on the contrary, the ebullition is too low, the quantity will be diminished, and the quality, in some cases, improved.*

Thus, with all these conditions and casualties attached to the process of refining sugar, it must be tolerably evident to our readers, that the only means of correctly ascertaining the *pro rata* production of refined to raw sugar is by balancing the total quantity of refined sugar made in a sugar house against the quantity of raw sugar worked, taking an average of several years' work in a house fol-

* Skill in boiling the syrup is of the utmost importance in sugar refining, and is only to be acquired by long practice, assisted by good judgment. The necessary degree of ebullition depends on the quality of the material under process: if it is of fine quality, the ebullition must be less, or the *proof* light: if of inferior quality, the ebullition must be stronger. The point required is determined by the boiler dipping the proof stick in the boiling syrup (being at about 350 degrees of temperature), drawing it out quickly, and immediately taking a small portion of the hot syrup adhering to the stick on the thumb of his left hand; then turning to the proof box—which is usually a sort of three-sided wooden case containing a lighted candle—he touches the hot syrup on his thumb with the point of his fore finger, and by drawing out the thread (a small column of syrup), determines by the degree of consistency the syrup has attained whether it is sufficiently boiled. The pan man, and usually one or two other workmen, during the time the boiler is trying, or taking the proof, stand close to the pan, with ladles and basins ready to discharge the contents of it; and if the boiler says "*enough*," or "*proof*," the syrup is discharged from the pan into the cooler with all possible expedition.

lowing a regular system of manufacture. The *trade*, from experience, know with tolerable accuracy what this average is, and we believe it will be admitted by those who understand the subject to be as follows :—

Produce of 112 lbs. of raw sugar of fair average quality, supposing it be manufactured into single-refined sugar of low quality on the old system.

Refined sugar, or lump.		Bastard sugar.		Treacle.		Waste.		Total.
66	+	24	+	18	+	4	=	112*

This point explained—we hope as clearly as the subject will admit of—the extent of the bounty will be very easily shewn : thus—

Quality of the sugar.	Quantity produced from 112 lbs. of raw sugar.	Rate of drawback paid on exportation, per cwt.	Actual money paid as drawback.
		£. s. d.	s. d.
Single refined	. 66	. . 1 16 9 $\frac{2}{5}$. . 21 7 $\frac{5}{4}$
Bastards	. . 24	. . 1 4 0	. . 5 0 $\frac{5}{4}$
Treacle	. . 18	. . nil.	. . nil.
	108	Drawback of duty	. 26 8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Waste	. 4	Duty paid on 112 lbs. of raw sugar	. . 24 0
	112		

Net bounty on the exportation of sugar, per cwt. . 2 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ †

This supposes the whole of the produce to be *exported*, but as the exports of refined or lump sugar usually surpass the proportional quantity of bastard sugar and molasses exported, the actual bounty is, in some years, more considerable. If, for instance, the export were entirely of refined or lump sugar, the duty which remains charged on the bastard sugar and treacle weighing 42lbs. is

* The relative quantities of treacle and bastard depend on the state in which the latter is turned out of the moulds. Dr. Ure, who used the doomed pan, found less bastard than our estimate : our calculation supposes the open pan to be used, and the bastard sugar sold in the ordinary unclayed state.

† There being scarcely any double-refined sugar exported, we have formed the above table supposing the raw sugar to be singly refined. A small quantity of double-refined sugar is shipped to India as stores, and some little is exported to various British colonies.

only 2s. 4½*d.*; while the duty charged on it when incorporated with the raw sugar, is 9s. The bastard sugar and molasses may, however, be considered the low impure particles of the raw sugar, and ought not therefore to remain charged with the full proportion of duty. The bounty may, therefore, be fairly considered to be as we have stated it (2s. 8½*d.* per cwt.)—Thus, having shewn the ratio of the drawback, we have only to ascertain the quantity of sugar refined for exportation, to demonstrate the loss sustained by the British exchequer under the head of sugar bounties.

The following extract from an official document laid before parliament in 1832, will shew the relative quantities of British plantation and foreign sugar delivered for exportation and home consumption during the years 1828, 1829, and 1830—

Deliveries of Raw Sugar from Ports

For Exportation.				For Home Consumption.		
	1828.	1829.	1830.	1828.	1829.	1830.
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
British Plantation .	2,530	810	1,485	191,005	182,350	190,840
Mauritius . . .	5,900	2,620	2,930	12,100	12,020	20,240
Bengal . . .	2,100	2,810	1,855	4,870	6,060	8,625
Siam, China, Ma- nilla, &c. . . }	1,200	2,000	2,835	—	150	85
Havannah . . .	3,050	3,000	4,450	—	10	300
Brazil . . .	3,770	5,000	2,995	75	150	1,150
Molasses equal to bastard . . }	—	60	—	10,360	9,350	8,030
Totals . .	18,550	16,300	16,550	218,410	210,090	229,270
Deduct export of refined sugar re- duced into raw	38,830	40,420	47,650	40,530	41,420	50,000
Ditto of bastards .	1,700	1,000	2,350			
Actual consumption, including made from molasses . . .	bastards }			177,880	168,670	179,270

The table, *ut supra*, shews that the annual quantity of raw sugar refined for exportation, on the average of three years ending January 1831, is 43,983 tons; which at a bounty of 2*l.* 14s. 2*d.* per ton, or 2s. 8½*d.* per cwt., annually subtracts 115,968*l.* from the British exchequer.

Let us inquire for whose benefit the community is thus annually taxed 116,000*l.* per annum.—The object of the bounty is to benefit the sugar grower, and to increase the price of sugar 2*s.* 8½*d.* per cwt., not merely on the quantity exported, but on the whole quantity of sugar brought to the British market by the West India interest. If it produces this effect, the people are not merely annually taxed 116,000*l.* on this account, but 2*l.* 14*s.* 2*d.* per ton on 229,270 tons; being no less than 620,941*l.* If this be not the operation of the tax, the bounty is ineffective for its legitimate object, and the sum of 116,000*l.* benefits some other interest not contemplated by the legislature. Happily the bounty paid is, as we shall presently shew, inoperative to the extent intended, and the only loss to the British people on this account is 116,000*l.* per annum, paid not to the West India merchant—not to the British manufacturer—but to the German and Italian consumers.

We propose first to examine the operation of this bounty as regards the manufacturer; we shall, however, *in limine*, refer to the effect of the partial reduction of bounty in the year 1824. Up to that period the duty payable on raw sugar was 30*s.* per cwt. when the current price was upwards of 49*s.* per cwt., and 27*s.* per cwt. when the price was under 47*s.* per cwt.;* at the time these duties were fixed, the price being usually above 49*s.* per cwt., the drawback was calculated on that rate of duty, and 46*s.* per cwt. was allowed on the exportation of refined sugar. After 1819, prices declined, and seldom reached 47*s.* per cwt.; thus the duty diminished ten per cent. after 1819, but no alteration was made in the rate of drawback until 1824,

* In bond.—The Lords of the Treasury were, by the Act of 1806, imposing a duty of 30*s.* per cwt., empowered to remit 1*s.* per cwt. when the price was under 49*s.*; 2*s.* when under 48*s.*; and 3*s.* when under 47*s.*

when in conformity of what may then be termed the permanent rate of duty, 27s., the drawback was reduced from 46s. to 41s. 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ d., or ten per cent. : thus from 1819 to 1824 the bounty was 4s. 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per cwt. more than it has been since that date.

Now during the operation of the high bounty, the official value of refined sugar exported, was, in 1822, 678,495*l.*; in 1823, 886,917*l.*; and in 1824, 748,305*l.*; being an annual average for the three years ending 1824, of 771,272*l.*; and during the operation of the reduced bounty, the official value of refined sugar exported was in 1828, 1,117,329*l.*; in 1829, 1,229,503*l.*; and in 1830, 1,294,773*l.*; being an annual average of 1,213,868*l.*; shewing an important increase in the exportation, despite a large diminution of bounty : thus the diminution of bounty has not tended to diminish the exportation of refined sugar. That the export trade of refined sugar has, since the peace, suffered most materially, we are fully aware; but from causes totally unconnected with the rates of bounty granted. The official value of refined sugar exported in 1814, was 3,091,653*l.*; and in 1815, 2,813,419*l.*; while, as we have seen, the official value of the quantity exported was, for the three years ending 1824, only 771,000*l.*; and for the three years ending 1830, 1,213,868*l.*

To shew the effect of this diminution of trade, we may observe, that at the peace, the *city* of London contained about *thirty* sugar refining houses at work; at the present day (1833), there is but *one*. In the eastern suburbs of the metropolis, the part distinguished for this branch of trade, the number of houses at work at the present day (64) does not exceed half the number in 1814 and 1815. We lately saw an account, which says, that in 1815 there were in London and its suburbs 226 pans at work—this number is now reduced to about 110—in 1822, 1823, and 1824 the number must have been less. This arises from no deficiency

in the home demand, but from the decline of the export trade, arising from the severe competition to which the manufacturer is exposed in foreign markets. It may be necessary to shew the real cause of the decline of the export trade. During the war, our export of refined sugar was (with temporary interruption, consequent on the anti-commercial decrees of Buonaparte), to Hambro', Bremen, Lubeck, Koningsberg, and St. Petersburg in the north; Genoa, Trieste, and Leghorn in the south. In Russia, the consumption of sugar is chiefly limited to the finer descriptions; and as that country could obtain no supply of the raw material direct from the West Indies in time of war, she was incapable of manufacturing sugar for her own consumption: hence the exportation of double-refined sugar from Great Britain to Russia was very extensive. But at the peace the commercial intercourse with the Brazils, Cuba, Porto Rico, Surinam, &c., became open to the flags of all nations; and the means of obtaining direct supplies of the raw material being thus provided to continental nations, the barrier to manufacture was swept away, and the British monopoly ceased. Manufactories of refined sugar were established in various continental ports—Hambro', Bremen, Lubeck, Riga, St. Petersburg, &c.*—and duties were imposed by foreign governments against the importation of British refined sugar; hence our exportation of the article in a state fit for consumption so rapidly declined, that for some years past there has been scarcely any exportation of double-refined sugar from Great Britain to the European continent. The refined sugar exported at the present day is chiefly of the lowest description, requiring to be re-manufactured ere it is fit for

* It is said, that during the visit of the Emperor Alexander to this country in 1814, he ordered models to be taken of the most approved London sugar houses. One of the houses in the eastern part of the metropolis was particularly selected, and on its model several houses have been erected in St. Petersburg.

consumption. As this subject is little understood by those who are not practically acquainted with the sugar trade, it may not be uninteresting or unimportant to shew the cause of the demand for this description of sugar only—this we can only do by entering, in detail, on the difference of the process of manufacture in the British sugar-producing colonies, compared with that in other parts. Conciseness being our aim, we shall describe the process in the fewest words possible. The British tariff prohibits by a high rate of duty the importation of sugar having passed through the process of claying or refining; hence the crop of the British colonies is imported in a state merely granulated by ebullition, the *grosser* syrup or molasses being drained from the sugar by means of holes perforated in the casks in which it is packed. In the Brazils, Cuba, Porto Rico, &c., the sugar is prepared on a different system. After boiling the syrup, until a sufficiency of the aqueous part is evaporated, it is cooled and poured into moulds, troughs, or other vessels, where it cands or granulates, and becomes a substance; a quantity of wet clay is then spread on the surface, and the water filtering through the sugar, carries with it the weaker or less saccharine syrup, which may have failed to granulate. By this treatment the sugar is rendered more pure, white, and dry; and contains a smaller portion of molasses than the raw sugar, which is imported from the British colonies. Now we shall shew in what manner this difference of system influences the trade, both in the colonies and Great Britain.

In the process of refining, the chamber or floor in which the sugar is placed to drain off the syrup (a process requiring from three to five weeks, according to the quality of the sugar)—should be heated to a certain regular degree, depending on the quality of the material. British colonial sugar requires from eighty to eighty-five degrees

of Fahrenheit, and the clayed or demi-refined sugar of the Brazils and the Havannah, from sixty-five to seventy degrees.

The northern climes of Russia, and other Baltic ports, are thus little adapted to refine with advantage the unclayed sugars of the British colonies, for the larger portion of treacle or impure syrup they contain, render a high temperature indispensable to the success of the process. We are fully aware it may be urged that the heat in the drying floors of sugar houses may be carried by flues to a high degree, despite exterior cold; but those who are practically acquainted with the trade can fully appreciate the immense expense in fuel, labour, wear and tear, &c., in thus competing with the elements.* Even in the temperate climate of London, great difficulty is experienced during severe winters in refining low sugar, particularly in separating the treacle from the bastard sugar. If this difficulty is felt in London, how much greater must it be in St. Petersburg, Riga, and the free ports on the shores of the Baltic, where the neighbouring rivers are frozen during successive winter months to the durity of the adamantine rock? But, besides this physical incapacity attaching to the northern ports, there is, on the continent, but a very slack demand for the molasses necessarily produced in refining unclayed sugars. Thus foreign refiners reject the British colonial sugar, and purchase the demi-refined sugar of the

* We have frequently been in the upper floor of a sugar house (of course the warmest and most generally heated), where—under the operation of *four* flues pouring in the hot air both in and under the floors, with such force that the hand could not be held five seconds in the current within four feet of the flue door—the temperature has varied from thirty-three to thirty-five degrees in different parts of the floor, being in one part eighty-eight degrees of Fahrenheit, and in another part situated in an oblique direction from the flue, only fifty-four or fifty-five degrees. This certainly may be remedied by pipes and conductors, which are used by those houses who work on the Honorable Frederick Howard's plan.

Havannah and the Brazils, and the lowest descriptions of British refined sugar from which the grosser syrups have been already expelled, and which are consequently refined with more moderate heats. Thus the difference of system in preparing the sugars in the British colonies, deprives the colonists from a direct trade with the foreign markets, and drives the foreign refiner to seek supplies from the Brazils and the Havannah. These sugars are, however, in primitive quality, very inferior to the general description of sugars produced in the British colonies; and the foreign refiner finds his advantage in working a portion of the British refined sugars with them.* Thus, to suit foreign markets, our refined sugar exported to the north of Europe is usually of the lowest description, possessing just enough quality to pass as duly refined, and hence to obtain the drawback and bounty. To the West India interest the bounty can be of no avail; for as by the foregoing returns it appears that the quantity imported exceeds the home consumption by upwards of 40,000 tons, it is evident that the price at home cannot exceed the price which that surplus commands in foreign markets; and as the British West India colonist holds no monopoly on the continent, the price of sugar, both at home and abroad, must be regulated by the competition of the sugar growers of Cuba and the Brazils.

The British sugar planter would obtain a far greater advantage, if he were permitted to prepare his sugars on the plan practised in the Havannah. His present monopoly, while the quantity produced surpasses the quantity consumed in the United Kingdom, must be held in abeyance to foreign competition; but if he prepared the sugar by

* Some London sugar refiners have attempted to work the Brazilian sugars alone; but they find the advantage of mixing British sugars with them.

claying, he would not only command a direct and indirect foreign trade for his surplus quantity, but the quantity exported from the colonies would be considerably diminished. The process of claying, or separating the molasses, on the plan adopted in the Brazils, diminishes the weight of the sugar about thirteen or fourteen pounds per hundred weight. Thus the quantity of sugar sent to this country from the British colonies would decrease about 32,000 tons, being about two-thirds of the present surplus quantity imported. For the extra quantity of molasses produced, a ready market would be found in the American United States; or it could be converted into rum, and exported wherever it would command a sale.

The present bounty benefits neither the West India planter nor the British sugar refiner. Who then derives advantage from it?—the foreign consumers of our surplus growth of sugar. We can see no reason why the British people should be taxed for the advantage of the Germans and Italians, and hence conclude that the bounty ought to be abolished by substituting, for the present, the subjoined rates of drawback, which are calculated to return precisely the duties paid.

Drawback on the exportation of				
	66 lbs. of refined sugar, £.	s.	d.	
	at the new rate of	1	12	11 per cwt.
				19 4 $\frac{5}{4}$
Ditto on	24 lbs. of bastard sugar	1	4	0
				4 7 $\frac{1}{4}$
Treacle	18 ditto	nil.		nil.
Waste	4			
<hr/>				
	Total drawback on the exportation of			
112	the produce of 112 lbs. of raw sugar .			
	Duty paid on 112 lbs. of raw sugar .			
		24	0	0

Bounty nil.

Any disadvantage which the British sugar refiner might experience from the abolition of the bounty, would be fully met by giving extra facilities for refining foreign sugars for exportation. It is quite evident that this would be absolutely

necessary as a concurrent measure with a change of system in preparing the sugars in the British colonies ; for, as the surplus quantity imported would be diminished by two-thirds, the business of those houses who now principally work for the export trade, would be proportionally reduced. Such measures have long been contemplated by ministers ; and in the early part of 1832, the government commissioned the erudite and ingenious Dr. Ure to make experiments on foreign sugars, with a view of determining the degrees of saccharine they contain, and the proportional quantity of refined sugar they would yield. This latter point is indispensable, in order that the drawback may be precisely equivalent to the duty charged or deposited. Dr. Ure's calculations are doubtless as accurate as any that could be made on a limited scale ; but from what has been said, it must appear evident to our readers, that nothing short of practical regular work, continued for a long period, can solve the problem with any thing like accuracy. But, presuming that the quantities sought, prove to be 66 pounds of single refined sugar, 24 pounds of bastard sugar, 18 pounds of treacle, and 4 pounds waste ;* then there can be no difficulty in making the revenue secure, and protecting the monopoly of the West India interest, without subjecting the refiner of foreign sugars for exportation to the inconvenience, and the nation the expense of excise surveillance. For, if foreign sugar were delivered from the bonded warehouse to be refined for exportation, at a *deposit* duty of 25 per cent. in advance of the duty charged on British plantation sugar, and an equivalent excess of drawback allowed on its exportation in the manufactured state, not a pound would be supplied to the

* Havannah clayed sugar of good quality would produce 76 to 78lbs. of refined ; Brazilian, 60 to 68lbs. ; Siam and Manilla, various.

home market. To explain;—if, in the place of a deposit duty of 24s. per cwt. charged on British plantation sugar, which, when exported in the manufactured state, claims a drawback of 36s. 9d. per cwt., a deposit duty of 30s. per cwt. were required on the delivery of foreign sugar, allowing an equivalent drawback on its exportation when refined, it is clear, that the refiner would export sugar which entitled him to a drawback of 30s. per cwt. in preference to that on which he could receive but 24s. per cwt. The very system would carry its own protection. Supposing the duty charged on foreign sugar were 30s. per cwt., and the produce of the raw material determined in the proportion before mentioned, the equivalent rates of drawback would be thus :—

		Rate of Drawback.			
		s.	d.	s.	d.
66 lbs. of single	Refined sugar . .	40	1	23	7
24	Bastard ditto . .	30	0	6	5
18	Treacle				
4	Waste				
<hr/>		<hr/>			
Total drawback . .				30	0
Deposit duty . . .				30	0
112					

When, in the latter part of the parliamentary session of 1833, the question of permitting the refiners to work foreign sugar for exportation was discussed, some difficulty seemed to arise from the practice of mixing sugars of different qualities,* it was supposed, that by allowing the sugar refiner to work British plantation and foreign sugar in the same house, the revenue and the monopoly of the West interest might both suffer. Whether or not the refiner mixed his foreign with British plantation sugar, it could make no possible difference to either the

* It is a curious fact, that different qualities of sugar worked together, will produce more refined sugar than if worked separately; for instance, if two parcels of sugar were worked separately, one might produce 62lbs. to the hundred weight, and the other 65 or 66; but if worked together, the general produce would be 66, and the quality equal.

revenue or the West India interest: if the refiner were allowed the high drawback on the export of a limited quantity of refined sugar, calculated on the quantity on which he had paid the high duty, there would be merely a substitution of British plantation for foreign sugar, and an equivalent substitution of foreign sugar for British plantation; the *aliud alio* could not affect the revenue one penny, nor would one pound additional quantity of sugar be forced into the home market. The refiner would receive an excess of drawback on one portion of the produce, and an equivalent diminution on the other. It is only necessary that accounts should be kept at the Custom-house, of the duties paid on foreign sugar, and of the quantity of the refined material on which the refiner would be entitled to receive the high rate of drawback.*

We have entered more fully on this subject than we intended; but, as it is little understood by the public, and the loss arising to the exchequer, through the operation of the bounty, is very large, we felt that a due explanation of it would not be uninteresting.

The total abolition of these bounties would act as a counterpoise to the loss of revenue to the extent of 200,000*l.* per annum.

PROSPECTIVE REDUCTIONS OF EXPENDITURE.

REFERRING to what has been said at the commencement of this section, we shall not investigate the several heads of expenditure for the collection of the revenue; but in the most simple form note the economy which would follow the abolition of the taxes recommended.

Reduction of charge in the collection of the revenue.

—The total charge for the collection of the revenue

* If this plan were adopted, all the vexatious and expensive regulations imposed by 3 and 4 William IV., relating to the refining of foreign sugars in bond, might be dispensed with.

for the year ending Jan. 1833, is 2,986,518*l.* exclusive of the charge for the collection of the post-office revenue, 707,288*l.* ; forming a total of 3,693,806*l.*, being about 7*l.* 2*s.* 9*d.* per cent. Of this immense sum, 360,333*l.* is charged by the Customs' department under the head of Preventive Service. Previous to 1831, a very large sum was annually paid from the navy department for this service ; and Mr. Dean, in 1829, told the finance committee, that the whole expense of the preventive service was, in 1826, no less than 643,840*l.** Since 1831, the duty of detecting the smuggler has entirely devolved on the customs' department ; but as a portion of the charge must of necessity be included in the navy estimates, the total amount may be fairly estimated at the very reduced sum of 400,000*l.*

It is well known that smuggling is almost exclusively confined to three articles—spirits, tobacco, and some small quantity of tea, the latter chiefly from the Dutch coast ; and it is equally well known, that if ten times 400,000*l.* were expended in the endeavour to repress smuggling, *vi et armis*, it would be insufficient.—(Vide reports of Dr. Bowring). The only effectual protection is to be found in the reduction of duties—the tax on tea is already in progress of reduction ; the diminution of duty on spirits and tobacco is supposed, in estimating the loss to the revenue (see page 589). Such reductions would almost supersede the necessity of any coast guard. But we shall presume that the abolition of the preventive water guard would be consequent, and the charge would then be confined to the ex-

				£.
* The items were, Customs' department				466,099
	Excise	ditto	2,233
	Navy	ditto	157,808

£ 626,140

pense of cruisers, 115,000*l.* ; land guard, 22,000*l.* ; and harbour vessels, 5,000*l.* ; in all 142,000*l.*—thus economising to the extent of 260,000*l.* per annum.

The reduction of duties to the extent of 7,500,000*l.* it is fair to presume, would enable ministers to reduce the expenses of collecting the revenue, equivalent to a fair per centage on the above sum. The average expense of collecting the revenue, exclusive of the post-office charge, is 5*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* per 100*l.*. Supposing that the reduction of expense was *pro rata* with the diminution of the sum expended, the saving under this head would be 432,000*l.* ; we shall, however, call the actual economy 380,000*l.*

Sir Henry Parnell, in his Financial Reform, especially notices the economy which might be introduced into the revenue departments by simplifying the plan on which the revenue is collected. "If," says the hon. baronet, "the duties on all articles producing less than 10,000*l.* per annum were repealed, the saving of expense would in all probability be greater than the revenue (585,000*l.*)." It would, however, be too much to expect the realization of such a saving ; but the repeal of these duties, in conjunction with the effective suppression of contraband trade, would tend materially to clear the way for contemplated reforms. By such a sweeping repeal of a multiplicity of petty taxes, the duties of the officers of the revenue departments would be rendered so comparatively easy, that the boards of customs and excise might probably be consolidated into one revenue board, on the plan lately adopted with regard to the board of stamps and assessed taxes, or on the system more recently followed with respect to the exchequer.

The boards of customs and excise are extremely expensive, and we shall note the charges incurred in

these departments, where the services of the officers employed in either appear to be of the same description.

Taken from the Finance Accounts of the year ending January 1830.*

EXCISE DEPARTMENT.			CUSTOMS' DEPARTMENT.		
Offices.	Number of persons employed.	Amount of Salaries.	Offices.	Number of persons employed.	Amount of Salaries.
		£.			£.
Boards, Secretaries, and Attendants .	71	34,620	Boards and Attendants . .	116	42,207
Law department and Clerks . .	26	10,680	Law officers & Clerks . .	24	9,900
Accountants & Comptrollers }	142	24,335	Comptrollers & Examiners . }	41	11,280
Collectors . .	96	39,450	Collectors and other in-door officers . . }	487	97,240
	335	109,085		668	160,627 109,085
Expense of these offices in the two departments . .					269,712

These offices cost the nation 270,000*l.* per annum. The boards, secretaries, and attendants cost 76,000*l.*, being nearly as much as when the revenue collected was one-third more than at present, and the duties of office much more complex. A consolidation of some of these offices we cannot but think would be attended with economy; and, to a reforming administration, pledged to abolish every office not actually required for the public service, it may appear practicable.

The system of excise surveillance is very expensive, and a great deal of curious information was last year adduced before the "commission for customs and excise inquiry," tending to shew its inutility in various branches, particularly as respects tea and tobacco. We shall note the ex-

* Some reductions have been effected since 1830.

penses of the surveying and permit departments of the excise as they appeared in the finance accounts of 1830.

	£.
Salaries paid to officers on the establishment . . .	617,599
Twenty-four permit examiners, 2503 <i>l.</i> ; salaries of two clerks in the permit printing office, 249 <i>l.</i> . .	2,752
Stationary, rent, and miscellaneous expenses . . .	69,651
	<hr/>
	£ 690,002

This is a very important sum, a considerable portion of which might unquestionably be economised, especially in concurrence with a reduction of duty on tea, tobacco, and spirits,—the repeal of the duties on glass, paper, bricks, &c., and the transfer of the collection of the duty on hops to the commissioners of taxes.

It is both contrary to evidence and common reason, to suppose that the present system of surveying the stock of tea and tobacco in every little retail shop, every fourteen days, can be any protection to the revenue; the officer has no means of determining the quantity sold in small parcels during the interval of his visits, and therefore can exercise no check against the introduction of a contraband article into consumption.

Mr. Fry, an extensive tea dealer, in speaking of the utter inutility of surveying the stocks of retail dealers, told the committee—"Some time ago our warehouseman lost a parcel of permits, which made a large quantity of tea in our stock seizable; at first we thought of laying the case before the excise commissioners, and obtaining new permits, but on reconsideration we decided that it would be less troublesome to write to a few of our country customers, offering them the teas at a halfpenny or a penny per pound cheaper, if they would receive them without *permits*, and in a few days we got rid of the whole quantity."

Many other witnesses, whose evidence we have not space to notice, spoke in the same terms of the utter inefficiency of the permit system, particularly as regards tea and tobacco. Within the last three or four years the permit system has been abolished.

on coffee and pepper, in neither of which commodities has there been any diminution of consumption; on the contrary, the consumption of no imported article has increased so much as of coffee since the removal of the excise surveillance: in 1822, the quantity of coffee charged with duty was 7,593,000lbs; in 1826, 11,082,943lbs.; in 1830, 19,476,180lbs.; and in 1832, 22,740,627lbs. From progressive reforms in the system of collecting the revenue, it is fair to estimate a further prospective saving of 100,000*l.* per annum.

Diminution of charge for the public debt.—How far reduction will be carried in the charge for the public debt is a question dependent on so many political and domestic circumstances, that we can scarcely hazard an opinion on the subject. That the rate of interest has a tendency to decline with the progress of national wealth and the growth of public confidence in the government of the state is clear, but how far it may be state policy to depress the rate of interest in this country is very problematical. Ministers cannot be insensible to the mischievous effects of the operation of a *large* surplus of revenue annually invested in the repurchase of stock, thereby depressing the rate of interest, and driving British capital into foreign countries for investment. The diminution of the rate of interest in this country, to be safe and beneficial, must, in some degree, be regulated by a fall in the interest of money on the continent. Strange as it may appear, our debt scarcely admits of reduction to the extent of more than two or three millions sterling per annum, by the actual repurchase of stock. The application of a larger sum involves a series of disadvantages: the redemption of capital being more rapid than the creation of the means of employing it in national commercial enterprises, it flies to distant objects for invest-

ment ; witness the effects in 1824-5, when by the application of 18,000,000*l.* to the redemption of stock in 1822, 1823, and 1824, upwards of 20,000,000*l.* were invested in foreign securities, Mexican mines, &c. ; witness the effect produced in 1826 by this emigration of capital. Yet the pacific aspect of Europe, and the firm and stable basis on which the British government stands, since the late salutary reform in the representative system, portend that the interest in the funded debt of Great Britain will, at no very distant date, be reduced to three per cent. ; a further depression cannot reasonably be anticipated in the present age. However, our object is more particularly to estimate immediate reductions. First, the arrangement with the Bank saves 120,000*l.* per annum ; the reduction of half per cent. interest on 10,800,000*l.*, new four per cent. annuities, gives 54,000*l.* ; the application of 2,100,000*l.* surplus revenue to the redemption of stock at three and a half per cent., gives 73,000*l.* ; but as the charge must be in some degree increased by the progressive exchange of terminable for permanent annuities, we shall call this head of saving 50,000*l.* : these items shew an immediate reduction in the charge for the debt of 224,000*l.*, to which we may add 56,000*l.* for the falling in of life annuities, money received from the Bank on account of unclaimed dividends, &c., carrying the total to 280,000*l.* In what degree the grant of 20,000,000*l.*, for the abolition of slavery, will augment the charge for the debt, time only can shew ; no specific information having transpired as to whether the colonists are to contribute any, or what part of it, or on what terms it is to be raised ; we therefore leave that prospective addition to the dead weight out of the calculation.*

* The most effectual means of reducing a large national debt, is the most difficult problem in financial science ; tracts,

Probable reduction of charge for the army.—In referring to the reductions which may be effected

pamphlets and books, devising plans, have, during the last hundred years, been continually issuing from the press; but their number, however large, is inconsiderable, compared with that of the manuscript communications which pour into the Treasury offices on the subject. Most of these involve a principle of bad faith towards the public creditor; some advocate a general levy on the capital of the British empire, without considering the impracticability of its collection, or heeding the injurious effects which would result from the application of a real capital to replace an imaginary stock, thereby ensuring a certain emigration of means, now productively employed at home, to other nations. No plan can be operative without it is sanctioned by debtor and creditor, and neither would consent to any measure which prejudiced their separate interests—thus reciprocity must form the basis of all speculation on the subject. The plan of converting permanent into terminable annuities, which has been adopted on a large scale by the Bill of 1828-9, seems that which meets most approval on the part of the government; but it is very questionable whether it is the province of a government to enter into a kind of gambling speculation with individuals, by granting life annuities on the surrender of a permanent claim; by such an arrangement, prodigality is encouraged, a real capital is consumed, and families, on the decease of a parent, are deprived of that provision which former circumstances had led them to expect. Such plans are calculated to weaken domestic affections, and tend progressively to impoverish society. These, however, are rather moral than political considerations, and looking to the plan in its mere abstract financial point of view, we can conceive none more effectual in diminishing the state obligations, as it carries a certain sinking fund; yet the portion of funded property which can be so exchanged is, in comparison with the amount of the debt, very limited, and even the bonus offered last year by government to facilitate these operations, is insufficient to produce extensive effects.

The amount of stock transferred to the commis-	£.
sioners for annuities for terms of year, from	
23d of Nov. 1829, to 18th Dec. 1830 . . .	7,253,360
Ditto, for life annuities	596,994
	<hr/>
	7,850,355
In addition to this, the money received for annuities	1,856,435
	<hr/>
Total	£ 9,806,890

The *capital* of the debt is so large, that it is to be hoped it will not be increased in paying the West India planters' indemnity.

in the military expenditure, we shall not, by comparing its present amount with that of the year 1792, or other years of the peace preceding the late wars, presume that the present charge is excessive; our altered position, and the increase of the colonies, both in number and importance, justifying a large extension of military force.

An account was submitted to the late finance committee, shewing the force necessarily maintained in order to provide the colonial garrisons on the regulated scale. The number of garrison troops was computed at 49,389; to maintain which (always abroad) requires, on the plan adopted, an effective force of 75,388 men; computed as follows: each regiment to remain in the colony ten years, and at home four years; so that a tenth of 49,389, or 4,938 men must go out each year. The reliefs at home consequently amount to four times this number, or 19,752; besides which it is deemed necessary to maintain a depôt of 120 men to each of the 54 regiments or battalions abroad, to recruit deficiencies arising from mortality or other casualties; thus demanding a further addition of 6240 men: so that the whole number of troops exclusively maintained for the colonial service is as under—

Number of troops always abroad	. . .	49,392
Reliefs at home	19,750
Depôts	6,240

75,382*

The present generation, to whom belongs the honour of emancipating the negro, should rather bear the burden of its own munificence; it would be but the burden of a badge of honour, and its weight scarcely more irksome than the insignia of title, or the ornaments of dress. Annuities for short terms of years (twenty, or even fifteen), being as it were instalments, would better consult our future financial security than an addition of 20,000,000*l.* to the national debt.

* A return of the distribution of the British army in 1833 (said to be official), lately appeared in the *New Monthly Magazine*,

Thus the question of the reduction of the numerical force of the army is more particularly dependent on the reduction of the colonial garrisons; and as 75,000 men are required to be supported in order to maintain 49,000 actually in the colonies, a reduction of 5000 men in the colonial garrisons would enable ministers to reduce the standing force 7500 men. It is not improbable but that when the tranquillity of the colonies shall be assured by the measures in progress to emancipate slaves, that such a reduction will be effected.

A return was made to parliament in 1831, shewing the increase of pay to the officers and soldiers of the British army since 1792, of which the following is an extract. Since this date (1831) some reductions have been made in the pay of newly-enlisted soldiers in the horse guards (blue), and the life guards.

REGIMENTS.	Rate of pay per diem in 1792.	Pay in 1831.	Increase per diem.	Increase per cent.
CAVALRY.				
Royal cavalry horse guards (blue) . . . }	s. d. 1 9	s. d. 2 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	s. d. 0 5 $\frac{1}{4}$	25
Life guards . . .	1 6	1 11 $\frac{1}{4}$	0 5 $\frac{1}{4}$	29
Regular cavalry .	0 8	1 3	0 7	62
INFANTRY.				
Foot guards . . .	0 10	1 4	0 6	60
Regiments of the line	0 6	1 1	0 7	117

which states the number of troops (officers and men) abroad to be as under:—Cape of Good Hope, 1,725; Gibraltar, 2,875; Malta, 2,366; Ionian Isles, 2,889; Canadas, 2,417; Western Africa, 255; Nova Scotia and the Bermudas, 3,222; Windward and Leeward Isles, 4,432; Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Honduras, 3,122; Mauritius, 1,445; Ceylon, 3,547; New South Wales and its dependencies, 2,539: total, 30,855. In the East Indies, 2,663 cavalry, and 15,701 infantry: total, 18,364. Great Britain, cavalry, 5,731; foot guards, 4,452; infantry of the line, 18,569: total, 28,772. Ireland, cavalry, 2,626; foot guards, 745; infantry of the line, 19,428: total, 22,799.—Grand total, 100,790 men.

In 1792 a private soldier received an additional daily allowance called "necessary money," amounting to nearly one penny per diem for cavalry, and one halfpenny for infantry; also an addition of twopence per diem, called allowance for bread and necessary money. In 1795 these allowances were consolidated into one payment of $3\frac{1}{2}d.$ per diem for cavalry, and $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ for infantry, called the consolidated allowance. In the same year, *in consequence of the rise in the price of provisions*, an addition of $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ per diem was made to both cavalry and infantry soldiers; and in 1797, a further addition was granted of $2d.$ per diem to privates in the regular army, and of $1d.$ per diem to infantry. Since which no alteration has been made in the rate of pay to private soldiers *upon their enlistment*; but by a subsequent alteration, the private soldier is entitled to an addition of $2d.$ per diem after seventeen years' service in the cavalry, and fourteen in the infantry.

By this return it appears that, on the average, sixty-five per cent. increase of pay was granted between the years 1792 and 1797; out of which, from twopence halfpenny to threepence halfpenny were granted between the years 1795 and 1797, expressly in consequence of the high price of provisions. If the increase of pay was authorised solely on account of the increase in the price of provisions, surely at the present time, when low prices have assumed the character of permanency, some reduction of pay ought to be effected. There is no military force in Europe which is *pro rata* maintained at a moiety of the expense of the British army. The pay of the French fantassin (foot soldier) is nine sous per diem—about fourpence farthing;* and of the cavalry soldier (regular cavalry), fourteen sous, or about sixpence three

* Eight sous of this sum is retained for provisions: the actual money received by the foot soldier is only *one sou* per diem.

farthings per diem. The Prussian soldier (exclusive of the landguard and landwher) is paid on nearly the same ratio, and the pay of the Austrian soldier is somewhat less. The military system of foreign governments yet offers no model for British imitation, and none desire to see the baneful plan of conscription introduced in this free land. Compulsory military service would strike at all the good principles of our national system, and, in a financial view—however low the pay of the soldier—cost the nation more than the expense of the present mode. Reductions in the pay of soldiers newly enlisting, have, in some divisions of the army, been commenced; and as the economy arising from the adopted plan will annually progress, we may fairly and moderately calculate the entire economy in the effective expenditure of the army, both by the reduction of the numerical force and in the rate of pay, at 250,000*l.* per annum.

But it is in the ineffective military expenditure that the more important and certain economy must arise. The justice of the claim of those who have spent the best period of their lives in the service of the state, for an alimentary pension in their latter days,—charged on the funds of society,—is indisputable; and the obligation of the state to the decrepid, wounded, or worn-out soldier, is as sacred as any other pledge in which it could have engaged. The abuse of this obligation has, however, caused the ineffective military expenditure to augment in a degree never contemplated either by the government or the nation. In 1814, the number of Chelsea and Kilmainham pensioners (in and out door) was 31,000;—in 1825, the number was 81,877; being an increase of 50,000 during eleven years of peace; and, allowing for casualties which took place during this period, it appears that 75,000 men had been placed on the pension list. In 1828, the number was 85,000; and in 1831—

the maximum; 96,595, exclusive of 13,052 ordnance pensioners. Under the system pursued up to 1831, it was found extremely difficult to curtail the number of military pensioners; but the fact, that in 1832, the eighteenth year of peace, the military pension list includes 20,000 claimants, whose ages, when pensioned, did not, on the average, exceed *thirty-one* years, evidences a great absence of circumspection in management.*

Several regulations have lately been adopted to check this large increase, among which the most important is the abolition of the right of registry—of the practice hitherto pursued of granting permanent pensions for temporary disabilities—and the more extensive plan of commuting the pensions of soldiers willing to emigrate.† These measures have already effected some reduction of the number of pensions, and of the amount distributed. In 1832, the number diminished to 94,024, and in 1833 (year ending 5th of January) to 90,867. The saving of expense in 1833 compared with 1832, is 134,513*l*. We confidently calculate that the reduction of the ineffective military expenditure will continue on this ratio for some forthcoming years.

If a small portion of the pay of the soldier, say one halfpenny per diem, were applied to a superannuation fund, from which he would be entitled to claim a pension after a certain term of service, increasing with the prolongation of that term, a very large prospective saving in the non-effective military expenditure would result. Supposing the minimum term to be fixed at fourteen years, allowing for casualties, the fund increasing at com-

* Speech of Sir Henry Hardinge, session 1832.

† This latter plan, except under very careful management, is likely to lead to mischievous results, and is strongly and justly objected to by several members of parliament possessing great practical information.

pound interest during that time, would go far to relieve the nation from a very large portion of the charge.

Charge for the navy.—Viewing the maintenance of the navy on a scale of superiority, not only as compared with the maritime forces of any other nation, but as compared with the maritime forces of the whole world, to be of vital importance to Great Britain, we shall not anticipate any reduction in the effective expenditure under this head. A superior marine, which would at all times enable Great Britain to maintain her neutrality through all political revolutions of continental Europe, although an expensive appendage, is by no means at variance with sound principles of economy*.

The non-effective expenditure of the navy cannot fail under good management to diminish with the continuance of peace. The charge under this head, for the year ending 5th January 1833, was 1,613,328*l*. The late Lord Londonderry, in 1818, estimated that the annual average reduction in the charge for the dead weight, would be at the rate of seven per cent. ; time has proved the fallacy of such a calculation ; but, under a reforming administration, it may be fair to estimate the pro-

* The number of ships in the British navy on the 1st Jan. 1833, in commission, ordinary, and building :—

					Men.
14 ships	120 guns	<div> <div>Of these there were in</div> <div>commission at the</div> <div>same date—</div> </div>	5 ships	1st rate, carrying	2,910
5 —	110 —		2 —	2d do. —	844
3 —	108 —		4 —	3d do. —	2,358
12 —	84 —		5 —	4th do. —	2,255
9 —	78 —		10 —	5th do. —	2,799
62 —	62 —		14 —	6th do. —	2,405
7 —	52 —		35	sloops —	1,593
15 —	50 —		13	steam vessels —	464
62 —	46 —		26	packets —	754
20 —	42 —		—	—	—
			114		22,500

365 from 36 to 2 guns, including 20 steam vessels.

spective reduction at a moiety of that estimate, or $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. ; which gives 56,000*l.* per annum.

Ordnance expenditure.—No branch of public expenditure shews so great an increase as the ordnance department. In 1792, the total charge was 424,000*l.*; in 1833, it was 1,455,000*l.*, and deducting the non-effective expenditure, 1,073,211*l.*; the mere comparison of these sums seems to warrant an opinion, that a reforming administration will be enabled to carry extensive economy into this department.

Colonial expenditure.—Few branches of public expenditure have been more generally and justly complained of than that on account of the colonies.

The expense of protecting the colonies is so interwoven with the other branches of military and naval disbursement, as to make it extremely difficult to state accurately the entire charge. It may be estimated, in round numbers, rather above 2,000,000*l.* per annum, exclusive of the proportion of the navy expenditure incurred on their account.* Such an estimate, however, totally excludes the interest of the immense debt contracted in their defence, the hundred millions added to the state obligations in the ineffectual endeavours to retain the allegiance of the American states, or the prospective charge of twenty millions as indemnity to the West India colonists! If these sums were included in the account, it is very questionable whether the charge on account of the colonies is not equal to the commercial profit derived from their possession. If the valuation of the property invested in the West India islands, as estimated by the Select Committee of the House of Lords, be accurate, the profits derived from the colonies, as computed by the amount of imports

* This estimate is founded on good authority.

over exports, is not above that which might be more readily obtained by trade nearer home.*

There is something in the possession of colonies, which carries with it a sort of political grandeur, which feeds the appetite for empire, without conferring any solid advantages. Colonies may be fairly assimilated to children, who cause their parents a great deal of trouble and expense, for which the only recompense is obedience. When grown out of infancy, and merging, as it were, into maturity, colonies seem to feel all that desire for independence, which so generally characterises youth. A mother country is generally less skilful in her plan of government towards her political offspring, than a parent towards a family. During the periods of transition from infancy to youth, and from youth to manhood, instead of relaxing the system of management adopted during the infancy of the colonies; the former enforces her rights of sovereignty with a rigour proportional to the growth of the spirit of independence; hence arises a contest, which seldom terminates otherwise than in a complete separation of the political ties which connected the parent state with the colony; yet the relationship which, *de facto*, exists between the two, after the separation, always tends to identify the interests of the colony with those of the parent state. The similarity of language, ideas, habits, customs, commercial and political plans, being all brought from the parent state, will always attach them to the mother country, and, as it were, despite of themselves, draw forth that feeling of respect which the members of a family bear towards their paternal head.

* In computing the value of colonial trade, the amount of imports over exports must be taken; every shilling of the value of the imports is British property, and no returns, except those necessary for the cultivation of the estates and the maintenance of those on them, are made: the surplus or balance remains in England. (This is intended to apply to the West Indies).

The American states were, for a series of years previous to the consummation of their independence, a heavy burden on the British resources; yet their loss was regarded by the politicians of the day, as a vital wound to British commerce. It was supposed that France, from the assistance she had afforded them in the contest, would acquire that kind of ascendancy in America, which would enable her easily to supplant British interests; but never were political prophecies more at variance with results. "The very men" (says Prince Talleyrand,*) "who were the movers of the American revolution, and who were active in instilling into the minds of the people a hatred of the English, were insensibly drawn back towards England by different motives. Many of them were educated in Europe, and at that period England alone was the Europe of the Americans." The identity of language places the English and Americans on a level of character—they have a reciprocal pleasure in the interchange of ideas—they forget that they are relatively foreigners; not so between the French and Americans—they cannot utter a word in conversation, without recollecting that they belong to different nations—every transmission of thought is an irksome labour, and the result of conversation, after the fatigue of unavailing efforts, is to find themselves mutually ridiculous. "In every part of America through which I have travelled," (says Prince Talleyrand), "I have not found a single Englishman who did not feel himself to be an American—not a single Frenchman who did not find himself to be a stranger." Thus, so far from the American independence having diminished our resources, no political event has been more beneficial; for while it has relieved the nation from a heavy burden, it has caused the commercial intercourse between the two countries to augment in

* *Memoire des relations commerciales des états unies avec la Grande Brétagne.*

a degree it could never have attained, had it continued shackled with those restrictions to free trade which have so long characterised our colonial policy.

Our object in the foregoing remarks, is merely to illustrate that a greater liberty of commerce and government might be beneficially extended to the colonies. From the superiority which Britain possesses in staple manufactures, she has nothing to fear from the competition of other states; and if the colonists were permitted to trade with those nations which best suited their interests, their resources would sufficiently expand to enable them to provide for their own means of defence and government, or to remunerate the mother country for the protection they require. It is not at all improbable that a reforming parliament will oblige ministers to effect a large diminution of the 2,000,000*l.* per annum now expended on account of the colonies.

Expenditure on account of the civil government.—The expenditure on account of the civil government is susceptible of a far greater proportional reduction than any preceding head of public disbursement; and the avowed determination of ministers to abolish, progressively, every useless office and unmerited pension, promises that great economy will be introduced into the civil departments. We have before us a mass of official documents and memorandums; many of the latter collected from private sources, illustrative of the wasteful prodigality of government expenditure, consequent on grants made during times of deficient investigation and discrimination. We shall, however, with the exception of the subjoined note, forbear to comment on any of these items; and in estimating the probable annual saving under this head, confine it to the amount of the economy actually effected in the year ending January, 1833, in comparison

with the former year, which in round numbers is 100,000*l*.*

Items of saving collated.—It remains that we collate the various items of prospective retrenchment noted in the preceding pages, and in the collection and management of the revenue.

By the total abolition of bounties	£ 200,000
By a reduction in the expense of the preventive service	£ 240,000
By a diminution of the sum to be collected	380,000
Other items of saving, consequent on the simplification of the tariff, the consolidation of the revenue boards, and the curtailment of the plan of survey . .	100,000
	<hr/>
	720,000
Reduction of charge on the national debt	280,000
Reduction of expenditure in the effective and ineffective expenditure of the army, navy, ordnance, and colonial departments	640,000
Ditto in the civil administration and the cessation of pensions	100,000
	<hr/>
Total prospective annual saving . .	£ 1,940,000

This amount may appear large to some of our readers, who reflect that it amounts to about ten per cent. on the disposable revenue; but as it is

* In 1831, a return was made to parliament shewing the number of public functionaries receiving salaries of 1000*l*. and upwards, and the total sum thus distributed; from which it appears that the total sum paid in salaries of 1000*l*. per annum and upwards is, to functionaries in the

Civil and diplomatic departments . .	£ 1,193,536
To military and naval officers . . .	334,327
To colonial ditto	338,711

£ 2,066,374

This sum is enjoyed by 993 persons, dividing, upon the average, 2081*l*. each. Of these there are 161 with salaries from 2500*l*. to 5000*l*. per annum; 44 with 5000*l*. and under 10,000*l*.; and eleven with salaries exceeding 10,000*l*. per annum. The total amount paid in salaries surpassing 2500*l*. per annum is 962,000*l*., divided among 216 functionaries. These salaries are now in course of reduction.

chiefly consequent on the adoption of a reformed plan of taxation, we are convinced that it is much within the limit of the economy which would, in that case, be found practicable. It must likewise be remembered, that this is not merely a reduction of expenditure to a *permanent* minimum, but that a large portion of it—such as the non-effective expenditure in the army, navy, and civil departments—is a progressive reduction, and as such will become annually more important.

Proposed new tax.—This estimated amount of economy is yet very inadequate to enable the government to relinquish 5,000,000*l.* of annual revenue, and the difference (about 3,000,000*l.*) must be sought in the levy of a new tax, and the expansion of national resources. The principle of this tax we shall here endeavour to develop. All taxes cause, in their abstract character, an abridgment of property; but if they afford it protection against lawless depredation, they amply repay the sacrifice, and hence may be said to be reproductive. The value of protection to property is in proportion to the amount possessed: hence the tax on individual members of society should bear in proportion to individual income; but the practicability of applying this theory, and of exactly taxing each member of the community in the *pro rata* of his means of contribution, is, in the ordinary sense of the word, *impossible*. Perhaps the nearest assimilation is to levy a tax on the income of each individual; but the various weighty objections to the levy of such a tax in Great Britain decidedly forbid it. Looking to the numerous inducements which present themselves for the emigration of British capital, a general tax on income would unquestionably be impolitic; for capital being a prime agent in production, it would counteract the reproduction of property, impair the sources of

revenue, and diminish the amount of general imposts in a greater degree than the sum raised by the individual tax.

The tax we propose is a duty on the succession to bequeathed or entailed property in immovables—lands and buildings; or an extension of the tax levied on personal property passing under probate and administration, to real property, calculated according to the value of the estate and degrees of consanguinity. Such a tax is not novel; during many years it has constituted an important branch of revenue in neighbouring countries—France, Holland, Belgium, and elsewhere; and there seems no sufficient reason why property invested in lands and buildings should escape taxation, while property in the government funds is liable to it. There is no valid reason why the rich heir who inherits 20,000*l.* per annum in landed property should escape taxation, while the poor man who enjoys a bequest of 20*l.* is subject to it.* It is unworthy of those who impose the tax, specially to exempt themselves from its bane, merely because they possess the power to do so. Some objections may, however, as in every other case of taxation, be urged against the levy of such an impost. It may be said that the tax would have a tendency to discourage the improvement of lands and the erection of buildings: such an objection has undoubtedly some weight, although, in looking to the practical operation of the tax on the opposite shores, we can discover no proofs of such a result, nor do we think such an effect would be produced in England; but in order to meet this objection, it might be provided that all lands brought into cultivation or buildings erected *subsequent* to the imposition of the tax, should not be liable to charge

* The probate of will and legacy duty is payable on bequests charged on the land, as on the value of the residue of leases; but freehold and copyhold property is entirely exempt from duty.

until the termination of the second life. Thus the present family of testators would experience no diminution in newly-invested property, nor would the impost impede in any degree prospective improvements; since, on the ordinary calculation of the life lease, a sufficiency of time would elapse to reap a large share of the profit on vested capital ere it would become chargeable.

The objections commonly urged against a general tax on property, that it would encourage the emigration of capital, cannot bear in this case; for depreciated as may be the profit on capital invested in lands in this country, yet in no neighbouring state is it more productive. In France, and the Germanic states, where confidence in the government securities is far from being firmly established, moneyed men prefer landed property, which pays three or three and a half per cent., to government stock, though the annuity may be five or six per cent.; besides, whither could British capital emigrate to escape the tax?—*les droits de succession* are in every neighbouring state enforced; and in the Netherlands, previous to the late revolution, twenty-five per cent. of the value of bequeathed property was, in some cases, claimed by the government. It has never been said that the probate and legacy duties, which are decidedly taxes on property, tend to drive capital from the country; no such effect, therefore, could be reasonably anticipated from the extension of these taxes to landed property.

What would such a tax produce to the national exchequer? This leads to an estimate of the value of landed property in Great Britain. On this subject, the guesses of Mr. Colquhoun so generally referred to will afford but little information, much less the various estimates since founded on that gentleman's calculations. We shall, therefore, attempt an approximate estimate, founded on the property tax returns of 1814.

The rent of land was returned, in 1814, at	£.
43,000,000 <i>l.</i> , and probably amounted, after allowing for all deductions, omissions, and evasions in the returns, to	48,000,000
Add for land brought into cultivation since the peace	3,000,000
	<hr/>
	51,000,000
Since which the reduction of rent has probably been thirty per cent.	15,000,000
	<hr/>
Landed rental of Great Britain in 1833 . . .	36,000,000
Add for rental of houses	18,000,000
	<hr/>
Total rental of Great Britain, exclusive of crown lands, and public buildings, &c. . .	£ 54,000,000

From the above approximate estimate there remains, in estimating the sum which would come under charge, to be deducted, the rental of lands bequeathed for the endowment of charitable or other institutions of public utility, such as free schools, the universities, or establishments for the diffusion of the arts and sciences, church lands, or property bequeathed for the provision of ministers attached to public worship—allowing 4,000,000*l.* for these deductions; in the proportion of three in lands to one in buildings,—a clear rental of 50,000,000*l.* would remain subject to tax. Land is at present worth little less than thirty-one or thirty-two years' purchase, and the value of buildings is on the average about twenty-two years' purchase; but, as we are disposed to be moderate in such an estimate, we shall call the value of the first twenty-five years, and the second twenty years' purchase.

Present rental of land, after allowing 3,000,000 <i>l.</i> for exemptions, <i>ut supra</i> , 33,000,000 <i>l.</i> at twenty-five years' purchase	£. 825,000,000
Rental of buildings (allowing 1,000,000 <i>l.</i> for exemptions) 17,000,000 <i>l.</i> , at twenty years' purchase	340,000,000
	<hr/>
Total value of property subject to the proposed tax	£ 1,165,000,000

What proportion of this sum would annually come under charge?—A reference to the terms of the inheritance of the last seven deceased premier dukes, marquesses, and earls in the *English* peerage, gives an average of about twenty-eight years; hence, the annual amount of property subject to assessment would stand thus:—

$$1,165,000,000\text{£} \div 28 = 41,600,000\text{£}.$$

The ratio of duty is the next question to be considered: this, of course, would vary with the degree of consanguinity, and the value of the bequeathed or entailed property. The ratio of the French *droits de succession* varies from 22 sous to 9*f.* per 100*f.*, or from $1\frac{1}{10}$ to 9 per cent. The British probate and legacy duties vary from one to ten per cent. The average ratio of tax levied in 1825, on 46,435,066*£.* charged with probate duty, and 35,806,480*£.* charged with legacy duty, gave an average tax of 4*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.* per cent.; supposing the new tax varied from two to seven per cent., and the average rate charged were four per cent., the annual amount paid into the public exchequer would stand thus—

$$41,600,000\text{£} \div 25 = 1,664,000\text{£}.$$

This, it will be recollected, is exclusive of Irish property, for which, if we add twenty per cent., the tax, supposing it to be extended to Ireland, would annually yield 1,996,800*£.* to the national exchequer. This is no paltry tax—it attaches to those who acquire large property without the pain of earning it by labour; those who derive important advantages from a firm government, which insures to them the protection of their property. The 2,000,000*£.* which it would yield, added to the 2,000,000*£.* saved by the diminution of expenditure, would do much to enable the government to reform the present incongruous plan of taxation.

It is very evident from the present tone of public opinion, that there must ere long be a commutation of various taxes for a tax on property; the question

is no longer whether a property tax is to be imposed, but in what manner it can be levied with the least injury to the interests of individuals, and with the greatest advantage to the nation. In the present system of taxation there is neither justice nor policy. It is an irrational, confused plan, retaining many features of the fiscal system followed in the days of feudal ignorance. A plan which cripples industry, limits international commerce, impoverishes the working classes, and largely contributes to the sum of human misery. The only means of conciliating the wants of government with those of the nation, is by taxing the superfluities of the people; never their materials of industry or their means of support; for it is better to let the government perish, than the people for whom it is instituted.

The tax which we have proposed would deduct nothing from present incomes, while the benefit it would enable ministers to confer in removing impediments to commerce, would, by its reaction on agriculture, tend materially to maintain the present value of landed property.

But even with the aid afforded by this tax, ministers would be unable to carry financial reform to the extent recommended; an annual deficiency to the amount of 1,000,000*l.* would still present itself, which, in a season of peace, could not be sanctioned. There is, however, a cheering prospect of the progressive expansion of the national resources.

Expansion of national resources.—In estimating the extent of the annual increase of the state resources, we refer to the increase of population as the basis of national prosperity. A nation equitably governed, increases her wealth with her population. The production of men, is in fact the production of national riches. The increased productiveness of taxes has, during the seventeen

years ending 1832, been 43 per cent., or about $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. per annum. The taxes remitted from 1817 to 1832, amount to 34,137,000*l.*; while the loss to the revenue has been only 18,717,000*l.*; shewing an increase in the productiveness of taxes during this period, amounting to 15,420,000*l.*, or an annual average of 907,000*l.* Population still progresses in a regular and rapid ratio, and the buoyancy of the national resources is a natural consequence. So powerful is this buoyancy, that the chancellor of the exchequer seemed, on a late occasion, to feel surprise when he triumphantly announced to parliament that the surplus revenue for the year 1833 surpassed his estimate of it in 1832 by nearly 1,900,000*l.* It would be too sanguine to anticipate such an increase in future years. In 1833 we are blessed with abundance, and a ministry that enjoys a large share of public confidence;—half the sum will be sufficient to counterpoise the deficiency before estimated.—Thus, after a short interval, when the new tax may be expected to operate, the government would find itself in a condition to relinquish a large amount of taxes, and the return to a better system would be protracted no longer than would be necessary to provide time for vested interests to give a different direction to their capital. The total remission of various taxes, such as those on Baltic timber, could not prudently be immediate; the Canadian merchants would justly demand that the extinction of their monopoly should be gradual;—similar arrangements would be necessary to the progressive extinction of the duties on several other commodities, and thus the means would progressively become commensurate with the desired object.

Probability of continued peace.—The determination of the government to preserve peace, so emphatically proclaimed by the head of the ad-

ministration, is no new political resolve. The extent of the injury inflicted by late wars, has been frankly acknowledged and duly appreciated by every ministry that has held the reins of government since the termination of hostilities in 1815; indeed, a pacific course, as the only effectual remedy for the wounds of state yet unhealed, has become a fundamental principle of British legislation. The aspect of Europe is not such as to portend the probability of the British nation being speedily called on to figure in a continental war. France no longer presents an attitude of menace towards Great Britain; her political condition, and her military power are widely different from what they were in the days of Louis XIV. or Buonaparte; and her free institutions are secure checks against wars proceeding from the ambition of ruling princes, or the sanguinary ignorance of despots. No such circumstances as those which gave rise to the wars of 1702, 1739-41, and 1756, would at this day prompt ministers to enter into a continental coalition, much less would they attempt by hostilities to regulate the governments of foreign states. This determination to maintain peace, is not merely limited to men in office: the antipathy which so long existed between the British people and their Gallic neighbours, is rapidly declining, and the solid interests of peace are fully appreciated by the intelligent portion of both nations. Each would defend, and defend vigorously any attack by foreign powers against their institutions or empire, but would not support their respective governments in any measures tending to interference in the internal affairs of other countries.


The probability that the peace of Europe will not be disturbed, unfolds something cheering in the prospect, and offers us the full opportunity to progress in that course of improvement which so happily distinguishes the present age.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

IN every stage of the work, evidences of the growth of the national resources cannot fail to strike the reader. The nation, although long organised, moves onward with all the freshness of youth; and seems far from having attained that zenith of empire, from which, in natural order, she must gradually descend. During many ages, she has been increasing in intensity of power, planting her dynasty in remote regions, and dispensing freedom and civilisation in every quarter of the globe.

Among the 120,000,000 inhabitants who people her vast empire, the *slave* is not found; all are admitted within the pale of the social compact; all enjoy the protection of British laws, and the felicities of personal freedom. In the course of liberty and civilisation, she appears in the van of nations, encouraging those who follow in her train, to emulate her bold career and generous example. Whatever may be her doom—whether, ere she passes her culminating point, her beams of intellectual light, bursting in upon states yet uncivilised, may dispel the gloom which now veils so large a portion of the globe—whether, like her fallen predecessors, she may, by an abuse of her power, become a prey to invading enemies; or whether she may meet her ruin in the loss of her free constitution, by internal discord, none can define: but her physical and acquired advantages; such as her secure and compact geographical position—her facilities of internal communication—the justice of her councils—the rational liberty upheld by her governing plan—the stock of intelligence dispersed throughout her community, and maintained by the art of printing—the characteristic union of her people in the time of danger, and their attachment to national independence,—seem to warrant confidence in the permanency of her prosperity.

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